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PREFACE 
P r i o r to 1900 the immunity of sovereign s t a t e s from the 
j u d i c i a l process and enforcement j u r i s d i c t i o n of m u n i c i p a l 
courts was absolute and t h i s i n the main ex hypothesi was 
derived from two important concepts, namely sovereignty and the 
e q u a l i t y of s t a t e s . Sovereignty may be defined as the power to 
make laws backed by a l l the coercive forces i t cares to employ. 
Th i s means that a sovereign s t a t e has what can be known as 
suprema potestas w i t h i n i t s t e r r i t o r i a l boundaries. Jean Bodin 
was the f i r s t of w r i t e r s to propose t h i s idea of sovereignty, 
but i n h i s e x p o s i t i o n of t h i s notion, he undoubtedly c r e a t e d a 
confusion about the leges imperii which arguably turned out to 
be a s t a r t i n g point f o r the long controversy between what can be 
denoted as a n a l y t i c and an h i s t o r i c a l method i n m e t a - j u r i d i c a l 
philosophy as regards immunity of s t a t e s . His i n f l u e n c e , 
however, has remained a l a s t i n g imprint on p u b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l , 
backed by the f a c t t h a t a l l s t a t e s are equal and independent 
w i t h i n t h e i r spheres of influence (superanus) , which i m p l i c i t l y 
has given root to a m e t a - j u r i d i c a l philosophy t h a t f o r e i g n 
s t a t e s be accorded immunity i n domestic c o u r t s . That t h i s meta-
j u r i d i c a l philosophy found a p p l i c a t i o n i n the Schooner Exchange 
v. McFaddon i s c l e a r l y exemplified by Chief J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l ' s 
judgment i n the following formulated manner. 
" T h i s p e r f e c t e q u a l i t y and absolute independence of 
sovereigns, and t h i s common i n t e r e s t i m p e l l i n g them to mutual 
i n t e r c o u r s e , and an exchange of good o f f i c e s with each other, 
have given r i s e to a c l a s s of cases i n which every sovereign i s 
understood to waive the e x e r c i s e of a p a r t of t h a t complete 
e x c l u s i v e t e r r i t o r i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n , which has been s t a t e d to be 
the a t t r i b u t e of every nation." [See (1812) 7 Cranch 116.] 
The d e c i s i o n i n the Schooner Exchange over the years i n f a c t 
became w e l l grounded i n the p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s u n t i l q u i t e 
r e c e n t l y when i t s currency was thrown int o doubt because of the 
great i n c r e a s e i n commercial a c t i v i t i e s of s t a t e s . 
The Current State of the Law of State Immunity 
The power of a domestic court or a n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y to 
determine whether i t has j u r i s d i c t i o n over a p a r t i c u l a r l e g a l 
controversy i s without doubt a question of p r i v a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law and t h i s notion i s wholly predicated on whether the s u b j e c t 
matter at i s s u e i s properly a s s o c i a t e d with a f o r e i g n element. 
The lex fori i s therefore designated as an important means of 
d e f i n i n g l e g a l i s s u e s and i n determining whether to take 
j u r i s d i c t i o n or not because i t i s considered as the b a s i c r u l e 
i n p r i v a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. The problem, however, becomes 
more d i f f i c u l t i f a sovereign s t a t e i s d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y 
impleaded before a n a t i o n a l authority. In t h i s r e s p e c t , the 
court would be faced with the i s s u e of whether a sovereign s t a t e 
can be sued by a p r i v a t e e n t i t y i n a foreign court. 
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U n t i l q u i t e r e c e n t l y the notion of absolute sovereign 
immunity was embraced and accepted without question, but of 
l a t e , many have s t a r t e d q u e s t i o n i n g the l e g i t i m a t e b a s i s of the 
concept of s t a t e immunity and have i n turn suggested t h a t 
l i m i t a t i o n s be placed on s t a t e immunity. This i n f a c t has 
prompted some c o u n t r i e s , notably U.S.A., U.K., Canada, 
Singapore, A u s t r a l i a , P a k i s t a n and South A f r i c a , to r e s o r t to 
l e g i s l a t i o n as a means of i n t r o d u c i n g r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i n t o 
t h e i r s t a t u t e books. In s p i t e of the c a l l by some lead i n g 
countries to abrogate or modulate the concept of absolute 
immunity i n t r a n s n a t i o n a l l i t i g a t i o n , R u s s i a and the developing 
nations, however, s t i l l c l i n g without any r e s e r v a t i o n s to the 
notion of absolute immunity. 
I t i s i n s t r u c t i v e to note t h a t recent w r i t e r s have 
suggested and supported the i n t r o d u c t i o n of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity 
but arguably have f a i l e d to provide a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d and 
p r e c i s e p r e s c r i p t i o n to the problem. While i t i s c l e a r t h a t the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n a l immunity accorded to foreign s t a t e s i s most 
r e a d i l y recognised for p u b l i c a c t s , i t i s no more recognised i n 
the Western world for a c t s e s s e n t i a l l y commercial i n nature. 
There i s therefore a strong t r e n d among some cou n t r i e s toward 
the complete acceptance of commercial r e s t r i c t i o n on s t a t e 
immunity. Be t h i s as i t may, one i s s t i l l l e f t wondering 
whether i n t h i s complex world without any supranational 
authority l e g i s l a t i o n per se i s adequate i n containing t h i s 
e l u s i v e problem. 
The major problem l i k e l y to face l i t i g a t i n g p a r t i e s i s 
that r e s t r i c t i v e immunity depends wholly on a method by which 
governmental (public a c t s ) and commercial a c t s of s t a t e s are 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d i n order to determine whether to accord immunity 
or not. So f a r i t has become almost impossible to f i n d a common 
ground to formulate a c r i t e r i o n t h a t would perhaps be acceptable 
to a l l and sundry. Even domestic c o u r t s w i t h i n many sovereign 
s t a t e s have d i f f e r e d i n t h e i r reasoning or quest to formulate a 
s u i t a b l e methodology or proper standards to d i s t i n g u i s h 
commercial a c t s of s t a t e s from p u b l i c a c t s . This i n turn has 
l e d to p e r s i s t e n t divergence i n the p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s as f a r as 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i s concerned. I t i s therefore f a r from 
c l e a r as to the c u r r e n t s t a t e of the law of s t a t e immunity i n 
respect of customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law or general i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law because i t would seem r e s t r i c t i v e immunity l a c k s usus and 
the p s y c h o l o g i c a l element of opinio juris sive necessitatis. 
These d i f f i c u l t i e s i n a way have c r e a t e d a l b e i t a penumbra of 
doubt i n the a p p l i c a t i o n of the d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity. 
I t i s suggested t h a t c o d i f i c a t i o n i s i n h e r e n t l y 
problematic and not the only means of r e s o l v i n g the controversy. 
The hub of t h i s t h e s i s i s to f i n d an a l t e r n a t i v e means of 
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d e a l i n g wxth the problem, thus looking at the i n f l u e n c e of e a r l y 
w r i t e r s on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In t h i s l i g h t 
I would be able to l a y bare the problem and then deal with i t 
o b j e c t i v e l y . Chapter One focuses on the h i s t o r i c a l o r i g i n s of 
the concept of absolute immunity, where an attempt would be made 
to prove t h a t e a r l y European w r i t e r s did influence Chief J u s t i c e 
M a r s h a l l ' s judgment i n the Schooner Exchange d e c i s i o n . Chapter 
Two addresses s p e c i f i c a l l y the reasoning behind the Schooner 
Exchange judgment and how the s a i d judgment found a p p l i c a t i o n i n 
other courts around the globe. Chapter Three reexamines some 
asp e c t s of the r a t i o n a l foundation of s t a t e immunity and the 
reasons why some s t a t e s are f i n d i n g i t d i f f i c u l t to give up the 
o l d order, i . e . , s t a t e immunity. 
Chapter Four evaluates the reasons behind the changing 
views of s t a t e s on absolute immunity. I t a l s o covers 
observations on current l e g a l p o s i t i o n on absolute and 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i n the USA and UK, r e s p e c t i v e l y . Chapter 
F i v e covers i n many re s p e c t s p r i v a t e s u i t s a g a i n s t A f r i c a n 
s t a t e s i n foreign courts, while Chapter Six examines the 
p r a c t i c e of A f r i c a n s t a t e s i n respect of s t a t e immunity. 
Chapter Seven i s devoted to ILC d r a f t a r t i c l e s on j u r i s d i c t i o n a l 
immunities. Chapters E i g h t and Nine cover i s s u e s r e l a t i n g to 
some unresolved problems of s t a t e immunity and the c u r r e n t s t a t e 
of the law. 
The conclusion i s s t r u c t u r e d as to have regard to the 
o v e r a l l p o s i t i o n of the t h e s i s : (1) that c o d i f i c a t i o n has i t s 
own problems; (2) that t r e a t y provisions between s t a t e s would be 
h e l p f u l and. w i l l c e r t a i n l y bring about s t a b i l i t y i n 
t r a n s n a t i o n a l business t r a n s a c t i o n s ; (3) that there should be 
j u d i c i a l development of the law of sovereign immunity as 
e x e m p l i f i e d i n Lord Denning's reasoning on s t a t e immunity; (4) 
t h a t domestic courts should follow the p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e , 
e q u i t y and good conscience i n dealing with sovereign immunity 
i s s u e s , and thus must make i t a point to r e l y on or supplement 
t h e i r forum data with comparative survey of s t a t e p r a c t i c e the 
world over; (5) t h a t n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n must be discouraged so 
as to pave way for the modern judge to have a l a t i t u d e of 
freedom to explore and solve by reasoning the d i f f i c u l t i e s 
u s u a l l y a s s o c i a t e d with immunity of s t a t e s and i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
commercial t r a n s a c t i o n ( j u s gentium publicum) . For r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity i s an incomplete doctrine which must be r e l e g a t e d to 
the background and t h a t municipal courts would be b e t t e r o f f by 
b a l a n c i n g the j u s t i f i e d expectations of p r i v a t e t r a d e r s as 
a g a i n s t the r i g h t s of sovereign s t a t e s . 
The present study or t h e s i s i s submitted for the p a r t i a l 
f u l f i l m e n t of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy i n Law at Durham U n i v e r s i t y , England, The United 
Kingdom. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPT 
OF ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY OF STATES 
The p r i n c i p a l purpose f o r which t h i s study i s conducted i s 
to explore the sovereign immunity controversy 1 regarding claims 
against f o r e i g n sovereign s t a t e s i n domestic c o u r t s . T h i s then 
leads us to an important question which runs thus: I f a 
sovereign s t a t e has entered i n t o a s a l e c o n t r a c t for the supply 
of cement with a f o r e i g n corporation and as a r e s u l t of the 
v i o l a t i o n of the terms of the c o n t r a c t , the s t a t e i s sued i n a 
foreign court, i s i t p o s s i b l e t h a t the p l e a for sovereign 
immunity can s u c c e s s f u l l y be l i t i g a t e d according to the lex 
fori? Many b e l i e v e i t i s p o s s i b l e . 2 While others have answered 
i n the negative i n the l i g h t of r e c e n t developments i n the law. 3 
1Sompong S u c h a r i t k u l , S t a t e immunities and trading 
a c t i v i t i e s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law (1959). A l l e n , The p o s i t i o n of 
foreign s t a t e s before n a t i o n a l courts (1928-33). Gamel Badr, 
State immunity, an a n a l y t i c a l and prognostic view (1984). 
Christopher Schreuer, S t a t e immunity, some recent developments. 
Fitzmaurice, State immunity from proceedings i n f o r e i g n courts 
(1933) 14 BYIL. Lauterpacht, H., The problem of j u r i s d i c t i o n a l 
immunities of f o r e i g n s t a t e s (1951) 28 BYIL. 
2The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon (1812) 7 Cranch 116; The 
Prins F r e d e r i k (1820) 2 Dods 451. The Parlement Beige (1880) 5 
PD 197; The C r i s t i n a (1938) AC 485; Fitzmaurice, State immunity 
from Proceedings i n F o r e i g n Courts (1933) 14 BYIL. Hyde, 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1947) , " I n h i s view a s t a t e always a c t s as a 
p u b l i c person." 
3See Lauterpacht, H., The problem of j u r i s d i c t i o n a l 
immunities of f o r e i g n s t a t e s (1951) 28 BYIL; P a s i c r i s i e (1857) 
I I 348 Foro I t a l i a n o 1887, 1474. See g e n e r a l l y B r i t o n , S u i t s 
against f o r e i g n s t a t e s (1931) 25 AJ 16. For recent r u l e : See 
Trendtex Trading Corp. v. C e n t r a l Bank of N i g e r i a (1977) I A l l 
ER 881. 
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I . Source A n a l y s i s 
In order to o f f e r an objective assessment of the s u b j e c t 
matter at stake, i t i s apposite that an i n q u i r y be made i n t o the 
h i s t o r i c a l sources or foundation of absolute immunity. Judge T. 
0. E l i a s , i n h i s ex p o s i t i o n on the development of modern 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, had t h i s to say: 
"The f i r s t and e a r l i e s t period was c h a r a c t e r i z e d by often 
rudimentary arrangements for r e g u l a t i n g the almost c e a s e l e s s 
old-world s t r u g g l e s between empires, kingdoms and c i t y s t a t e s . 
The medieval p e r i o d witnessed the break-up of Western 
Christendom under the Holy Roman Empire as a r e s u l t of the 
Tr e a t y of Westphalia (1648) and the consequent r i s e of n a t i o n -
s t a t e s based upon the C u l t of P o l i t i c a l Sovereignty adumbrated 
by Jean Bodin and o t h e r s . " 4 
I n f a c t , h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d s 5 show that Jean Bodin (1530-1596), a 
French p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t and j u r i s t , was the f i r s t of w r i t e r s 
to develop the concept of sovereignty i n the s i x t e e n t h c entury. 6 
And i t i s b e l i e v e d Bodin took up the challenge because of the 
c e a s e l e s s s i x t e e n t h century struggles between empires and 
n a t i o n - s t a t e s , and more p a r t i c u l a r l y because of the problems of 
p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y f a c i n g France. 7 I n an attempt to f i n d 
s o l u t i o n s to these problems, Bodin undoubtedly c r e a t e d a 
4T. 0. E l i a s , A f r i c a and the development of I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Law (1990) p. 63. 
5George Sabine and Thomas Thorson, A h i s t o r y of p o l i t i c a l 
theory (1973) pp. 348-385; A. Appadorae: The substance of 
p o l i t i c s (1968) p. 48. 
6Appadorea, op. c i t . , supra note 5. 
7George Sabine and Thomas Thorson, op. c i t . , 5. 
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confusion about the leges imperii which arguably turned out to 
be a s t a r t i n g point f o r the long controversy between what can be 
denoted as a n a l y t i c and an h i s t o r i c a l method i n meta j u r i d i c a l 
philosophy as regards immunity of s t a t e s . 
I I . Jean Bodin's Philosophy on Sovereignty 
The term superanus means s o v e r e i g n t y which i n simple terms 
denotes supreme power. Sovereignty i s t h e r e f o r e an e s s e n t i a l 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the s t a t e and i t continues to be p a r t of the 
s t a t e so long as the s t a t e s u b s i s t s . 9 In other words, 
sovereignty i n r e a l i t y i s i n s e p a r a b l e from the s t a t e . 
The modern theory of s o v e r e i g n t y came i n t o being i n 
France 1 0 because of i t s i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n s . Bodin 
l i v e d i n France a t t h a t h i s t o r i c a l epoch. And during that era, 
France was d i v i d e d as to whether to obey the Monarch or the Pope 
as he was b e l i e v e d to be the head of Christendom. 1 1 The 
controversy regarding the l o c a t i o n of the sovereign power was to 
a large extent due to the f a c t t h a t , a t that h i s t o r i c a l epoch, 
the French war of r e l i g i o n was a t i t s z e n i t h . 1 2 These problems 
with respect to the l o c a t i o n of the sovereign power thus 
8 I b i d . 
9Bhattacharyya, F i r s t course of p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e with 
c o n s t i t u t i o n s of I n d i a Republic and P a k i s t a n (1949) pp. 89-103. 
1 0 I b i d . 
n I b i d . a t pp. 348-385. 
1 2Appadorae, op. c i t . , note 5. 
3 
prompted Bodin to express h i s thoughts on the concept of 
sovereignty i n the following formulated manner. Defining the 
s t a t e : 
"as an aggregation of f a m i l i e s and t h e i r common 
po s s e s s i o n s r u l e d by a sovereign and by reason, he s a i d t h a t i n 
every independent community governed by law there must be some 
a u t h o r i t y whether r e s i d i n g i n one person or s e v e r a l , where the 
laws themselves are e s t a b l i s h e d and from which they proceed. 
And t h i s power being the source of law must be above the law 
though not above duty and moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . " 1 3 
For Bodin, i n p r a c t i c a l terms any legitimate power being the 
source of s t a t e law must be above the law though somewhat 
l i m i t e d by the demands of duty and moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 
Sovereignty, he maintained, i s a supreme power over c i t i z e n s or 
the r u l e d and t h i s supreme power being the source of law i s not 
bound by any laws of the realm. 1 4 
Bodin's theory, however, f e l l short of the mark when he 
p o s t u l a t e d and admitted t h a t the sovereign could not abrogate 
c e r t a i n important entrenched laws dear to the h e a r t s of the 
r u l e d , e.g., the S a l i c Law of France, 1 5 and that i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law was outside the domain of the power of the Sovereign. 1 6 He 
f u r t h e r explained t h a t the laws of God and nature are to be duly 
r e s p e c t e d by the Sovereign and the c i t i z e n r y , i . e . , the 
s u b j e c t s . However, he was c a r e f u l i n s t a t i n g that the law of 
1 3 I b i d . a t p. 48. 
1 4 I b i d . 
1 5 I b i d . 
1 6Edwin Dickinson, The e q u a l i t y of s t a t e s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law (1920) a t pp. 56-57. 
4 
nations ( i n t e r n a t i o n a l law) cannot i n f l u e n c e or bind a sovereign 
any more than domestic laws l e g i t i m a t e l y enacted by the 
Sovereign, except the laws of God and n a t u r e . 1 7 Bodin's system 
as can be gathered i m p l i c i t l y favours or s h i f t s somewhat towards 
the maxim: Par in parent non habet imperium, and t h i s i n the 
main can l o g i c a l l y be supported i n s o f a r as sovereignty according 
to h i s system means a supreme power, wholly u n l i m i t e d i n i t s 
sphere of influence and does not bow or succumb to any other 
power, be i t on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l plane or i n i t s l o c a l spheres 
of operation. 1 8 This bent of t h i n k i n g c o n t r i b u t e s g r e a t l y to the 
postulation that i f a country or a sovereign s t a t e has i t s 
source of power c o n t r o l l e d by another country, i t cannot i n the 
r e a l sense of the meaning of sov e r e i g n t y be designated as a 
s t a t e , because i t l a c k s sovereign power or supreme power which 
as a matter of p r i n c i p l e i s a d i s t i n c t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c or mark 
of a s t a t e . 1 9 In t h i s r e s p e c t , Bodin l a i d the groundwork for 
others to develop the s u b j e c t to such reasonable heights as to 
be received into i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 2 0 
Many scholars from the p e r i o d of Renaissance to Hume,21 
such as Thomas Hobbes (1508-1679), John Locke (1632-1704), 
1 7 I b i d . 
1 8 I b i d . 
1 9Bhattacharyy, op. c i t . , note 9, a t p. 80, pp. 90-92. 
2 0Dickinson, op. c i t . , not 16 a t pp. 55-99. 
2 1Bertrand R u s s e l l , A h i s t o r y of Western Philosophy (1964), 
p. 491. 
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Rousseau (1712-1778), Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Austin 
(1790-1859) c o n t r i b u t e d g r e a t l y t o the development of the theory 
of s o v e r e i g n t y . 2 2 Grotius whom many regard as the f a t h e r of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, also made h i s mark as an exponent of 
p o l i t i c a l sovereignty. Grotius, as may be r e c a l l e d , however, 
was the f i r s t t o concentrate on explaining the importance of 
e x t e r n a l sovereignty 2 3 and i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s w i t h regard t o s t a t e 
e q u a l i t y , which has much t o do w i t h the independence of states 
w i t h respect t o a l l other states i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system. 2 4 
But he was c e r t a i n l y not the o r i g i n a l proponent of the concept 
of n a t u r a l e q u a l i t y of states. 
I l l . Thomas Hobbes 
Thomas Hobbes made sovereignty absolute and a p t l y located 
i t w i t h o u t any h e s i t a t i o n i n the r u l e r , thus d e r i v i n g h i s theory 
from the f o r c e and t h r u s t of the s o c i a l contact. 2 5 Professor 
Russell i n h i s studies stated t h a t : 
"Hobbes holds t h a t a l l men are n a t u r a l l y equal. I n a 
s t a t e of nature, before there i s any government, every man 
d e s i r e s to p r e s e r v e h i s own l i b e r t y but to acquire dominion over 
o t h e r s ; both these d e s i r e s are d i c t a t e d by the impulse to s e l f -
p r e s e r v a t i o n . From t h e i r c o n f l i c t a r i s e s a war of a l l a g a i n s t 
a l l , which makes l i f e 'nasty, b r u t i s h and short.' In a s t a t e of 
nature, t h e r e i s no property, no j u s t i c e or i n j u s t i c e ; there i s 
2 2 I b i d . 
2 3Appadorae, op. c i t . , note 5; Dickenson, op. c i t . , note 16 
at pp. 56-60. 
2 4Dickinson, op. c i t . , note 16 a t pp. 60-98. 
2 5 R u s s e l l , op. c i t . , note 21 a t pp. 494-659. 
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only war and 'force and fraud are i n war, the two c a r d i n a l 
v i r t u e s . ' " 2 6 
For Hobbes, i n order f o r men t o escape from these e v i l s , 
they must endeavour t o form communities ready t o delegate 
absolute power i n t o the hands of a c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y 2 7 and t h i s , 
according t o him, must be based on the concept o f the s o c i a l 
c o n t r a c t . 2 8 This c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y , according t o Hobbes, 
represents a source of power known as superanus which by a l l 
means s h a l l put an end t o the " u n i v e r s a l war." 2 9 
Again Professor Russell explains t h a t : 
are e q u a l l y a p p l i c a b l e to a l l forms of government i n which there 
i s one supreme a u t h o r i t y not l i m i t e d by l e g a l r i g h t s of other 
bodies. He could t o l e r a t e Parliament alone but not a system i n 
which governmental power i s shared between King and Parliament. 
T h i s i s the exact a n t i t h e s i s to the views of Locke and 
Montesquieu. The E n g l i s h c i v i l war occurred, s a y s Hobbes, 
because power was di v i d e d between King, Lords and Commons."30 
I t i s i n s t r u c t i v e t o note t h a t Hobbes p r e f e r s d i c t a t o r s h i p 
to checks and balances and the purported golden n o t i o n of 
l i b e r t y . The powers of the sovereign i n h i s view must be made 
Sovereign i n order t o have peace and t r a n q u i l l i t y which shows 
c l e a r l y t h a t the kernel of h i s t h e s i s was predicated on 
2 6 I b i d . at p. 550. 
"Hobbes p r e f e r s monarchy, but a l l h i s a b s t r a c t arguments 
u n l i m i t e d . 31 Thus the r u l e d must surrender power t o the 
27 I b i d . 
28 I b i d . 
29 I b i d . 
30 I b i d , at p. 551. 
31 I b i d . 
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achieving i n t e r n a l peace. 3 2 Hobbes was also of the opinion t h a t 
the worse despotism be p r e f e r r e d t o anarchy since absolute power 
w i l l create perpetual peace. 3 3 
The concept of absolute sovereignty also found favour w i t h 
Rousseau but he was a b i t c a r e f u l t o conclude t h a t i t belonged 
t o the people r a t h e r than the r u l e r . 3 4 
The most a u t h o r i t a t i v e restatement of the modern concept 
of sovereignty may be c r e d i t e d t o John Austin (17 9 0-18 5 9) . 3 5 I n 
his words, 
" I f a determinate human su p e r i o r , not i n the habit of 
obedience t o a l i k e s u p e r i o r , r e c e i v e s h a b i t u a l obedience from 
the b ulk of a given s o c i e t y , t h a t determinate superior i s 
sov e r e i g n i n t h a t s o c i e t y ( i n c l u d i n g the su p e r i o r ) i s a s o c i e t y 
p o l i t i c a l and independent. . . . Furthermore every p o s i t i v e law 
or every law simply and s t r i c t l y so c a l l e d i s s e t d i r e c t l y or 
c i r c u i t o u s l y , by a sovereign person or body to a member or 
members of the independent p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y wherein that person 
or body i s so v e r e i g n or supreme." 3 6 
A u s t i n a l s o f o l l o w s the notion t h a t the sovereign's power 
i s u n l i m i t e d . 3 7 His system t h e r e f o r e accepts the precept t h a t 
sovereign power i s i n a l i e n a b l e and t h a t the sovereign has the 
a u t h o r i t y t o exact obedience from the r u l e d but his status i s 
such t h a t h i s a u t h o r i t y cannot be a f f e c t e d by anybody i n the 
3 2 I b i d . 
3 3 I b i d . 
3 4Appadorae, op. c i t . , n. 5 a t p. 451. 
3 5 I b i d . 
3 6 I b i d . , a t p. 49. 
3 7Bhattacharyy, op. c i t . , n. 9 a t pp. 94-95. 
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w o r l d . 3 8 The t r u t h of the matter i s t h a t A ustin b e l i e v e s t h a t 
law i s the command of the sovereign and t h e r e f o r e according t o 
h i s bent of reasoning, knows no i n t e r n a l or e x t e r n a l s u p e r i o r . 3 9 
Austin's views at best were l e g a l i s t i c and t h e r e f o r e may 
require proper q u a l i f i c a t i o n w i t h respect t o the democratic 
d o c t r i n e of sovereignty, i n order t o contain c r i t i c i s m of h i s 
views being u n r e a l i s t i c . 4 0 These d i f f i c u l t i e s regarding the 
concept of sovereignty and i t s many other confused un d e r l y i n g 
p r i n c i p l e s prompted Professor Laski t o argue t h a t the whole 
notion of sovereignty be surrendered f o r the sake of p o l i t i c a l 
science. 4 1 I t must be noted i n passing, however, t h a t Austin's 
views were vehemently opposed. 4 2 
I t should, however, be noted t h a t a l l these t h e o r i e s can 
be attacked from a standpoint of e q u i t a b l e maxims s p e c i f i c a l l y 
associated w i t h the w r i t i n g s of Locke 4 3 and Montesquieu, 4 4 but 
these equitable maxims can only be a p p l i e d t o put pressure t o 
bear on the sovereign i f the sovereign i s w i l l i n g t o succumb t o 
world p u b l i c opinion. I n t e r n a t i o n a l law i n i t s i n t r i n s i c 
nature, as derived from the p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s , can be a source 
3 8 I b i d . a t p. 95. 
3 9Appadorae, op. c i t . n. 5 at pp. 49-50. 
4 0 I b i d . 
4 1 I b i d . , p. 50. 
42See Laski, A grammar of p o l i t i c s (1967), pp. 44-45. 
4 3 R u s s e l l , op. c i t . , n. 21. 
""Montesquieu, The s p i r i t of law (1748). 
of l i m i t a t i o n upon the absolute power of the s t a t e , but i n 
r e a l i t y there i s no supranational power t o enforce these laws. 4 5 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l law, t h e r e f o r e , i s obeyed by states out of 
courtesy and the need t o promote the concept of comity w i t h the 
hope of avoiding d i s r e p u t e . 
IV. The Influence o f the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes on Later 
Writers 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l law was not invented by magical powers. I t s 
growth followed a r o u t e of gradual process s i n g u l a r l y influenced 
by p h i l o s o p h i c a l w r i t i n g s s p e c i f i c a l l y derived from n a t u r a l law 
as c o r r e c t l y s t a t e d by some prominent w r i t e r s 4 6 on i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law; one such w r i t e r was Professor Schwarzenberger who observed 
t h a t : 
"Although s e v e r a l systems of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i n v a r i o u s 
s t a ges of a r r e s t e d development e x i s t e d i n a n t i q u i t y and 
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y or subsequently, i n other p a r t s of the world, 
present-day i n t e r n a t i o n a l law has i t s roots i n medieval Europe. 
I t might be thought t h a t the h i e r a r c h i c a l order of the Middle 
Ages was i n c o m p a t i b l e with the e x i s t e n c e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
4 5Sornarayah, Problems i n applying the r e s t r i c t i v e theory of 
sovereign immunity (1982) 31 ICLQ 664. 
46Nussbaum, A concise h i s t o r y of the law of nations (1962) 
pp. 35-44, 61-114; op. c i t . , n. 6, pp. 35-99; Sanders, 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l jurisprudence i n A f r i c a n context (1979) pp. 3-38. 
Brownlie p r i n c i p l e s of p u b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l law (1992). 
B r i e r l y , The law of nations, an i n t r o d u c t i o n t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law and peace (6th ed. 1963); Kelsen, P r i n c i p l e s of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law (2d 1966) per Tucker; Lauterpacht, 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l law (general works) (1970) 4 volumes; O'Connell, 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l law (2d ed. 1970) 2 v o l s . ; H e r z i j l , I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law i n h i s t o r i c a l p erspective; Schwerzenberger, I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law ( v o l . 1 3d ed. 1957; v o l . 2, 1962); Oppenheim and 
Lauterpacht, A t r e a t i s e (1952) 2 v o l s ; Hyde, I n t e r n a t i o n a l law 
c h i e f l y as i n t e r p r e t e d and a p p l i e d by the United States (1947) 3 
vols) . 
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which r e q u i r e s the coexistence of equal and independent 
communities. A c t u a l l y , the pyramidal s t r u c t u r e of feudalism, 
culminating i n Pope and Emperor as s p i r i t u a l and temporal heads 
of Western Christendom was hardly ever f u l l y r e a l i z e d . I t l e f t 
ample scope f o r r e l a t i o n s on a footing of e q u a l i t y between what 
were often i n f a c t independent s t a t e s . " 4 7 
Professor Schwarzenberger seemed to i n d i c a t e t h a t the 
tre n d of i n e q u a l i t y t h a t existed i n medieval pe r i o d was not t h a t 
markedly pronounced as to eclipse the development of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law which by i t s very nature supports the e q u a l i t y 
of states, as a special ingredient necessary f o r the harmonious 
existence of s t a t e s . Secondly, the materialism of Hobbes, a 
n a t u r a l i s t d i s q u i s i t i o n , encouraged the e s s e n t i a l nature of 
n a t u r a l law, the quest f o r universal order and the e q u a l i t y of 
s t a t e s . 4 8 
The i n t r o d u c t i o n of the theory of n a t u r a l e q u a l i t y i n t o 
the law of nations was f i r s t developed by the n a t u r a l i s t s who 
gathered i n s p i r a t i o n from the s i n g u l a r l y pragmatist views of 
Thomas Hobbes (an Oxford t r a i n e d philosopher) , 4 9 The works of 
Hobbes covered l e g a l and p o l i t i c a l theory and t h i s can be found 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n h i s Elementa Philosophica de Cive and the 
Leviathan. 5 0 As a r e s u l t of h i s i n f l u e n t i a l work, he was able t o 
revive the importance of j u r i d i c a l philosophy which covered a 
c r i t i c a l aspect of medieval theory of n a t u r a l law, the s t a t e of 
4 7Schwarzenberger, Manual of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law (4th ed. 
1960) . 
4 8Dickinson, op. c i t . , n. 16 at pp. 69-75. 
4 9Russell, op. c i t . , n. 21. 
5 0Dickinson, op. c i t . , n. 16. 
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nature, and n a t u r a l e q u a l i t y . 5 1 Through h i s sagacious w r i t i n g s 
and influence these t h e o r i e s were not by any means relegated to 
the background but were r a t h e r explored i n a new fashion as a 
way of encouraging philosophers and j u r i s t s of the 17th, 18th 
and 19th c e n t u r i e s . I t i s important t o note, however, t h a t the 
system of Hobbes was somewhat i n a n t i t h e s i s t o t h a t of G r o t i u s 1 
teachings 5 2 and t h i s ex-hypothesi cannot be disputed i n view of 
the a u t h o r i t a t i v e analysis of the works of Grotius and Hobbes by 
Dr. Edwin Dickinson. 5 3 
The teachings of Hobbes a l b e i t d i d influence Pufendorf and 
the n a t u r a l i s t s , and such prominent w r i t e r s as Barbeyrac, 
Rutherforth, Burlamaqui and V a t t e l , 5 4 but i t would appear t h a t 
these successors were by no means a l l agreed as to the basic 
general a p p l i c a t i o n s of the n a t u r a l i s t theories advanced by 
Thomas Hobbes.55 I n sum "anthropomorphism" played a c e n t r a l r o l e 
i n the p h i l o s o p h i c a l teachings of Hobbes which also leads t o the 
conclusion t h a t the law of nature and the law of nations i n h i s 
system can a p p r o p r i a t e l y be taken i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l terms t o mean 
the same t h i n g . 5 6 Hobbes, t h e r e f o r e , can be c r e d i t e d f o r the 
i n t r o d u c t i o n of the n o t i o n of n a t u r a l e q u a l i t y of states i n t o 
5 1 I b i d . a t p. 74. 
5 2 I b i d . a t p. 70. 
5 3 I b i d . a t pp. 35-100. 
5 4 I b i d . at pp. 68-100. 
5 5 I b i d . at pp. 76-89. 
5 6 I b i d . at p. 75. 
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j u r i d i c a l philosophy. And i t s a f t e r - e f f e c t on V a t t e l , by every 
est i m a t i o n cannot be ignored i n the l i g h t of h i s w r i t i n g s and 
the f a c t t h a t the combined force of a l l these t h e o r i e s 
i m p l i c i t l y or e x p l i c i t l y have had e f f e c t on the development o f 
the law of n a t i o n s . 5 7 
One major influ e n c e of Hobbes as can be gathered from the 
w r i t i n g s of V a t t e l runs thus: 
"Since men are by nature equal and t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l 
r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s the same, as coming e q u a l l y from nature, 
nations, which are composed of men and may be regarded as so 
many f r e e persons l i v i n g together i n a s t a t e of nature, a re by 
nature equal and hold from nature the same o b l i g a t i o n s and the 
same r i g h t s , s t r e n g t h or weakness, i n t h i s case, counts f o r 
nothing. A dwarf i s as much a man as a giant i s ; a s m a l l 
r e p u b l i c i s no l e s s a sovereign s t a t e than the most powerful 
kingdom. 
A n a t i o n i s t h e r e f o r e f r e e to a c t as i t p l e a s e s , so f a r 
as i t s a c t s do not a f f e c t the p e r f e c t r i g h t s of another nation, 
and so f a r as the nation i s under merely o b l i g a t i o n s without any 
p e r f e c t e x t e r n a l o b l i g a t i o n . I f i t abused i t s l i b e r t y i t a c t s 
wrongfully; but other nations cannot complain s i n c e they have no 
r i g h t to d i c t a t e to i t . 
Since nations are f r e e , independent, and equal, and s i n c e 
each has the r i g h t to decide i n i t s conscience what i t must do 
to f u l f i l i t s d u t i e s , the e f f e c t of t h i s i s to produce, before 
the world a t l e a s t , a p e r f e c t e q u a l i t y of r i g h t s among na t i o n s 
i n the conduct of t h e i r a f f a i r s and i n the p u r s u i t of t h e i r 
p o l i c i e s . The i n t r i n s i c j u s t i c e of t h e i r conduct i s another 
matter which i s not for others to pass upon f i n a l l y ; so t h a t 
what one may do another may do, and they must be regarded i n the 
s o c i e t y of mankind as having equal r i g h t s . " 5 8 
The t h r u s t and t o t a l e f f e c t of the above statement by 
V a t t e l i n i t s p h i l o s o p h i c a l and p r a c t i c a l terms without doubt 
supports the maxim: par in parem non habet imperium which i s 
5 7 I b i d . 
5 8 I b i d . a t p. 98. 
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derived b a s i c a l l y from the p r i n c i p l e of independence, e q u a l i t y 
and the d i g n i t y of s t a t e s . 5 9 Although the c l a s s i c a l w r i t e r s of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law d i d not e x p l i c i t l y deal a t length w i t h the 
notion of immunity of f o r e i g n s t a t e s from the j u r i s d i c t i o n of 
domestic c o u r t s , 6 0 at l e a s t i n the main, t h e i r w r i t i n g s i n one 
way or the other gave support t o the idea of absolute 
sovereignty which i n t u r n l o g i c a l l y gave foundation t o the 
concept of s t a t e immunity i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 6 1 The weight of 
these h i s t o r i c a l records shows c l e a r l y t h a t e a r l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
w r i t i n g s on the concept of absolute sovereignty d i d influe n c e 
i n d i v i d u a l states and t h e i r municipal courts t o take the lead i n 
opening the way f o r the development of the rule s of s t a t e 
immunity. 6 2 
Further evidence of the i n f l u e n c e of c l a s s i c a l 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law w r i t e r s such as Grotius, Pufendorf, 
Bynkershoek and V a t t e l , who were a l l t o some extent influenced 
by the w r i t i n g s of Hobbes on n a t u r a l law, the sta t e of nature 
and natural e q u a l i t y , found a p p l i c a t i o n i n the decisions of 
5 9Badr, op. c i t . , n. 1, pp. 34-40; Lauterpacht, op. c i t . , n. 
1. 
6 0Badr op. c i t . , n. 1, p. 9. 
6 1 I b i d . , p. 12. 
62The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon (1812) 7 Cranch 116; The 
Prins Frederik (1820) 2 Dods 451; The Parlement Beige (1880) 5 
PD 197; The C r i s t i n a (1938) AC 485; The Annette: The Dora 
(1919) p. 105 at p. 111. M i g h e l l v. Sultan of Johore (1894) 1QB 
149. 
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municipal courts of the United States between 1789 t o 1820 . 6 3 
And t h i s i s c l e a r l y supported by the s t a t i s t i c a l data below. 
Writers Citations 
of 
Pleadings 
Court 
Citations 
Court 
Quotation 
Grotius 16 11 2 
Pufendorf 9 4 8 
Bynkershoek 25 16 7 
V a t t e l 92 38 22 
Source: See G. Schwarzenberger, Manual of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law 
(1960). This information was borrowed from Dr. Dickinson's 
work. 
The above s t a t i s t i c a l data was prepared by Professor Edwin 
D. Dickinson, and i t r e f l e c t s c i t a t i o n s and quotations from 
e a r l y w r i t e r s t o support i n t e r n a t i o n a l law cases which were 
decided by American courts from 1789 to 1820 . 6 4 One th e r e f o r e 
cannot underestimate the influe n c e of e a r l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
w r i t e r s of Europe i n view of the a u t h o r i t y of the above 
s t a t i s t i c s . 6 5 I t i s important also to take note of the f a c t t h a t 
Bynkershoek and V a t t e l were s p e c i f i c a l l y c i t e d i n Schooner 
Exchange v. McFaddon,66 by Chief Justice Marshall and th e r e f o r e 
lends support t o the the s i s t h a t e a r l y philosophers and 
"Schwarzenberger, op. c i t . , n. 46. 
6 4 I b i d . 
" I b i d . 
"(1812) 7 Cranch 116. 
75 
c l a s s i c a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l law w r i t e r s d i d a f f e c t the jurisprudence 
of municipal courts i n developing the r u l e of sovereign 
immunity. 6 7 This i s f u r t h e r supported by the f a c t t h a t Justice 
Marshall r e l i e d on a combination of f a c t o r s ranging from 
h i s t o r y , philosophy, and the U. S. C o n s t i t u t i o n , i . e . , the 
Eleventh Amendment i n h i s quest t o f i n d s o l u t i o n s t o the issues 
regarding state immunity i n the Schooner Exchange case. 6 8 
V. Claims and Counter Claims 
The w r i t i n g s of Bodin, Hobbes, Hagel and V a t t e l set the 
pace f o r the understanding t h a t immunity of s t a t e s must be seen 
i n a metaphysical sense as a t h e o r e t i c a l d e r i v a t i o n from l o c a l 
supreme power (superanus).69 This d o c t r i n e gave foundation t o 
the accepted notion t h a t the s t a t e has a p o s i t i v e l i n k w i t h 
sovereign power. Thus without a s t a t e there w i l l be no 
sovereign power. 7 0 Which means t h a t i n the absence of sovereign 
power and the power t o enact or make laws backed by a l l the 
coercive forces i t cares t o employ, a s t a t e cannot be recognised 
i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 7 1 I n l o g i c a l terms, t h e r e f o r e , the former 
6 7Badr, op. c i t . , n. 1 at p. 9. 
6 8 I b i d . 
6 9Dickinson, op. c i t . , n. 16 a t p. 
7 0Bhattacharyya, op. c i t . , n. 9. 
7 10'Connell, I n t e r n a t i o n a l law f o r students (1971) pp. 49-
63. See also Chen, The i n t e r n a t i o n a l law of r e c o g n i t i o n (1951). 
Compare the views of the above w r i t e r s w i t h Lord McNair's "The 
Stimson Doctrine of Non-Recognition" (1933) 14 BYIL. 
Lauterpacht, Recognition i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law (1948). 
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cannot e x i s t without the l a t t e r . An i n t r i g u i n g r e s u l t can 
hereby be d i s c e r n i b l e from the above p r o p o s i t i o n , and t h a t i s 
before a t e r r i t o r y i s recognised as a s t a t e , equal i n status t o 
other s t a t e s , i t must have a permanent population, a defined 
t e r r i t o r y , and a determinable a t t r i b u t e of an autonomous 
j u r i d i c a l community r u l e d by a sovereign power. 7 2 I f these 
f a c t o r s are present w i t h i n a community, statehood i s achieved 
equal t o a l l other states i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 7 3 Statehood i n 
t u r n gives b i r t h t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l p e r s o n a l i t y and thus breeds 
consensus among equals on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l plane rather than 
s u b j e c t i o n . 7 4 Such i s the essence of the concept of 
independence, e q u a l i t y and d i g n i t y among sovereign states, 
shaped by Pufendorf's do c t r i n e of guae invicem in statu naturali 
vivunt,15 coupled w i t h perhaps Zouche's idea of pax civilis, 
i . e . , "between equals as s t a t e s " 7 6 and f i n a l l y by V a t t e l ' s 
p o s i t i v e n o t i o n o f s t a t e e q u a l i t y . 7 7 
The commitment of most states t o the notion of immunity of 
state s stems from the w r i t i n g s of modern scholars who followed 
Bodin and Hobbes, and t h e i r influence had l a i d the foundation 
f o r the determination of s t a t e e q u a l i t y based on the f o l l o w i n g 
7 2Brownlie, op. c i t . , n. 46 at pp. 87-105. 
7 3 I b i d . , a t pp. 88-91. 
7 40'Connell, op. c i t . , n. 46, p. 842. 
7 5Dickinson, op. c i t . , n. 16 
7 6 I b i d . 
7 7 I b i d . 
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f a c t o r s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law: (1) The independence of states; 
(2) The d i g n i t y of states; (3) The need f o r comity; (4) The 
l e g a l nature of sovereign property; and (5) Diplomatic f u n c t i o n 
qua i n t e r n a t i o n a l p e r s o n a l i t y . 
The l i t e r a t u r e on jurisprudence shows c l e a r l y as has 
already been stated elsewhere, t h a t Hobbes's bent of reasoning 
was i n a n t i t h e s i s to both Grotius and Montesquieu. Hobbes' 
notion of absolute sovereignty also runs counter t o Locke's 
theory of l e g a l and p o l i t i c a l sovereignty. I n r e a l i t y , 
t h e r e f o r e , the notion of absolute sovereignty has f a l l e n out of 
favour w i t h modern p u b l i c i s t s . 7 8 
I n f a c t , i t i s h i g h l y d o u b t f u l as t o whether the views 
expressed by exponents of absolute sovereignty today would be 
allowed without c r i t i c i s m . The theory t h a t sovereignty i s 
u n l i m i t e d , i n d i v i s i b l e , i n a l i e n a b l e , i m p r e s c r i p t i b l e , u l t r a -
comprehensive and exclusive i s open t o question and t h e r e f o r e 
must be relegated t o the background. Perhaps i t was so before 
the 20th century, 7 9 when the sovereign had c o n t r o l over the 
p o l i c e and army and was also at the same time the lawmaker, a 
judge and the executor. 8 0 Modern states w i l l not accept the 
theory as i t stands i n view of Montesquieu's theory of 
separation of powers. 8 1 This i s perhaps c o r r e c t i n s o f a r as the 
7 8 L a s k i , op. c i t . , n. 42. 
7 9 I b i d . 
8 0George Sabine, Thomas Thorson, Laski. 
8 1Montesquieu, op. c i t . , The F e d e r a l i s t Papers (American 
c l a s s i c s about government) (1981). 
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sovereign has t o conform t o c e r t a i n p r i n c i p l e s w e l l entrenched 
and respected i n modern democratic c o u n t r i e s . 8 2 I t may be 
contended, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t i n these modern times the argument i n 
support of absolute sovereignty i s non sequitur and perhaps 
anachronistic, given the changes t h a t have taken place both i n 
municipal law and i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 8 3 
The sentiments expressed by modern w r i t e r s against the 
absolute nature of sovereign power have been canvassed of l a t e 
before domestic c o u r t s . 8 4 This tendency f i n d s expression i n both 
common law 8 5 and c i v i l law c o u n t r i e s 8 6 except i n former Soviet 
Union. I n Great B r i t a i n , f o r example, the Crown Proceedings 
Act, 1947, prepared the way f o r s u i t s t o be f i l e d against the 
government. 8 7 Actions i n contract i n the United States against 
the s t a t e are p o s s i b l e as a r e s u l t of the enactment of the Court 
Claims Act 1855 . 8 8 And q u i t e r e c e n t l y , l e g a l proceedings w i t h 
respect t o the j u r i s d i c t i o n of U.S. courts have been f l e x i b l y 
82A. D. Linsay, The ess e n t i a l s of democracy, Oxford (1935). 
8 3The European Convention on State Immunity and Add i t i o n a l 
Protocol (1972); The U.S. Sovereign Immunity Act (1976); U. K. 
Sovereign Immunity act (1978). 
8 4Claims before U.S. courts and U.K. courts are on the r i s e 
and t h i s I b e l i e v e might have been influenced by modern w r i t e r s 
on s t a t e immunity. But there i s an absence of precise 
p r e s c r i p t i o n s as t o the problem. 
8 5 C l i v e M. Schmitthoff, The claim of sovereign immunity i n 
the law of i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade (1958) 7 ICLQ 456-457. 
8 6 I b i d . a t p. 457. 
8 7 (1957) 3WLR 884, 910. 
8 8 S c h m i t t h o f f , a t p. 457. 
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extended and t h i s culminated i n the enactment of the Torts 
Claims Act of 1946. 8 9 I t i s possible t h e r e f o r e i n these modern 
times f o r a sovereign to submit t o i t s own c o u r t s . 9 0 These 
trends of events and the c a l l f o r l i m i t e d immunity are gaining 
ground and have i n f a c t , sit venia verbo, unhappily I may say, 
created a Pandora's box of d i f f i c u l t i e s and u n c e r t a i n t i e s i n 
t r a n s n a t i o n a l business t r a n s a c t i o n s . 9 1 I t i s submitted, however, 
t h a t the above argument i s eclipsed by the very f a c t t h a t forum 
law i s v e r t i c a l and thus the creature of the sovereign and 
the r e f o r e cannot be applied to sovereign states i n view of the 
popular concept of natural e q u a l i t y of s t a t e s . 
V I . F i n a l Remarks 
At the onset of t h i s study, a question was p o s i t e d as t o 
whether a sovereign state can possibly l i t i g a t e a sovereign 
immunity claim successfully before a f o r e i g n c o u r t . To answer 
the question a journey was taken through the uncharted seas of 
the h i s t o r y of philosophy and law t o f i n d an answer t o the 
question. The answer seems t o be predicated on the p r i n c i p l e 
t h a t every sovereign state has the o b l i g a t i o n t o give due 
8 9 I b i d . 
9 0 I b i d . 
9 1Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of N i g e r i a (1977) 
QB 529 Court of Appeal I Congreso Del Partido (1988) AC 244 
House of Lords. Alcom Ltd. v. Republic of Colombia (1984) 2 A l l 
ER6. 
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respect t o each o t h e r s ' independence, e q u a l i t y and d i g n i t y , a 
concept c l e a r l y borrowed by Chief Justice Marshall from the 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l w r i t i n g s of the past to support h i s Schooner 
Exchange decision on s t a t e immunity regarding p u b l i c ships. 
Prima facie, J u s t i c e Marshall's decision today, however, seemed 
to run counter t o Lord Denning's observations i n Rachimtoola v. 
Nizam of Hyderabad, 9 3 thus: 
" I t i s more i n keeping with the d i g n i t y of a f o r e i g n 
sovereign to submit h i m s e l f to the r u l e of law than to c l a i m to 
be above i t , and h i s independence i s b e t t e r ensured by accepting 
the d e c i s i o n of a c o u r t of acknowledged i m p a r t i a l i t y than by 
a r b i t r a r i l y r e j e c t i n g t h e i r j u r i s d i c t i o n . " 9 4 
Be t h i s as i t may, some leading countries are now modulating 
t h e i r p o s i t i o n s on the question of st a t e immunity, 9 5 and 
t h e r e f o r e , while successful l i t i g a t i o n of immunity claim was 
f a i r l y easy i n the past, a t l e a s t i n recent years the trend has 
changed because the m o d a l i t i e s of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity are 
gaining currency. 9 6 
9 20'Connell, op. c i t . , note 46 at pp. 842-845. 
9 3 (1958) AC 379. 
9 4 I n Rachimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad (1957) 3 WLR 884, 
910. 
9 5This i s very common i n the Western Hemisphere, especially 
i n countries such as the U.S., U.K., Canada, A u s t r a l i a , to 
mention the main ones. 
9 6Report of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission (1986) Yrbk 
ICL; see also Fitzmaurice (1957, 11) 92 Hague Recueil; Emanuelli 
(1984) 2 Canadian Yrbk; Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, FSIA 
(1976) . The State Immunity Act, SIA (1978) reproduced i n ILR 64 
(1983) p. 718; Canadian Sovereign Immunity Act (1982); South 
A f r i c a n Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (1981); Pakistani Foreign 
Sovereign Immunity Act (1981); Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 
Singapore (1981); A u s t r a l i a n Sovereign Immunity Act (1979). 
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In sum the sources of modern law of immunity of s t a t e s can 
be t r a c e d back to the days of Bodin, Hobbes, Aust i n , G r o t i u s and 
V a t t e l , to mention a few. And the d e s i r e of these g r e a t 
t h i n k e r s to ameliorate perhaps the problems of t h e i r days gave 
strength to the thought that because of the notion of e q u a l i t y 
of s a t e s , sovereign s t a t e s be accorded absolute immunity i n 
t h e i r dealings with other s t a t e s , both p u b l i c and p r i v a t e . For 
i t w i l l c e r t a i n l y be d i f f i c u l t to l o r d i t over an "equal," i . e . , 
another s t a t e , two or three hundred years ago i n view of the 
c e a s e l e s s s t r u g g l e s between na t i o n - s t a t e s , hence the notion par 
in parem non habet imperium or par in non habet jurisdictionem. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITY: A CLAIM AGAINST FRANCE BEFORE 
AMERICAN COURTS AND ITS AFTEREFFECTS 
The d o c t r i n e of s t a t e immunity was not simply conceived 
overnight or eo instanti, but was r a t h e r g r a d u a l l y developed 
over a long period of time by municipal c o u r t s . I n other words, 
the concept became law s p e c i f i c a l l y through j u r i d i c a l e v o l u t i o n 
t o t a l l y i n f l u e n c e d by j u r i d i c a l philosophy. 1 
I t a l l s t a r t e d when p h i l o s o p h i c a l w r i t i n g s of the past 
found expression i n an American municipal court d e c i s i o n of 
1812. 2 This d e c i s i o n i n due course became a cause celebre and 
therefore turned out to be a source of strong i n f l u e n c e on other 
municipal courts of the world. 3 Arguably, the p r o p o s i t i o n that 
the doctrine of s t a t e immunity i s a product of municipal courts 
cannot ex-hypothesi be d i s p u t e d i n view of the f a c t t h a t there 
i s a considerable amount of municipal case law on t h i s s u b j e c t . 4 
^ i t z m a u r i c e (1933) 14 BYIL; S u c h a r i t k u l , State immunities 
and t r a d i n g a c t i v i t i e s (1959); S i n c l a i r , 167 Hague R e c u e i l 113 
(1980 I I ) ; Badr, State immunity: An a n a l y t i c a l and Prognostic 
view (1984) . 
2The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon 11 US 7 Cranch, 116, 3 
ed 287 (1812) ; Chief J u s t i c e M a r s hall as can be gathered from 
h i s reasoning per the i s s u e of immunity, r e l i e d on the w r i t i n g s 
of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y e r a , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h a t of V a t t e l . 
3See S i n c l a i r , op. c i t . , n. 1, pp. 121-134; O'Connell, 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (2nd ed 1990) v o l pp. 844-845. 
4See S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , n. 1, pp. 51-162; S i n c l a i r , op. 
c i t . , n. 1, pp. 121-134. 
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In f a c t , American courts were the f i r s t to express t h e i r 
thoughts and perhaps to give true meaning to the d o c t r i n e of 
sovereign immunity. I t i s indeed worth noting t h a t C h i e f 
J u s t i c e Marshall's r u l i n g focused on the leges imperii and 
borrowed h e a v i l y from V a t t e l ' s j u r i d i c a l philosophy. 5 I n order 
to understand the reasoning behind J u s t i c e Marshall's d e c i s i o n , 
i t i s expedient t h a t a thorough study of the case be done so as 
to l a y bare the force and t h r u s t of i t s a u t h o r i t y and a f f e c t s 
thereto, for one would not l i k e to be accused of looking a t 
flowers from a horseback. 6 Let us now consider seriatim the 
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, i t s e f f e c t s and subsequent c a s e s 
t h a t followed i t s a u t h o r i t y . 
I . J u s t i c e Marshall and His Groundbreaking Rule 
The Schooner Exchange, by every estimation can be 
d e s c r i b e d as the fons et origo of the modern law of s t a t e 
immunity. That such an a t t r i b u t e i s proper and must not be 
doubted had been w e l l documented i n the w r i t i n g s of modern 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l lawyers. 7 The case alluded to above can be 
5A c a r e f u l reading of Chief J u s t i c e Marshall's t h e s i s i n 
the Schooner Exchange shows c l e a r l y i n part t h a t he r e l i e d on 
V a t t e l ' s thoughts or philosophy regarding the s u b j e c t matter of 
sovereign immunity. See Badr, op. c i t . , p. 12. 
6 T h i s i s a Chinese saying regarding 'piecemeal attempts' or 
l e s s thorough work. 
7See S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . n. 1; S i n c l a i r , op. c i t . ; 
O'Connell, op. c i t . ; J . Sweeney The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law of 
Sovereign Immunity (1963); Brownlie, P r i n c i p l e s of P u b l i c 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, 4th ed. (1990) pp. 323-326; H a l l , 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l law (8th ed. 1924). See a l s o g e n e r a l l y 
Lauterpacht, The problem of j u r i s d i c t i o n a l immunities of f o r e i g n 
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r e l a t e d thus: Two American c i t i z e n s named McFaddon and 
Greetham, the true owners of the Schooner Exchange, f i l e d a 
l i b e l s u i t i n the United S t a t e s D i s t r i c t Court of Pennsylvania 
claiming that, based on e q u i t a b l e p r i n c i p l e s , they were e n t i t l e d 
to the possession of the Schooner Exchange and that they had 
t i t l e to i t when i t l e f t the p o r t of Baltimore for Spain on 
October 27, 1809; they s t a t e d f u r t h e r t h a t on December 30, 1810, 
the ship was s e i z e d on the orders of Napoleon, then the Emperor 
of France, i n v i o l a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, without due 
process or proper French p r i z e c o u r t a d j u d i c a t i o n . In a d d i t i o n 
to a l l these, the two p a r t n e r s a l s o intimated t h a t the v e s s e l 
was now docked i n P h i l a d e l p h i a i n p o s s e s s i o n of one Dennis 
Begon. I t must be pointed out, however, tha t at t h i s j u n c t u r e a 
decree of condemnation had not been formally i s s u e d a g a i n s t the 
s a i d v e s s e l by any l o c a l c ourt. They t h e r e f o r e prayed i n t h e i r 
pleadings that they be allowed by the Court to take p o s s e s s i o n 
of the v e s s e l for r e s t o r a t i o n s i n c e the v e s s e l was damaged 
severely on the high seas. A process was i s s u e d , but Mr. 
Dallas, a U.S. attorney a t t h a t time f o r the D i s t r i c t of 
Pennsylvania, appeared and f i l e d a b r i e f of suggestion s t a t i n g 
i n t e r a l i a t h a t s i n c e peace e x i s t e d between France and the 
United States, a p u b l i c v e s s e l of the Emperor which had been 
driven into the port of P h i l a d e l p h i a i n d i s t r e s s cannot be 
attached. The D i s t r i c t Court without any h e s i t a t i o n dismissed 
s t a t e s (1951) 28 BYIL; Harvey, Immunity of sovereign s t a t e s when 
engaged i n commercial e n t e r p r i s e : A proposed s o l u t i o n , Mich L 
Rev (1929); Brandon, C o r n e l l Law Q u a r t e r l y , 39 (1954). 
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the l i b e l . The d e c i s i o n , however, was t h e r e a f t e r r e v e r s e d by 
the C i r c u i t Court, and then appealed to the Supreme Court; the 
i s s u e s t h a t f e l l before the Supreme Court for consideration were 
as f o l l o w s : 
(1) Whether France being a sovereign country can be impleaded 
or sued i n her own name i n a foreign court, i . e . , U.S. 
c o u r t s . 
(2) Whether based on absolute or c l a s s i c a l d o c t r i n e of 
sovereignty immunity France could a r r e s t s u i t or p o s s i b l y 
r e s i s t i f the need be an execution against her property. 
(3) Whether Napoleon having acquired t i t l e by force could be 
impleaded. 
Mars h a l l , Ch.J. D e l i v e r e d the opinion of the Court as 
f o l l o w s : 
"A nation would j u s t l y be considered as v i o l a t i n g i t s 
f a i t h , although t h a t f a i t h might not be e x p r e s s l y p l i g h t e d , 
which should suddenly and without previous notice, e x e r c i s e i t s 
t e r r i t o r i a l powers i n a manner not consonant to the usages and 
r e c e i v e d o b l i g a t i o n s of the c i v i l i z e d world. 
T h i s f u l l and abs o l u t e t e r r i t o r i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n being 
a l i k e the a t t r i b u t e of every sovereign, and being incapable of 
c o n f e r r i n g e x t r a - t e r r i t o r i a l power, would not seem to 
contemplate f o r e i g n sovereigns nor t h e i r sovereign r i g h t s as i t s 
o b j e c t s . One sovereign being i n no respect amenable to another; 
and being bound by o b l i g a t i o n s of the highest character not to 
degrade the d i g n i t y of h i s nation, by p l a c i n g himself or i t s 
sov e r e i g n r i g h t s w i t h i n the j u r i s d i c t i o n of another, can be 
supposed to enter a f o r e i g n t e r r i t o r y only under an express 
l i c e n s e , or i n the confidence t h a t the immunities belonging to 
h i s independent sovereign s t a t i o n , though not e x p r e s s l y 
s t i p u l a t e d , are r e s e r v e d by i m p l i c a t i o n , and w i l l be extended to 
him." 
He concluded h i s judgment i n the following words: 
" I f the preceding reasoning be c o r r e c t , the Exchange, 
being a p u b l i c armed sh i p , i n the s e r v i c e of a f o r e i g n 
sovereign, with whom the government of the United S t a t e s i s a t 
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peace, and having entered an American p o r t open f o r her 
reception, on the terms on which s h i p s of war are g e n e r a l l y 
permitted to enter the p o r t s of a f r i e n d l y power, must be 
considered as having come i n t o the American t e r r i t o r y , under an 
implied promise, t h a t while n e c e s s a r i l y w i t h i n i t , and demeaning 
h e r s e l f i n a f r i e n d l y manner, she should be exempt from the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of the country." 
I I . A n a l y s i s of Chief J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l ' s T h e s i s 
There was no lex scripta, i . e . , w r i t t e n law, on the 
question of s t a t e immunity to guide C h i e f J u s t i c e Marshall when 
the Schooner Exchange case was brought before him. 8 And i n 
order to keep himself w i t h i n the c o n f i n e s of reasonableness, he 
threw h i s e f f o r t s behind the a u t h o r i t y of the w r i t i n g s of the 
p a s t , 9 but s p e c i f i c a l l y on the p h i l o s o p h i c a l w r i t i n g s of 
V a t t e l , 1 0 coupled with the i n h e r i t e d precepts of the s o c i a l 
contract, c l e v e r l y adumbrated by Hobbes 1 1 and Rousseau. 1 2 
In f a c t , Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon can r i g h t l y be 
termed the locus c l a s s i c u s or the f i r s t of i t s kind to delve 
i n t o the jurisprudence of sovereign immunity. And before t h i s 
case was decided there was no l i t e r a t u r e on the s u b j e c t , i . e . , 
there was no lex non scripta on the s u b j e c t . Marshall t h e r e f o r e 
r e l i e d on p h i l o s o p h i c a l w r i t i n g s of the p a s t : see 
Schwarzenberger, Manual of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law 4th ed. (1960). 
but i t appears c l e a r l y t h a t Schwarzenberger got h i s information 
from the works of Professor Edwin D. Dickinson, a leading 
American l e g a l h i s t o r i a n . See supra chapter one f o r an i n s i g h t 
i n t o the s t a t i s t i c a l formulation prepared by Dr. Dickinson. 
9Emmerich de V a t t e l , Le d r o i t des gens, OU, P r i n c i p e s de l a 
l o i n a t u r e l l e , appliques a l a conduite & aux a f f a i r s des 
nationes & des souverains (1758) t r a n s l a t e d by C.G. Fenwick, 
C l a s s i c s of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1916) 3 v o l s . ; Bynkershoek, De 
foro legatonun appeared i n 1702; and Quaestiones j u r i s p u b l i c i 
(1737). 
1 0 V a t t e l , op. c i t . , n. 9, and perhaps e a r l i e r w r i t e r s . 
n B . R u s s e l l , A H i s t o r y of Western Philosophy (10 ed. 1964) 
pp. 546-556. 
1 2 I b i d . at pp. 685-701. 
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Perhaps i t would have been e a s i e r on him i f there was i n 
e x i s t e n c e cum sensu, i . e . , shared f e e l i n g , among judges at t h a t 
time s l a n t e d towards a c l a s s i c a l d o c trine, according to which a 
sovereign i s accorded absolute immunity i r r e s p e c t i v e of the 
s u b j e c t matter at i s s u e . Nevertheless, J u s t i c e Marshall was 
able to gather courage from the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of h i s time 1 3 
to s e t the pace for the e v o l u t i o n of the doctrine of absolute 
sovereign immunity. 
For M a r s h a l l , a potentate's freedom from domestic j u d i c i a l 
c o n t r o l or subjugation cannot be p r e d i c a t e d upon the w i l l or 
power of a l o c a l court. Thus i n considering the immunity of a 
f o r e i g n s t a t e much depends upon the w i l l of the l o c a l sovereign, 
i n other words, the a b i l i t y and freedom of a sovereign to a r r e s t 
s u i t or r e s i s t j u r i s d i c t i o n must be derived from the express 
consent of the l o c a l sovereign and nothing e l s e . 1 4 This immunity 
as can be gathered from h i s reasoning emanates from the notion 
of s o v e r e i g n t y arguably p r e d i c a t e d on innate s u p e r i o r i t y . I n a 
sense J u s t i c e Marshall was t r y i n g h i s best to postulate t h a t 
s o v e r e i g n t y e n t a i l s e q u a l i t y , independence and dignity which i n 
turn g i v e s meaning to common sense that e q u a l i t y breeds 
consensus and courtesy r a t h e r than s u b j e c t i o n . 1 5 The reason 
1 3U.S. C o n s t i t u t i o n i n whole or i n p a r t did influence Chief 
J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l ' s t h e s i s i n the Schooner Exchange. See a l s o 
Lauterpacht with respect to h i s comments on t h i s i s s u e : op. 
c i t . , n. 7 a t p. 230. The d i g n i t y of s t a t e s concept seemed to 
have come from the V i r g i n i a Convention of 1788. 
1 4Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 US 7 Cranch 116 3 Ed 287 
(1812). 
1 5 I b i d . 
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o f f e r e d by J u s t i c e Marshall i n support of the sovereign's 
w i l l i n g n e s s or consent to the e x c l u s i o n of sovereign s t a t e s from 
the general j u r i s d i c t i o n of domestic courts can be s t a t e d as 
fol l o w s : 
"The world being composed of d i s t i n c t s o v e r e i g n t i e s , 
p o s s e s s i n g equal r i g h t s and equal independence, whose mutual 
b e n e f i t i s promoted by i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h each other, and by an 
interchange of these good o f f i c e s which humanity d i c t a t e s and 
i t s wants require, a l l sovereigns have consented to a r e l a x a t i o n 
i n p r a c t i c e , i n cases under c e r t a i n p e c u l i a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s , of 
t h a t absolute and complete j u r i s d i c t i o n w i t h i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e 
t e r r i t o r i e s which sovereignty c o n f e r s . 
This consent may i n some i n s t a n c e s be t e s t e d by common 
usage, and by common opinion, growing out of t h a t usage." 1 6 
C h i e f J u s t i c e Marshall's bent of t h i n k i n g i n t h i s r e s p e c t 
takes us unto a higher l e v e l of reasoning, where he argues t h a t 
the world which involves the interchange between ambassadors of 
d i f f e r e n t s t a t e s detests an a c t i o n not i n consonant with 
accepted usage. Thus i f a s t a t e goes to the extent of 
e x e r c i s i n g i t s t e r r i t o r i a l powers i n a manner t h a t generates 
acrimony and disrepute, without any regard to the d i g n i t y of 
s t a t e s , then such a s t a t e b l a t a n t l y v i o l a t e s the terms of an 
implied agreement or f a i t h not s p e c i f i c a l l y s t i p u l a t e d . 1 7 His 
t h e s i s a l s o t e l l s us that the power of one sovereign i s not 
amenable to another sovereign 1 8 which i n l o g i c a l terms adds 
p r e c i s i o n to the idea that sovereign s t a t e s have the highest 
o b l i g a t i o n to guard against being s u b j e c t e d to the j u r i s d i c t i o n 
1 6 I b i d . at p. 136. 
1 7 I b i d . 
1 8 I b i d . 
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of other s t a t e s . 19 One important in g r e d i e n t of Marshall's 
reasoning can be l i k e n e d unto the p r o p o s i t i o n that s t a t e s must 
endeavour always to p r o t e c t t h e i r d i g n i t y from being damaged. 
There i s t h e r e f o r e the presumption th a t the law of immunities of 
s t a t e s i n h i s days, although not c l e a r l y or s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e d 
i n s t a t u t e books, was r e s e r v e d by i m p l i c a t i o n and therefore must 
be respected so as to promote comity among s t a t e s . 2 0 
The foundation of the reasoning behind the Schooner 
Exchange i s t h a t the essence of sovereignty must be seen within 
the context of an independent s t a t e ' s supremacy i n i t s spheres 
of operation, p u t a t i v e or r e a l , and given the innate supreme 
l i c e n s e of the s t a t e , i t cannot be subjected to any other laws 
but i t s own, suis legibus u t i . 2 1 T e c h n i c a l l y , therefore, a s t a t e 
which i s independent i n the eyes of the world i s ipso iure 
sovereign and l o g i c a l l y has o v e r a l l a u t h o r i t y suprema potestas 
i n l o c a l matters, which according to Chief J u s t i c e Marshall 
g i v e s support to the allowance of immunity to s t a t e s from the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of other s t a t e s . 2 2 There i s an element of l o g i c 
and t r u i s m a s s o c i a t e d with h i s l i n e of thought for such an 
approach w i l l c e r t a i n l y not v i o l a t e sovereign r i g h t s of s t a t e s 
but r a t h e r enhance mutual i n t e r c o u r s e and n a t u r a l equality, 
which two c e n t u r i e s e a r l i e r had been introduced i n t o j u r i d i c a l 
19 I b i d . 
20 I b i d . 
21 I b i d . 
22 I b i d . 
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philosophy by Thomas Hobbes.23 In r e a l i t y , however, exemptions 
from the j u r i s d i c t i o n of a domestic court are t r u l y d e r i v e d from 
the concept of suprema potestas which by i t s very nature g i v e s 
consent express or implied based on l o c a l a u t h o r i t y i n deference 
to the accepted doctrine of e q u a l i t y of s t a t e s upon the 
n e c e s s i t y of promoting the needed i n d i s p e n s a b l e i n g r e d i e n t of 
comity and good w i l l among nations. 
Without doubt there i s c e r t a i n l y an element of communis 
opinio doctorum to support r e l a t i v e sovereignty, i . e . , the 
l i m i t a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law on sovereign power, 2 4 however, i t 
seems c l e a r t h a t at the time that Chief J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l wrote 
the s a i d judgment, the idea of sovereign power and i t s 
a t t r i b u t e s of absoluteness, i n a l i e n a b i l i t y and i n d i v i s i b i l i t y 
had t o t a l l y e c l i p s e d the precepts of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law 
l i m i t a t i o n upon sovereign power. 2 5 There was t h e r e f o r e no 
evidence at t h a t h i s t o r i c a l epoch whereby any nation had been 
subjected to the j u r i s d i c t i o n of another s t a t e . 2 6 However, p r i o r 
to the d e c i s i o n he handed down i n the Schooner Exchange, i t 
2 3Edwin Dickinson, The E q u a l i t y of S t a t e s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Law (1920) pp. 69-89. See a l s o Thomas Hobbes c l a s s i c a l works, 
The Leviathan, ed. by A.K. Waller, Cambridge, 1904. 
2 4Korowicz, Re c e u i l des Cours (1961 1) pp. 27-29. 
2 5See Bodin, The Six Books of a Commonweal, t r a n s , by 
Richard K n o l l e s , London (1606). See a l s o g e n e r a l l y Dickenson, 
op. c i t . 
2 6 T h i s i s an i m p l i c i t proposition, f o r every t r e a t i s e on 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law did mention the Schooner Exchange as the Fons 
et origo on the subject. See Briggs, The Law of Nations (2nd 
ed. 1962) p. 413. 
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would appear t h a t "Marshall C.J. himself i n 1788 i n the debates 
preceding the adoption of the V i r g i n i a C o n s t i t u t i o n had applied 
to the s t a t e s of the Union the same doct r i n e t h a t he was to 
apply l a t e r to f o r e i g n s t a t e s . " 2 7 
This shows c l e a r l y t h a t not only was he in f l u e n c e d by the 
wr i t i n g s of e a r l y w r i t e r s on sovereignty and the w r i t i n g s of 
c l a s s i c a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l law s c h o l a r s but was to some extent a l s o 
i nfluenced by American p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e and p o s s i b l y an 
a f f e c t i v e c o g n i t i o n of the dynamics of American C o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
debates, and more importantly, the U.S. C o n s t i t u t i o n . 2 8 
I f t h i s be t r u e , then Chief J u s t i c e Marshall could not 
have r u l e d any other way i n view of the i n f l u e n c e of the 
Revolutionary e r a coupled with the popular maxim commonly known 
in England and America, t h a t the King can do no wrong. 2 9 I t was 
therefore not a s u r p r i s e a t a l l when he reasoned thus: 
" I n e x p l o r i n g an unbeaten path, with few, i f any from 
precedents or w r i t t e n law, the court has found i t ne c e s s a r y to 
r e l y much on g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s and on a t r a i n of reasoning, 
founded on c a s e s i n some degree analogous to t h i s . 
The j u r i s d i c t i o n of c o u r t s i s a branch of what which i s 
possessed by the n a t i o n as an independent sovereign power. 
The j u r i s d i c t i o n of the n a t i o n w i t h i n i t s own t e r r i t o r y 
i s n e c e s s a r i l y e x c l u s i v e and ab s o l u t e . I t i s s u s c e p t i b l e of no 
l i m i t a t i o n not imposed by i t s e l f . Any r e s t r i c t i o n upon i t , 
d e r i v i n g v a l i d i t y from an e x t e r n a l source would imply a 
2 70'Connell, op. c i t . , n. 3, p. 844; Lauterpacht, op. c i t . , 
n. 7, p. 230. 
2 8Lauterpacht, op. c i t . 
2 9See R. Dorsey Watkins, The s t a t e as a par t y l i t i g a n t 
(Johns Hopkins, 1927), chapters 1, 11, 12; L. Van Praag, 
J u r i s d i c t i o n e t D r o i t I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i c (1915); see a l s o the 
Supplement (1935). 
32 
diminution of i t s sovereignty to the extent of the r e s t r i c t i o n , 
and an investment of t h a t sovereignty to the same extent i n t h a t 
power which could impose such r e s t r i c t i o n . 
A l l e xceptions, therefore, to the f u l l and complete power 
of a nation w i t h i n i t s own t e r r i t o r i e s must be t r a c e d up to the 
consent of the nation i t s e l f . They flow from no other 
l e g i t i m a t e s o u r c e . 3 0 
There i s inherent i n the above contention a c l e v e r 
p r o p o s i t i o n of absolute immunity which must not be mistaken to 
be semantic as to mean anything other than a quest to o f f e r a 
cogent explanation to support the reason why j u r i s d i c t i o n over a 
foreign s t a t e be d e c l i n e d or waived. 
True, Marshall's argument can be construed to f a l l i n l i n e 
with the Roman Law M a x i m — j u r i s d i c t i o inhaeret, cohaeret imperio 
par in parem non habet judicium. E s s e n t i a l l y , however, the 
o v e r a l l t h r u s t of h i s argument i n the Schooner Exchange, be i t 
t h e o r e t i c a l or p r a c t i c a l , seemed to follow the p r a c t i c e of the 
"time when most s t a t e s were r u l e d by person sovereigns who, i n a 
very r e a l sense, p e r s o n i f i e d the s t a t e . . . . I n such a period, 
i n f l u e n c e d by the s u r v i v a l of the p r i n c i p l e of feudalism, the 
e x e r c i s e of a u t h o r i t y on the part of one sovereign over another 
i n e v i t a b l y i n d i c a t e d e i t h e r the s u p e r i o r i t y of o v e r l o r d s h i p or 
the a c t i v e h o s t i l i t y of an equal. The p e a c e f u l i n t e r c o u r s e of 
s t a t e s could be p r e d i c a t e d only on the b a s i s of r e s p e c t f o r 
other s o v e r e i g n s . . . ." 3 1 
As a fundamental point of departure, i t would appear as 
regards s t a t e p r a c t i c e that absolute sovereign immunity p e r s i s t s 
today because of C h i e f J u s t i c e Marshall's w e l l reasoned judgment 
which seems to have found favour with many judges of h i s time. 
30 (1812) 7 Cranch 116. p.136-137. 
3 1Harvard r e s e a r c h d r a f t Convention on Competence of Courts 
i n Regard to Foreign S t a t e s (1932) a r t i c l e 7, p. 527. 
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Again, Marshall's deference f o r the supremacy of the 
sovereign i s e x e m p l i f i e d when he s t a t e d c l e a r l y as f ollows: 
" E q u a l l y i m p o s s i b l e i s i t to conceive, whatever may be 
the c o n s t r u c t i o n as to p r i v a t e s h i p s , t h a t a p r i n c e who 
s t i p u l a t e s a passage f o r h i s troops or an asylum for h i s s h i p s 
of war i n d i s t r e s s , should mean to s u b j e c t h i s army or h i s navy 
to the j u r i s d i c t i o n of a f o r e i g n s o v e r e i g n . And i f t h i s cannot 
be presumed, the s o v e r e i g n of the p o r t must be considered as 
having conceded the p r i v i l e g e to the e x t e n t i n which i t must 
have been understood to a s k . " 3 2 
In short, i t can be argued t h a t the p r i n c i p l e of waiver on 
behalf of a f o r e i g n s t a t e i s presumed as "given" i n the l i g h t of 
the accepted l e g a l and p o l i t i c a l usage of give and take i n order 
to avoid a s p e c t r e of d i s r e p u t e or t e n s i o n . But t h i s power of 
waiver of j u r i s d i c t i o n can a l s o be denied at the d i s c r e t i o n of 
the r e c e i v i n g sovereign. Thus the p r o p o s i t i o n s t a t e d above can 
e a s i l y be r e l e g a t e d to the background based on the whims and 
caprices of the l o c a l s o v e r e i g n . 3 3 
S t r i c t l y speaking, t h e r e f o r e , one can a p p r o p r i a t e l y 
postulate t h a t J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l ' s t h e s i s i n the Schooner 
Exchange e n t a i l s three i n t e r r e l a t e d exceptions to the e x e r c i s e 
of t e r r i t o r i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n , and these exceptions are: 
(1) The exemption of the person of the sovereign from 
a r r e s t or detention w i t h i n a f o r e i g n t e r r i t o r y . 3 4 
(2) The immunity which a l l c i v i l i z e d nations allow to 
foreign m i n i s t e r s . 3 5 
3 2Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon 11 US 7 Cranch (1812). 
3 3 I b i d . 
3 4 I b i d . a t p. 137. 
3 5 I b i d . a t p. 138. 
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(3) The c e s s i o n of a portion of h i s t e r r i t o r i a l 
j u r i s d i c t i o n i s where he allows the troops of a f o r e i g n 
p r i n c e to pass through h i s dominions. 3 6 
These p r i n c i p l e s i f put together o f f e r an enlightened theory 
t h a t the source of immunities enjoyed by i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l 
f u n c t i o n a r i e s of s t a t e s and sovereigns stem from the l e g a l and 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l p e r s o n a l i t y of the t e r r i t o r y they r e p r e s e n t . 3 7 
Thus, diplomatic immunities i n p r i n c i p l e are d e r i v a t i v e i n 
nature and are t h e r e f o r e granted to ambassadors or diplomatic 
agents because they are r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of a recognised s t a t e . 3 8 
Thus, every s t a t e , small or big, i r r e s p e c t i v e of the 
circumstances must be accorded the same j u r i d i c a l and n a t u r a l 
r e s p e c t . These ideas perhaps e x i s t e d before Marshall handed 
down h i s famous d e c i s i o n , however, i t would not have been shaped 
i n t o municipal law i f c o u n t r i e s of the world, and p a r t i c u l a r l y 
other municipal courts, had challenged the a u t h o r i t y of the 
Schooner Exchange. Prima f a c i e , the heart of Marshall's 
d e c i s i o n was based on the concept of absolute immunity of 
s t a t e s , i f not more r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of i t . But i t i s p l a u s i b l e 
to argue th a t he never envisaged h i s t h e s i s w i l l c a r r y much 
weight i n t o the 20th century as to create u n c e r t a i n t i e s . 3 9 
3 6 I b i d . at p. 139. 
3 7See S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , n. 1, p. 24. 
3 8 I b i d . , Michael Brandon, Report on Diplomatic Immunity 
(1952) ICLQ. 
3 9Schreuer, State immunity, some developments (1988); 
F e l l e r , Procedure i n Cases Involving Immunity of Foreign S t a t e s 
i n Courts of the United S t a t e s (1931) 25 Am J . I n t L. Pugh and 
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Dr. Badr i n h i s i n t e r e s t i n g and i l l u m i n a t i n g book declared 
that "The Schooner Exchange can be r i g h t l y s a i d to be the harbinger 
of the r e s t r i c t i v e theory of immunity r a t h e r than, as commonly maintained, the 
s t a r t i n g point of absolute t h e o r y . " 4 0 
He further s t a t e d that, 
" I t i s n e v e r t h e l e s s i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t the s a i d 
e a r l y d e c i s i o n s d i d d i s t i n g u i s h , as we a l r e a d y pointed out, 
between a f o r e i g n sovereign's p u b l i c a c t s on the one hand and 
h i s p r i v a t e a c t s on the other, s t a t i n g i n no u n c e r t a i n terms 
that the l a t t e r enjoyed no immunity from the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the 
l o c a l c ourts. The continued c i t a t i o n of these e a r l y d e c i s i o n s 
i n support of the a b s o l u t e theory of s t a t e immunity i s t h e r e f o r e 
a curious phenomenon, due perhaps t o a h a s t y p e r u s a l of those 
d e c i s i o n s or to second-hand knowledge of them."''1 
Although Dr. Badr' s contention i n t h i s l i g h t i s w e l l 
taken, I would beg to d i f f e r with r e s p e c t to h i s statement th a t 
"the Schooner Exchange can be r i g h t l y s a i d to be the harbinger 
of the r e s t r i c t i v e theory of immunity." I t i s submitted th a t 
such a statement i s too dramatic and not r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of 
Marshall's t h e s i s . Dr. Badr, i t would appear, arguably got h i s 
i n s p i r a t i o n from a p a s s i n g argument o f f e r e d by S i r Ian S i n c l a i r 
McLaughlin, J u r i s d i c t i o n a l immunities of f o r e i g n s t a t e s 41 NYUL 
Rev 25 (1966); C a r l , Foreign governments i n American co u r t s : 
The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act i n p r a c t i c e , 
Southwestern L J 33 (197 9 ) ; Sornarajah, Problems i n applying the 
r e s t r i c t i v e theory of sovereign immunity (1982) 31 ICLQ 664; 
Fox, Enforcement j u r i s d i c t i o n , f o r e i g n s t a t e property and 
diplomatic immunity 34 (1985) ICLQ; Higgins, C e r t a i n unresolved 
aspects of the law of s t a t e immunity 29 (1982) NILR; Brower, 
L i t i g a t i o n of sovereign immunity before a s t a t e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
body and the department of S t a t e : the Japanese Uranium Tax Case 
72 (1977) AJIL; Markesinis, The changing law of sovereign 
immunity 36 (1977) Cambridge Law J o u r n a l . 
4 0Badr, op. c i t . , n. 1, p. 13. 
4 1 I b i d . at pp. 18-19. 
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i n h i s general course i n 1980 . 4 2 With the greatest respect, I 
venture to s t a t e t h a t such a p o s i t i o n i s i n e r r o r and the 
flow e r s on the way w i l l soon be so b e a u t i f u l as to e n t i c e 
s c h o l a r s who follow the s a i d reasoning to pause and dismount f o r 
a more c a r e f u l r e a p p r a i s a l of the Schooner Exchange. I t i s t r u e 
t h a t the d e c i s i o n i n the Schooner Exchange can be subjected to 
d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s but one must be c a r e f u l not to 
overlook the c a r d i n a l p r i n c i p l e s of the judgment. Thus to 
u n v e i l the r e a l i t i e s behind the reasoning of Chief J u s t i c e 
M a r s h a l l , i t i s apposite not to be seduced by the cu r r e n t 
seemingly growing acceptance of the doctrine of r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity. 4 3 For there i s always a dense fog of m y s t i f i c a t i o n 
a s s o c i a t e d with the semantic approach taken by Marshall with 
r e s p e c t to h i s sagacious reasoning i n the s a i d case and t h i s has 
given b i r t h to o c c a s i o n a l r a d i c a l or dramatic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
h i s d e c i s i o n 4 4 to mean many thi n g s . 
As we a l l know the case was reversed i n the c i r c u i t court, 
but a f f i r m e d on appeal, and the main i s s u e was =whether two 
American c i t i z e n s could p o s s i b l y implead a foreign sovereign 
s t a t e before U.S. courts and the answer that was o f f e r e d gave 
deference to the absolute immunity of France c a r e f u l l y , d e r i v e d 
from m e t a j u r i d i c a l thought i n support of the notion t h a t every 
s t a t e , small or big, weak or strong, i s equal to every other 
4 2 S i n c l a i r , op. c i t . , n. 1, p. 122. 
4 3 I b i d . a t pp. 197-217. 
4 4Badr, op. c i t . , pp. 17-18. 
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nation i n the s o c i e t y of n a t i o n s . 4 5 T h i s I b e l i e v e might have 
prompted Professor O'Connell to conclude as f o l l o w s : 
"from t h i s theory the deduction i s made t h a t a l l 
sovereigns being equal no one of them can be s u b j e c t e d to the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of another without s u r r e n d e r i n g a fundamental 
r i g h t . This view r e f l e c t s the d o c t r i n e which developed from 
Bodin through to Austin and Hegel t h a t the law i s the c r e a t u r e 
of sovereignty and t h a t as between eq u a l s t h e r e can only be 
consensus, not s u b j e c t i o n . " 1 1 6 
These ideas i n due course i n f l u e n c e d other c o u r t s to follow the 
absolute immunity d o c t r i n e . 4 7 I t w i l l c e r t a i n l y be u n f a i r to 
contend that Lord Stowell's reasoning i n the P r i n s F r e d e r i k , 4 8 
and many others who followed him to date, be taken to represent 
a hasty perusal and a secondhand knowledge of the Schooner 
Exchange. In f a c t the do c t r i n e of absolute immunity was the 
main reason which prompted Marshall to r u l e i n favour of France 
and i t has remained supreme u n t i l r e c e n t l y . 4 9 I t i s therefore 
submitted that the contention by Dr. Badr t h a t the Schooner 
Exchange gave b i r t h to the r e s t r i c t i v e theory r a t h e r than the 
absolute immunity doctrine i s not h e l p f u l and t h e r e f o r e must be 
releg a t e d to the background f o r h i s p o s i t i o n simply runs counter 
4 5See the a n a l y s i s o f f e r e d by C h i e f J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l i n h i s 
cel e b r a t e d r u l i n g i n the Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon. 
4 60'Connell, op. c i t . , p. 842. 
4 7The Prins Frederik (1820) 2 Dods 451; The Parlement Beige 
(1880) 5 PD 197; The C r i s t i n a (1938) AC 485; see g e n e r a l l y 
Strousberg v. Republic of Costa R i c a (1880) 44 LT; Manning v. 
State of Nicaragua, 14 How Pr 517 (1857); Hassard v. Mexico, 29 
Misc NY 511 (1899); De Haber v. Queen of Portugal (1851) 17 QB 
171. 
4 8The Prins Frederik (1820) 2 Dods 451. 
" S i n c l a i r , op. c i t . , n. 1, pp. 146-196. 
38 
to every s c h o l a r who had w r i t t e n on the su b j e c t . Perhaps he 
misconstrued J u s t i c e Marshall's orbiter dicta i n the Schooner 
Exchange to re p r e s e n t the main i s s u e of the case. Obviously-
such a p o s i t i o n i s ex-facie erroneous. 
I l l . F a c t o r s t h a t I n f l u e n c e d Chief J u s t i c e Marshall's Decision 
Before J u s t i c e Marshall handed down h i s most c i t e d and 
c e l e b r a t e d d e c i s i o n , lex non scripta with regard to absolute 
immunity never e x i s t e d . 5 0 By i m p l i c a t i o n i t appears that the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law p r i n c i p l e s of diplomatic immunities somewhere 
along the way might have i n f l u e n c e d the development of the 
d o c t r i n e of immunities of s t a t e s . 5 1 Thus, i n view of the cum 
sensu as regards diplomatic immunities among judges, the b i r t h 
of s t a t e immunity was i n e v i t a b l e and not by accident i n so f a r 
as the l e g a l p o s i t i o n of the diplomatic agent i s d e r i v a t i v e of 
the sovereign s t a t e . 
The philosophy behind Marshall's d e c i s i o n can be 
p r e d i c a t e d on the f o l l o w i n g f a c t o r s : 
(1) That s t a t e immunity can be t r a c e d to the Roman law maxim 
of jurisdiction inhaeret, cohaeret, adhaeret imperio par 
in parem non habet judicium. 
(2) That i t i s expedient to prevent the a c t i v e h o s t i l i t y of an 
equal i n order to promote peaceful coexistence of s t a t e s . 5 2 
5 0 S u c h a r i t k u l , Immunities of foreign s t a t e s before n a t i o n a l 
a u t h o r i t i e s , 149 Hague R e c u e i l (1976 1) . See g e n e r a l l y 
S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , n. 1. 
5 1 S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , n. 1, pp. 24-50. 
5 2Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon 1 Cranch (1812) pp. 136-132. 
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(3) That the p r i n c i p l e of e q u a l i t y of s t a t e s i s grounded on 
n a t u r a l law, the s t a t e of nature and n a t u r a l e q u a l i t y . 
Marshall was therefore i n f l u e n c e d by both the n a t u r a l i s t s 
and the e c l e c t i c s , p a r t i c u l a r l y V a t t e l . 5 j 
(4) That the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of h i s country, i . e . , the U.S., 
and the f a c t that the U.S. was only t h i r t y - s i x years old, 
when the Schooner Exchange came up f o r a d j u d i c a t i o n 
prompted Marshall to follow s t a t e immunity i n order to 
avoid serious disputes a t diplomatic l e v e l (see the 
p o s i t i o n of the F e d e r a l i s t , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h a t of Hamilton 
[ F e d e r a l i s t paper No. 8 1 ] ) . 5 4 
(5) That the writings of e a r l y w r i t e r s on s o v e r e i g n t y ( i . e . , 
superanus) influenced Marshall cannot be disputed, i n the 
l i g h t of the concept of ipso iure sovereign coupled with 
t h a t of suprema potestas. 
(6) That the influence of the U.S. C o n s t i t u t i o n i s noteworthy 
can be seen i n terms of the p r i n c i p l e t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l 
cannot sue a sovereign without i t s consent, e.g., the 11th 
Amendment of the U.S. C o n s t i t u t i o n ( 1798), 5 5 
See a l s o Hicks, American J I L (1908), 11, 530-561; The r u l i n g i n 
Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, LR (1894) 1 QB, 149 i s appropriate 
or i n order since i t l a i d emphasis on e q u a l i t y of s t a t e s per the 
question of j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
"Emerick de V a t t e l , Le d r o i t des gers (1758) Book IV, Chap. 
V I I . 
5 4See the c l a s s i c American l i t e r a t u r e of the F e d e r a l i s t 
Papers (1981), No. 81 by Hamilton. 
"Chisholm v. Georgia (1793) 2 D a l l , 419. 
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(7) That h i s background as a diplomat, a S e c r e t a r y of State 
and a lawmaker might have influenced h i s approach. 
IV. The I n f l u e n c e of J u s t i c e Marshall's Judgment on E n g l i s h 
Courts 
A. E n g l i s h Courts and the Sovereign Immunity Question 
E i g h t years a f t e r the d e c i s i o n i n the Schooner Exchange, 
an E n g l i s h Court a l s o had i t s f i r s t opportunity to deal with the 
question of j u r i s d i c t i o n a l immunities i n the case of The Prins 
F r e d e r i k , 5 6 t h e r e a p u b l i c warship l a w f u l l y owned by the King of 
the Netherlands embarked on a voyage from the coast of Batavia 
to Texel, c a r r y i n g on board cargo of s p i c e s and other valuable 
goods. During the course of the journey i t s u f f e r e d damage off 
the rough waters of S c i l l i e s and therefore was brought to an 
E n g l i s h port f o r r e s p i t e by the help of the master and crew of 
the B r i t i s h b r i g Howe who by an implied a u t h o r i t y claimed 
salvage. The Court of Admiralty thus was faced with the i s s u e 
as to whether i t had j u r i s d i c t i o n to decide a claim of salvage 
a g a i n s t the property of the King of Netherlands. Having been 
i n f l u e n c e d by the a u t h o r i t y of the Schooner Exchange and the 
w r i t i n g s of Bynkershoek, the l i t i g a t i o n produced very 
i n t e r e s t i n g arguments as to whether the property i n question be 
given up f o r i n d i v i d u a l a c q u i s i t i o n and t h i s as a matter of 
l o g i c was taken i n t o a semantic domain, c h a r a c t e r i s i n g the ship 
as sacra, religiosa publica—publicis usibus destinata, and 
5 6 (18 2 0 ) 2 Docts. 451. 
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therefore t o t a l l y out of reach of p r i v a t e r i g h t s and i n d i v i d u a l 
claims and that i f allowed to f a l l w i t h i n the p r i v a t e r i g h t s of 
men, w i l l be d i v e r t e d from i t s p u b l i c use. 5 7 Although a c l e a r 
determination with respect to the doctrine of immunity of s t a t e 
was not s p e c i f i c a l l y stated, at l e a s t , the r e f u s a l by S i r 
William Scott ( l a t e r Lord Stowell) to give a r u l i n g on the 
question of j u r i s d i c t i o n appeared to take i t s a u t h o r i t y from 
Chief J u s t i c e Marshall's t h e s i s . 5 8 The case, however, was 
r e f e r r e d to a r b i t r a t i o n for settlement. But the argument of Dr. 
Arnold, 5 9 on behalf of the Admiralty Court i n support of absolute 
immunity, thus l a i d the groundwork for the allowance of immunity 
i n the Parlement Beige. 6 0 
Admittedly, one can c l e a r l y see that the s a i d groundwork 
followed the p r i n c i p l e l a i d down by J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l i n 1812 
when he observed that 
"a . c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n i s to be drawn between the r i g h t s 
accorded to p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l s or p r i v a t e t r a d i n g v e s s e l s , and 
those accorded to p u b l i c armed ships which c o n s t i t u t e a p a r t of 
the m i l i t a r y f o r c e of the nation. I t seems, then, to the Court, 
to be a p r i n c i p l e of p u b l i c law, t h a t n a t i o n a l s h i p s of war, 
e n t e r i n g the port of a f r i e n d l y power open f o r t h e i r r e c e p t i o n , 
are to be considered as exempted by the consent of t h a t power 
from i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n . " 6 1 
5 7At p. 468. 
5 8See O'Connell, op. c t . , p. 844. 
5 9 S i n c l a i r , op. c i t . , n. 1, p. 123. 
6 0 (1880) LR 5 PD 197. 
6 1 (1812) 7 Cranch 116. 
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The l o g i c a l power of reasoning behind the Schooner 
Exchange t h e s i s apparently thus c r o s s e d the A t l a n t i c unto the 
shores of the B r i t i s h I s l e s 6 2 because of i t s p o s i t i v e appeal and 
reasonableness. I t t h e r e f o r e gave municipal courts i n England a 
good working t o o l as to how to shape the development of the 
doctrine of s t a t e immunity. 6 3 I t i s worth pointing out, however, 
that an attempt was made by P h i l l i m o r e J . to d e r a i l t h i s 
movement towards the estab l i s h m e n t of the doctrine of s t a t e 
immunity i n England. 6 4 Although he took a p o s i t i o n worthy of a 
man with c o n v i c t i o n , h i s e f f o r t s , however, were defeated on 
appeal by B r e t t L J i n the Parlement Beige. 6 5 A s i m i l a r 
preference f o r absolute immunity was promoted by Lord Campbell 
i n De Haber v. Queen of P o r t u g a l 6 6 i n a p o s i t i v e response and 
support of S i r William S c o t t ' s approach i n the Pr i n s F r e d e r i c k . 
Again, P h i l l i m o r e J . , i n the case of the Charkieh, 6 7 made 
another attempt to c o n t e s t the l e g i t i m a c y behind the absolute 
sovereignty d o c t r i n e by espousing the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity r u l e . 
There, a v e s s e l owned by the Khedive of Egypt was refused 
immunity because of the contention that the p r i n c e was not 
6 2The P r i n s F r e d e r i k (1820) 2 Dods; The Parlement Beige 
(1880) 5 PD 197. 
" S i n c l a i r , op. c i t . , n. 1, pp. 121-127; O'Connell, op. 
c i t . , a t pp. 847-853. 
6 4 1 8 8 0 LR 5 PD 197. 
6 5 I b i d . 
6 6(1851) 17 QB 171 a t pp. 212-213. 
6 71873 LR 4 and E 59. 
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endowed with sovereign power as to be accorded immunity a t the 
time i n i s s u e . P h i l l i m o r e J's famous p o s i t i o n can be s t a t e d 
thus: 
"No p r i n c i p l e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, and no decided case, 
and no dictum of j u r i s t s of which I am aware, has gone so f a r as 
to a u t h o r i z e a sovereign prince to assume the c h a r a c t e r of a 
t r a d e r , when i t i s f o r h i s b e n e f i t ; and when he i n c u r s an 
o b l i g a t i o n to a p r i v a t e s u b j e c t to throw o f f , i f I may so speak, 
h i s d i s g u i s e , and appear as a sovereign, c l a i m i n g f o r h i s own 
b e n e f i t , and to the i n j u r y of a p r i v a t e person, f o r the f i r s t 
time, a l l the a t t r i b u t e s of h i s c h a r a c t e r . " 6 8 
Furthermore, an a u t h o r i t a t i v e expression of the r u l e of 
absolute immunity i n E n g l i s h law occurs i n the c l a s s i c case of 
the Parlement Beige i n which as already s t a t e d elsewhere 
P h i l l i m o r e J took a bold step i n denying immunity to a m a i l 
packet l e g i t i m a t e l y owned by the Belgian King and duly o f f i c e r e d 
by the commissioned servants of the Belgian Navy on the ground 
t h a t i t somewhat took i t s e l f outside the domain of p u b l i c a c t s 
i n t o the domain of commercial a c t i v i t y . On appeal P h i l l i m o r e ' s 
J d e c i s i o n was r e v e r s e d 6 9 on the strength of independence, 
d i g n i t y and comity of s t a t e s as follows: 
"The p r i n c i p l e to be deduced from a l l these cases i s 
t h a t , as a consequence of the absolute independence of e v ery 
sovereign a u t h o r i t y , and of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l comity which 
induces every sovereign s t a t e to r e s p e c t the independence and 
d i g n i t y of every other s t a t e , each and every one d e c l i n e s to 
e x e r c i s e by means of i t s courts any of i t s t e r r i t o r i a l 
j u r i s d i c t i o n over the person of any sovereign or ambassador of 
any other s t a t e , or over the p u b l i c property of any s t a t e which 
i s d e s t i n e d to p u b l i c use, or over the property of any 
ambassador, though such sovereign ambassador or property be 
BAt pp. 99-100. 
9(1880) LR 5 PD 197. 
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w i t h i n i t s t e r r i t o r y and t h e r e f o r e , but f o r the common agreement 
s u b j e c t to j u r i s d i c t i o n . " 7 0 
Thus, Parlement Beige e s t a b l i s h e d a f o r c e f u l precedent 
which extends immunity to warships i n c l u d i n g inter lia p u b l i c 
ships a s s o c i a t e d with p u b l i c a c t i v i t i e s . T e c h n i c a l l y , the 
d e c i s i o n d i d not t r u l y delve i n t o s p e c i f i c questions regarding 
trading a c t i v i t i e s coupled with i t s p u b l i c c h a r a c t e r and e f f e c t 
thereto. But arguably the k e r n e l of the d e c i s i o n gave n o t i c e 
with respect to the acceptance of the r u l e of s t a t e immunity. 
P r i o r to B r e t t L J ' s d e c i s i o n i n the Parlement Beige, t h e r e 
was somewhat an u n c e r t a i n t y 7 1 i n r e s p e c t of how to deal with 
i s s u e s r e l a t i n g to the exemption of the property of a f o r e i g n 
power from a l o c a l j u r i s d i c t i o n . Thus i n the case of Duke of 
Brunswick v. King of Hanover, 7 2 the House of Lords took pains to 
e x e r c i s e caution i n d e a l i n g w i t h the i s s u e s i n the f o l l o w i n g 
formulated manner per Lord Cottenham LC. 
"That a f o r e i g n s o v e r e i g n coming i n t o t h i s country cannot 
be made r e s p o n s i b l e here f o r an a c t done i n h i s sovereign 
c h a r a c t e r i n h i s own country; whether i t be an a c t r i g h t or 
wrong, whether according to the c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h a t country or 
not, the c o u r t s of t h i s country cannot s i t i n judgment upon an 
act of a sovereign, e f f e c t e d by v i r t u e of h i s sovereign 
a u t h o r i t y abroad, an a c t not done as a B r i t i s h s u b j e c t , but 
supposed to be done i n the e x e r c i s e of h i s a u t h o r i t y vested i n 
him as s o v e r e i g n . " 1 3 
7 0At pp. 214-215 per B r e t t L J . 
7 1 S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , n. 1, a t pp. 56-57. 
7 21851 17 QB 171. 
7 3 I b i d . , pp. 212-213. 
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The House of Lords' attempt to follow i m p l i c i t l y the t h e s i s 
presented i n the Schooner Exchange i s amply demonstrated by a 
c l e a r i l l u s t r a t i o n of i t s deference for sovereign power and i t s 
a t t r i b u t e s of d i g n i t y and e q u a l i t y . 
E n g l i s h case law shows tha t the Porto Alexandre 7 4 marks the 
f i n a l onward march to a complete acceptance of the d o c t r i n e of 
absolute immunity i n E n g l i s h law. 7 5 In other words, the 
i n f l u e n c e of the judgment i n The Parlement Beige became w e l l 
grounded when H i l l J , d eclared himself t o t a l l y bound by the 
reasoning behind i t s absolute immunity d o c t r i n e . 7 6 And h i s 
c o l l e a g u e s i n view of other a u t h o r i t i e s on appeal followed h i s 
r e a s o n i n g . 7 7 In the Porto Alexandre, a German p r i v a t e l y owned 
s h i p was l a w f u l l y adjudged by the Portuguese p r i z e court i n 
1917, as t o t a l l y condemned i n value. But p r i o r to the d e c i s i o n 
of the court i t was intimated that i t had e a r l i e r on been 
r e q u i s i t i o n e d by the Portuguese government only to be 
r e l i n q u i s h e d l a t e r , and had s i n c e then been involved e x c l u s i v e l y 
i n commercial t r a n s a c t i o n s . A w r i t i n rem was f i l e d a g a i n s t the 
s h i p , but H i l l J , although exposed to some doubts regarding the 
case, d e c l i n e d j u r i s d i c t i o n by s e t t i n g aside the w r i t , thus 
embracing an absolute view of immunity on the question of p u b l i c 
7 4 (19 2 0) p. 30. 
7 5 S i n c l a i r , op. c i t . , n. 1 at p. 126. 
7 6 (1920) p. 30. 
7 7 (1920) P a t 34 per Bankes L . J . 
46 
s h i p s . 7 8 Let us now turn to the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of an aspect of 
e a r l y jurisprudence on the continent of Europe. 
V. C i v i l Law Countries and the Sovereign Immunity Question 
I t i s hard to say whether the c l a s s i c a l t h e s i s of Chief 
J u s t i c e Marshall ever found i t s way i n t o the p r a c t i c e of c i v i l 
law countries, but i t appears somehow t h a t i t s philosophy might 
have given these c o u n t r i e s food f o r thought. 7 9 This contention 
i s being made because while common law c o u n t r i e s adhere to the 
p r i n c i p l e of stare decisis, c i v i l law c o u n t r i e s , on the other 
hand, look up to the a u t h o r i t y of the c o d i f i e d system f o r 
shaping t h e i r laws. 8 0 
Precedent therefore does not p l a y any considerable r o l e i n 
the development of municipal laws i n c i v i l law c o u n t r i e s . 8 1 
O r i g i n a l l y French courts followed the d o c t r i n e of absolute 
immunity and t h i s was c l e a r l y e n unciated by the Cour de 
Cessation i n 1849. 8 2 However, i n a l a t e r case of Chaliapine v. 
7 8 (1920) P a t p. 31. 
7 9Government Espagnol v. Casaux, 22 Jan., 1849 Dalloz; 
H e l l f e d Case (1910) Z e i t c h r i f t f u r I n t e r n a t i o n a l e s Recht v o l . 
20. See g e n e r a l l y Harvard Research D r a f t at p. 620; M i l i t a r -
Liquidierungsamt (1922) Weekblad No. 10928; German Immunities i n 
Poland Case, S Ct 31.8.1938 Clunet 66 (1939). 
8 0See Lawson and Markesinis, 1 t o r t i o u s l i a b i l i t y f o r 
unintentional harm i n the common law and the c i v i l law 19 
(1982). 
8 1 I b i d . ; S.A. Bayitch, C o d i f i c a t i o n i n Modern Times, i n 
C i v i l Law i n the Modern World (ed. A.N. Yiannapoulos) , Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana State U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s (1965). 
8 2 2 2 Jan (1849) Dalloz, 1849, n. 5. 
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USSR, 8 3 the Court of Cassation was quick i n denying a plea f o r 
immunity with respect to an a c t i o n for a breach of copyright. 
Again i n S o c i e t e de Gostorget USSR v. Association of France 
E x p o r t , 8 4 the French court r u l e d t h a t a s t a t e owned e n t e r p r i s e or 
a s t a t e i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y cannot be accorded immunity. France 
t h e r e f o r e adopted the p r a c t i c e of absolute immunity at one time 
and r e s t r i c t i v e immunity at other times, but i t appears that the 
move towards the r e s t r i c t i v e d o c t r i n e i s w e l l nigh complete. 8 5 
Holland i s torn between the concept of absolute immunity 
and r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 8 6 I n Weber v. USSR,87 i t s courts 
a f f i r m e d the p r i n c i p l e of s t a t e immunity, however, a f t e r the 
Second World War i n 1947, i t changed i t s p o s i t i o n by jumping 
onto the bandwagon of the reasoning behind the theory of l i m i t e d 
immunity. I t s p r a c t i c e therefore i s not c l e a r c u t . C i v i l law 
c o u n t r i e s i n which the r e s t r i c t i v e doctrine i s followed are 
A u s t r i a , 8 8 Germany, 8 9 Greece, 9 0 and Switzerland 9 1 whereas 
8 3 D a l l o z periodigne 1937, Part i p. 63. 
8 4Annual Digest, 1926-26 No. 125. See Hamson i n BYBIL 27 
(1950), 292-331. 
8 5 S c h m i t t h o f f , The claims of sovereign immunity i n the law 
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade (1958) ICLQ 4 60. 
8 6 I b i d . , a t p. 461. 
8 7Annual Digest, 1919-42 Supp. Vol., Case No. 74. 
8 8Hoffman v. D r a l l e (May 10, 1950, 3 I n t . Law Q (1950), 576-
579) . See g e n e r a l l y Seidl-Hohenveldern, State immunity: (1979) 
NYBIL 74. 
" R e p u b l i c of L a t v i a Case ( R e s t i t u t i o n Chamber of B e r l i n ) R2 
W4 (1953) 358. See g e n e r a l l y , Lauterpacht, op. c i t . , at p. 266. 
9 0See Lauterpacht, op. c i t . , a t p. 256. 
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Sweden, has remained s t e a d f a s t i n f o l l o w i n g the absolute 
immunity doctrine. Dr. Eleanor A l l e n a f t e r a thorough and 
learned study concluded i n 1933 t h a t 
"a growing number of courts are r e s t r i c t i n g the immunity 
to i n s t a n c e s i n which the s t a t e has a c t e d i n i t s o f f i c i a l 
c a p a c i t y as a sovereign p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y . The c u r r e n t i d e a t h a t 
t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s p e c u l i a r to Belgium and I t a l y must be 
enlarged to include Switzerland, Egypt, Rumania, France, A u s t r i a 
and Greece." 9 3 
I t i s i n s t r u c t i v e , however, to note t h a t , before 1900, or 
perhaps the F i r s t World War, most c o u n t r i e s of the world, one 
way or the other, might have followed the d o c t r i n e of absolute 
immunity, 9 4 except perhaps I t a l y Belgium and probably the 
Netherlands for before the F i r s t World War Dutch cou r t s did not 
show any i n c l i n a t i o n of r e c o g n i s i n g s t a t e immunities. 9 5 
Arguably, therefore, no one can say w i t h much candour or 
exactitude as to p r e c i s e l y when a l l these c o u n t r i e s adopted the 
absolute immunity doctrine and whether a formal change has been 
made towards the acceptance of the d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity. Thus i t i s quite cumbersome to prove the end of the 
g e s t a t i o n of an old r u l e , i . e . , customary law, and the b i r t h of 
9 1Sovereign M i l i t a r y order of Malta v. S o c i e t a Camaina, Nov. 
18, 1953. See g e n e r a l l y Lauterpacht, op. c i t . a t p. 257. 
9 2The Rigmor, Annual Diges, 1941-42, Case No. 63. 
93E.W. A l l e n , The p o s i t i o n of Foreign S t a t e s before National 
Courts C h i e f l y i n Europe, New York (1933) p. 301. 
9 4 I b i d . , S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . ; S i n c l a i r , op. c i t . ; Dunbar, 
op. c i t . , n. 85; Lauterpacht, op. c i t . ; but see g e n e r a l l y 
Fitzmaurice (1933) BYIL; Badr, State Immunity, op. c i t . 
9 5 S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . at pp. 156-258, Lauterpacht, op. 
c i t . , a t pp. 250-273. 
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a new one. The d i f f i c u l t y i s that the h i s t o r y on the p r a c t i c e 
of s t a t e s i s scanty and not at a l l easy or s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . 9 6 
Germany, before the F i r s t World War followed the precepts 
of the d o c t r i n e of absolute immunity without any problems, 9' but 
i t i s c r y s t a l c l e a r of l a t e , that i t s e a r l i e r p o s i t i o n had been 
completely n e u t r a l i z e d or abandoned when Germany gave i t s 
b l e s s i n g s to the B r u s s e l s Convention of 1926 by r a t i f y i n g i t 
a c c o r d i n g l y . 9 8 
V I . R u s s i a and the Sovereign Immunity Question 
The p r a c t i c e of courts i n p r e - r e v o l u t i o n a r y Russia was not 
t h a t c l e a r but with r e s p e c t to i t s monarchical background, i t i s 
submitted t h a t i t s t a r t e d o f f with absolute immunity 9 9 before 
assuming j u r i s d i c t i o n over s t a t e a c t i o n s c h a r a c t e r i s e d as 
commercial i n nature, i . e . , jure gestionis.100 This continued 
for a w h i l e u n t i l the Communist Revolution changed the 
s u p e r s t r u c t u r e of the machinery of government and ushered i n the 
absolute immunity d o c t r i n e . 1 0 1 The p r a c t i c e of absolute immunity 
9 6 L a u t e r p a c h t , op. c i t . , at pp. 268-272. 
9 7 I b i d . a t pp. 266-268. See g e n e r a l l y S i n c l a i r , op. c i t . , 
at pp. 130-132. 
9 8See g e n e r a l l y Seidl-Hohenveldern, S t a t e Immunity, Federal 
Republic of Germany (1979) NYBIL 66. S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . 
9 9Dr. A l l e n , op. c i t . , where a good survey was made of 
European p r a c t i c e . 
1 0 0 L a u t e r p a c h t , op. c i t . , at p. 259. 
1 0 1See M. Boguslavsky, Foreign State immunity: Soviet 
d o c t r i n e and p r a c t i c e (1979) NYBIL 167; Osakwe (1982) 23 v i v 
J . I n t . 13. 
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t h e r e a f t e r by Russia was forced on former Warsaw Pact members 
and f i n a l l y made the accepted p r a c t i c e of the Communist world 
( i f t h i s designation i s appr o p r i a t e ) . The o f f i c i a l Russian 
p o s i t i o n can be st a t e d thus: 
"The p o s i t i o n of the Soviet S t a t e , e x p r e s s e d i n normative 
documents, p r a c t i c e and doctrine, has always c o n s i s t e d of 
re c o g n i t i o n for the State and i t s p r o p e r t y of f u l l 
j u r i s d i c t i o n a l immunity derived from the p r i n c i p l e s of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law concerning sovereignty, s o v e r e i g n e q u a l i t y and 
non-interference i n the a f f a i r s of other s t a t e s . " 1 0 2 
Recent trends show c l e a r l y t h a t R u s s i a and the T h i r d World 
s t i l l s t e a d f a s t l y follow the doctrine of absolute sovereign 
immunity, 1 0 3 hence we are l e f t with a world t o t a l l y t o r n between 
adherents of absolute sovereignty and r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. The 
ranks of the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity are, however, s w e l l i n g 
c o n s i d e r a b l y . 1 0 4 
V I I . I s Sovereign Immunity an I n t e r n a t i o n a l Custom? 
(1) A Controversy 
For sometime now, w r i t e r s have argued back and f o r t h as to 
whether sovereign immunity i s a binding lex non scripta or 
102 ILC Report, F o r t i e t h Session, p. 82. 
1 0 3 C a r l , Foreign Governments i n American Courts: The United 
S t a t e s Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act i n P r a c t i c e , 
Southwestern L J (1979) 33; Higgins, The Death Throes of Absolute 
Immunity, The Government of Uganda before E n g l i s h Courts (1979) 
73 AJIL; The Asian-African Legal C o n s u l t a t i v e Committee 3rd to 
17th Session; see a l s o the ILC report Y B I L L 1982 11-1, e t c . , 
where the p o s i t i o n of Third World Countries, i n c l u d i n g t h a t of 
A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s , seems to move i n the d i r e c t i o n of absolute 
immunity. 
1 0 4 S i n c l a i r , op. c i t . , a t pp. 197-217, Dr. A l l e n op. c i t . ; 
Lauterpacht, op. c i t . ; Badr, op. c i t . ; S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . ; 
Dunbar, op. c i t . 
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customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. But i n r e a l i t y i t i s expedient to 
l a y bare the a t t r i b u t e s of customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law before an 
o b j e c t i v e a n a l y s i s can be made. The elements of custom 
comprises duration, uniformity, consistency of p r a c t i c e , 
g e n e r a l i t y of p r a c t i c e and opinio juris sive necessitatis.105 
What then i s custom or customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law? Roberto Ago 
defines customary law as "spontaneous law, emerging i n the 
conscience of members." 1 0 6 Professor Tunkin says th a t 
"A customary norm of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law a r i s e s i n 
consequences of the repeated a c t i o n s of s t a t e s . The element of 
r e p e t i t i o n i s b a s i c to the formation of a r u l e of conduct. In 
m a j o r i t y of i n s t a n c e s the r e p e t i t i o n of s p e c i f i c a c t i o n s i n 
analogous s i t u a t i o n s can l e a d to the c o n s o l i d a t i o n of such 
p r a c t i c e as a r u l e of conduct." 1 0 7 
Customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law the r e f o r e presupposes general 
p r a c t i c e or usage aided by opinio juris passed on from 
generation to generation based on good conscience and morality. 
Professor J o s e f Kunz explained th a t "custom-produced general 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s the b a s i s ; the customary p r i n c i p l e of 
"pacta sunt servanda" i s the reason for v a l i d i t y of a l l 
p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r n a t i o n a l law created by t r e a t y procedure." 1 0 8 
Judge Read i n the F i s h e r i e s case e x p l a i n s t h a t "customary 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s the g e n e r a l i z a t i o n of the p r a c t i c e of 
1 0 5Brownlie, op. c i t . a t pp. 4-1; Akehurst, Custom as a 
Source of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1974-75) 4 BYBIL. 
1 0 6Kunz, The nature of customary law (1953) 47 AJIL 664-65. 
1 0 7Tunkin, Theory of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1976) t r a n s l a t e d by 
B u t l e r , p. 114. 
1 0 8Kunz, The nature of customary law (1953) 47 AJIL 665. 
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s t a t e s . " 1 0 9 So by inference, any m e t a j u r i d i c a l concept shaped 
into general p r a c t i c e and aided by opinio juris can be regarded 
as customary law. 1 1 0 
I f these explanations be expedient and convincing, then 
can i t be s a i d t h a t sovereign immunity i s a norm of general 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law? Judge Lauterpacht answered i n the negative by 
contending t h a t sovereign immunity does not form p a r t of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and that the d e r i v a t i o n of the notion of 
immunity of s t a t e s from the p r i n c i p l e of e q u a l i t y and 
independence of s t a t e s be thoroughly reexamined. 1 1 1 His 
authority, however, according to Professor L i s s i t z y n , i s o f f s e t 
by the p o s i t i o n held by Judge Jessup. 1 1 2 Judge Jessup's p o s i t i o n 
was f u r t h e r made known when he became the r e p o r t e r of the 
restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United S t a t e s , 
i n which he concluded that immunity of s t a t e s forms p a r t of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 1 1 3 
The notion t h a t absolute sovereign immunity has become 
part of general i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s p l a u s i b l y p r e d i c a t e d on the 
f a c t that h i s t o r i c a l l y the r u l e became entrenched and was 
predominantly a p p l i e d by municipal courts without any 
1 0 9 I C J Reports (1951), 191. 
1 1 0See g e n e r a l l y Kunz, op.; c ; i t . 
u l L a u t e r p a c h t , op. c i t . , at p. 228. 
1 1 2 L i s s i t t z y n , i n Friedmann, Henkin, and L i e s i t z y n , ed., 
Essays i n Honour of P h i l i p C. Jessup (1972) pp. 189-201. 
1 1 3The American I n s t i t u t e Restatement of the Foreign 
R e l a t i o n s Law of the United States (1965). 
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o p p o s i t i o n 1 1 4 from other n a t i o n - s t a t e s and secondly, i t was on 
s e v e r a l occasions v i g o r o u s l y a s s e r t e d i n diplomatic c i r c l e s 
without any problems of disagreement or acrimony. 1 1 5 
Furthermore, i t can be s a i d t h a t although some courts have i n 
recent times made a momentous change to embracing the 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity, a t l e a s t t h e i r reasoning wholly takes i t s 
a u t h o r i t y from the concept of s t a t e immunity. Thus based on 
o b j e c t i v e a n a l y s i s one could p o s s i b l y p o s t u l a t e that i n r e a l i t y 
absolute immunity never a t t a i n e d the heights of being accepted 
by a l l c o u n t r i e s of the world as a canon of p u b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law or r u l e . However, i t would appear i t d i d a t t a i n a s t a t u s of 
opinio generalis juris generalis. But the argument as to how 
w e l l grounded the p r a c t i c e must be i n order to become customary 
law i s not c l e a r c u t . I n t e r n a t i o n a l law, however, demands that 
i t be only general not unanimous. 1 1 6 This notion then destroys 
the consent theory of pactum taciturn.111 I t i s i n s t r u c t i v e 
therefore to note t h a t a l o c a l court's d e c i s i o n , having i n 
general a t t a i n e d an eo ipso f u n c t i o n 1 1 8 ex hypothesi can serve as 
a good source of p u b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. And t h i s i s 
c o r r e c t l y i n t e r p r e t e d by Lammers as follows: 
1 1 4 S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , pp. 3 5 5 - 3 5 9 . 
1 1 5 I b i d . a t pp. 2 8 5 - 3 0 4 . 
1 1 6 B i n Cheng, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law: Teaching and P r a c t i c e 
(1982) at pp. 2 2 7 - 2 2 9 , but see Kunz, op. c i t . , g e n e r a l l y . 
1 1 7Kunz, op. c i t . a t p. 6 6 6 . 
1 1 8 B i n Cheng, 5 , I n d i a n J o u r n a l of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1965) 
p. 2 5 1 . 
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" I t has f u r t h e r been maintained t h a t p r i n c i p l e s g e n e r a l l y 
recognized at the n a t i o n a l l e v e l are not j u s t p r i n c i p l e s of 
n a t i o n a l law to be a p p l i e d by analogy to i n t e r s t a t e d i s p u t e s , or 
incorporated i n the body of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, but a c t u a l l y 
c o n s t i t u t e p r i n c i p l e s of law i n general, of a l l law, n a t i o n a l as 
w e l l as i n t e r n a t i o n a l . " 1 1 9 
I f the statement above be c o r r e c t or sound, then without 
doubt municipal court's d e c i s i o n could serve as formative and 
p e r s uasive source of law to other courts and most l i k e l y the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. 
Indeed, i f a l l are agreed that the doctrine of absolute 
immunity was the product of a municipal court, a product p l a n t e d 
and harvested i n the l e g a l f i e l d s of the United S t a t e s , which 
l a t e r found i t s way i n t o the jurisprudence of other c o u n t r i e s 
and had s i n c e remained on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l plane as a y a r d s t i c k 
and a l o g i c a l b a s i s f o r current s t a t e of a f f a i r s , then i t w i l l 
not offend common sense to postulate that i t i s customary 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 1 2 0 The t h r u s t of t h i s argument emanates from 
the p l a u s i b l e notion t h a t sovereign immunity became a r e a l i t y 
out of the i n t e r a c t i o n of the precepts of p r i v a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law ( c o n f l i c t of laws) and public i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, and i t s 
l e g a l i n s p i r a t i o n and a u t h o r i t y although had been challenged i n 
r e c e n t times, at l e a s t i t s influence had not been abandoned but 
r a t h e r modified to move i n abreast with t i m e . 1 2 1 Dr. 
1 1 9Lammers i n Kalshoven, Kuyper and Lammers ( e d s . ) , E s s a y s 
i n honour of Haro F. van Panhuys (1980), p. 61. See a l s o B i n 
Cheng, op. c i t . 
1 2 0Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated one of i t s 
Functions? (1946) 40 Am J I n t 168. S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , 355-
359. 
1 2 1The present trend where most leading i n d u s t r i a l i z e d 
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S u c h a r i t k u l 1 s f o r c e f u l argument i s i n consonant with the 
pos i t i o n alluded to above t h a t 
"the d o c t r i n e of s t a t e immunity, as f a r as can be 
asc e r t a i n e d , was s u f f i c i e n t l y w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d i n the p r a c t i c e 
of s t a t e s to j u s t i f y i t s c l a i m to become a p r i n c i p l e of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i n the n i n e t e e n t h century. The o r i g i n a l 
version, as s t a t e d by C h i e f J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l i n the Schooner 
Exchange v. McFaddon i n 1812 i s g e n e r a l l y considered to be 
re p r e s e n t a t i v e of ab s o l u t e immunity. 1 2 2 
At t h i s j u n c t u r e i t i s app r o p r i a t e to explore the c r i t e r i a 
by which general i n t e r n a t i o n a l law can be s a i d to s u b s i s t . A 
quest to devise a method t h i s e l u s i v e w i l l c e r t a i n l y be quite a 
d i f f i c u l t task and i t i s p o s s i b l e many may dismi s s i t as a 
question that should be r e l e g a t e d to the confines of metaphysics 
or j u r i m e t r i c s . The l i t e r a t u r e , however, shows tha t l e a d i n g 
s c h o l a r s 1 2 3 are agreed t h a t i t i s not necessary t h a t there be a 
t o t a l unanimity among s t a t e s before i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s made or 
cre a t e d . 1 2 4 Thus the presumption i s t h a t the e x i s t e n c e of opinio 
generalis juris generalis on a p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r n a t i o n a l law 
is s u e i s s u f f i c i e n t as opposed to opinio communis juris 
generalis.125 In the l i g h t of the fo r c e and strength of these 
countries are moving towards the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i s 
i n d i c a t i v e of the f a c t t h a t they a r e not i n a c t u a l f a c t doing 
away with absolute immunity but r a t h e r t r y i n g to a d j u s t t h e i r 
p o l i c i e s to move i n ab r e a s t of with present-day demands. And 
secondly to f o s t e r t r a n s n a t i o n a l t r a n s a c t i o n . See S i n c l a i r , op. 
c i t . , and Dunbar, op. c i t . , M a r k e s i n i s , The changing law of 
sovereign immunity (1977) 36 Cambridge Law Jou r n a l . 
1 2 2 S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . a t p. 355. 
1 2 3Kunz, op. c i t . ; Bin Cheng, op. c i t . 
1 2 4 B i n Cheng, op. c i t . a t p. 227. 
1 2 5 I b i d . 
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concepts, one can p o s s i b l y conclude that customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law can grow ov e r n i g h t 1 2 6 or be generated i n s t a n t l y . 1 2 7 Judge 
L a u t e r p a c h t 1 s approach the r e f o r e i n the determination of the 
e x i s t e n c e of customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l Law i n respect of s t a t e 
immunity seemed too r i g i d and unorthodox. His admonition, 
however, t h a t the doctrine of absolute immunity be reexamined 1 2 8 
i s w e l l taken. While Judge Jessup's bent of reasoning, or 194 6 
t h e s i s on the other hand f a l l s i n l i n e with the m a j o r i t y t h a t 
sovereign immunity i s a norm of general i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w 1 2 9 
because of the f a c t that the r u l e was for some time accepted 
and predominantly applied by many municipal courts the world 
o v e r . 1 3 0 Jessup's p o s i t i o n therefore appears to c a r r y the 
m a j o r i t y vote. Arguably, i n the l i g h t of the multitude of 
l i t e r a t u r e on t h i s s u b j e c t , i t w i l l be f a i r and expedient to 
leave the v e r d i c t i n the hands of the jury, i . e . , the reader, 
f o r p e r f e c t i o n i s not human v i r t u e , much l e s s a v i r t u e i n 
judges. With the g r e a t e s t respect, however, i t i s submitted 
1 2 6 I b i d . 
1 2 7 I b i d . 
1 2 8 L a u t e r p a c h t , op. c i t . , at p. 228. 
1 2 9 J e s s u p , op. c i t . 
1 3 0See g e n e r a l l y Dr. S u c h a r i t k u l ' s t h e s i s , op. c i t . , on the 
whole s u b j e c t matter; see a l s o S i n c l a i r , for h i s thorough 
a n a l y s i s of the p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s both i n the common law world 
and the c i v i l law world; the present w r i t e r i s of the view t h a t 
sovereign immunity i s an i n t e r n a t i o n a l norm because i t has two 
c o n s t i t u t e elements th a t i s an o b j e c t i v e element corpus, and a 
s u b j e c t i v e element animus. See Bin Cheng, op. c i t . , supra note 
148 a t pp. 249-251. 
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t h a t Judge Lauterpacht p o s i t i o n (as he then was) on t h i s 
p a r t i c u l a r subject r a t h e r found favour with the minority. 
That there i s a c o n s i d e r a b l e weight of a u t h o r i t y with 
respect to the p o s i t i o n taken above can h a r d l y be questioned. 
His Lordship once s t a t e d t h a t 
"The b a s i s of the r u l e i s t h a t i t i s beneath the d i g n i t y of a 
foreign sovereign government to submit to the j u r i s d i c t i o n of an a l i e n 
court, and t h a t no government should be faced with the a l t e r n a t i v e of 
e i t h e r submitting to such i n d i g n i t y or l o s i n g i t s property" (1954) 3 
WLR 531, 533. 
The s p i r i t of Lord J e w i t t ' s statement above appears not 
d i f f e r e n t from the t h e s i s enunciated by C h i e f J u s t i c e Marshall 
i n the Schooner Exchange i n 1812. Thus a f t e r 142 years the 
persuasive force behind J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l ' s d e c i s i o n s t i l l found 
a p p l i c a t i o n i n E n g l i s h law. There i s t h e r e f o r e s u f f i c i e n c y of 
p r a c t i c e of t h i s law as to persuade a reasonable person to 
conclude that sovereign immunity i s an i n t e r n a t i o n a l norm. The 
acceptance of the absolute immunity d o c t r i n e by the U.K. and 
U.S. courts with remarkable i n f l e x i b i l i t y i n the p a s t cannot 
exhypothesi be challenged or disputed. And t h i s supports the 
f a c t that sovereign immunity was w e l l grounded i n the p r a c t i c e 
of s t a t e s before the Second World War. I n other words i t was 
supported by USUS and OPINIO JURIS. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE RIGHTS AND IMMUNITIES OF STATES IN FOREIGN 
COURTS: A STUDY OF ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY OF STATES 
A. General Observations 
Sovereignty denotes independence and coercive power, and, 
every S t a t e , whether larg e or small, powerful or weak, developed 
or developing, enjoys e q u a l i t y i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s and 
even more so i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 1 A s t a t e once recognised by 
other s t a t e s as having acquired p o l i t i c a l freedom or complete 
exemption from c o l o n i a l c o n t r o l i s independent and ipso i u r e 
s o vereign, which means that such a sovereign s t a t e has what can 
be known as suprema potestas w i t h i n i t s t e r r i t o r i a l boundaries. 2 
The independence and sovereignty of s t a t e s therefore cannot be 
compromised or given away, for i n t e r n a l sovereignty, i n s p i t e of 
c e r t a i n l i m i t i n g f a c t o r s on i t s power i n modern times, i s 
b e l i e v e d to be absolute and perpetual within i t s spheres of 
i n f l u e n c e . I n the l i g h t of these t h e o r e t i c a l pronouncements and 
the purported attendant consequences of these ideas, some 
c o u n t r i e s of the world on r e c o r d have r e f r a i n e d from the 
e x e r c i s e of j u r i s d i c t i o n over other countries because of the 
p r i n c i p l e s of e q u a l i t y and the independence of sovereign s t a t e s . 
xThe Schooner Exchange v. McFadden and others (1812) 7 
Cranch, Edwin Dickerson, The E q u a l i t y of States i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Law (1920) pp. 68-187; Coleman P h i l l i p s o n , The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law 
and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome, London (1911) Vol. 2, pp. 
11-113. 
2Marek Korawicz, 101 Hague R e c u e i l 10-12 (1961 1) . 
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The r e f u s a l therefore by a s t a t e to e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n or to 
persuade i t s l o c a l courts not to e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n without 
the consent of a foreign s t a t e presupposes the general 
acceptance of the concept of absolute immunity J which i n the 
main takes i t s authority and s t r e n g t h from the maxim par in 
parem non habet imperium. 
That there i s a p e r c e p t i b l e measure of r e l a t i v i t y 
expressed more or l e s s i n the notion of sovereignty, 
independence and dignity of s t a t e s i n r e s p e c t of s t a t e immunity 
cannot ex hypothesi be doubted. 4 For i t g i v e s f o r c e and 
a u t h o r i t y to the true meaning of immunity and the l o g i c a l 
j u s t i c i a b i l i t y of the p r a c t i c e whereby a s t a t e could plead for 
immunity or submit to j u r i s d i c t i o n i f need be and may thus be 
allowed to a r r e s t s u i t or i f the worse comes, t h a t i s i f 
immunity i s denied, r e s i s t execution i r r e s p e c t i v e of the 
circumstances. 
The ideas alluded to above can c l e a r l y be understood by 
making reference to what Joseph Beale s a i d sometime ago, t h a t 
"The power of a sovereign to a f f e c t the r i g h t s of persons 
whether by l e g i s l a t i o n , by e x e c u t i v e decree, or by judgment of a 
c o u r t i s c a l l e d j u r i s d i c t i o n . " 5 
3The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden and others (1812) 7 
Cranch 116. The Parlement Beige (1880) 5 P D 197; Mighell v. 
the S u l t a n of Johore (1894) I Q B; Strousberg v. Republic of 
Costa R i c a (1880) 44 L T 199; Manning v. S t a t e of Nicaragua 
(1857) 14, How Pr. 517; The Porto Alexandre (1920) p. 30. 
4Sompong Sucharitkul, Immunity of S t a t e i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Law: Achievements and Prospects (1991) 327, 327-4 6. E d i t e d by 
M. Bedjaoui. 
5See (1923) 36 Harvard Law Review 241. 
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T h i s power of j u r i s d i c t i o n arguably can be likened unto the 
making and enforcement of laws i n a given country coupled with 
the need of the r u l e d or the c i t i z e n r y to respect these laws and 
to give a l l e g i a n c e to the potentate or the sovereign. But one 
question t h a t must be grappled with i s whether an equal can 
e x e r c i s e dominion over another equal. C e r t a i n l y , no! A 
sovereign s t a t e , given i t s a t t r i b u t e s , has j u r i s d i c t i o n over 
every i n d i v i d u a l l i v i n g under i t s p r o t e c t i o n and over a l l a c t s 
t h a t take p l a c e w i t h i n i t s t e r r i t o r i a l boundaries. 6 However, 
according to the precepts of customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, i t 
cannot i n r e a l i t y by l i c e n s e e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n i n c e r t a i n 
circumstances, t h a t i s , when a foreign s t a t e , i t s agents, and 
property are concerned or i n v o l v e d . 7 The non-assertion of 
j u r i s d i c t i o n i n such circumstances may be due to courtesy, 
comity and the n a t u r a l e q u a l i t y of s t a t e s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
The p r i n c i p l e of s t a t e immunity i s c l e a r l y s t a t e d by Judge 
Hackworth i n h i s venerable d i g e s t as f o l l o w s : 
"The p r i n c i p l e t h a t , g e n e r a l l y speaking, each s t a t e i s 
supreme w i t h i n i t s own t e r r i t o r y and t h a t i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n 
extends to a l l persons and t h i n g s w i t h i n t h a t t e r r i t o r y i s , 
under c e r t a i n circumstances, s u b j e c t to exceptions i n favour 
p a r t i c u l a r l y of f o r e i g n f r i e n d l y sovereigns, t h e i r a c c r e d i t e d 
d i p l o m a t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . . . and t h e i r p u b l i c v e s s e l s and 
p u b l i c p r o p e r t y i n the p o s s e s s i o n of and devoted to the s e r v i c e 
of the s t a t e . These exemptions from the l o c a l j u r i s d i c t i o n are 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y based upon the consent, express or implied, of the 
l o c a l s t a t e , upon the p r i n c i p l e of e q u a l i t y of s t a t e s i n the 
eyes of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, and upon the n e c e s s i t y of y i e l d i n g 
6See J.H.C. Morris, The C o n f l i c t of Laws (1993) pp. 60-102. 
7G.G. F i t z m a u r i c e , State Immunity from Proceedings i n 
Foreign Courts (1933) 14 BYIL. J.M. S i n c l a i r , The Law of 
Sovereign Immunity, Recent Developments, 167 Hague Recueil 113 
(1980 I I ) . 
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the l o c a l j u r i s d i c t i o n i n these r e s p e c t s as an i n d i s p e n s a b l e 
f a c t o r i n the conduct of f r i e n d l y i n t e r c o u r s e between members of 
the f a m i l y of nations. While i t i s sometimes s t a t e d t h a t they 
are based upon i n t e r n a t i o n a l comity or courtesy, and wh i l e 
they doubtless f i n d t h e i r o r i g i n t h e r e i n , they may now be s a i d 
to be based upon g e n e r a l l y accepted custom and usage, i . e . , 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law." 8 
This view i s the cor r e c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, 
however, the accuracy of Judge Hackworth's p o s i t i o n seemed to 
run counter to the 1951 t h e s i s of Judge L a u t e r p a c h t . 9 Arguably, 
i f what i s declaratory of one s c h o l a r runs counter to the 
d e c l a r a t i o n s of a multitude of s c h o l a r s , then c e r t a i n l y both the 
minority d e c l a r a t i o n and the ma j o r i t y d e c l a r a t i o n cannot a l l be 
r i g h t . At l e a s t one must be w e l l founded and convincing and the 
other not so weighty. Judge Hackworth's p o s i t i o n thus can be 
described as representative of municipal court d e c i s i o n s and 
there f o r e corroborative, back then of the cum sensu of judges 
and s c h o l a r s . 1 0 L o g i c a l l y , therefore, Judge Hackworth's p o s i t i o n 
i n t h i s l i g h t i s the cor r e c t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the law a t t h a t 
time, i . e . , before 1900 and immediately a f t e r the g r e a t war. 1 1 
8 D i g e s t of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1946), Vol. I I , Chap. V I I , p. 
393, 8.169. 
9Lauterpacht, The Problem of J u r i s d i c t i o n a l Immunities of 
Foreign S t a t e s (1951) 28 BYIL. 
1 0The Parlement Beige (1880), Mighell v. the Sult a n of 
Johore (1894), IQB. The Porto Alexandra (1920) p. 20; The 
C r i s t i n a (1938) AC 485 per Lord Wright's Benzzi Bros. Co. v. SS 
Pesaro (1926) 271 US 562. Ex parte Peru (1943) 318 US 578. 
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman (1945) 324 US 30. The notion of 
absolute sovereign c l e v e r l y enunciated by Chi e f J u s t i c e Marshall 
i n 1812 seemed to have paved the way f o r the formation of cum 
sensu of judges i n the common law world. 
1 1See S u c h a r i t k u l , State Immunities and Trading A c t i v i t i e s 
(1959). S i n c l a i r , op. c i t . N.C.H. Dunbar, C o n t r o v e r s i a l 
Aspects of Sovereign Immunity i n the Case Law of S t a t e s (1971) 
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True, the t r e n d s which are already c l e a r i n the study of 
p u b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l law with r e s p e c t to the concept of 
sovereign immunity l o g i c a l l y are not mere b i r t h pangs of a new 
l e g a l order. These trends i n the r e a l sense are the harbinger 
of fundamental problems which w i l l a r i s e one a f t e r another i n 
search f o r a l e g a l s o l u t i o n t h a t perhaps w i l l command the opinio 
juris the world over. I t i s submitted t h a t any piecemeal 
attempt or halfway house attempt to r e s o l v e the problem of s t a t e 
immunities and commercial a c t i v i t i e s on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l plane, 
u n r e a l i s t i c a l l y but not e c l e c t i c a l l y , w i l l consume so much time 
and resources t h a t l i t t l e w i l l be l e f t f or other, some would 
say, e q u a l l y p r e s s i n g l e g i t i m a t e problems of concern i n 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. T h i s contention ex hypothesi cannot be 
disputed i n view of the f a c t that only very few t o p i c s i n public 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law of r e c e n t memory have given r i s e to a 
multitude of l i t e r a t u r e and controversy more than the subject of 
sovereign immunity. 1 2 
S i x years a f t e r the Second World War a leading E n g l i s h 
a u t h o r i t y , Dr. Lauterpacht, published a learned and i l l u m i n a t i n g 
a r t i c l e on the above s u b j e c t i n which he o f f e r e d an in-depth 
a n a l y s i s as regards the d i f f i c u l t i e s a s s o c i a t e d with the 
a p p l i c a t i o n of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity, the l e g a l b a s i s of s t a t e 
immunity and the p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s coupled with an admonition 
132 Hague R e c u e i l 197. 
1 2See I.M. S i n c l a i r , European Convention on State Immunity 
(1973) 22 ICLQ 154. 
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as to how to deal with the problems of j u r i s d i c t i o n a l immunities 
of sovereign s t a t e s . 1 3 So f a r i t appears h i s admonitions were 
not allowed to pass away l i k e an ex-cathedra gospel f o r i t has 
prompted many countries e i t h e r to modify the d o c t r i n e of 
absolute immunity 1 4 or to completely abandon i t to embrace the 
r e l a t i v e immunity r u l e . 1 5 Arguably, however, there e x i s t s i n the 
world non-uniformity i n the p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s as regards the 
doctrine of absolute immunity. 1 6 This dichotomy of p o l i c y 
between sovereign s t a t e s did not solve the problem but r a t h e r 
brought u n c e r t a i n t i e s and d i f f i c u l t i e s i n l i t i g a t i o n . 1 7 And t h i s 
c e r t a i n l y could be a t t r i b u t e d to the f a c t t h a t i n t h i s century 
the functions of the s t a t e i n terms of nation b u i l d i n g , i . e . , 
p u b l i c economic management, developmental economics, shipping, 
a i r l i n e s e r v i c e s , p o s t a l s e r v i c e s , banking, r a i l w a y s e r v i c e s , 
h e a l t h care, road building, town planning, have undergone 
dramatic changes. 1 8 Thus while i n some c o u n t r i e s c e n t r a l panning 
1 3Lauterpacht, op. c i t . , pp. 220-272. 
1 4 I b i d . a t 250-272. S p e c i f i c a l l y the Appendix to t h i s 
a r t i c l e g i v e s a good idea about the p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s i n some 
co u n t r i e s . 
1 5 I . Brownlie, P r i n c i p l e s of Pub l i c I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1990) 
416. 4th Ed. p. 326-329. 
1 6 I b i d . 
1 7 S u c h a r i t k u l , 149 Hague Recueil (1976, 1) 51-103. L a t e r , 
Sovereign Immunity: Substantiation of Claim (1955) 4 ICLQ 469-
475; Cohn, Immunity of Foreign Trading Governments (1957) 73 LQR 
26-40. B. Fensterwald, Sovereign Immunity and S o c i e t y Trading 
(1949-50) 63 Harvard LR 614. 
1 8See Brownlie, op. c i t . , at pp. 325-332. 
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i s preferred, others f o l l o w d e c e n t r a l i s e d planning based on free 
market economy. The m a n i f e s t a t i o n s with respect to c e n t r a l 
panning are c l e a r l y expressed i n the former USSR where the 
public s e c t o r was given g r e a t e r prominence i n n a t i o n a l economic 
planning. 1 9 T h i s c e n t r a l planning idea i s a l s o common i n the 
Third World or developing c o u n t r i e s , where the elements of f r e e 
e n t e r p r i s e can be s a i d to be a t t h e i r embryonic stage and 
therefore perhaps needed c e n t r a l panning u n t i l maturity or 
takeoff. 
I t i s i n s t r u c t i v e to note t h a t , before the coming into 
existence of the former USSR, as a r e s u l t of the S o c i a l i s t 
Revolution of 1917, governments of the v a r i o u s c o u n t r i e s of the 
world i n f a c t d i d not engage i n commercial a c t i v i t i e s on any 
considerable s c a l e or a p p r e c i a b l e degree, hence s t a t e s were ever 
ready to o f f e r immunity i n r e s p e c t to a l l a c t s of sovereign 
s t a t e s , be i t acta jure imperii or acta jure gestiones. Thus 
p r i o r to the advent of many c e n t r a l l y c o n t r o l l e d economies, 
immunity was a b s o l u t e . 2 0 S t a t e owned t r a d i n g corporations thus 
grew rampantly i n the Communist world and the T h i r d World 
p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r the Second World War, and t h i s may have 
prompted some c o u n t r i e s to embrace the r e s t r i c t i v e d o c t r i n e of 
immunity. Be t h i s as i t may, S i r Fitzmaurice argued f o r c e f u l l y 
thus. 
1 90sakwe (1982) 23 V i r g i n i a J I n t Law 13; T.A. Peterson and 
H.W. Hoyt, Foreign Sovereign Immunity—Community and S o c i a l i s t 
Organizations (1979) 9 Georgia Journal of I n t and Cont Law, 111. 
2 0See S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , note 11; and S i n c l a i r , op. 
c i t . , note 7. 
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" I t i s submitted that the f a c t t hat judgments rendered 
a g a i n s t s t a t e s cannot i n p r a c t i c e be enforced without the 
consent of the s t a t e concerned and that they are, moreover, 
v i r t u a l l y without even a moral e f f e c t , i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e r e i s a 
fundamental weaknesses i n the doctrine which seeks to draw a 
d i s t i n c t i o n between v a r i o u s c l a s s e s of s t a t e a c t s . The t r u t h i s 
t h a t a sovereign s t a t e does not cease to be a sovereign s t a t e 
because i t performs a c t s which a p r i v a t e c i t i z e n might perform. 
Consequently, any attempt to make i t answerable f o r i t s a c t i o n s , 
of whatever kind, i n courts other than i t s own c o u r t s , i s 
i n c o n s i s t e n t with i t s sovereignty, and t h i s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s 
made evident by the complete i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the judgments 
rendered." 2 1 
S i r Fitzmaurice i s of the opinion that a s t a t e i n r e a l i t y cannot 
be e f f e c t i v e l y impleaded or i n d i r e c t l y impleaded a g a i n s t i t s 
w i l l and t h i s he eloquently a t t r i b u t e d to the nature of 
sovereignty, as being perpetual and absolute and t h e r e f o r e 
cannot wither away i r r e s p e c t i v e of the nature of the a c t 
performed by the s t a t e . 
Another E n g l i s h s c h o l a r i n h i s e x p o s i t i o n on absolute 
immunity and r e s t r i c t i v e immunity o f f e r e d the f o l l o w i n g 
explanation. 
"The d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n which i s a n a t u r a l consequence of 
the e f f e c t of the r u l e of absolute immunity i s compounded by the 
f a c t t h a t s t a t e s applying the r u l e of absolute immunity enjoy no 
corresponding immunity from the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the c o u r t s of 
other s t a t e s which apply the r u l e of r e l a t i v e immunity. 
Although i t might be thought that the e x i s t i n g p o s i t i o n was more 
s a t i s f a c t o r y f o r s t a t e s which apply the r u l e of r e l a t i v e 
immunity, t h i s i s not n e c e s s a r i l y so. S t a t e s applying the r u l e 
of r e l a t i v e immunity of course enjoy an uncovenanted b e n e f i t i n 
the sense t h a t they are e n t i t l e d to plead and to be accorded 
immunity from the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the courts of s t a t e s applying 
the r u l e of a b s o l u t e immunity i n circumstances where the 
'absolute immunity' s t a t e would not, i n the mirror-image case, 
have been e n t i t l e d to a s s e r t immunity from the j u r i s d i c t i o n of 
courts of the r e l a t i v e immunity s t a t e . 2 2 
2 1See Fitzmaurice, op. c i t . , note 7 at pp. 120-121. 
2 2See S i n c l a i r , op. c i t . , note 12 at pp. 254-255. 
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I t i s observed th a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l law operates on a 
horizontal order without the presence of a l e g i t i m a t e 
supranational power or a u t h o r i t y and the prospect of maintaining 
order by s u b j e c t i n g a sovereign s t a t e to the j u r i s d i c t i o n of a 
foreign court without i t s consent i s l i k e l y to c r e a t e attendant 
problems of p o l i t i c a l t e n s i o n and p o s s i b l y acrimony. 2 3 The 
horizontal nature of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law t h e r e f o r e gives c o u n t r i e s 
the grounds to e i t h e r ignore judgments or simply argue that they 
be accorded immunity. T h i s can r i g h t l y be d e r i v e d from the 
p r i n c i p l e of independence, the e q u a l i t y and d i g n i t y of s t a t e s . 2 4 
These s t a t e s are simply t h e r e f o r e c l a i m i n g equal r i g h t s ex 
hypothesi, i n the peer community of c i v i l i z e d s t a t e s based on 
the p r i n c i p l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
B. The R a t i o n a l Foundation of S t a t e Immunity 
A s t a t e having been endowed with c o e r c i v e powers and 
recognised as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l person 2 5 enjoys immunity i n 
respect of i t s property, from s u i t and execution of the courts 
of other s t a t e s . 2 6 T h i s means t h a t a s t a t e cannot be impleaded 
i n the courts of another s t a t e without i t s express consent. The 
2 3Sornarajah (1982) 31 ICLQ 664. 
24De Haber v. The Queen of Portugal (1851) 17 QB 171; The 
Parlement Beige (1880) 5PD 197; P r i n c i p a l i t y of Monaco v. 
M i s s i s s i p p i (1934) 292 313; The C r i s t i n a (1938) AC 485. 
2 5Lauterpacht, Recognition i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1947) ; 
B l i x , 130 Hague R e c u e i l 587 (1970-11); Chen, The I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Law of Recognition (1951); Brownlie (1982) 53 BYIL 197. 
2 6The J u p i t e r (1924) p. 236, No. 1; The C r i s t i n a (1938) AC 
485. 
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s t a t e i s a means to an end, hence s t a t e immunity e x i s t s as a 
v e r i t a b l e consequence of sovereignty, and for that matter, i t i s 
not dependent upon any tenuous conditions as to v i t i a t e i t s 
absolute power both i n i t s l o c a l s e t t i n g and on the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l plane. 
Argument 
(1) The Supremacy of the Lo c a l Sovereign 
L o c a l sovereign power may be s a i d to represent the power 
to make laws backed by a l l the coercive powers i t ca r e s to 
employ. This means tha t the sovereign has the suprema potestas 
i n l o c a l matters and as such has superior authority over i t s 
powers of command. I t i s submitted that the Roman v e r s i o n of 
sovereignty d i d not o f f e r any l i m i t a t i o n s on the libertas of the 
s t a t e , 2 7 but i t would appear th a t Bodin i n h i s studies subjected 
the power of the sovereign to c e r t a i n important l i m i t a t i o n s . 2 8 
Proculus, f or example, o f f e r e d an important d e f i n i t i o n as 
f o l l o w s : "that nation i s f r e e which i s not s u b j e c t to any 
government of any other n a t i o n . " 2 9 The Romans th e r e f o r e 
expressed the essence of sovereignty by i t s endowed 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of independence sub j e c t only to the norms of the 
s t a t e , suis legibus uti. The Roman concept r e l a t i n g to 
sovereignty as the absolute power of the s t a t e over i t s people, 
27 Korowicz, op. c i t note 2 at pp. 7-8. 
28 I b i d pp. 8-9. • r 
29 I b i d , a t p. 6, c f . Korowicz. 
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t e r r i t o r y , and governmental machinery, without any l i m i t a t i o n 
from any e a r t h l y power can be l i k e n e d unto the p r i n c i p l e — 
princeps legibus solutus—or the E n g l i s h maxim, "The King can do 
no wrong," almost eq u a l l y a s s o c i a t e d with the h i s t o r i c a l epoch 
i n which most s t a t e s were r u l e d by kings and queens or personal 
sovereigns who by every measure p e r s o n i f i e d the s t a t e . 3 0 
These ideas give primacy to the supremacy of the l o c a l 
sovereign as follows: 
(1) That c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y a king cannot be sued i n h i s 
own court. 
(2) That no organ of the s t a t e can e x e r c i s e dominion over 
the crown through any j u d i c i a l means. 
(3) That impleading the King w i l l be a d i f f i c u l t process 
where one would simply be throwing h i s or her e f f o r t s 
unto uncharted seas without any n a v i g a t i n g f o r c e . 
The r u l e of sovereign immunity i s t h e r e f o r e the byproduct of 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and innate supremacy of the l o c a l s o v e r e i g n . 3 1 
And t h i s i s predicated on the i m p l i c i t notion t h a t i f the 
sovereign cannot be sued l o c a l l y , then i t s l o c a l determinate 
s u p e r i o r i t y be extended a l s o unto the i n t e r n a t i o n a l plane for 
3 0de Haber v. Queen of Portugal (1851) 17 QB 196; Mighen v. 
Sultan of Johore (1894) 1 QB; Kingdom of Rumania v. Guaranty 
T r u s t Co. (1918) 250 Fed. 341; Matsuyama and Sano v. The 
Republic of China (1928) Supreme Court of Japan. 
3 1George Sabine and Thomas Thorson, A H i s t o r y of P o l i t i c a l 
Theory (1973) pp. 348-385; Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan London 
(1651); Bertrand R u s s e l l , A H i s t o r y of Philosophy (1964) pp. 
54 6-557; Nassbaum, A Concise H i s t o r y of the Law of Nations 
(1962). 
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the sake of i t s d i g n i t y and independence. Thus to implead an 
independent sovereign s t a t e amounts to reducing i t s absolute 
a u t h o r i t y . There i s t h e r e f o r e demand for the p r a c t i c a l 
n e c e s s i t y of s t a t e immunity to avoid disrepute. These ideas 
prima facie were r e i n f o r c e d by Chief J u s t i c e Marshall i n the 
Schooner Exchange and l a t e r on approved i n E n g l i s h law. 3 3 A good 
i l l u s t r a t i o n i s c l e a r l y afforded by the dictum per B r e t t L J i n 
the Parlement Beige, as f o l l o w s : 
" I t has been f r e q u e n t l y s t a t e d that an independent 
s o v e r e i g n cannot be p e r s o n a l l y sued, although he has c a r r i e d on 
a p r i v a t e t r a d i n g adventure. I t has been held that an 
ambassador cannot be p e r s o n a l l y sued, although he had traded; 
and i n both c a s e s because such a s u i t would be i n c o n s i s t e n t with 
the independence and the e q u a l i t y of the s t a t e which he 
r e p r e s e n t s . " 3 4 
As can be gathered from the above passage, B r e t t L J was arguing 
t h a t immunity be granted to personal sovereigns and ambassadors 
because of the sovereignty of the independent s t a t e and the 
purported notion of t r a n s f e r r e d immunity i n respect of 
ambassadors. 
Again i n De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, the r u l e of 
absolute immunity was s t r o n g l y expressed by Lord Campbell CJ, 
thus. 
" I n the f i r s t p l a c e , i t i s q u i t e c e r t a i n , upon general 
p r i n c i p l e s , and upon the a u t h o r i t y of the case of the Duke of 
Brunswick v. King of Hanover, r e c e n t l y decided i n the House of 
Lords, t h a t an a c t i o n cannot be maintained i n an E n g l i s h court 
3 2 L . Oppenheim, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1912, 2nd ed.), Vol. 168; 
Dickinson, op. c i t . , pp. 100-188. 
3 3The Parlement Beige (1880) 5 PD 197; Vavasseur v. Krupp 
(1880) 5 PD. 
3 4(1880) 5 PD 197, a t p. 220. 
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a g a i n s t a foreign potentate f o r anything done or omitted to be 
done by him i n h i s p u b l i c c a p a c i t y as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the 
nation of which he i s the head; and t h a t no E n g l i s h c o u r t has 
j u r i s d i c t i o n to e n t e r t a i n any complaints a g a i n s t him i n t h a t 
c a p a c i t y . . . . To c i t e a f o r e i g n potentate i n a m u n i c i p a l c o u r t 
f o r any complaint a g a i n s t him i n h i s p u b l i c c a p a c i t y , i s 
c o n t r a r y to the law of n a tions and an i n s u l t which he i s 
e n t i t l e d to r e s e n t . " 3 5 
The p r a c t i c e whereby a f o r e i g n s t a t e i s impleaded before a 
domestic court i n the 19th century d i d not f i n d favour with 
statesmen and judges a l i k e , f o r i t was b e l i e v e d then to be an 
i n s u l t to the regal d i g n i t y of the s o v e r e i g n . 3 6 There are 
t h e r e f o r e i n the main adequate reasons founded on the a t t r i b u t e s 
of sovereignty to j u s t i f y immunity from s u i t s , save where under 
s p e c i a l circumstances the sovereign i n i t s own r i g h t s submits or 
waives the s a i d immunity. The U.S. C o n s t i t u t i o n , i . e . , the 
Eleventh Amendment, t o t a l l y i n f l u e n c e d by f e d e r a l p r i n c i p l e s 
geared towards the p r o t e c t i o n of the S t a t e s of the Union a f f o r d s 
an i n d i s p u t a b l e foundation f o r the concept of immunity. And 
t h i s i s c l e a r l y supported by Hamilton when he a s s e r t e d t h a t 
" I t i s inherent i n the nature of s o v e r e i g n t y , not to be 
amenable to the s u i t of an i n d i v i d u a l without i t s c o n s e n t . " 3 1 
Indeed, these ideas i n respect of the supremacy of the sovereign 
can be traced to the w r i t i n g s of Bodin, Hobbes, Proculus, 
Grotius and V a t t e l . 3 8 Although the w r i t i n g s of these s c h o l a r s 
3 5 (1851) 17 QB 121 at pp. 206-207. 
3 6 I b i d . 
3 7See The F e d e r a l i s t Papers, no. 81 (a c l a s s i c American 
theory on the science of government). 
3 8See Dickinson, op. c i t . 
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d i d not cover s p e c i f i c a l l y sovereign immunity, at l e a s t 
i m p l i c i t l y t h e i r p h i l o s o p h i e s c l e a r e d the unbeaten path for the 
maxim jurisdictio inhaeret cohaeret, adhaeret imperio to come to 
the fore, f o r s e r i o u s consideration and a n a l y s i s before 
municipal c o u r t s , and f i n a l l y to be r e c e i v e d i n t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law. 3 9 
C. (2) Diplomatic Immunities and State Sovereignty 
N e c e s s i t y i s the b a s i s of diplomatic immunity and i t s true 
essence i s to be found i n the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e functions of an 
envoy. I n t e r n a t i o n a l law t h e r e f o r e confers on diplomats, 
immunity from the j u r i s d i c t i o n of another s t a t e , because of the 
consequence of s t a t e sovereignty. The p r i n c i p l e of diplomatic 
immunities dates back to ancient times. Grotius may thus be 
c r e d i t e d with h i s thought-provoking expositions on the l e g a l 
p o s i t i o n of the embassy and the l o g i c a l reasons for giving 
diplomats immunity. 4 0 T h i s idea of diplomatic immunity l o g i c a l l y 
can be p r e d i c a t e d on the concept of t r a n s f e r r e d immunity. And 
Professor O'Connell i n respect of t h i s s u b j e c t o f f e r s an 
i n s i g h t f u l e x p l a n a t i o n thus. 
"An a l t e r n a t i v e t h e s i s , which appealed to the eighteenth 
century i n p a r t i c u l a r , i s t h a t the immunity of a diplomat i s a 
t r a n s f e r r e d immunity of h i s sovereign, and i s to be explained as 
a m a n i f e s t a t i o n of s o v e r e i g n d i g n i t y . The diplomat stands for 
the s o v e r e i g n , as h i s agent and s u b s t i t u t e i n the n e g o t i a t i o n of 
3 9The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden and Others (1812) 7 
Cranch; The Parlement Beige (1880) 5 PD 197; Le Governement 
Espagnol v. Cassaux 22 Jan. 1849 c. 1849, 1-5, 7; The 
C o n s t i t u t i o n (1879) 4 PD 39. 
4 0See O'Connell, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, Vol. 2 (1970) p. 888. 
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a c t s of s t a t e , and hence i s i n v e s t e d with the same degree of 
p r i v i l e g e as the prince whom he r e p r e s e n t s . " 4 1 
O'Connell's t h e s i s thus a l l u d e d to seemed not d i f f e r e n t 
from the argument posited by Dr. S u c h a r i t k u l i n 1959, when he 
s a i d that, 
"The r e l a t i o n between these p r i n c i p l e s f i n d s o c c a s i o n a l 
e x p r e s s i o n i n the theory t h a t the immunities enjoyed by 
sovereigns and ambassadors belong u l t i m a t e l y to the s t a t e s they 
represent which i s fu r t h e r r e f l e c t e d i n the case of d i p l o m a t i c 
agents i n the r u l e that diplomatic immunities can on l y be waived 
by an a u t h o r i s e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the f o r e i g n government and 
with the l a t t e r ' s a u t h o r i s a t i o n . " 4 2 
I f the p o s i t i o n s taken by these s c h o l a r s be c o r r e c t and l o g i c a l , 
then common sense c e r t a i n l y w i l l r e v o l t i f immunity i s denied to 
sovereign s t a t e s which, according to i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, are the 
source of the appointment of ambassadors. Thus i f ambassadors 
of States were accorded immunity i n t h e i r c a p a c i t y as envoys of 
s t a t e s or fore i g n sovereigns, 4 3 then by i m p l i c a t i o n s t a t e s a l s o 
ought to be accorded or given the same degree of immunity f o r i n 
r e a l i t y these ambassadors are appointed by the sove r e i g n and can 
ther e f o r e be removed, r e c a l l e d or reappointed to other c o u n t r i e s 
a t the whim and caprice of the sovereign. A f o r t i o r i , immunity 
cannot be denied to the "power" t h a t i n the eyes of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s the l e g i t i m a t e source of the appointment of 
ambassadors. This argument i s being put f o r t h because the r u l e 
of diplomatic immunity i s w e l l nigh s e t t l e d . 
4 1 I b i d . 
4 2 S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , note 22, a t p. 24. 
4 3 I b i d . 
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H i s t o r i c a l l y , the p r i n c i p l e s of diplomatic immunity 
precedes the concept of immunity of s t a t e s 4 4 and although 
regulated by somewhat d i f f e r e n t p r i n c i p l e s , have had some 
in f l u e n c e on the development of the law of s t a t e immunity, 4 5 
which i n turn has given r i s e to the foundational argument of 
t r a n s f e r r e d immunity, s i n g u l a r l y manifested by the accepted 
notion of sovereign d i g n i t y . By the weight of these arguments, 
i t i s submitted t h a t the source of the law of sovereign immunity 
de r i v e s s i g n i f i c a n t l y from the d e c i s i o n s of municipal courts and 
p a r t l y a l s o from the p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s c l e a r l y d e rived from the 
law of diplomatic immunities. 4 6 
Lord Hewart C J i n an attempt to s e t the record s t r a i g h t i n 
Dickinson v. Del S o l a r , 4 7 where a s u i t was brought against a 
foreign mission f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r y caused by a car owned and 
driven by the S e c r e t a r y of the Peruvian Legation, r u l e d that 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law does not accord immunity from " l e g a l 
l i a b i l i t y " but only g i v e s allowance of immunity from the l o c a l 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . And t h a t the immunity accorded to a diplomat i s a 
p r i v i l e g e , not of i t s own power but of the power of the 
sovereign by whom he i s by law duly recognised and given 
a c c r e d i t a t i o n . 4 8 The ambassador i n t h i s l i g h t i s regarded as the 
4 4 I b i d . a t 23. 
4 5 I b i d . 
4 6 I b i d . 
4 7 (19 3 0) 1 KB 376. 
4 8 I b i d . 
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r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the sovereign and therefore impleading him by 
the r u l e s of customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law simply amounts to 
impleading the sovereign. 4 9 This theory f i n d s e x p r e s s i o n i n the 
1815 Congress of Vienna (Annex XVII of the Acts of the Congress, 
19 March 1915). 
D. Comity of Nations, R e c i p r o c i t y and Peaceful Coexistence 
The c l a s s i c a l notion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
where immunity i s given i r r e s p e c t i v e of the circumstances f i n d s 
expression i n the customary r u l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and the 
patent r u l e of r e c i p r o c i t y backed by the need f o r p e a c e f u l 
coexistence of s t a t e s . 
Thus Chief J u s t i c e Marshall, when confronted w i t h the 
questions r e l a t i n g to mutual b e n e f i t and peaceful c o e x i s t e n c e of 
s t a t e s , took a persuasive and appealing stance as f o l l o w s : 
"This p e r f e c t e q u a l i t y and absolute independence of 
sovereigns, and t h i s common i n t e r e s t i m p e l l i n g them to mutual 
i n t e r c o u r s e , and an exchange of good o f f i c e s with each other, 
have given r i s e to a c l a s s of cases i n which every s o v e r e i g n i s 
understood to waive the e x e r c i s e of a p a r t of t h a t complete 
e x c l u s i v e t e r r i t o r i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n , which has been s t a t e d to be 
the a t t r i b u t e of every n a t i o n . " 5 0 
J u s t i c e Marshall's reasoning, prima facie, i s i n consonant with 
the quest for promoting peaceful and mutual i n t e r c o u r s e among 
s t a t e s , coupled with an appeal for mutual r e s p e c t and entente 
cordiale. Thus the assumption of j u r i s d i c t i o n over a f r i e n d l y 
4 90'Connell, op. c i t . , at pp. 887-998; S u c h a r i t k u l , op. 
c i t . , note 11 at 24-29. 
5 0Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon and Others (1812) 7 Cranch 
136-137. 
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nation amounts to a b l a t a n t d i s r e s p e c t or d i s r e g a r d f o r the 
d i g n i t y of the f o r e i g n s t a t e , which i n p o l i t i c a l and l e g a l terms 
could be construed to mean a v i o l a t i o n of an e s t a b l i s h e d f a i t h 
i n comity or the r e l e g a t i o n to the background of the r i g h t s of 
the s t a t e i n question. While on the other hand, the p r i n c i p l e 
of o f f e r i n g immunity to f o r e i g n s t a t e s without doubt i s 
absolutely grounded on the notion of comity with the hope of 
promoting f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s i n order to avoid the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of confrontation or d i s r e p u t e . 5 1 Furthermore, the o b l i g a t i o n of 
domestic courts not to e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n over foreign s t a t e s 
i s a matter s u f f i c i e n t l y r e s p e c t e d and wholly derived from s t a t e 
p r a c t i c e , which has s i n c e then become customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law. 5 2 
An important argument u s u a l l y p o s i t e d i n support of the 
doctrine of absolute immunity i s that according to the 
p r e v a i l i n g r u l e s of p u b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i t i s impossible to 
enforce execution by means of s e i z u r e a g a i n s t a foreign s t a t e , 
i n which case the e x e r c i s e of j u r i s d i c t i o n w i l l be an empty 
attempt of doing the impossible, even i f the reasons for t a k i n g 
j u r i s d i c t i o n are r a t i o n a l l y conditioned on a c t s jure gestionis.53 
Judge Lauterpacht, i n o f f e r i n g an argument i n support of 
the doctrine of immunity of s t a t e s , had t h i s to say. 
5 1 I b i d . 
5 2The Porto Alexandre (1920), p. 30 (The Ingbert) ; The 
Pesaro (1921) 77 F 473; S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , note 11 at 355. 
"Lauterpacht, op. c i t . , a t 222-226. 
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"The main argument i n favour of absolute immunity from 
j u r i s d i c t i o n has been the view that what has been considered the 
only a l t e r n a t i v e to absolute immunity, namely, e x e r c i s e of 
j u r i s d i c t i o n based on the d i s t i n c t i o n between a c t s j u r e 
g e s t i o n i s and a c t s j u r e i m p e r i i , i s impossible of d e f i n i t i o n and 
t h e r e f o r e of a p p l i c a t i o n . Apart from the f a c t t h a t i t 
d i s r e g a r d s the t h i r d a l t e r n a t i v e , namely, the g e n e r a l 
abandonment of immunity, that argument appears to be, and 
probably i s , d e c i s i v e . Courts of d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s and 
o c c a s i o n a l l y c ourts of the same country have t r e a t e d the same 
kind of a c t i v i t y i n d i f f e r e n t ways." 5 4 
I t must be borne i n mind, however, that the d i f f e r e n c e 
between the jurisprudence of s t a t e s that adhere to absolute 
immunity and r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i s l i k e l y to be a breeding 
ground for making enforcement of judgments d i f f i c u l t and 
f r u s t r a t i n g , and given the u n c e r t a i n t i e s regarding t h i s s u b j e c t 
matter, the defendant s t a t e w i l l simply ignore the judgment i n 
order to p r o t e c t i t s d i g n i t y among the community of s t a t e s . One 
p o s i t i v e impact, however, of such attempts could be l i k e n e d unto 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of the whole matter giving way to a di p l o m a t i c 
n e g o t i a t i o n , f o r the dispute to be r e s o l v e d . 5 5 The notion of 
comity i s conditioned upon the patent concept of r e c i p r o c i t y 
which i n turn lends support to the r u l e of absolute immunity, 
whereby an atmosphere of give and take i s promoted and pres e r v e d 
i n the name of humanity. This i d e a l notion of p e a c e f u l 
i n t e r c o u r s e among s t a t e s , I presume, might have i n f l u e n c e d 
J u s t i c e Marshall to r u l e i n favour of France. 
54 I b i d , a t 222-223. 
3 I b i d . 
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E. The E q u a l i t y of S t a t e s i n the Sphere of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law 
One v i a b l e r a t i o n a l foundation of sovereign immunity stems 
from the e s s e n t i a l nature of s t a t e e q u a l i t y i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law. But i n order for t h i s concept to have any l e g a l b a s i s , i t 
must coalesce with such f a c t o r s or i d e a s as sovereignty, 
independence and d i g n i t y of s t a t e s . 5 6 The fundamental a t t r i b u t e 
of the s t a t e as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l person cannot be a t t a i n e d 
without the presence of the above mentioned f a c t o r s . Thus 
without sovereignty there w i l l be no s t a t e and without an 
independent s t a t e there w i l l be no s o v e r e i g n t y power. Hence f o r 
a s t a t e to achieve e q u a l i t y with other s t a t e s on the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l plane, i t must be ultra-comprehensive with a 
determinate supreme power, which means ther e must be no higher 
power over the s t a t e both from w i t h i n and without. In r e a l i t y , 
i t i s by v i r t u e of these a t t r i b u t e s t h a t a s t a t e i s accorded an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l p e r s o n a l i t y or r e c o g n i s e d by a community of s t a t e s 
as equal to other s t a t e s i n the eyes of the law. 5 7 
True, an equal cannot put p r e s s u r e to bear on another 
equal. 5 8 Any attempt by a s t a t e to downplay the v a l i d i t y of t h i s 
proposition can le a d to s e r i o u s consequences of p o l i t i c a l 
5 6 S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , note 17 a t 117. 
5 7Brownlie (1982) 53 BYIL 197; Chen, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law of 
Recognition (1951) . 
5 8Schooner Exchange v. McFadden and Others (1812) 7 Cranch; 
The Parlement Beige (1880) 5 PD 197; M i g h e l l v. Sultan of Johore 
(1894) 1 QB; The Porto Alexandre (1920) p. 30 (The Ingbert) ; The 
C r i s t i n a (1938) AC 485; The Arantzazu Mendi (1939) AC 256. 
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embarrassment and p o l i t i c a l t e n s i o n or protest, hence the maxim 
par in parem non habet imperium. 
The theory of n a t u r a l e q u a l i t y was f i r s t analysed i n the 
w r i t i n g s of the famous E n g l i s h philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, i n 
h i s book, The Leviathan, which t h e r e a f t e r was studied, followed 
and f u r t h e r developed by Pufendorf. 5 9 This h i s t o r i c a l f a c t 
appears to have been overlooked or misconstrued by some s c h o l a r s 
who, having r e l i e d on a l e s s a u t h e n t i c source a t t r i b u t e d the 
o r i g i n of the p r i n c i p l e to G r o t i u s . 6 0 Any such conclusion i s i n 
e r r o r f o r although Grotius f l i r t e d with the idea, i t w i l l be 
h i s t o r i c a l l y untenable to p o s t u l a t e that he was the f a t h e r of 
the concept. A c a r e f u l reading of Hobbes as already s t a t e d 
elsewhere would show that h i s system was i n a n t i t h e s i s to t h a t 
of the system of G r o t i u s , 6 1 as regards h i s methods and 
p r i n c i p l e s . 
Pradier-Fodere, a leading 19th century expert on G r o t i u s , 
i n h i s w r i t i n g s d i d not a t t r i b u t e the p r i n c i p l e of s t a t e 
e q u a l i t y to G r o t i u s , 6 2 but r a t h e r intimated that G r o t i u s 
c oncentrated on the r e c o g n i t i o n of the r i g h t s of s e l f -
p r e s e r v a t i o n , property and the l e g a l p o s i t i o n of the embassy of 
s t a t e s . Ward, i n h i s study of t h i s subject, concluded t h a t : 
5 9 D i c k i n s o n , op. c i t . , at pp. 75-84. 
6 0 I b i d . a t pp. 35-67. 
6 1 I b i d . a t p. 70, 69-75, 75-86. 
6 2 I b i d . at 51. (See p a r t i c u l a r l y Dr. Dickinson's 
e x p l a n a t i o n i n footnote 2 i n respect of the controversy 
regarding the c o n t r i b u t i o n of Grotius to the n a t u r a l e q u a l i t y of 
s t a t e theory.) 
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"This theory, though o f t e n s t a t e d , and b e a u t i f u l l y 
a m p l i f i e d by the ancient poets, seems f i r s t t o have been thought 
of as the foundation of a system of law, by Hobbes, i n h i s 
famous book c a l l e d The Leviathan, i n which t h e r e i s so much to 
admire and so much to condemn. I t was adopted, and c o n s i d e r a b l y 
enlarged by Pufendorf, and i n s t a n t l y approved of by w r i t e r s 
without number." 6 3 
Professor Dickinson i n a thorough study of the s u b j e c t a l s o 
concluded that: 
"The t r a n s l a t i o n of the theory of n a t u r a l e q u a l i t y i n t o 
the law of nations o r i g i n a t e d with and was f i r s t d e f i n i t e l y 
s t a t e d by the n a t u r a l i s t s , whose i n s p i r a t i o n was found i n the 
w r i t i n g s of Thomas Hobbes and whose l e a d e r i n the seventeenth 
century was Samuel Von Pufendorf." 6 4 
The p o s i t i o n thus a l l u d e d to i s i m p l i c i t l y supported by 
Professor Dunning as follows: 
"Pufendorf's system r e v e a l s most d i s t i n c t l y the i n f l u e n c e 
of h i s two great predecessors, and i n g e n e r a l i t may be s a i d to 
be d i r e c t e d toward a c o n c i l i a t i o n of t h e i r c o n f l i c t i n g views. 
Where h i s philosophy i s concerned with the concepts of e t h i c s , 
he c l e a r l y leans to the p r i n c i p l e s of G r o t i u s ; where he takes up 
more purely p o l i t i c a l t o p i c s , the Hobbesian d o c t r i n e assumes the 
more conspicuous p l a c e . 6 5 
I t i s i n s t r u c t i v e to note th a t Pufendorf was g r e a t l y aided i n 
the development of the p r i n c i p l e of s t a t e e q u a l i t y as f a r as the 
law of nations i s concerned by the Hobbesian premises or Hobbes' 
anthropomorphic d e s c r i p t i o n of the s t a t e . 6 6 For Hobbes arguably 
l i k e n e d the concept of the s t a t e of nature, which i n h i s system 
was presumed to e x i s t i n a community of men, unto the s c i e n t i f i c 
6 3 I b i d . , 80-81 ( r e f e r p a r t i c u l a r l y to footnote 2 ) , c i t e d 
from Dr. Dickinson's work. 
64 I b i d , at p. 69. 
6 5I.N.A. Dunning, A H i s t o r y of P o l i t i c a l Theories from 
Luther to Montesquieu, New York, 1905, p. 318. 
6 6Dickenson, op. c i t . , a t p. 79. 
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reasoning based on the r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t a t e s which i n turn 
l o g i c a l l y or s e m a n t i c a l l y uncovered the d o c t r i n a l precepts of 
e q u a l i t y of s t a t e s . 6 7 Thus by s u b s t i t u t i n g the words " s t a t e s " 
for "men" i n h i s system based on such t h e o r i e s as the s t a t e of 
nature, n a t u r a l r i g h t and n a t u r a l e q u a l i t y , Hobbes managed to 
l a y the foundation of the d o c t r i n e of fundamental r i g h t s of 
s t a t e s as f o l l o w s : 
"Which speaking of the duty of s i n g l e men we c a l l n a t u r a l , being 
a p p l i e d to whole c i t i e s and n a t i o n s , i s c a l l e d the r i g h t of 
n a t i o n s . And the same elements of n a t u r a l law and r i g h t , which 
have h i t h e r t o been spoken of, being t r a n s f e r r e d to whole c i t i e s 
and n a t i o n s , may be taken for the elements of the laws and the 
r i g h t s of n a t i o n s . " 6 8 
Arguably Hobbes 1 opinion appears to follow the idea t h a t 
the law of nature and the law of nations were the same thing and 
t h i s was a b s o l u t e l y subscribed to by Pufendorf. These ideas 
have markedly con t r i b u t e d to the development of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law, e s p e c i a l l y i n the area of the p r a c t i c e of s t a t e as regards 
the r u l e of law i n r e s p e c t of equal treatment of s t a t e s . 
These p r i n c i p l e s were f u r t h e r developed by Wolff, whose 
t h e o r i e s found favour with Emerich de V a t t e l . 6 9 Like h i s 
predecessors, V a t t e l followed the same l i n e of thinking but 
perhaps i n a more f o r c e f u l manner thus: 
" S i n c e n a t i o n s are f r e e , independent, and equal, and each 
has the r i g h t to decide i n i t s conscience what i t must do to 
f u l f i l i t s d u t i e s , the e f f e c t of t h i s i s to produce, before the 
world a t l e a s t , a p e r f e c t e q u a l i t y of r i g h t s among nations i n 
67 I b i d , a t 75-76, 75-89. 
"Dominion, pp. x i v , 4, i n E n g l i s h Works, I I 186 ( c f . 
Dickenson), p. 75. 
6 9Dickenson, op. c i t . , at p. 97. 
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the conduct of t h e i r a f f a i r s and i n the p u r s u i t of t h e i r 
p o l i c i e s . The i n t r i n s i c j u s t i c e of t h e i r conduct i s another 
matter which i t i s not for others to pass upon f i n a l l y : so t h a t 
what one may do another may do, and they must be regarded i n the 
s o c i e t y of mankind as having equal r i g h t s . " 7 0 
The contention that p h i l o s o p h i c a l w r i t i n g s of s t a t e e q u a l i t y i n 
the past found a p p l i c a t i o n i n case law of the 19th or 20th 
c e n t u r i e s cannot ex hypothesi be d i s p u t e d i n view of 
developments i n case law i n America, England and other European 
c o u n t r i e s . This i s c l e a r l y evidenced by C J M a r s h a l l ' s t h e s i s i n 
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, where he followed p a r t l y or 
wholly the w r i t i n g s of the n a t u r a l i s t and e c l e c t i c s of the past 
thus. 
"The world being composed of d i s t i n c t s o v e r e i g n t i e s 
p o s s e s s i n g equal r i g h t s and equal independence, whose mutual 
b e n e f i t i s promoted by i n t e r c o u r s e with each other, and by an 
interchange of those good o f f i c e s which humanity d i c t a t e s and 
i t s wants require a l l sovereigns have consented to a r e l a x a t i o n , 
i n p r a c t i c e , i n cases under c e r t a i n p e c u l i a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s , of 
t h a t absolute and complete j u r i s d i c t i o n w i t h i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e 
t e r r i t o r i e s which sovereignty c o n f e r s . 
This p e r f e c t e q u a l i t y and a b s o l u t e independence of 
sovereigns and t h i s common i n t e r e s t i m p e l l i n g them to mutual 
i n t e r c o u r s e , and an exchange of good o f f i c e s w i t h each other 
have given r i s e to a c l a s s of cases i n which e v e r y s o v e r e i g n i s 
understood to waive the e x e r c i s e of a p a r t of t h a t complete 
e x c l u s i v e t e r r i t o r i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n which has been s t a t e d to be 
the a t t r i b u t e of every s t a t e . " 7 1 
S i m i l a r expressions regarding the e q u a l i t y of s t a t e s i n 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law can also be found i n Le Gouvernement Espagnol 
c. Cassaux i n 18 4 9 7 2 and t h e r e a f t e r a l s o i n the c l a s s i c dictum of 
7 0 C f . Dickenson at p. 98. 
7 1 (1812) 7 Cranch 136-137. 
7 222 January 1849 Dalloz 1849, p. 5. 
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B r e t t L J i n the Parlement Beige of 1880. 7 3 Although ample traces 
of the concept can w e l l be discerned i n a considerable number of 
municipal c o u r t d e c i s i o n s , 7 4 i t i s appropriate to explain further 
that the concept cannot stand on i t s own without the support of 
the p r i n c i p l e s of s o v e r e i g n t y and independence. Thus a l l these 
p r i n c i p l e s must c o a l e s c e i n l o g i c a l terms i n order to add 
support to the l e g a l b a s i s of absolute immunity. The s a i d idea 
has two-dimensional consequences and t h a t i s , i t a t t r i b u t e s by 
every measure to sovereign s t a t e s the same r i g h t s and i n turn 
imposes upon these s t a t e s the same measure of obligations and 
perhaps d u t i e s . E v e r y s t a t e , according to these p r i n c i p l e s , 
t herefore has equal r i g h t s , but these r i g h t s must be seen as a 
general l i m i t a t i o n geared towards the p r e s e r v a t i o n of orderly 
conduct of s o v e r e i g n s t a t e s . The immunity of sovereign s t a t e s 
from s u i t i s t h e r e f o r e a matter of give-and-take, t e c h n i c a l l y 
and p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y conditioned by law, usage and i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . 
F. B e n e f i c i a r i e s of S t a t e Immunities 
Having d e a l t with the r a t i o n a l foundation of sovereign 
immunity, i t i s i n order now to explore the b e n e f i c i a r i e s of 
these immunities, so as to l a y bare under what s p e c i f i c 
73 (1920) p. 30, The Ingbert. 
7 4See S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , note 11; S i n c l a i r , op. c i t . , 
note 7. 
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conditions a foreign s t a t e be accorded immunity or be exempted 
from the j u r i s d i c t i o n of a l o c a l court. 
Generally speaking, s t a t e immunities are considered 
procedural and therefore p r i m a r i l y f a l l w i t h i n the c o n f i n e s of 
p u b l i c and p r i v a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. I n other words, the power 
of a domestic court or a l o c a l forum to determine whether i t has 
j u r i s d i c t i o n over a p a r t i c u l a r l e g a l controversy i s prima f a c i e 
a question of p r i v a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and t h i s notion i s 
wholly p r e d i c a t e d on whether the s u b j e c t matter a t i s s u e i s 
properly a s s o c i a t e d with a foreign element. 7 5 Thus the p l e a f o r 
immunity which emanates from the p r i n c i p l e s of p u b l i c 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law would have to be explored with r e s p e c t to the 
lex fori, a concept a l l too w e l l a s s o c i a t e d with p r i v a t e 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. This then takes us unto another plane where 
a t t e n t i o n must be drawn to immunity ratione personae, t h a t i s , 
when a foreign sovereign s t a t e i s d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d as regards 
s u i t s and immunity ratione materiae, which r e f e r s to a process 
whereby a f o r e i g n s t a t e ' s property i s at i s s u e . 
7 5See Cheshire and North, P r i v a t e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (12th 
ed. 1992); Dicey and Morris, C o n f l i c t of Law (12th ed. 1993); 
Beal, T r e a t i s e on the C o n f l i c t of Laws (1935). 
"The c o n f l i c t of laws i s a n e c e s s a r y p a r t of the law of every 
country because d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s have d i f f e r e n t l e g a l systems 
c o n t a i n i n g d i f f e r e n t l e g a l r u l e s , w h i l e p u b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l law 
seeks p r i m a r i l y to r e g u l a t e r e l a t i o n s between d i f f e r e n t 
s o v ereign s t a t e s . Nevertheless, some o v e r l a p e x i s t s , f o r 
example, the t o p i c s of sovereign and d i p l o m a t i c immunity from 
s u i t s and government s e i z u r e of p r i v a t e property" 
by the l a t e Dr. Morris, C o n f l i c t of Law (1993) pp. 1-2. E d i t e d 
by J.D. McClean. 
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The lex fori, a l l u d e d to above, must be considered i n 
regard to j u r i s d i c t i o n , s i n c e immunity i n t h i s l i g h t r e f e r s to 
the exemption of the person of the sovereign from the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of another s t a t e , 7 6 hence the notion t h a t immunity 
be granted to s t a t e s s p e c i f i c a l l y has nothing to do with l o c a l 
substantive laws. Which means that procedural and remedial 
r u l e s of the s t a t e and p u b l i c p o l i c y are r a t h e r very important 
f a c t o r s to consider when confronted with i s s u e s i n respect of 
sovereign immunity, i . e . , p r i v a t e claims a g a i n s t f o r e i g n s t a t e s 
i n domestic c o u r t s . 
Immunities r i g h t f u l l y accorded to sovereign s t a t e s cover a 
wide but i n t e r e s t i n g spectrum of i n s t i t u t i o n s and persons. 
These immunities t e c h n i c a l l y are accorded e s p e c i a l l y , as already 
stated, due to the a t t r i b u t e s of the s t a t e . For s t a t e s qua 
invicem in statu naturali vivunt, i n r e a l i t y must have 
fundamental r i g h t s as regards equal treatment i n foreign 
j u r i s d i c t i o n s . And the enjoyment of equal treatment by s t a t e s 
i n foreign j u r i s d i c t i o n s must be rec i p r o c a t e d , because i n the 
absence of r e c i p r o c i t y the e f f e c t of comity w i l l simply be 
relegated to the bottom or destroyed. 
State immunity may be extended to s t a t e s even i f there i s 
an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t the s t a t e i s being i n d i r e c t l y impleaded, 
i . e . , when the s t a t e i s not being sued i n i t s own name. In t h i s 
respect, one i s a l l u d i n g to s u i t s a g a i n s t the government, i t s 
7 6Porto Alexandre (1920) p. 30 (The Ingbert) ; The C r i s t i n a 
(1938) AC 485; United S t a t e s of America and Republic of France 
v. D o l l f u s Mieg e t C i e SS v. Bank of England 1952 AC 582. 
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head of s t a t e , m i n i s t r i e s , s ubsidiary organs, s t a t e agencies or 
i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s , and other i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t can be 
c h a r a c t e r i s e d as government e n t i t y i n the performance of 
everyday governmental functions. I t i s worth noting t h e r e f o r e 
t h a t personal sovereigns or heads of s t a t e s enjoy the same 
degree of immunities normally extended to s t a t e s , ratione 
personae and ratione materiae. In Mighell v. S u l t a n of Johore, 7 7 
the defendant, a potente having been sued f o r a breach of 
promise to marry a young lady, prayed i n h i s defence t h a t 
immunity be granted to him because of h i s p o s i t i o n as a S u l t a n 
of Johore, then a B r i t i s h protectorate. I t was h e l d t h a t the 
co n c l u s i v e c e r t i f i c a t i o n by the foreign c o l o n i a l o f f i c e as 
regards the s t a t u s of the sultan as a sovereign, precluded the 
court from e x e r c i s i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n , although i t was c l e a r the 
t e r r i t o r y r e f e r r e d to was not t o t a l l y independent of the B r i t i s h 
crown. This d e c i s i o n shows i n r e a l i t y that a f o r e i g n sovereign 
cannot be impleaded i n En g l i s h courts. T h i s same l i n e of 
reasoning found a p p l i c a t i o n i n the Duke of Brunswick v. the King 
of Hanover, 7 8 and was fu r t h e r extended i n De Haber v. Queen of 
P o r t u g a l , 7 9 r e s p e c t i v e l y . The law, however, of l a t e has taken a 
d i f f e r e n t t u r n . 8 0 A c a r e f u l reading of the Harvard D r a f t 
Convention shows i t included sovereigns and heads of s t a t e s 
7 7 (1894) 1 QB. 
7 8 (1844) ch. 107 13 L J . 
7 9 (1851) 17 QB 196. 
8 0 (1976) 2 I MLR 214. 
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under one r u b r i c , t h a t i s , the " s t a t e . " T h i s aspect of the 
subject thus was made simple i n r e s p e c t of the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of 
st a t e f u n c t i o n a r i e s , which means sovereign immunity and s t a t e 
immunity can a p p r o p r i a t e l y be r e f e r r e d to interchangeably. But 
one must be e c l e c t i c i n view of the concept of dual p e r s o n a l i t y 
of the s t a t e , a concept c l e a r l y introduced i n t o I t a l i a n 
p r a c t i c e 8 1 somewhere i n 1882, which a f t e r the second world war 
had found favour with most judges and w r i t e r s i n Continental 
European c o u n t r i e s . 8 2 
State immunity has a l s o been extended to r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 
of government. T h i s a s p e c t of the law i s much older and might 
have a t t a i n e d uniformity of p r a c t i c e , and may have i n many 
respects over the years e x e r c i s e d some i n f l u e n c e on the 
development of s t a t e immunity. 8 3 Government r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s such 
as diplomatic agents, members of s p e c i a l missions, delegates 
representing the s t a t e on i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s , consular 
o f f i c e r s and many other s t a t e i n s t i t u t i o n s d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to 
the conduct of f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , are th e r e f o r e duly accorded 
immunities i n re s p e c t of a c t s performed on beh a l f of the s t a t e s 
they represent. 
In t h i s regard i t would be apposite or appropriate to 
consider or explore the degree to which the concept of s t a t e 
immunity has been covered by the r u l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, or 
8 1See S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , note 11 at 233. 
8 2 I b i d . 
8 3 I b i d . a t 23-24. 
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more s p e c i f i c a l l y , by conventions. The following are the areas 
so f a r covered by conventions. 8 4 
(1) B r u s s e l s Convention for the u n i f i c a t i o n of c e r t a i n 
r u l e s r e l a t i n g to immunity of state-owned v e s s e l s 
(1926) . 
(2) The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic R e l a t i o n s (1961) . 
(3) The New York Convention on S p e c i a l Mission (1969). 
(4) The Vienna Convention on the representation of s t a t e s 
i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n to i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of 
u n i v e r s a l c h a r a c t e r (1975) , and the European 
Convention on s t a t e immunity with a d d i t i o n a l p r o t o c o l 
(1972), thereto. 
I t would appear th a t a l l these conventions r e f e r r e d to 
above, except the European Convention, give due regard to the 
use of s t a t e property s i t u a t e d i n foreign s t a t e s f o r the purpose 
of conducting foreign a f f a i r s , without any i n t e r f e r e n c e from the 
r e c e i v i n g s t a t e . 8 5 These r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of government therefore 
enjoy s t a t e immunities i n t h e i r personal ca p a c i t y , which by 
custom i s s p e c i f i c a l l y p r e d i c a t e d on the duration of t h e i r 
appointment. 8 6 These immunities remain i n t a c t u n l e s s i t i s 
o f f i c i a l l y waived by the sending s t a t e . I n the absence of a 
waiver, a s t a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e cannot be made amenable to the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of the r e c e i v i n g s t a t e . Furthermore, immunity 
8 4See J . Bouchez (1979) NYIL, Vol. 10, p. 3. 
8 5 I b i d . 
8 6 S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , note 17 at pp. 121-124. 
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ratione materiae, covering the performance of governmental 
duties by an envoy or government r e p r e s e n t a t i v e u s u a l l y s u r v i v e s 
the tenure of t h e i r appointment. 8 7 I n short, i t i s denoted or 
r e f e r r e d to as diplomatic immunity and thus d e r i v a t i v e of the 
s t a t e . 
One other area t h a t deserves to be mentioned i s 
j u r i s d i c t i o n a l immunities and t h i s covers not only aspects of 
immunities from the j u d i c i a l process of a s t a t e , but a l s o covers 
such important areas as immunities from the e x e r c i s e of a l l 
j u r i d i c a l powers of a domestic court i n r e s p e c t of o f f i c i a l 
j u d i c i a l review or examination of i s s u e s r e l a t i n g to the s t a t e 
or i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , f o r example, "a process," orders, 
appearance as a witness, and judgment of cour t s i n v i o l a t i o n of 
a l o c a l law. 8 8 What i s being put a c r o s s here i s that the l o c a l 
court based on r u l e s r e l a t i n g to sovereign immunity, be i t 
t r a n s f e r r e d or not, cannot e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n over a foreign 
s t a t e . There i s th e r e f o r e a r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e immunity from the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of domestic co u r t s or l o c a l c o u r t s . 
These immunities a l s o cover immunity from a r r e s t , immunity 
from execution, immunity from s e a r c h and i n v i o l a b i l i t y and tax 
p r i v i l e g e s . 8 9 So i n essence one can c l e a r l y argue that the 
submission to a l o c a l j u r i s d i c t i o n does not mean the property of 
a foreign s t a t e can be attached i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of s a t i s f y i n g an 
8 7 I b i d . , O'Connell, op. c i t . , a t pp. 887-938. 
8 8 S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , note 17 a t p. 122. 
8 9 I b i d . at pp. 122-123. 
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adverse j u r i d i c a l d e c i s i o n , for such a process can be cumbersome 
and t o t a l l y an a f f r o n t to the d i g n i t y of the s t a t e being 
s u b j e c t e d to measures of e x e c u t i o n . 9 0 Granted t h i s , then no 
measure of execution against the properties of a f o r e i g n 
sovereign s t a t e can be allowed under i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, given 
the t h r u s t and force of the d o c t r i n e of s t a t e immunity. But i t 
would appear th a t some s t a t e s are now modulating t h e i r 
p o s i t i o n s , although there i s no c l e a r - c u t a u t h o r i t y i n 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law to support such a c t i o n s . 
P r a c t i c e i n the Matter of Sovereign Immunity 
Sovereign Immunity—Claims to Immunity i n E n g l i s h Courts 
Overview 
Once upon a time E n g l i s h courts applied the r u l e of 
a b s o l u t e immunity to the l e t t e r without any q u a l i f i c a t i o n s i n 
r e s p e c t of a c t i o n s both i n personam and i n rem, r e s p e c t i v e l y . 9 1 
T h i s means t h a t a t common law, a foreign s t a t e could not be 
impleaded d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y before E n g l i s h courts without 
i t s consent. 9 2 Thus i n the 19th century and perhaps for almost 
9 0The law i n t h i s r e s p e c t was maintained as an a u t h o r i t y 
u n t i l r e c e n t l y when the Tate l e t t e r was i s s u e d i n the United 
S t a t e s followed by the 1976 FSIA, which i n c l e a r terms does not 
f o l l o w the s a i d a u t h o r i t y anymore. The ILC reports seemed not 
c l e a r on t h i s s u b j e c t , but appear to have d e a l t with i t i n great 
d e t a i l . I n short, however, member countries are not a l l agreed 
as to whether a f o r e i g n s t a t e ' s property be s u b j e c t to 
e x e c u t i o n . 
9 1See S i n c l a i r , op. c i t . , note 7 at pp. 121-127; The Porto 
Alexandre (1920) p. 30; The C r i s t i n a (1938) AC 485; Kahan v. 
P a k i s t a n Federation (1951) 2K 13 1003. 
9 2Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover (1844) 6 Beav 1, 2HLC 
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the greater part of the 20th century the d o c t r i n e of absolute 
immunity became the order of the day whereby f o r e i g n s t a t e s were 
accorded t o t a l immunity i r r e s p e c t i v e of whether the a c t i v i t i e s 
i n question be governmental, non-governmental or commercial. In 
other words, what appears to be embraced by E n g l i s h c o u r t s stems 
from a reasonable and appealing stance t h a t recognised s t a t e s of 
equal status and standing cannot have t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s r e s o l v e d 
or canvassed i n the l o c a l courts of one or the other, hence the 
propo s i t i o n that immunity be given to f o r e i g n s t a t e s to avoid 
d i s r e p u t e . These r u l e s have s i n c e become p a r t of E n g l i s h common 
law. 9 3 I t i s to be noted, however, t h a t e f f o r t s i n c h a r t e r i n g 
the unbeaten path to e s t a b l i s h i n g the ab s o l u t e immunity doc t r i n e 
was not c l e a r - c u t , but was r a t h e r met with doubts and 
u n c e r t a i n t i e s . 
(1) A Survey,of E a r l y E n g l i s h P r a c t i c e 
The two most w e l l c i t e d a u t h o r i t i e s i n support of absolute 
immunity i n E n g l i s h l e g a l p r a c t i c e were The Parlement Beige and 
The Porto Alexandre. I n The Parlement Beige, the court of 
appeals reversed S i r Robert P h i l l i m o r e ' s d e c i s i o n a t the f i r s t 
i n s t a n c e thus: 
"As a consequence of the a b s o l u t e independence of every 
sovereign s t a t e to r e s p e c t the independence and d i g n i t y of every 
other sovereign s t a t e , each and every one d e c l i n e s to e x e r c i s e 
by means of i t s courts any of i t s t e r r i t o r i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n over 
the person of any s o v e r e i g n . " 9 4 
1. 
" C r i s t i n a (1938) AC 485. 
9 4 (18 8 0 ) 5 PD 197, 217. 
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The court of appeals thus l a i d much emphasis on the 
e q u a l i t y of every sovereign i n the a s s o c i a t i o n of c i v i l i s e d 
s t a t e s as can be gathered from i t s r a t i o , but the d e c i s i o n i n 
Parlement Beige to be sure was i n f l u e n c e d by Lord Towell's 
d e c i s i o n i n The P r i n s Frederik, which as a matter of p r i n c i p l e 
got i t s i n s p i r a t i o n from Chief J u s t i c e Marshall's t h e s i s . The 
Porto Alexandre, as i t i s w e l l known, l a i d the foundation f o r 
the triumph of absolute immunity. 9 5 The case concerned a German 
p r i v a t e l y owned v e s s e l p r e v i o u s l y named Ingbert, which by some 
means got l a w f u l l y adjudged by the Portuguese P r i z e Court and 
t h e r e a f t e r r e q u i s i t i o n e d by the Portuguese Government, but was 
l a t e r determined to be e x c l u s i v e l y employed i n commercial 
a c t i v i t i e s i n the c a r r i a g e of f r e i g h t . In view of t h i s 
evidence, H i l l J , however, d e c l a r e d himself bound by the 
Parlement Beige a u t h o r i t y and t h e r e f o r e d e c l i n e d j u r i s d i c t i o n by 
s e t t i n g a s i d e the w r i t i n rem a g a i n s t the s a i d ship. Absolute 
immunity i n rem thus appeared to be c l e a r l y s e t t l e d i n E n g l i s h 
law. 9 6 I t must, however, be explained that these two d e c i s i o n s 
were handed down by the court of appeals and therefore could be 
r e v e r s e d by the House of Lords i f need be. Furthermore, i t 
would appear co n s i d e r a b l e s c e p t i c i s m loomed large i n respect of 
the d e c i s i o n . I n other words, the ratio decidendi i n The Porto 
Alexandre d i d not f i n d favour with the majority at large. I n 
s p i t e of the c o n s i d e r a b l e doubts expressed, the p r i n c i p l e of 
9 5See S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , note 11 at 66-71. 
9 6 P o r t o Alexandre (1920) p. 20. 
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absolute immunity was made the order of the day or more r e a d i l y 
confirmed on numerous subsequent occasions by E n g l i s h Courts, 
arguably s l a n t e d towards a c t i o n s i n rem than a c t i o n s i n 
personam. y 7 The acceptance or adherence to the d o c t r i n e of 
absolute immunity continued or was more c l e a r l y debated and 
st a t e d i n the C r i s t i n a . 9 8 The C r i s t i n a d e a l t with i s s u e s 
concerning ownership, possession and c o n t r o l . L e t us f o r a 
moment consider the f a c t s of the case. There a s h i p c a l l e d the 
C r i s t i n a , belonging to a duly c o n s t i t u t e d Spanish shipping 
company, Compania Naviera Vascongado which had been r e g i s t e r e d 
and c a r r y i n g on business at Bilbao, was soon to dock a t the port 
of C a r d i f f . I t so happened t h a t s h o r t l y before the a r r i v a l of 
the s a i d s h i p but a f t e r she had s t a r t e d her voyage from the port 
of Spain, a decree was passed by the Spanish Government 
r e q u i s i t i o n i n g a l l v e s s e l s r e g i s t e r e d a t the port of B i l b a o . I n 
the l i g h t of t h i s decree, and a c t i n g on the express i n s t r u c t i o n s 
of the Spanish government, the Spanish consul, r e s i d e n t a t 
C a r d i f f a t that time, went on board the C r i s t i n a and by the 
a u t h o r i t y reposed i n him by the s a i d decree d i s m i s s e d the master 
and put a new master i n h i s place or i n charge of the s h i p . The 
ap p e l l a n t s thereupon issued a w r i t i n rem c h a l l e n g i n g or 
claiming possession of the C r i s t i n a , as s o l e owners. The 
Spanish government i n response t h e r e t o entered a c o n d i t i o n a l 
See Higgins, Recent Developments i n Law of Sovereign 
Immunity i n the United States (1977) A J I L 71, p. 423. 
9 8 (1938) AC 485. 
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appearance as the r i g h t f u l owner of the C r i s t i n a and gave notice 
t h a t the w r i t be s e t a s i d e for i t impleaded a foreign s t a t e . 
The House of Lords having taken pains to review the i s s u e s ruled 
i n favour of the Spanish government, thus s e t t i n g aside the w r i t 
and a l l other subsequent proceedings thereof. Lord Atkin, i n 
h i s judgment a n a l y s e d the doctrine of absolute sovereignty of 
s t a t e s , as f o l l o w s : 
"The foundation f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n to s e t a s i d e the w r i t 
and a r r e s t of the s h i p i s to be found i n two p r o p o s i t i o n s of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law e n g r a f t e d i n t o our domestic law which seem to 
me to be w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d and to be beyond d i s p u t e . T h i s f i r s t 
i s t h a t the c o u r t s of a country w i l l not implead a foreign 
sovereign, t h a t i s , they w i l l not by t h e i r p rocess make him 
a g a i n s t h i s w i l l a p a r t y to l e g a l proceedings whether the 
proceedings i n v o l v e p r o c e s s a g a i n s t h i s person or seek to 
recover from him s p e c i f i c property or damages. 
The second i s t h a t they w i l l not by t h e i r process, 
whether the s o v e r e i g n i s a p a r t y to the proceedings or not, 
s e i z e or d e t a i n p r o p e r t y which i s h i s or of which he i s i n 
p o s s e s s i o n or c o n t r o l . There has been some d i f f e r e n c e i n the 
p r a c t i c e of n a t i o n s as to p o s s i b l e l i m i t a t i o n s of t h i s second 
p r i n c i p l e as to whether i t extends to property only used for the 
commercial purposes of the sovereign or to p e r s o n a l p r i v a t e 
property. I n t h i s country i t i s i n my opinion w e l l s e t t l e d that 
i t a p p l i e s to b o t h . " 9 9 
T h i s formulation of the law regarding sovereign immunity 
was accepted by the House of Lords as d e f i n i t i v e and hence was 
a p p l i e d i n subsequent c a s e s . 1 0 0 But i t appears very c l e a r that 
not a l l t h e i r l o r d s h i p s were ready to go as f a r as Lord Atkin i n 
h i s e x p o s i t i o n of the s u b j e c t i n i s s u e . Lord Maugham, i t would 
appear, was h e s i t a n t , while Lords Thankerton and Macmillan 
" I b i d . 
100c JSee N.C.H. Dunbar, 132, Hague R e c u e i l 203 (1971) 1 258-
350. 
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questioned the a u t h o r i t y of The Porto Alexandre, whether i t was 
based on adequate reasoning. 1 0 1 Lord Macmillan, i n order to 
avoid allowing h i s heart to control h i s head, took i s s u e with 
t h i s e l u s i v e question as to whether the a p p l i c a t i o n of the 
precept of p u b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l law r e l a t i n g to absolute 
immunity i s j u s t i f i e d or w e l l s e t t l e d i n the p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s . 
He then warned t h a t 
" I t i s manifestly of the h i g h e s t importance t h a t the 
c o u r t s of t h i s country before they give the f o r c e of law w i t h i n 
t h i s realm to any doctrine of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law should be 
s a t i s f i e d t h a t i t has the hallmarks of g e n e r a l a s s e n t and 
r e c i p r o c i t y . " 1 0 2 
The d e c i s i o n handed down by Lord At k i n seemed not 
d i f f e r e n t from t h a t of H i l l J i n the J u p i t e r , an e a r l i e r case 
adjudged most important i n E n g l i s h p r a c t i c e i n r e s p e c t of 
absolute immunity. There, H i l l J , i n attempt to j u s t i f y h i s 
d e c i s i o n , r u l e d thus: 
"The motion to s e t a s i d e the w r i t i s based on the 
a s s e r t i o n t h a t the J u p i t e r i s the property of the Union. . . . 
The w r i t i s a w r i t i n rem . . . i t i s a w r i t which compels the 
owner e i t h e r to appear and submit to the j u r i s d i c t i o n or to 
allow judgment against h i s property to go by d e f a u l t . I n t h e s e 
circumstances, the ship being Russian and the R u s s i a n Sovereign 
a s s e r t i n g p roperty i n her and being u n w i l l i n g to submit to the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of the court, t h i s court has no j u r i s d i c t i o n to 
e n t e r t a i n proceedings against t h a t property or to i n v e s t i g a t e 
the a s s e r t i o n t h a t the ship i s the property of the R u s s i a n 
S o v e r e i g n . " 1 0 3 
1 0 1 C r i s t i n a (1938) AL 485. 
1 0 2 I b i d . a t 497. 
1 0 3The J u p i t e r (1924) p. 236, no. 1, c f . Dunbar, op. c i t . , 
p. 290. 
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On appeal the judgment of H i l l J was duly affirmed. 
Bankes L J (as he then was) supported the p o s i t i o n taken by H i l l 
J , thus 
" H i l l J has s e t a s i d e the w r i t , i n my opinion r i g h t l y , on 
the grounds which he expressed, I t h i n k a c c u r a t e l y . " 1 0 4 
Scrutton L J a l s o supported the s a i d d e c i s i o n without question i n 
the following formulated manner. 
" I t i s agreed t h a t the Union has been recognised de j u r e 
and de facto by the B r i t i s h Government. I t appears to me 
without going any f u r t h e r , without i n v e s t i g a t i n g whether the 
c l a i m i s good or bad, t h a t the c o u r t on h e a r i n g t h a t statement 
made to i t must d e c l i n e j u r i s d i c t i o n . " 1 0 5 
Thus i n view of the f a c t t h a t the Soviet Union has been 
recognised by the B r i t i s h government coupled with the f a c t that 
the USSR o f f e r e d proof of ownership of the J u p i t e r , persuaded 
the court to d e c l i n e j u r i s d i c t i o n . These cases i l l u s t r a t e the 
consistency of E n g l i s h c o u r t s i n d e c l i n i n g to e x e r c i s e 
j u r i s d i c t i o n over f o r e i g n sovereign s t a t e s based on the doctrine 
of absolute immunity e a r l i e r on e s t a b l i s h e d i n the 1880 case of 
the Parlement Beige. 
I t i s of the g r e a t e s t i n t e r e s t to note, however, that the 
doctrine of absolute immunity became shaky a f t e r 1938 and has 
since t h a t time been f i g h t i n g a l o s i n g b a t t l e , but as can be 
r e c a l l e d , i t took some time before the r e l a t i v e or r e s t r i c t i v e 
1 0 4C.F. Dunbar, op. c i t . , p. 291. 
1 0 5 I b i d . a t 292. See g e n e r a l l y the d e c i s i o n handed down by 
Atkin L J i n the J u p i t e r d e a l i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y with ownership 
control and p o s s e s s i o n (mere a s s e r t i o n was the watchword). 
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d o c t r i n e of immunity was given i t s r i g h t f u l p lace i n E n g l i s h 
law. 1 0 6 
A Look at Post-Second World War Cases 
B r i t a i n d i d not give up i t s continued acceptance of the 
doc t r i n e of absolute immunity a f t e r the war. However, i t d i d 
not take long before the shortcomings of the d o c t r i n e of 
absolute immunity became apparent. 1 0 7 Many i n f a c t s t a r t e d 
questioning the r a t i o n a l e behind the absolute immunity r u l e and 
whether i t s l e g i t i m a c y could p o s s i b l y be supported by cogent 
reasoning. This was followed by a gradual d i s q u i e t as regards 
the unchallenged r u l e of absolute immunity. 
In order to c l e a r the unbeaten path as regards these 
e l u s i v e i s s u e s , i t i s suggested that e a r l y post-war cases t h a t 
s t i l l followed e a r l i e r a u t h o r i t i e s i n E n g l i s h p r a c t i c e need to 
be considered. 
The question as to whether a p u b l i c corporation can be so 
incorporated as a p u b l i c e n t i t y to be t r u l y accorded immunity 
was the s u b j e c t or the i s s u e of contention i n K r a j i n a v. Tass 
Agency. 1 0 8 There the Court of Appeal a f t e r a c a r e f u l review of 
a l l the evidence, r u l e d that immunity be accorded to Tass 
Agency. Cohen L J , having been influenced by an American case 
law, argued th a t 
1 0 6The P h i l i p p i n e Admiral (1977) AC 373 JC; Trendtex Trading 
Corp. v. C e n t r a l Bank of Nigeria (1977) QB 529 (CA); I Congreso 
d e l Partido (1981) 3 WLR 329 (HL) . 
1 0 7The P h i l i p p i n e Admiral (1977) AL 373 JC. 
1 0 8 (19 4 9 ) 2 A l l E R 274. 
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"A sovereign government may so i n c o r p o r a t e a p a r t i c u l a r 
department of s t a t e as to make i t p l a i n t h a t i t i s to be an 
ordinary t r a d i n g , commercial or b u s i n e s s a c t i v i t y and not to be 
par t of the s t a t e so t h a t i t can c l a i m immunity, but I think i t 
would be wrong to i n f e r from these a u t h o r i t i e s , and I should 
not, without f u r t h e r argument, be prepared to accept the view, 
that i t n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w e d t h a t , because a department of s t a t e 
was granted i n c o r p o r a t i o n , i t was deprived thereby of the r i g h t 
to a s s e r t i t s sovereign immunity i n f o r e i g n c o u r t s . " 1 0 9 
He further s t a t e d c l e a r l y t h a t 
" I t h i n k t h a t t u r n s upon what I have a l r e a d y s a i d , t h a t , 
i n my view, the defendants do e s t a b l i s h t h a t Tass was, and i n 
essence i s , a department of s t a t e to the n e c e s s a r y extent to 
s h i f t the onus of proving t h a t they were a sepa r a t e l e g a l e n t i t y 
to the p l a i n t i f f . That onus, i n my opinion, he has f a i l e d to 
discharge. For these reasons I t h i n k t h a t the d e c i s i o n of 
Birkett J was r i g h t and ought to be a f f i r m e d . " 1 1 0 
In the l i g h t of the tone of the judgment, one i s convinced 
to the f u l l e s t extent t h a t the judgment h e r e i n s t a t e d appears to 
follow a w e l l s e t t l e d E n g l i s h law i n r e s p e c t of the law r e l a t i n g 
to domestic corporations, f o r nothing i n the judgment seemed to 
be influenced by any other p e r t i n e n t independent f a c t o r s i n 
r u l i n g i n favour of the Tass Agency except the a u t h o r i t y of 
Eng l i s h Acts of Parliament or perhaps c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law and the 
i n t e r n a l laws of the country i n i s s u e , i . e . , USSR. 
Again i n t h i s case the shortcomings of the doctrine of 
absolute immunity were made known by Singl e t o n L J . 
" I c onfess t h a t I do not know what those words mean. 
They are not e q u i v a l e n t t o s a y i n g t h a t Tass i s a l e g a l e n t i t y . 
I f they were, the p o s i t i o n might be d i f f e r e n t . So f a r as I can 
see there i s no precedent f o r extending immunity to a corporate 
body c a r r y i n g on b u s i n e s s i n t h i s country, and I should wish f or 
109 (1949) 2 A l l E R 274. 
J I b i d . 
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f u r t h e r argument before deciding that i t could be so 
extended." 1 1 1 
As can be gathered from the above passage, Singleton L J 
simply appears to be t a k i n g i s s u e with the e x i s t i n g a u t h o r i t y 
e a r l i e r on e s t a b l i s h e d i n The Porto Alexandre and other cases 
t h a t followed i t s a u t h o r i t y . His argument thus seemed to take a 
r a d i c a l p o s i t i o n . 
Another important case worthy of consideration i s the 
United S t a t e s and the Republic of France v. Dollfus Mieg e t Cie 
and the Bank of England. 1 1 2 There the heart of the i s s u e before 
the court was whether France, the UK and the United S t a t e s 
having s e t up a T r i p a r t i t e Commission for the r e s t i t u t i o n of 
monetary gold for enforcing the terms of Part I I I of a purported 
agreement signed by the duly c o n s t i t u t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the 
18 A l l i e d governments a f t e r the war could p o s s i b l y a s s e r t 
immunity i n view of the demand made by the p l a i n t i f f s t h a t the 
64 gold bars i n i s s u e be returned. Jenkins J . , the judge a t 
f i r s t i n s t a n c e , stayed a l l proceedings i n order to avoid the 
i n t e r f e r e n c e with the r i g h t of possession and c o n t r o l of the 
choses i n a c t i o n of the three sovereign s t a t e s involved. 
D o l l f u l Mieg thereupon appealed to the court of appeals where 
the judgment of the t r i a l judge was reversed i n view of the 
mistaken d i s p o s a l of 13 of the 64 gold bars i n question. On a 
f u r t h e r appeal to the House of Lords, Jenkins J's judgment was 
X 1 1 l b i d . at 274, 279. 
1 1 2 (1951) ch. 33. 
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restored. Lord J o w i t t took time to c o n s i d e r the i s s u e s i n the 
following l i g h t . 
" I agree with Jenkins J . i n t h i n k i n g t h a t the f a c t t h a t 
the foreign governments had the immediate r i g h t to p o s s e s s i o n of 
the 64 bars made i t i m p o s s i b l e , c o n s i s t e n t l y with the 
e s t a b l i s h e d p r i n c i p l e of E n g l i s h law r e l a t i n g to s t a t e immunity, 
for r e l i e f to be given i n t h i s a c t i o n by o r d e r i n g the d e l i v e r y 
up of the bars or by g r a n t i n g an i n j u n c t i o n r e s t r a i n i n g the bank 
from p a r t i n g with t h e i r p o s s e s s i o n ; f o r i f e i t h e r of these 
courses were taken i t would be n e c e s s a r y f o r the f o r e i g n 
governments to take proceedings i n t h i s country i f they wanted 
to recover the gold here. 
The d o c t r i n e of immunity should not, I t h i n k , be confined 
to those cases i n which the f o r e i g n s o v e r e i g n was e i t h e r 
d i r e c t l y i n p o s s e s s i o n of pr o p e r t y by h i m s e l f or at l e a s t 
i n d i r e c t l y by h i s s e r v a n t s , f o r i f i t were so confined the 
doctrine would not be a p p l i c a b l e to the cas e of any bailment. I 
can f i n d nothing i n any decided c a s e to support any such 
l i m i t a t i o n . We have been r e f e r r e d to c e r t a i n American c a s e s , 
which I have considered w i t h c a r e , but I do not t h i n k t h a t any 
of these cases a f f o r d s any j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r such a l i m i t a t i o n 
of the d o c t r i n e of sovereign immunity as i s here sought to be 
intro d u c e d . 1 , 1 1 3 
He then went on by arguing thus: 
" I f i t were so l i m i t e d the r e s u l t would be t h a t i f the 
foreign sovereign deposited h i s bag or h i s j e w e l l e r y with the 
rai l w a y or with the h o t e l or with the bank, proceedings could be 
taken against the b a i l e e , c l a i m i n g the d e l i v e r y of the a r t i c l e 
which had been deposited by or on b e h a l f of t h a t s o v e r e i g n . 1 , 1 1 4 
Professor Dunbar i n h i s c o l l e c t e d course a t the Hague analysed 
the Dollfus Mieg case and i n c o n c l u s i o n s a i d t h a t "there seems 
to be no tertium quid f o r the g r a n t i n g of immunity." 1 1 5 In t h i s 
respect who i s r i g h t , P r ofessor Dunbar or Lord E a r l J o w i t t ? A 
1 1 3 (1952) AC 605; th a t i s when the case was appealed (House 
of Lords). 
1 1 4 I b i d . a t 67. 
1 1 5See Dunbar, op. c i t . , a t p. 333. 
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debate on t h i s i s s u e c e r t a i n l y w i l l give an i n t e r e s t i n g reading 
but t h a t should not detain us at t h i s juncture. 
The E n g l i s h j u d i c i a r y over the years have had the occasion 
to apply the d o c t r i n e of immunity without any q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , 
but i t would appear t h a t i t s a u t h o r i t y i n one way or the other 
was questioned i n the case of Juan Ysmael and Co. v. Government 
of the Republic of I n d o n e s i a . 1 1 6 There the i s s u e that f e l l to be 
c o n s i d e r e d by the P r i v y C ouncil was what degree of 
s u b s t a n t i a t i o n of a foreign s t a t e ' s claim to t i t l e or i n t e r e s t 
i n property be accepted or recognised i n order to grant 
immunity. I t was h e l d th a t the Government of Indonesia f a i l e d 
to prove i t s i n t e r e s t i n the Steamship Tasikmalaja as to warrant 
her being impleaded hence the appeal accordingly was stayed and 
the judgment of the Appeal Court of Hong Kong was set aside with 
an admonition t h a t the other questions r a i s e d i n the appeal be 
considered. Lord J o w i t t i n h i s judgment offered the following 
e x p l a n a t i o n . 
of i t s c l a i m i s s u f f i c i e n t has the advantage of being l o g i c a l , 
and simple i n a p p l i c a t i o n , but i t may lead to a very grave 
i n j u s t i c e i f the c l a i m a s s e r t e d by the foreign government i s i n 
f a c t not maintainable and the view of Scrutton L J has not found 
favour i n subsequent c a s e s . " 1 1 7 
I n a quest to explore the i s s u e s a t stake Lord Jowitt c i t e d 
Compania Naviera Vascongado v. SS C r i s t i n a i n which Lord Wright 
had expressed h i s doubts o b i t e r with the authority i n i s s u e , 
"The view t h a t a bare a s s e r t i o n by a foreign government 
116 (1955) AC 72 reported i n ILR, 1954, p. 95. 
117 I b i d . 531. 
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coupled with Lord Maugham candid r e j e c t i o n of the Scrutton 
t h e s i s . In a further attempt to o f f e r an e x p o s i t i o n on the 
present i s s u e Lord Jowitt r e f e r r e d to H a i l e S e l a s s i e v. Cable 
and Wireless L t d . 1 1 8 where the Court of Appeal re f u s e d to st a y 
the a c t i o n , thus accepting the view c a n d i d l y expressed by Lord 
Maugham i n the C r i s t i n a , 1 1 9 r e q u i r i n g more proof as a 
p r e r e q u i s i t e to claiming immunity. For Lord Maugham "a mere 
cla i m by a foreign government i s not enough." This was c a r r i e d 
a stage further i n embracing Godden L J ' s p o s i t i o n i n the 
Arantzazu Menai case where the learned Judge (as he then was) 
s t a t e d more c l e a r l y that 
"Where a c l a i m f o r immunity i s made by a f o r e i g n 
sovereign i t i s not enough t h a t h i s c l a i m should be a bare 
a s s e r t i o n of r i g h t or a mere c l a i m . " 1 2 0 
The j u d i c i a l d i s q u i e t expressed i n Juan Ysmael & Co. Ltd. v. 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia a l l u d e d to above c l e a r l y 
manifested i t s e l f i n Baccus SRL v. S e r v i c e N a t i o n a l d e l T r i g o . 1 2 1 
I n t h a t case although a claim of immunity was upheld, Singleton 
L J took i s s u e with the judgment of Jenkins L J and Parker L J as 
fol l o w s : 
" I cannot f i n d t h a t i t has been almost u n i v e r s a l l y 
recognised t h a t i f a government s e t s up a l e g a l e n t i t y , 
something which may c o n t r a c t on i t s own b e h a l f as a l i m i t e d 
company does i n t h i s country, i t can succeed i n a c l a i m f o r 
1 1 8 (1938) 1 Ch 545 No. 1 
1 1 9 (1938) A 485. 
1 2 0 (1939) AC 256. 
1 2 1 (1957) 1 QB 438. 
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s o v e r e i g n immunity i n r e s p e c t of the a c t i v i t i e s of that company 
or e n t i t y . " 1 2 2 
Lord Denning i n one of h i s sagacious l e g a l reasonings, 
managed somehow to draw a t t e n t i o n to the unreasonable r e l i a n c e 
on the shaky a u t h o r i t y of the doctrine of absolute immunity i n 
E n g l i s h p r a c t i c e , although he a r r i v e d at the same r e s u l t as the 
r e s t of h i s c o l l e a g u e s on the bench i n respect of the i s s u e s 
before them. At l e a s t he was able to break the myth surrounding 
E n g l i s h a u t h o r i t i e s i n regard to absolute immunity. Thus i n 
Rahemtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad, 1 2 3 the main i s s u e was whether a 
b e n e f i c i a l t i t l e to a debt can be i n v e s t i g a t e d by a l o c a l court, 
where the l e g a l t i t l e to the debt i s s i t u a t e d , that i s , i f the 
sovereign s t a t e i n i s s u e claims immunity even though i t c l e a r l y 
does not purport to l a y claim to the b e n e f i c i a l t i t l e to the 
debt. The House of Lords upheld the c l a i m of immunity i n 
r e s p e c t of the f a c t t h a t the appellant was an agent of the 
Government of P a k i s t a n . Again, although Lord Denning reached 
the same c o n c l u s i o n , he o f f e r e d a f o r c e f u l and c r i t i c a l judgment 
questi o n i n g the l e g i t i m a t e b a s i s of the E n g l i s h r u l e of absolute 
sovereignty i n t h i s w e l l formulated manner. 
"There i s no agreed p r i n c i p l e except t h i s : that each 
s t a t e ought to have proper r e s p e c t f o r the d i g n i t y and 
independence of other s t a t e s . Beyond t h a t p r i n c i p l e there i s no 
common ground. I t i s l e f t to each s t a t e to apply the p r i n c i p l e 
i n i t s own way: and each has a p p l i e d i t d i f f e r e n t l y . 1 , 1 2 4 
2 I b i d . a t p. 461. 
3 (1957) 3 A l l ER. 
" i b i d , a t p. 461. 
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Furthermore, one finds great strength i n Lord Denning's argument 
thus: 
" I n a l l c i v i l i z e d c o u n t r i e s there has been a p r o g r e s s i v e 
tendency towards making the sovereign l i a b l e to be sued i n h i s 
own c o u r t s notably i n England by the Crown Proceedings A c t s , 
1947. Foreign sovereigns should not be i n any d i f f e r e n t 
p o s i t i o n . There i s no reason why we should g r a n t to the 
departments or agencies of f o r e i g n governments an immunity which 
we do not grant our own, provided always t h a t the matter i n 
d i s p u t e a r i s e s within the j u r i s d i c t i o n of our c o u r t s and i s 
p r o p e r l y cognizable by them." 1 2 5 
For Lord Denning, he was t r y i n g to b r i n g up some p o i n t s which 
w i s e r heads i n the future may attempt to s e t t l e . 1 2 6 
In Mellinger v. New Brunswick Development C o r p o r a t i o n , 1 2 7 the 
court of appeal upheld a claim of sovereign immunity on the 
ground th a t the defendant corporation was duly proved to be an 
arm of the government i n question, i . e . , the province of New 
Brunswick. 
I n Thai-Europe Tapioca S e r v i c e L t d v. Government of 
P a k i s t a n , 1 2 8 Lord Denning again continued h i s e r o s i o n of the 
a u t h o r i t y of absolute immunity i n r e s p e c t of h i s o b i t e r 
observations i n which he explored the m o d a l i t i e s of the 
r e s t r i c t i v e doctrine. Although the court d i s m i s s e d the appeal 
i t d i d not speak with one v o i c e . Lawton and Scarman L J ' s i t 
would appear c l e a r l y based t h e i r reasoning on conventional 
grounds t h a t the claim or s u i t being one of a c t i o n i n personam 
1 2 5 I b i d . 
1 2 6 I b i d . a t p. 464. 
1 2 7 (1971) 1 WLR 64. 
1 2 8 (19 7 5 ) 3 A l l ER. 
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cannot be canvassed i n the courts of England. Lord Denning on 
the other hand took a more r a d i c a l approach i n d e a l i n g with the 
i s s u e s i n the ca s e ; as he did i n Rahimtoola v. the Nizam of 
Hyderabad as f o l l o w s : 
" I f a f o r e i g n government in c o r p o r a t e s a l e g a l e n t i t y 
which buys commodities on the London market, or i f i t has a 
s t a t e department which c h a r t e r s s h i p s on the B a l t i c Exchange, i t 
thereby e n t e r s i n t o the market p l a c e s of the world, and 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l comity r e q u i r e s t h a t i t should abide by the r u l e s 
of the market." 1 2 9 
Although Lord Denning d i d not o f f e r any a u t h o r i t y for the 
above statement, one w i l l presume that he was again making 
points as he once s t a t e d , to be s e t t l e d i n the future by "wiser 
heads." By every measure, however, h i s observations appear to 
s h i f t towards the d o c t r i n e of r e l a t i v e immunity. 
The P h i l i p p i n e A d m i r a l 1 3 0 i n f a c t represents a fundamental 
departure from the d o c t r i n e of absolute immunity i n Eng l i s h 
p r a c t i c e . The P r i v y C o u n c i l i n the P h i l i p p i n e Admiral decided 
to follow the r e s t r i c t i v e or r e l a t i v e immunity because they 
b e l i e v e i t c l e a r l y appears "more i n consonant with j u s t i c e . " 1 3 1 
In t h a t case the P r i v y C o u n c i l was confronted with the is s u e of 
whether immunity be granted to a government owned v e s s e l purely 
used f o r commercial purposes and secondly whether the breach of 
co n t r a c t i n i s s u e could be designated or c h a r a c t e r i s e d as a 
commercial a c t i v i t y . I t must be made c l e a r i n passing that when 
1 2 9 I b i d . 966. 
1 3 0 (1977) AC 373 (JC) . 
1 3 1See Higgins (1982) 29 N I n t LR 266. 
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the case was f i r s t l i t i g a t e d and l a t e r brought before the c h i e f 
j u s t i c e of Hong Kong, the claim of immunity was allowed. A 
d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t , however, was reached when i t was l i t i g a t e d 
before the P r i v y Council. Lord Cross i n reaching t h i s r e s u l t 
had to deal with both The Parlement Beige and The Porto 
Alexandre, which were e a r l i e r a u t h o r i t i e s handed down by the 
Court of appeal. The Privy Council was of the opinion t h a t 
although the Court of Appeal i n The Parlement Beige r u l e d t h a t 
sovereign immunity be applied to p u b l i c property of a r e c o g n i s e d 
sovereign s t a t e , c l e a r l y destined for p u b l i c use, i t d i d not go 
as f a r as to conclude that a s t a t e owned v e s s e l used wholly or 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n the course of commerce must be duly taken to be 
properly d e stined for public use. A c a r e f u l reading of the 
d e c i s i o n i n the P h i l i p p i n e Admiral shows i t c l e a r l y s i d e d with 
the m a j o r i t y view expressed i n the C r i s t i n a t h a t the reasoning 
i n Porto Alexandre had been wrongly i n t e r p r e t e d per the 
a u t h o r i t y of the Parlement Beige, and t h e r e f o r e thought i t wise 
not to apply i t i n the present case. Lord Cross s t a t e d the 
p o s i t i o n of the court thus: 
" L a s t l y , t h e i r Lordships themselves t h i n k t h a t i t i s 
wrong t h a t i t should be so applied. I n t h i s c o u n t r y — a n d no 
doubt i n most c o u n t r i e s i n the western w o r l d — t h e s t a t e can be 
sued i n i t s own courts on commercial c o n t r a c t s i n t o which i t has 
entered and there i s no apparent reason why f o r e i g n s t a t e s 
should not be e q u a l l y l i a b l e to be sued there i n r e s p e c t of such 
t r a n s a c t i o n s . 1 , 1 3 2 
(1976) WLR 232. 
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In Trendtex Trading Corporation v. C e n t r a l Bank of 
N i g e r i a , 1 3 3 the Court of Appeal had the opportunity to take stock 
of i t s e a r l i e r d e c i s i o n s regarding the doctrine of absolute 
immunity. There Lord Denning i n a very thorough a n a l y s i s r u l e d 
that, 
" I f a government department goes i n t o the market p l a c e s 
of the world and buys boots or cement as a commercial 
t r a n s a c t i o n , t h a t government should be s u b j e c t e d to a l l r u l e s of 
the market p l a c e . The s e l l e r i s not concerned with the purpose 
to which the purchaser i n t e n d s to put the goods." 
He f u r t h e r r u l e d t h a t 
"The l e t t e r of c r e d i t was i s s u e d i n London through a 
London bank i n the o r d i n a r y course of commercial d e a l i n g s . I t 
i s completely w i t h i n the t e r r i t o r i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n of our c o u r t s . 
I do not t h i n k i t i s open to the Government of N i g e r i a to c l a i m 
134 
sovereign immunity i n r e s p e c t of i t . " 
Again Lord Denning e x p l a i n s t h a t 
"Many c o u n t r i e s have now departed from the r u l e of 
absolute immunity. So many have departed i t t h a t i t can no 
longer be cons i d e r e d a r u l e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. I t has been 
r e p l a c e d by the d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. The d o c t r i n e 
g i v e s immunity to a c t s of a government nature, d e s c r i b e d i n 
L a t i n as j u r e imperii, but no immunity to a c t s of a commercial 
nature j u r e gestionis."135 
Both Shaw L J and Denning L J were s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n agreement on 
the two rationes decidendi, namely, the place of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law i n E n g l i s h municipal law and the question of whether the 
status of the C e n t r a l Bank i s one of an a l t e r ego of the f e d e r a l 
government of N i g e r i a . Stephenson L J on the other hand took 
3 3 (1977) QB 529 CA. 
3 4 I b i d . a t 558. 
3 5 I b i d . a t 555. 
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i s s u e with the f i r s t r a t i o but equally accepted the second r a t i o 
i n r e s p e c t of the s t a t u s of the Central Bank. 
One important question that was, however, r e l e g a t e d to the 
background or not considered i n the Trendtex seemed to be 
p r e d i c t e d on whether the act i n breach of the cement c o n t r a c t 
can be regarded as an acta jure imperii, and i f so whether 
immunity should have been granted to the Nigerian government. 
Th i s i s s u e was, however, r a i s e d i n the I Congreso d e l P a r t i d o , 1 3 6 
i n which the House of Lords ruled that when faced with such 
d i f f i c u l t c o n t r a c t u a l problems regard be given to the nature of 
the c o n t r a c t and the nature of the breach. 
A f t e r the 1978 State Immunity Act was passed, and given 
the d e c i s i o n s i n Trendtex Trading Corp. v. C e n t r a l Bank of 
N i g e r i a and t h a t of I Congreso del Partido, many thought the 
whole question of sovereign immunity appeared s e t t l e d or put to 
r e s t . However, the case of Alcom v. Republic of Colombia, 1 3 7 i n 
1983, reopened the 171 years Pandora's box of the d o c t r i n e of 
absolute immunity i n which problems i n respect of the scope of 
exceptions enunciated i n the 1978 Act came up for s e r i o u s 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n , e.g., Sections 13 (2) and 3 (3) . 1 3 8 The main 
i s s u e i n Alcom was whether the bank account of a d i p l o m a t i c 
mission used i n the running of the mission can be attached. The 
1 3 6 (1983) 1 AC 244 (House of Lords). 
1 3 7 (1984) AC 580 (HL) . 
1 3 8See Fox (1985) 34 ICLQ 115, but see a l s o Crawford (1983) 
54 BYIL 75 for h i s r e a c t i o n to the d e c i s i o n . 
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Court of Appeal r u l e d t h a t the account be attached while the 
House of Lords took the opposite view by r e v e r s i n g the d e c i s i o n 
of the Court of Appeals. The Law Lords thus followed a method 
whereby every i s s u e i n r e s p e c t of Alcorn was c a r e f u l l y considered 
in order to promote a modicum of f a i r n e s s . Lord Diplock 
explained the p o s i t i o n of the Law Lords as f o l l o w s : 
"Such expenditure w i l l , , no doubt, i n c l u d e some moneys 
due under c o n t r a c t s f o r the supply of goods or s e r v i c e s to the 
mission . . ., but the account w i l l a l s o be drawn upon to meet 
many other items of expenditure which f a l l o u t s i d e even the 
extended d e f i n i t i o n of "commercial purposes" f o r which S e c t i o n 
17(1) and S e c t i o n 3(3) p r o v i d e . The debt owed by the bank to 
the f o r e i g n sovereign s t a t e and r e p r e s e n t e d by the c r e d i t 
balance i n the c u r r e n t account kept by the d i p l o m a t i c mission of 
that s t a t e as a p o s s i b l e s u b j e c t matter of the enforcement 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of the c o u r t i s , however, one and i n d i v i s i b l e 
unless i t can be shown by the judgment c r e d i t o r who i s seeking 
to a t t a c h the c r e d i t b alance by g a r n i s h e e proceedings, t h a t the 
bank account was earmarked by the f o r e i g n s t a t e s o l e l y (save f o r 
de minimis exception) f o r being drawn upon to s e t t l e l i a b i l i t i e s 
i n c u r r e d i n commercial t r a n s a c t i o n s . . i t cannot be s e n s i b l y 
brought w i t h i n S e c t i o n 1 3 ( 4 ) . " 1 3 9 
True, absolute immunity reached i t s peak i n the Porto Alexandre 
and has s i n c e remained an a u t h o r i t y u n t i l i t was overruled i n 
P h i l i p p i n e Admiral, and thus was r e a f f i r m e d both i n Trendtex and 
the I Congreso d e l Partido, r e s p e c t i v e l y . However, i t i s 
submitted th a t i t has r e i n c a r n a t e d i n Alcorn and could perhaps be 
seen i n the guise of a "dead man walking." 
Some Aspects of E a r l y American Case Law 
The P r a c t i c e of Sovereign Immunity i n American Courts 
As already s t a t e d elsewhere, a c a r e f u l review of American 
p r a c t i c e shows tha t i t was i n i t i a l l y i n f l u e n c e d by Chief J u s t i c e 
1 3 9 (1984) AC 580, 604 (HL) . 
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M a r s h a l l ' s c l a s s i c d e c i s i o n i n The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon 
as f o l l o w s : 
"One sovereign being i n no respect amenable to another; 
and being bound by o b l i g a t i o n s of the highest c h a r a c t e r not to 
degrade the d i g n i t y of h i s nation, by p l a c i n g himself or i t s 
s o v e r e i g n r i g h t s w i t h i n the j u r i s d i c t i o n of another, can be 
supposed to enter a f o r e i g n t e r r i t o r y only under an express 
l i c e n s e , or i n the confidence t h a t the immunities belonging to 
h i s independent sovereign s t a t i o n , though not e x p r e s s l y 
s t i p u l a t e d , are r e s e r v e d by i m p l i c a t i o n and w i l l be extended to 
him." 1 4 0 
T h i s often c i t e d case thus e s t a b l i s h e d the absolute 
sovereign immunity doctrine i n the p r a c t i c e of the United 
S t a t e s . E x a c t l y twelve years a f t e r the d e c i s i o n Chief J u s t i c e 
M a r s h a l l had the opportunity again to consider the same i s s u e s 
i n the United S t a t e s v. P l a n t e r s Bank of Georgia, 1 4 1 but t h i s 
time i n a l o c a l s e t t i n g thus. 
"When a government becomes a p a r t n e r i n any t r a d i n g company, i t 
d i v e s t s i t s e l f , so f a r as concerns the t r a n s a c t i o n s of t h a t 
company, of i t s sovereign c h a r a c t e r , and takes t h a t of a p r i v a t e 
c i t i z e n , i n s t e a d of communicating to the company i t s p r i v i l e g e s 
and p r e r o g a t i v e s . " 1 4 2 
J u s t i c e Marshall handed down t h i s d e c i s i o n i n r e a c t i o n to 
P l a n t e r s Bank defence, that i t be granted immunity because of 
the f a c t t h a t the State of Georgia was a partner to the s a i d 
t r a n s a c t i o n . Although the language i n the case i s o b i t e r 
because i t d e a l t with i s s u e s r e l a t i n g per se to i n t e r s t a t e 
problems, at l e a s t i t drew a t t e n t i o n to a d i s t i n c t i o n between 
1 4 0 (1812) 7 Cranch 136-137. 
1 4 19 Wheaton 904. 
1 4 2 I b i d . at p. 907. 
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p u b l i c and p r i v a t e functions of a q u a s i l o c a l sovereign i n a 
f e d e r a l s e t t i n g . 
I t i s i n s t r u c t i v e to note t h a t q u i t e apart from paving the 
way for the establishment of the absolute immunity doctrine, 
Chief J u s t i c e Marshall's t h e s i s a l s o l a i d down a t r a d i t i o n by 
which the executive branch was given the power to make d e c i s i o n s 
regarding sovereign immunity, although such a function 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y f a l l s i n t o the domain of the j u d i c i a r y . And the 
reason was to prevent or avoid p o l i t i c a l embarrassment. The 
Foreign Relations Law of the United S t a t e s i n support of the 
above alluded statement reads as f o l l o w s . 
"The immunity of s t a t e s from the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the 
courts of another s t a t e i s an e s t a b l i s h e d and undisputed 
p r i n c i p l e of customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. C h i e f J u s t i c e 
Marshall found t h a t i t was rooted i n the p e r f e c t e q u a l i t y and 
absolute independence of s o v e r e i g n s . The Schooner Exchange, 11 
US (7 Cranch) 116 136 (1812) . Such immunity has been j u s t i f i e d 
a l s o as necessary for the e f f e c t i v e conduct of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
i n t e r c o u r s e and the maintenance of f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s . " 1 4 3 
The theory of absolute immunity p r e v a i l e d u n t i l 1926 without 
question but came under a t t a c k a t the t r i a l court i n the case of 
B e r i z z i Brothers v. Steamship P e s a r o , 1 4 4 there a merchant ship 
r e g i s t e r e d by the name Pesaro was owned and operated by the 
government of I t a l y for the b u s i n e s s of c a r r y i n g merchandise for 
h i r e . I t so happened t h a t i n the course of i t s commercial 
dealing, the v e s s e l f a i l e d to d e l i v e r cargo from I t a l y to New 
York wherefore a l i b e l i n rem w r i t was f i l e d a g a i n s t the s a i d 
1 4 3Restatement, Chapter 2, I n t r o d u c t o r y Note. 
1 4 4 (192 6 ) 271 US 562. 
Ill 
v e s s e l f o r v i o l a t i n g the terms of the d e l i v e r y contract. As was 
the p r a c t i c e , the I t a l i a n government r e l i e d on the diplomatic 
channel with the hope that the w r i t would be dismissed. But to 
t h e i r s u r p r i s e , the S t a t e Department recommended that the Pesaro 
be denied immunity. But on appeal the decision of Judge Mack 
was r e v e r s e d by the Supreme Court on the ground that the Pesaro 
was an I t a l i a n government property used for a p u b l i c purpose. 
The c o u r t reasoned as follows. 
"We t h i n k the p r i n c i p l e s s t a t e d i n the Schooner Exchange 
a r e a p p l i c a b l e a l i k e to a l l s h i p s h e l d and used by a government 
f o r a p u b l i c purpose, and t h a t when, for the purpose of 
advancing the trade of i t s people or p r o v i d i n g revenues for i t s 
t r e a s u r y , a government a c q u i r e s , mans and operates s h i p s i n the 
c a r r y i n g of trade, they are p u b l i c s h i p s i n the same sense t h a t 
w a r s h i p s a r e . We know of no i n t e r n a t i o n a l usage which regards 
the maintenance and advancement of the economic welfare of a 
people i n time of peace as any l e s s a p u b l i c purpose than the 
maintenance and t r a i n i n g of a Naval f o r c e . " 1 4 5 
The Supreme Court thus e s t a b l i s h e d i t s p o s i t i o n as the 
h i g h e s t c o u r t of the land by applying the r u l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law, as considered proper a t the time the s a i d case came up f o r 
a d j u d i c a t i o n , although the State Department had argued t h a t 
immunity be denied i n view of the f a c t that the Pesaro was 
p u r e l y engaged i n commerce. 
Before the Second World War and subsequently t h e r e a f t e r , 
s o vereign immunity i s s u e s i n the United States were i n the main 
t r e a t e d or considered as a " p o l i t i c a l question." In t h i s 
r e s p e c t , a country i s given immunity or denied immunity based 
upon a S t a t e Department recommendation, rather than through the 
4 5 I b i d . a t p. 574, 46 S Ct at 612. 
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formal t r a d i t i o n a l means of a d j u d i c a t i n g l e g a l i s s u e s before the 
co u r t s . This does not, however, mean t h a t the function of the 
j u d i c i a r y was t o t a l l y reduced i n these matters. I t only means a 
foreign government was given the option or opportunity f i r s t to 
l i t i g a t e i t s claim for immunity before the S t a t e Department 
before canvassing i t s i n t e r e s t i n the f e d e r a l c o u r t s . 1 4 6 Thus i n 
Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 1 4 7 the S t a t e Department o f f e r e d a 
suggestion of immunity to the D i s t r i c t Court, only to be 
r e j e c t e d by the Court on the grounds t h a t the Government of Peru 
had waived immunity. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the 
judgment of the D i s t r i c t Court on the a u t h o r i t y th a t the 
suggestion given by the State Department t h a t immunity be 
granted was c o n c l u s i v e . 1 4 8 
I n the Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 1 4 9 the Supreme Court 
denied immunity to a merchant v e s s e l owned but not i n possession 
of the Mexican Government. Here i t was i n t i m a t e d th a t the 
v e s s e l i n i s s u e was owned by the Mexican government but the 
v e s s e l appeared somehow i n possession or c o n t r o l of a p r i v a t e 
company, under a duly executed commercial c o n t r a c t . On normal 
circumstances, the State Department would have made a suggestion 
tha t immunity be granted, however, i n t h i s important case the 
1 4 6The p r a c t i c e e x i s t e d before the Second World War and i t 
appears the d e c i s i o n i n the Schooner Exchange might have 
i n f l u e n c e d i t s c r e a t i o n and p r a c t i c e . 
1 4 7 (19 4 3 ) 3 1 8 US 578. 
1 4 8 I b i d . at pp. 588-89. 
1 4 9 (1943) 324 US 30. 
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State Department r e f r a i n e d from expressing any opinion i n 
r e s p e c t of the c l a i m for immunity on the question of ownership 
without r e a l p o s s e s s i o n of the s a i d merchant v e s s e l . The 
Supreme Court i n the absence of express recommendation from the 
executive r u l e d as f o l l o w s : 
" I t i s not f o r the courts to deny an immunity which our 
government has seen f i t to allow an immunity on new grounds 
which the government has seen f i t to recognize. The j u d i c i a l 
s e i z u r e of p r o p e r t y of a f r i e n d l y s t a t e may be regarded as such 
an a f f r o n t to i t s d i g n i t y and so may a f f e c t our r e l a t i o n s with 
i t , t h a t i t i s an accepted r u l e of s u b s t a n t i v e law governing the 
e x e r c i s e of j u r i s d i c t i o n of the courts t h a t they accept and 
f o l l o w the e x e c u t i v e determination t h a t the v e s s e l s h a l l be 
t r e a t e d as immune. But r e c o g n i t i o n by the c o u r t s of an immunity 
upon p r i n c i p l e s which the p o l i t i c a l department of government has 
not s a n c t i o n e d may be e q u a l l y embarrassing to i t i n securing the 
p r o t e c t i o n of our i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s and f o r recognition by 
other n a t i o n s . " 1 5 0 
The Supreme Court a l s o explained t h a t 
"And t h a t i t i s the duty of the c o u r t s i n a matter so i n t i m a t e l y 
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h our f o r e i g n p o l i c y and which may profoundly 
a f f e c t i t , not to e n l a r g e an immunity to an extent which the 
government, although often asked, has not seen f i t to 
r e c o g n i z e . " 1 5 1 
I t i s i n s t r u c t i v e to note t h a t the d e c i s i o n s i n Exparte 
Republic of Peru and the Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman prompted 
the State Department to formulate a reasonable standard by which 
immunity to f o r e i g n s t a t e s can be granted. S u r p r i s i n g l y , t h i s 
standard of review was formulated through a l e t t e r , soon to be 
known as the Tate l e t t e r . The e f f e c t of the Tate l e t t e r 
undoubtedly thus changed the s t r i c t adherence to the doctrine of 
absolute immunity i n American p r a c t i c e . 
l b 0 I b i d . a t pp. 35-36. 
1 5 1 I b i d . a t pp. 34-36. 
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I t could be s a i d that a f t e r the Tate l e t t e r , c ourts i n 
America have followed the r e l a t i v e immunity d o c t r i n e 1 5 2 but s t i l l 
i n some c l e a r c u t cases allowed immunity based on good f a i t h and 
good conscience. That i s , when the t r a n s a c t i o n i n i s s u e i s not 
purely commercial. 1 5 3 In A l f r e d D u n h i l l of London I n c . v. 
Republic of Cuba, 1 5 4 the Supreme Court, having taken cognisance 
of the import of the Tate l e t t e r coupled with e a r l i e r f e d e r a l 
court d e c i s i o n s , denied immunity based on the f a c t t h a t a l a r g e 
number of fo r e i g n s t a t e s i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community have now 
accepted the doctrine of r e l a t i v e immunity. While the 
modalities of the Tate l e t t e r was s t i l l being reviewed, the 
Supreme Court again i n National C i t y Bank v. the Republic of 
China, 1 5 5 r u l e d that immunity w i l l not be allowed i n a 
counterclaim by a foreign sovereign s t a t e duly l i m i t e d to the 
exact amount i n i s s u e a r i s i n g out of the same t r a n s a c t i o n . 
One would therefore conclude t h a t as a r e s u l t of the 
e f f e c t of the famous Tate l e t t e r , the a u t h o r i t y of the d o c t r i n e 
of absolute immunity has been s u b s t a n t i a l l y reduced. Sovereign 
immunity which has long been entrenched i n the p r a c t i c e of the 
United S t a t e s has now been r e j e c t e d . But i t remains to be seen 
as to whether the currency of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity could stand 
the t e s t of time. 
1 5 2See S i n c l a i r , op. c i t . , Note 7 at pp. 161-163. 
1 5 3 I b i d . a t pp. 163-170. 
1 5 4 (1976) 425 US 682. 
1 5 5(1955) 348 US 356. 
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The I s s u e of Sovereign Immunity and the Mixed Courts of Egypt 
The j u r i s p r u d e n c e of the Mixed Courts of Egypt as regards 
i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n qua the doctr i n e of absolute immunity prima 
facie was de r i v e d from the w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d Belgian p r a c t i c e of 
the doctrine of r e l a t i v e or r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 1 5 6 Having made 
t h i s p r e l i m i n a r y observation, i t i s important to s t a t e more 
c l e a r l y t h a t although the composition of the Mixed Courts was 
made up of f i v e f o r e i g n e r s and three Egyptians, the j u r i s d i c t i o n 
of these c o u r t s were i n r e a l i t y e s s e n t i a l l y n a t i o n a l and t h i s ex 
hypothesi cannot be disputed i n view of the f a c t that these 
courts rendered j u s t i c e not i n the name of any other sovereign 
s t a t e , but t h a t of the Egyptian s o v e r e i g n . 1 5 7 These judges as i t 
may be r e c a l l e d were q u a l i f i e d and s p e c i f i c a l l y drawn from 
leading western n a t i o n s , p r e f e r a b l y European and Anglo-Saxon 
nations. I n t r y i n g to l a y bare the composition of the mixed 
courts i n 1931, Judge B r i t o n s a i d : 
"The l e a d i n g c a s e i n the Mixed Courts was decided by the 
Court of Appeal i n 1921. At t h a t time a chamber of the court 
was composed of e i g h t members, f i v e f o r e i g n e r s and three 
Egyptians. I n t h i s c a s e the Pr e s i d e n t of the Chamber was Judge 
Larger, a Portuguese, the other f o r e i g n judges being an American 
Judge Tuck, an I t a l i a n and a S w i s s . " 1 5 8 
The Mixed Courts i n t h e i r d e l i b e r a t i o n s regarding 
l i m i t a t i o n s on s t a t e immunity have always followed to the l e t t e r 
the p r a c t i c e of the Belgium and I t a l i a n c o u r t s . 1 5 9 The standard 
1 5 6 S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , note 17, a t pp. 137-140. 
1 5 7 B r i n t o n , S u i t s Against Foreign S t a t e s (1931) AJIL 50, 52. 
1 5 8 I b i d . , a t p. 52. 
1 5 9 I b i d . 
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that was followed by these judges was p r e d i c a t e d on the 
d i s t i n c t i o n s between p u b l i c acts and commercial a c t s of s t a t e s . 
Thus where the a c t i v i t i e s of a s t a t e appear c r y s t a l c l e a r to be 
commercial, the court denied immunity. While on the other hand, 
i f the a c t i v i t i e s i n i s s u e are not commercial i n nature or 
appear to be acta jure imperii, immunity was allowed. The 
a p p l i c a t i o n of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity by the Mixed Courts was thus 
done on case by case b a s i s , where every a v a i l a b l e evidence 
brought before the court was c a r e f u l l y reviewed based on the 
s t a t u t e of general proviso of the court backed by the precepts 
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 1 6 0 
Serious l i t i g a t i o n i n respect of cases i n v o l v i n g c o l l i s i o n 
on the high seas between p r i v a t e l y owned ships and government 
owned ships t r u l y a s s o c i a t e d with the armed f o r c e s of a f o r e i g n 
s t a t e i n Egypt, more often than not were duly accorded 
immunity. 1 6 1 This a p p l i e s a l s o to a c c i d e n t s which might occur 
between p r i v a t e c a r s and that of c a r s driven by f o r e i g n s t a t e 
o f f i c i a l s i n the e x e r c i s e of t h e i r diplomatic d u t i e s or 
sovereign d u t i e s . 1 6 2 
Dr. S u c h a r i t k u l i n h i s exposition on the Mixed Courts 
explained that 
"The Mixed Courts have adopted every p o s s i b l e l i m i t a t i o n of 
immunity as evolved through the p r a c t i c e of I t a l i a n and Belgium 
c o u r t s . These l i m i t a t i o n s include the v a r i o u s d i s t i n c t i o n s 
1 6 0 I b i d . 
1 6 1 S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , note 17 at p. 138-141, 
1 6 2 I b i d . , at p. 139. 
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between s t a t e a c t s , commercial e x p l o i t a t i o n , i m p l i e d submission 
and execution of judgment a g a i n s t f o r e i g n governments." 1 6 3 
A good example of e n g r a f t i n g the doctrine of the 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity onto Egyptian p r a c t i c e i s to be found i n 
Pa l e s t i n e State Railways A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 1 6 4 There the court held 
that the government of P a l e s t i n e cannot be immune i n view of the 
fac t that i t was performing a function of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n rather 
than an act of sovere i g n t y . The court went on to conclude that 
the government of P a l e s t i n e having signed a c o n t r a c t based on 
the p r i n c i p l e of consensus ad idem had i n f a c t taken i t s e l f unto 
the domain of acta jure gestiones and ther e f o r e cannot escape 
the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Mixed C o u r t s . 1 6 5 
In 1927 the Court of Referees i n Ca i r o denied immunity to 
the Sudanese Government on the grounds t h a t the r e n t i n g of a 
well furnished v i l l a could not be designated as an act of 
government but r a t h e r f a l l s w i t h i n the confines of ac t a j u r e 
gestionis, although i t would appear without question t h a t the 
v i l l a was to be used as government premises i n the s a i d 
r e c e i v i n g c o u n t r y . 1 6 6 
S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , note 11 a t p. 252. This i s from 
h i s 1959 t h e s i s which he presented f o r a D.Phil, degree (Oxon). 
1 6 4C.F. Lauterpacht, op. c i t . a t p. 255. [In re P a l e s t i n e 
State Railways A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , Annual Digest, 1919-42, Suppl. 
Volume, Case no 7 8 ] . 
1 6 5 I b i d . 
1 6 6C.F. B r i t o n , op. c i t . a t p. 56; Zaki Beyy Gabra Contre 
R.E. Moore es q u a l i t e e t a u t r e . Feb. 14, 1927. Gazette Vol. 
XVII p. 104. 
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I t i s i n s t r u c t i v e on the other hand a l s o to note t h a t the 
mixed courts on some occasions have simply d e c l i n e d j u r i s d i c t i o n 
i f t here i s c l e a r c u t evidence that the a c t i v i t i e s of the s t a t e 
i n question are acta jure imperii.101 Thus i n the SS C o s t i , 1 6 a the 
Russian Government was accused of s e i z i n g the SS C o s t i on the 
high seas and a l s o for having taken i t to the port of Odessa and 
c o n f i s c a t e d . The owners of the s a i d v e s s e l i n turn f i l e d a w r i t 
a g a i n s t the Russian Government, so as to be afforded the r i g h t 
to s e i z e the two ships belonging to the Russian Government then 
docked at the port of Alexandra. The Russian Government o f f e r e d 
a p l e a that i t be given immunity and the D i s t r i c t of Court of 
Alexandra, having c a r e f u l l y reviewed the i s s u e s , r u l e d i n favour 
of R u s s i a by d e c l i n i n g to take j u r i s d i c t i o n of the controversy 
a t stake, without even delving into the i s s u e of p i r a c y i n 
r e s p e c t of the C o s t i . 
True, there was an express acceptance of the d o c t r i n e of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity by the Mixed Courts and t h i s was i n f l u e n c e d 
by the I t a l o - B e l g i a n p r a c t i c e . 1 6 9 But nevertheless, j u r i s d i c t i o n 
a t the same time was d e c l i n e d i f the Mixed Courts could be 
convinced of a true case of sovereign a c t . Although the Mixed 
Courts of Egypt were abolished i n 1947, i t s d e c i s i o n i n 
1 6 7 I b i d . , S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , note 11. 
1 6 8C.F., B r i t o n , op. c i t . , at pp. 56-57; The N a t i o n a l 
Navigation Co. of Egypt Congre Tavoulandis and c i e es q u a l i t e e t 
a u t r e s . Nov. 9, 1927. Gazette, Vol. XIX, p. 251. 
1 6 9 I b i d . , S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , note 11 and 17, 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
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accepting the I t a l o - B e l g i a n p r a c t i c e of the d o c t r i n e of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity had remained a l a s t i n g imprint on Egyptian 
p r a c t i c e to d a t e . 1 7 0 
The Issue of Sovereign Immunity Before South A f r i c a n Courts 
South A f r i c a p r i o r to the enactment of i t s Foreign S t a t e s 
Immunities Act on 20 November 1981, followed the t r a d i t i o n a l 
doctrine of absolute immunity i n which a f o r e i g n s t a t e i s 
accorded immunity from the j u r i s d i c t i o n of a l o c a l or municipal 
courts i r r e s p e c t i v e of the nature of the t r a n s a c t i o n . 1 7 1 The 
notion f i r s t found a p p l i c a t i o n i n England i n The Parlement Beige 
and l a t e r f o r c e f u l l y supported and confirmed i n The Porto 
Alexandre, and t h e r e a f t e r extended i n The C r i s t i n a and i n the 
case of Baccus SRL v. S e r v i c o N a t i o n a l de Trigo, r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
These E n g l i s h a u t h o r i t i e s thus over the years became w e l l 
entrenched i n the j u r i s p r u d e n c e of South A f r i c a u n t i l 1981. 1 7 2 
In other words, South A f r i c a n c o u r t s followed a path a l b e i t 
s t r i k i n g l y s i m i l a r to t h a t of the B r i t i s h p r a c t i c e . 
Thus i n De Howorth v. The SS I n d i a , 1 7 3 the South A f r i c a n 
court f e l t bound by the a u t h o r i t y e s t a b l i s h e d by the Court of 
1 7 0See g e n e r a l l y The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commissions Report on 
J u r i s d i c t i o n a l Immunities of S t a t e s and T h e i r Property (1983, 
1984, 1986, e t c . ) . 
1 7 1See Botha, Some Comments on the Foreign State Immunities 
Act 87 of 1981, The Comparative and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Journal of 
South A f r i c a 15 (1982) 334. 
1 7 2 I b i d . at pp. 334-335. 
1 7 3 (1921) CDD 451. 
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Appeal i n England, upheld a p l e a for immunity i n r e s p e c t of a 
Portuguese merchant ship g a i n f u l l y used for commerce. Gardiner 
J simply followed the cum sensu among judges at that time by 
reasoning that the use of the v e s s e l i n commerce was to 
s p e c i f i c a l l y generate revenue f o r the s t a t e . The above 
a u t h o r i t i e s were again followed i n the Ex Parte Sulman c a s e . 1 7 4 
Quite a s i m i l a r reasoning can a l s o be detected i n Parkin v. 
Government of the Republique Democratique du Congo and 
a n o t h e r , 1 7 5 there the a p p l i c a n t entered into an o r a l agreement to 
f i g h t as a mercenary for the Government of Congo. I t so 
happened tha t while the a p p l i c a n t was on p a t r o l i n August 1966, 
he was s e r i o u s l y wounded. He therefore sued the Republic of 
Congo demanding tha t he be p a i d for a f i x e d sum of money as 
compensation. The court a f t e r c a r e f u l l y reviewing the c o n t r a c t 
of employment, r u l e d t h a t (1) "The money held by the second 
respondent was held for p u b l i c purposes which applied to a l l 
property of a foreign sovereign s t a t e provided for i n Section 2 
of the Diplomatic P r i v i l e g e s Act (NO 71 of 1951) f o r heads of 
s t a t e a p p l i e d a fortiori to f o r e i g n sovereign s t a t e s . " 
I n P r i n t i c e Shaw and S c h i e s s v. Government of the Republic 
of B o l i v i a , 1 7 6 the a p p l i c a n t , a surveying company, was appointed 
i n 197 6 as a quantity surveyor for the c o n s t r u c t i o n of an 
1 7 4 (1942) CPD 407. 
1 7 5(1978) ISA 269 (W), (1983) I n t Law Reports Vol 64 p 668, 
668-684. 
1 7 6(1978) 3 SA 938 (W), (1983) I n t Law Reports Vol 64 p 685-
689. 
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Embassy for the Republic of B o l i v i a . The appointment, according 
to a f f i d a v i t s duly submitted to the court, showed the s a i d 
appointment was made through i t s charge d' affairs i n P r e t o r i a . 
Before long, a dispute arose as to whether the work done on the 
p r o j e c t had received the p r i o r approval of the B o l i v i a n 
Government. The s a i d government t h e r e f o r e denied any 
indebtedness to the a p p l i c a n t as regards the work already done, 
on the ground that the plan used had not been submitted for 
approval p r i o r to the commencement of the p r o j e c t . The 
a p p l i c a n t , i n an ex parte a p p l i c a t i o n , sought leave to sue the 
respondent for the 8,926 Rand a l r e a d y expended on the p r o j e c t , 
coupled with an order of attachment so as to be able to confirm 
the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the court. I t was h e l d t h a t the a c t i v i t y i n 
dispute f a l l s within the confines of governmental a c t , i . e . , 
jure imperii, and that the Government of B o l i v i a was immune from 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . The court even d i d not make any attempt to 
consider the r e s t r i c t i v e theory of sovereign immunity. Thus, 
even i f taken a stage f u r t h e r , i t i s p o s s i b l e the ambassador of 
B o l i v i a would have invoked the i n v i o l a b i l i t y p r i n c i p l e under 
diplomatic law to n e u t r a l i s e the e f f e c t of the law s u i t i n 
question. 
I t would appear th a t South A f r i c a s t a r t e d questioning the 
a u t h o r i t y of the doctrine of absolute immunity when the echo of 
Lord Denning's crusade to expose or l i m i t the d o c t r i n e of 
absolute immunity became known i n South A f r i c a . 1 7 7 Thus i n I n t e r 
1 7 7Botha, op. c i t . , at p. 335. 
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Science Research and Development S e r v i c e s Pty Ltd v. Republic 
Popular De Mocambique, 1 7 8 the C o l o n i a l Government of Mocambique 
signed a c o n t r a c t with a company named ETLAL for the development 
of a g r i c u l t u r e areas and the water resources i n Mocambique. 
ETLAL, which happens to be a l o c a l company incorporated under 
the l o c a l c o l o n i a l laws, subcontracted the purported co n t r a c t to 
the a p p l i c a n t ( I n t e r Science Research & D.S. Pty L t d . ) . I n 
September 1974 (RPM) the Independent Republica Popular de 
Mocambique "movement" came i n t o power and i n October 1975 took 
c e r t a i n d r a s t i c measures t h a t r e s u l t e d i n the n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n 
and the i n t e g r a t i o n of ETLAL i n t o the RPM government. I n other 
words, ETLAL ceased to e x i s t . So i n essence RPM assumed the 
bu s i n e s s a c t i v i t i e s of ETLAL. The RPM government f u r t h e r 
d e c l a r e d t h a t the subcontract i n dispute was n u l l and void i n 
the l i g h t of the force and t h r u s t of Decree Law 27 of October, 
1975. The a p p l i c a n t q u i c k l y sought leave to implead the RPM 
Government f o r damages s u f f e r e d i n res p e c t of s e r v i c e s rendered 
p r i o r to the n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of ETLAL. The court followed the 
d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity by g i v i n g e f f e c t to the a c t i o n 
to proceed i n p a r t , thus allowing an order of attachment. The 
cou r t f i n a l l y r u l e d t h a t the do c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity 
a p p l i e s i n South A f r i c a . 1 7 9 A c a r e f u l review of the case, 
however, shows t h a t i t in v o l v e s more complicated i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law i s s u e s than miss the eye. These e l u s i v e problem areas range 
1 7 8 (1983) I n t Law Reports Vol 64 p 6899-709. 
1 7 9 I b i d . 
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from a c t of s t a t e , s t a t e s u c c e s s i o n , s t a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , 
s t a t e immunity, recognition and d e c o l o n i s a t i o n . These concerns 
might have prompted Margo J to deny the a p p l i c a n t any claims 
r e s p e c t i n g the expropriation i n i s s u e because the a p p l i c a n t 
f a i l e d to show cause why the s a i d e x p r o p r i a t i o n be considered 
j u r e gestionis instead of jure imperii. On the whole, however, 
the judgment seems to be unconvincing and unbalanced because so 
many important i s s u e s that cut deep i n t o the h e a r t of the 
dispute were simply t r e a t e d c a s u a l l y , thus r a t h e r b r i n g i n g to 
the fore the old argument p o s i t e d by Lord Denning t h a t there has 
been a change i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. Again i n K a f f r a r i a Property 
Co. (Pty) Ltd v. Government of the Republic of Zambia, 1 8 0 the 
court confirmed the doctrine of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity by r u l i n g 
that immunity be denied f o r demurrage amounting to US $43,715 
coupled with further damages of $20,000 f o r a delay occasioned 
by the Republic of Zambia for f a i l i n g to s p e e d i l y a i d the 
process of f u r n i s h i n g the necessary l e t t e r of c r e d i t f o r the 
agreed-upon f r e i g h t charges to be p a i d as provided i n the 
agreement entered into with W e s t f i e l d Shipping Company f o r the 
c a r r i a g e of f e r t i l i z e r from the United S t a t e s to South A f r i c a . 
I t i s submitted, however, t h a t one important i s s u e t h a t was not 
analysed to i t s l o g i c a l conclusion was whether the attachment ad 
fundan dam jurisdictionem as regards the f e r t i l i z e r can be 
s u s t a i n e d by usus backed by opinio juris. The answer i s 
c e r t a i n l y no. 
1 8 0 (1980) 2 SA 709 (ECD) , (1983) I n t Law Reports Vol 64 p 
708-717. 
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That i n South A f r i c a , the h i s t o r y of the courts as regards 
the a p p l i c a t i o n of the doctrine of absolute immunity coupled 
with i t s momentous change at i t s z e n i t h followed a journey t r u l y 
s i m i l a r to t h a t of B r i t a i n i s without doubt c l e a r l y exemplified 
by the t h r u s t and import of the Foreign S t a t e s Immunities Act 87 
of 1981. 1 8 1 I n f a c t , the South A f r i c a n Act can appropriately be 
des c r i b e d as a t r u e carbon copy of the E n g l i s h State Immunity 
Act of 1978, i n so f a r as the Act can be seen as a true 
embodiment of the d o c t r i n e of r e l a t i v e or r e s t r i c t i v e immunity, 
wholly conditioned on Section 4 ( 1 ) , of the 1981 Act . 1 8 2 
The I n t r o d u c t i o n of Sovereign Immunity i n t o the Courts of Old 
and New B r i t i s h Commonwealth S t a t e s : Some Preliminary Thoughts 
There i s without doubt scant evidence i n the p r a c t i c e of 
A f r i c a n s t a t e s as regards the d o c t r i n e of absolute immunity. 
While there i s no d i r e c t information on municipal court r u l i n g s 
i n these c o u n t r i e s , a t l e a s t those c o u n t r i e s sued by p r i v a t e 
companies i n f o r e i g n courts have pro t e s t e d and expressed t h e i r 
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the currency of the doc t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity. 1 8 3 Thus the m o d i f i c a t i o n i n the p r i n c i p l e of s t a t e 
immunity which i s becoming w e l l recognised i n d i f f e r e n t degrees 
the world over has not been so f a r w e l l r e c e i v e d or embraced i n 
1 8 1See g e n e r a l l y Botha, op. c i t . 
1 8 2 I b i d . a t pp. 336-343. 
1 8 3See N.A. Ushakov i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission 
Yearbook (1983), V o l . I I a t p. 55; The N i g e r i a envoy a f t e r the 
d e c i s i o n s regarding the Cement Contracts i n the Courts of UK, 
USA and Germany d i d p r o t e s t vehemently. 
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Commonwealth A f r i c a . 1 8 4 In other words, the p r i n c i p l e appears to 
be standing on one leg as f a r as Commonwealth A f r i c a i s 
concerned and more so the whole Continent except i n such 
co u n t r i e s as Togo, Egypt, Lesotho, Madagascar, and South A f r i c a , 
which have t o t a l l y jumped onto the bandwagon of the r e s t r i c t i v e 
d o c t r i n e . 1 8 5 
Most Commonwealth A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s i n p r i n c i p l e have 
accepted the au t h o r i t y of the doctr i n e of absolute immunity and 
t h i s i n the main can be c o r r e c t l y p r e d i c a t e d on the c o l o n i a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t e x i s t e d between B r i t a i n and her former 
c o l o n i e s now independent. 
Judge T.O. E l i a s , while commenting on the t r u e nature of 
E n g l i s h law i n A f r i c a n courts, s a i d t h a t 
"The r e c e i v e d E n g l i s h law covers both c i v i l and c r i m i n a l 
laws as w e l l as the r u l e s of evidence and the procedure s i n c e , 
as Maitland once observed, 'the E n g l i s h Common Law r u l e s a r e 
embedded i n the i n t e r s t i c e s of procedure.' The r u l e s of c i v i l 
law e x i s t , b o t h i n j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s and i n s t a t u t e s which have 
been reenacted with or without m o d i f i c a t i o n s , i n l o c a l s t a t u t e s 
which a re to be found i n every Commonwealth t e r r i t o r y i n a s e t 
of Revised E d i t i o n s of the Laws pu b l i s h e d a t p e r i o d i c i n t e r v a l s . 
T h i s s e t of p u b l i c a t i o n s of enacted law c o n s t i t u t e s the s t a t u t e 
book of each t e r r i t o r y . In the f i e l d s of trade and commerce, 
E n g l i s h m e r c a n t i l e and commercial laws predominate. T h i s 
company law, partnership, c o n t r a c t s and agency, s a l e of goods, 
c a r r i a g e of goods by land and sea, shipping laws, n e g o t i a b l e 
instruments, banks and banking laws a r e the most important t h a t 
we need enumerate here. Another area of c i v i l law r e g u l a t e d by 
E n g l i s h Common Law p r i n c i p l e s are the law of t o r t , the law of 
t r u s t and equity, i n d u s t r i a l law and the c o n f l i c t of laws 
( p r i v a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l l aw). Although some of these laws a r e 
based upon the E n g l i s h Common Law and S t a t u t e s , t h e r e a r e y e t 
1 8 4See The ILC Report on J u r i s d i c t i o n a l Immunities of S t a t e s 
and T h e i r P r o p e r t i e s , 1983 and 1986, r e s p e c t i v e l y ; and the 
(1960) AALCC report. 
1 8 5The ILC Report on J u r i s d i c t i o n a l Immunities of S t a t e s 
and T h e i r Property, 1983 and 1986, r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
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l o c a l v a r i a t i o n s and p e c u l i a r i t i e s d i c t a t e d by the p r e v a i l i n g 
c ircumstances of the time and p l a c e . The element of E n g l i s h law 
i s l e s s s t r o n g i n the f i e l d of j u r i s p r u d e n c e and l e g a l theory as 
w e l l , as of p u b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, although the former i s i n 
i t s l o c a l o r i e n t a t i o n s t i l l haunted by the ghost of A u s t i n and 
the d o c t r i n e of j u d i c i a l precedent wh i l e i n p u b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law the l o c a l p r a c t i c e i s s t i l l based on the teachings of the 
D u a l i s t School, d e s p i t e the growing tendency towards 
independence which i s d i s c e r n i b l e i n the new concept and 
p r a c t i c e of contemporary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, e s p e c i a l l y the law 
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . " 1 8 6 
I n the l i g h t of the above a n a l y s i s one i s prompted to 
conclude t h a t the E n g l i s h Common Law, the doc t r i n e s of equity 
and s t a t u t e s of general a p p l i c a t i o n i n England perhaps at a 
named date or a t a p a r t i c u l a r time a p p l i e d and s t i l l apply i n 
Ghana, N i g e r i a , Kenya, Uganda, S i e r r a Leone, Gambia, with some 
minimal m o d i f i c a t i o n s thereof, as f a r as l o c a l conditions may 
permit. This i s c l e a r l y evidenced by the a u t h o r i t y behind the 
Ghana Courts Act of 1971, S e c t i o n I I I , thus: 
"(1) U n t i l p r o v i s i o n i s otherwise made by law, the 
S t a t u t e s of England s p e c i f i e d i n the f i r s t schedule to t h i s Act 
s h a l l continue t o apply i n Ghana as s t a t u t e s of general 
a p p l i c a t i o n 
(a) t o the e x t e n t i n d i c a t e d i n the f i r s t schedule to 
t h i s Act, and not f u r t h e r or otherwise; and 
(b) s u b j e c t to such v e r b a l amendment not a f f e c t i n g the 
substance as may be nec e s s a r y t o enable them to be 
c o n v e n i e n t l y a p p l i e d i n Ghana. 
(2) The S t a t u t e s of England r e f e r r e d to i n subsection 
(h) of t h i s s e c t i o n s h a l l be t r e a t e d as i f they formed p a r t of 
the Common Law p r e v a i l i n g over any r u l e t h e r e o f other than a 
r u l e of customary law i n c l u d e d i n the Common Law under any 
enactment p r o v i d i n g f o r the a s s i m i l a t i o n of such r u l e s of 
customary law as a r e s u i t a b l e f o r g e n e r a l a p p l i c a t i o n . " 1 8 7 
1 8 6T.O. E l i a s , The J u d i c i a l Process i n Commonwealth A f r i c a 
(1975) pp. 13-14. 
1 8 7See The Ghana Courts Act of 1971, Section I I . 
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The f a m i l i a r echo or common feature of the e a r l i e r Ghanaian Act 
or the present one f i n d s expression i n the Kenya J u d i c a t u r e Act 
of 1967 which took i t s i n s p i r a t i o n from the E a s t A f r i c a n 
Protectorate Order i n Council of 1902. The same can be s a i d of 
the Act of S i e r r a Leone 1888, the Judicature Act of Uganda 1902, 
and the March 4, 1863 Act of the Old Settlement of Lagos S 
45(1), S(2) and S ( 3 ) , r e s p e c t i v e l y . 1 8 8 The reception of E n g l i s h 
law i n Commonwealth A f r i c a therefore followed p r a c t i c a l l y an 
i n v a r i a b l e formula which supports the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t E n g l i s h 
law was e s t a b l i s h e d and applied i n every colony t h a t was c r e a t e d 
by the E n g l i s h Crown. Eng l i s h law i n a way thus became the 
means by which laws were enforced as c l e a r l y supported by T.O. 
E l i a s i n h i s a n a l y s i s 1 8 9 regarding the reception of E n g l i s h law 
i n Commonwealth A f r i c a . 
Granted t h i s , then the doctrine of absolute immunity was 
r e c e i v e d i n t o Commonwealth States based upon the a u t h o r i t y of 
the Anonymous Case, 1 9 0 which was decided by the P r i v y C o u n c i l 
somewhere i n 1722 thus . . . 
"An uninhabited country newly found out and i n h a b i t e d by the 
E n g l i s h to be governed by the laws of England. A conquered 
country to be governed by such laws as the conqueror w i l l 
impose: but u n t i l the conqueror gi v e s them new laws, they are 
to be governed by t h e i r own laws, u n l e s s where those laws are 
c o n t r a r y to the laws of God or t o t a l l y s i l e n t . " 1 9 1 
1 8 8T.O. E l i a s , op. c i t . , pp. 1-6. 
1 8 9 I b i d . 
1 9 0 (1722) 2 PWMS 75. 
1 9 1 I b i d . 
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This r u l i n g simply confirms Holt CJ's d e c i s i o n i n an e a r l i e r 
case of Blankard v. Galdy 1 9 2 i n 1694, i n which a c l e a r a u t h o r i t y 
on t h i s s u b j e c t was e s t a b l i s h e d . Thus i f The Parlement Beige 
was decided i n 1879 and was subsequently followed i n The Porto 
Alexandre and The C r i s t i n a , then per the a u t h o r i t y of the 
Anonymous, the d o c t r i n e of absolute immunity became pa r t of the 
laws of a l l E n g l i s h Colonies as of 1879. Hence the p r a c t i c e of 
E n g l i s h law as regards the d o c t r i n e of absolute immunity became 
ex hypothesi p a r t of the laws of Commonwealth A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s 
and other former B r i t i s h dominions 1 9 3 such as I n d i a , Pakistan, 
A u s t r a l i a , Canada, New Zealand, Jamaica, Ceylon, Bermuda, 
Barbados, Hong Kong, Singapore, Tonga, e t c . 
The above d i s c u s s i o n s warrant the following conclusions: 
1. That sovereign immunity se r v e s an important purpose 
i n the i n t e r - s t a t e system i s without doubt w e l l 
grounded. 
(1) I t s a p p l i c a t i o n would avoid the harassment of 
sovereign s t a t e s . 
(2) I t would promote comity and the diplomatic 
func t i o n s of s t a t e s . 
(3) I t s a p p l i c a t i o n c e r t a i n l y w i l l promote 
s t a b i l i t y i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
1 9 2 (1694) 2 S a l k 411. 
1 9 3See J.E.S. Fawcett, The B r i t i s h Commonwealth i n 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1963); and T.O. E l i a s , op. c i t . 
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2. That forum law i s the creature of sovereignty and 
between equals, only what i s understood and 
acknowledged as law among s t a t e s must be applied. 
3. The granting of absolute immunity to i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
o rganizations i s expedient i n the l i g h t of t h e i r 
s p e c i a l functions i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
4. That with r e s p e c t to employment contract s and s u i t s 
a g a i n s t states/embassies, the concept of ne imediatur 
legatio completely reduces the nature t e s t , and f o r 
that matter r e s t r i c t i v e immunity into an unworkable 
t o o l . 
5. That the s t a t e never acts as a j u r i d i c a l or n a t u r a l 
person can be supported by the argument t h a t the 
I t a l i a n theory of dual p e r s o n a l i t y of s t a t e s i s 
untenable f o r there i s no evidence i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law to support the notion that the functions of 
s t a t e s be d i v i d e d into potere politico and persona 
civile. 
6. Execution forcee or saisie conservatoire i n r e s p e c t 
of s t a t e property lacks usus and thus may l e a d to 
se r i o u s disputes among s t a t e s ( i . e . , a t the 
diplomatic l e v e l ) . 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE CHANGING LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
IN U.S. AND U.K. COURTS: 
A LOOK AT THE RESTRICTIVE IMMUNITY RULE 
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True, hasty climbers have a sudden f a l l , and one does not 
r e l e g a t e to the background an e s t a b l i s h e d authority f o r mere 
s p e c u l a t i v e reasons, h u r r i e d l y derived from a general theory or 
p r i n c i p l e , nor i s i t wise to adopt a new law based on s i m p l i s t i c 
a s p i r a t i o n s or g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s . Hence there must be very 
convincing reasons d e r i v i n g from well-known problems of s t a t e 
immunity and from the demonstrated s u p e r i o r i t y of r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity over sovereign immunity i n r e s o l v i n g problems of 
j u r i s d i c t i o n a l immunities i n r e s p e c t of commercial t r a n s a c t i o n s 
before c o u n t r i e s of the world would be f u l l y j u s t i f i e d i n 
throwing t h e i r e f f o r t s unto the uncharted seas of the purported 
currency of the doctrine of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. For 
u n q u a l i f i e d g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s are always dangerous and not at a l l 
h e l p f u l e s p e c i a l l y when considering a subject t h i s e l u s i v e . 
(1) Background 
S c h o l a r s are agreed th a t the concept of r e l a t i v e or 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity was planted and harvested i n Continental 
Europe, f i r s t i n Belgium and immediately t h e r e a f t e r i n I t a l y . 1 
However, i t would appear Chief J u s t i c e Marshall was the f i r s t of 
judges to d e a l with the s a i d s u b j e c t o b i t e r d i c t a i n h i s long 
c l a s s i c judgment of The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden i n 1812, 
inasmuch as the c e n t r a l i s s u e before the court was immunity i n 
•"^ Sompong S u c h a r i t k u l , State immunities and Trading 
A c t i v i t i e s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1959) pp. 233-251. See 
g e n e r a l l y a l s o h i s c o l l e c t e d courses at the Hague Academy. 
132 
respect of a French p u b l i c v e s s e l damaged a t s e a . 2 On another 
occasion twelve years a f t e r the d e c i s i o n i n the Schooner 
Exchange, J u s t i c e Marshall rendered a unique judgment i n which 
he took a bold step i n e x p l a i n i n g the b a s i c underlying 
p r i n c i p l e s behind the doctr i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity as 
foll o w s : 
"When a government becomes a p a r t n e r i n any t r a d i n g 
company, i t d i v e s t s i t s e l f , so f a r as concerns the t r a n s a c t i o n s 
of that company, of i t s sovereign c h a r a c t e r and ta k e s t h a t of a 
p r i v a t e c i t i z e n . I n s t e a d of communicating t o the company i t s 
p r i v i l e g e s and p r e r o g a t i v e s , i t descends t o a l e v e l with those 
with whom i t a s s o c i a t e s i t s e l f , and t a k e s the c h a r a c t e r which 
belongs to i t s a s s o c i a t e s and to the b u s i n e s s which i s to be 
tr a n s a c t e d . 3 
Without doubt the fundamental p r i n c i p l e s r e l a t i n g to the 
doctrine of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity a r e h e r e i n s u c c i n c t l y 
formulated, however, the case i n point was of a l o c a l nature 
r a t h e r than a case with a foreign element, hence many on the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l plane never took n o t i c e of the t h r u s t and force of 
i t s l e g a l reasoning and purported move towards the r e s t r i c t i v e 
approach. 
The preceding examination, although important, would not 
be complete without mentioning the names of H e f f t e r and 
Gianzana, who were a l s o e a r l y proponents of the doctr i n e of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 4 I t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t Gianzana was the 
f i r s t to formulate the d i s t i n c t i o n between acta jure imperii and 
acta jure gestionis i n 1884 notwithstanding the f a c t t h a t 
2(1812) 7 Cranch. 
39 Wheaton 904 at p. 907. 
4 S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , a t p. 265. 
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H e f f t e r might have touched on the s u b j e c t a l i t t l e e a r l i e r i n 
1881. 5 Be t h i s as i t may, Gianzana's approach was we l l r e c eived 
i n I t a l y and t h e r e f o r e l a i d the foundation for the development 
of the concept i n I t a l i a n p r a c t i c e . I t i s i n s t r u c t i v e a l s o at 
t h i s j u n c t u r e to take note of the f a c t that the doctrine of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity was adopted by the I n s t i t u t de Droit 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l i n 1891, not long a f t e r e a r l y proponents had 
considered the s u b j e c t i n t h e i r w r i t i n g s . 6 
(2) E a r l y P r a c t i c e i n Belgium and I t a l i a n Courts 
B e l g i a n and I t a l i a n courts, having r e j e c t e d e a r l i e r 
d o c t r i n a l precepts on absolute immunity developed a rather 
appealing but perhaps middle-ground approach i n t a c k l i n g the 
problems r e l a t i n g to s t a t e immunity and trading a c t i v i t i e s of 
s t a t e s by o f f e r i n g a d i s t i n c t i o n between acts jure gestiones and 
acts jure gestionis. The s a i d approach although appealing to 
B e l g i a n and I t a l i a n c ourts took a long time getting through the 
door i n other European c o u n t r i e s . I t would appear some 
c o u n t r i e s f l i r t e d with the notion but f e l l short of completely 
adopting i t . 7 
The notion of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity was f i r s t presented i n 
1840 before the Be l g i a n Court of Appeal, by the procureur 
general but h i s argument d i d not f i n d favour with the court. 8 
5 I b i d . 
6 I b i d . 
7 I b i d . a t pp. 162-255; S u c h a r i t k u l 149, Hague Rec u e i l (1976 
1 ) , 126-183. 
8 S i n c l a i r , The Law of Sovereign Immunity, Recent 
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I t was, however, followed i n subsequent ca s e s a f t e r the myth 
surrounding the concept was broken i n 1857. 9 The d o c t r i n e of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity was f i r s t c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h e d by the Court 
of Appeal i n The Havre Case, 1 0 where the court was persuaded to 
assume j u r i s d i c t i o n based on a c l e a r c u t showing of commercial 
a c t i v i t y on the part of the s t a t e i n question. The court, i t 
would appear, r a t i o n a l i s e d the e x e r c i s e of j u r i s d i c t i o n over the 
s a i d matter from the forum data s p e c i f i c a l l y d e r i v e d from the 
o b j e c t i v e t e s t . 
The doctrine of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity was again extended i n 
Government Ottoman c. G a s p a r i 1 1 and a l s o i n the famous case of 
Monroyer e t Bernard c. E t a l F r a n c a i s . 1 2 B e l g i a n courts i n 
1888 took a step further by making a d i s t i n c t i o n between p u b l i c 
and p r i v a t e a c t i v i t i e s of the s t a t e . Thus i n S o c i e t e pour l a 
F a b r i c a t i o n de Cartouches c. Col M. M i n i s t r e de l a Guerre de 
B u l g a r i e , 1 3 the Tribunal C i v i l de B r u x e l l e s was quick to assume 
j u r i s d i c t i o n over Bulgaria on the e s t a b l i s h e d p r i n c i p l e t h a t the 
sovereign act i n i s s u e was duly compatible with a c i v i l 
t r a n s a c t i o n and the maxim consensus ad idem, ( c o n t r a c t ) i n which 
Development, 167 Hague Recu e i l 113 (1980 I I ) 132. 
9 I b i d . 
1 0 C f . S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , note 1 at p. 243 (PB, 1876-11-
175) . 
1 XPB 1911-111-1094, c f . S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , note 1 at p. 
244. 
1 2PB 1927-111-129, c f . S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , p. 244. 
1 313 Jud 1889, Col 383; PB 1889-111-62, c f . S u c h a r i t k u l , op. 
c i t . , p. 244. 
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p a r t i e s to the s t a t e d o b l i g a t i o n are s t r i c t l y bound by i t s 
terms. The court f u r t h e r reasoned th a t B u l g a r i a took i t s e l f out 
of the domain of sovereign a c t s unto the domain of a p r i v a t e 
person and t h e r e f o r e cannot escape the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the 
court. B e l g i a n case law as can be seen demonstrates i n respect 
of i t s j u r i s p r u d e n c e a high degree of consistency i n the 
a p p l i c a t i o n of the d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 1 4 
I t a l i a n c o u r t s a l s o followed the d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity to the l e t t e r and by i t s t r a c k record, one could simply 
argue t h a t i t s c o u r t s have a l s o been c o n s i s t e n t i n the 
a p p l i c a t i o n of the s a i d d o c t rine. In 1882, the Corte d i 
Cessazione de Torino i n M o r e l l e c t c. Governo Danese analysed the 
theory of dual p e r s o n a l i t y of s t a t e s thus: 
" I t b eing incumbent upon the s t a t e to provide for the 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the p u b l i c body f o r the m a t e r i a l i n t e r e s t s of 
the i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n s , i t must ac q u i r e and own property, i t 
must c o n t r a c t , i t must sue and be sued and i n a word, i t must 
e x e r c i s e c i v i l r i g h t s i n l i k e manner as 'un a l t r a corpo moral o 
p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l qualunque.'" 1 5 
The l o g i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s or l i t e r a t u r e 
seemed to be d e r i v e d from the b a s i c p r i n c i p l e t h a t a s t a t e has 
two separate i d e n t i t i e s , one being p o l i t i c a l and the other 
"corpo moral." T h i s notion was applied i n 1886 by the Corte d i 
Cassezione de F i r e n z e i n G u t t e r i e r e s c. E l m i l i k 1 6 i n which 
immunity was denied on the grounds tha t i f a government descends 
1 4 S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , at p. 245. 
1 5 C f . S u c h a r i t k u l , C o l l e c t e d Works, Hague Academy, at p. 
127. 
1 6 C f . S u c h a r i t k u l , p. 127. 
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unto the market place by signing c o n t r a c t s with p r i v a t e b u s i n e s s 
e n t i t i e s , i t thus relegates to the background i t s sovereign 
a t t r i b u t e s and therefore must be t r e a t e d as any i n d i v i d u a l i n 
the market place and that " i n such case i t i s a qu e s t i o n s o l e l y 
of p r i v a t e a c t s and obligation to be governed by the r u l e s of 
the jus commune."11 
A s i m i l a r d i s t i n c t i o n was again made i n 1887 by the c o r t e 
d'Appello d i Lucca i n a case r e l a t i n g to the commercial 
a c t i v i t i e s of the Bey de T u n i s i ( T u n i s i a ) . 1 8 
The same p r i n c i p l e s were a l s o followed by the Corte d i 
Cassazione d i Napoli i n Typaldos c. Manicomio d i A v e r s a , 1 9 t h e r e 
i t was held t h a t : 
"The s t a t e becomes sub j e c t to co u r t s i n so f a r as i t o p e r a t e s 
w i t h i n the sphere of c i v i l t r a n s a c t i o n s , and i t has never been 
objected t h a t the sovereignty of the s t a t e has been i n j u r e d 
thereby; whereas the r a t i o n a l i t y of the law would s u f f e r from 
the opposite theory whereby i t would c l a i m the power to pursue 
i t s r i g h t s as p l a i n t i f f , while remaining beyond the r e a c h of 
such a c t i o n on the part of o t h e r s . " 2 0 
I n a somewhat recent case of P e r r u c c h e t t i c. Puig y Cassauro 
(1928), 2 1 which involved a Mexican ambassador, covers a c o n t r a c t 
signed f or the purchase of an immovable property i n the form of 
a b u i l d i n g duly designated to be used f o r the performance of 
diplomatic f u n c t i o n s . The court followed i t s e a r l i e r d e c i s i o n s 
1 7 I b i d . 
18C.A. Lucca, 1887, F. I t 1887-9-474 a t 485-486. 
1 9 G i n I t . 1886-1, 1-223, 239. 
2 0 I b i d . a t p. 229. 
2 1 F . I t . 1929-1-112 et seq.; R i v i s t a 20 (1928) pp. 521-527 
c f . S u c h a r i t k u l C o l l e c t e d Course H. p. 129. 
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by assuming j u r i s d i c t i o n over the ambassador during h i s terms of 
o f f i c e although l o g i c a l l y the co n t r a c t i n question d i r e c t l y or 
i n d i r e c t l y touched on an instrumentus legati. I t was l a t e r held 
that the c o n t r a c t i n ques t i o n f a l l s i n t o the p r e c i n c t of p r i v a t e 
law t r a n s a c t i o n f or the u l t i m a t e a c q u i s i t i o n of p r i v a t e r i g h t s 
and t h e r e f o r e j u r i s d i c t i o n cannot be waived on b e h a l f of the 
Mexican ambassador. The d e c i s i o n appears strange and out of 
l i n e with the precepts of p u b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l law because the 
c a r d i n a l p r i n c i p l e i n r e s p e c t of diplomatic p r i v i l e g e s and 
immunities i s p r e d i c a t e d on i n v i o l a b i l i t y and t h i s i s we l l 
entrenched i n the p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s the world over. 
I n s p i t e of the s t r i c t adherents of I t a l i a n , Belgian and 
Egyptian courts to the r e s t r i c t i v e theory or r u l e , i t would 
appear other leading c o u n t r i e s such as the United Kingdom and 
the United S t a t e s before the Second World War remained 
s t e a d f a s t l y i n support of absolute immunity. I t was, however, 
only r e c e n t l y t h a t these c o u n t r i e s have taken steps i n making 
changes to t h e i r s t a t u t e books, t h a t i s , i n 1976 and 1978, 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
(3) A Move Towards R e s t r i c t i v e Immunity 
The tendency f o r c o u n t r i e s to modulate the concept of 
absolute immunity i s of re c e n t development i n common law 
cou n t r i e s , but seemed to have taken a long time coming. Some 
governments and c o u r t s , however, have now jumped onto the 
bandwagon of c l e a r l y a c c e p t i n g the doctrine of r e s t r i c t i v e 
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immunity. 2 2 In other words, the r e s t r i c t i v e approach i s g a i n i n g 
currency. In f a c t , the United States a f t e r the Second World War 
was the f i r s t of c o u n t r i e s to o f f i c i a l l y express d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n 
with the idea of g i v i n g immunity to foreign governments and 
t h e i r agencies engaged i n trading a c t i v i t i e s . 2 3 And t h i s i s 
evidenced by the strength and import of the Tate l e t t e r thus: 
" I t i s thus evident that with the p o s s i b l e exception of 
the United Kingdom l i t t l e support has been found except on the 
p a r t of the S o v i e t Union and i t s s a t e l l i t e s f o r continued f u l l 
acceptance of the absolute theory of sovereign immunity. There 
are evidences t h a t B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s are aware of i t s 
d e f i c i e n c i e s and ready for a change. The reasons which 
obviously motivate s t a t e t r a d i n g c o u n t r i e s i n adhering to the 
theory with perhaps i n c r e a s i n g r i g i d i t y are most p e r s u a s i v e t h a t 
the United S t a t e s should change i t s p o l i c y . Furthermore, the 
g r a n t i n g of sovereign immunity to f o r e i g n governments i n the 
courts of the United S t a t e s i s most i n c o n s i s t e n t with the a c t i o n 
of the Government of the United States i n s u b j e c t i n g i t s e l f t o 
s u i t i n these same courts i n both co n t r a c t and t o r t and with i t s 
long e s t a b l i s h e d p o l i c y of not claiming immunity i n f o r e i g n 
j u r i s d i c t i o n s f o r i t s merchant v e s s e l s . F i n a l l y , the Department 
f e e l s t h a t the widespread and i n c r e a s i n g p r a c t i c e on the p a r t of 
governments of engaging i n commercial a c t i v i t i e s makes n e c e s s a r y 
a p r a c t i c e which w i l l enable persons doing b u s i n e s s with them to 
have t h e i r r i g h t s determined i n the c o u r t s . For these reasons 
i t w i l l h e r e a f t e r be the Department's p o l i c y to follow the 
r e s t r i c t i v e theory of sovereign immunity i n the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of 
requests of f o r e i g n governments for a grant of s o v e r e i g n 
immunity." 
As a r e s u l t of the Tate l e t t e r the r e s t r i c t i v e d o c t r i n e 
was embraced and entrenched i n American p o l i c y and t h i s has 
s i n c e then been f i r m l y confirmed by the enactment of the 
American Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. The Supreme 
Court a l s o gave i t s b l e s s i n g s to the Act i n A l f r e d D u n h i l l of 
2 2See The ILC Report (1982, 1984, 1986). 
2 3See The Famous Tate L e t t e r of May 19 (1952), S t a t e 
Department, 26 BULL 984. 
139 
London Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 2 4 i n the same year that the Act 
passed through Congress. The m o d a l i t i e s of t h i s d o c t r i n e are 
d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y r e f l e c t e d i n the recent p o l i c i e s of such 
countries as the United Kingdom, Canada, A u s t r a l i a , Pakistan, 
Singapore and South A f r i c a . 2 5 However, i t must not be forgotten 
that s t i l l other c o u n t r i e s f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t to give up the old 
order and t h e r e f o r e have not abandoned the p r i n c i p l e of absolute 
immunity. 2 6 I t must a l s o be remembered tha t at l e a s t before the 
h i s t o r i c landmark case of The P h i l i p p i n e Admiral, i n which the 
Privy Council followed the r e s t r i c t i v e d o c trine, B r i t a i n i n f a c t 
had i n the past maintained a p o l i c y of absolute immunity and 
t h i s p o l i c y of B r i t a i n seemed to have i n f l u e n c e d some 
commonwealth c o u n t r i e s to maintain the same p o s i t i o n . Perhaps 
B r i t a i n ' s change of p o l i c y t h e r e a f t e r a l s o had s i m i l a r i n f l u e n c e 
on the Old Commonwealth, notwithstanding the f a c t t h a t some 
commonwealth A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s have remained c o n s e r v a t i v e and 
s t i l l s t e a d f a s t l y support the d o c t r i n e of absolute immunity. 2 7 
Canada followed the United Kingdom i n adopting the 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity d o c t r i n e i n 1982, 2 8 but i t appeared Canada 
struggled with the idea f o r some time before a formal change was 
2 4 (1976) 425 114 682. 
2 5See Brownlie, P r i n c i p l e s of P u b l i c I n t . Law (1990) a t p. 
328. 
2 6 I b i d . a t pp. 329-336; I L C Report (1982, 1983, 1986). 
2 7 I L C Report (1982, 1984, 1986). 
^ 8Brownlie, op. c i t . a t p. 328; Rebecca Wallace, 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1986) p. 110. 
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made. The s h i f t i n p o l i c y by the United Kingdom paved the way 
f o r B r i t a i n to become a party to both the 1926 B r u s s e l s 
Convention and that of the 1972 European Convention on S t a t e 
Immunity, r e s p e c t i v e l y . 2 9 The object of the Convention was to 
provide a uniform method i n dealing with i s s u e s c e n t r a l to the 
problem of sovereign immunity. 3 0 
I n the l i g h t of the move towards the d o c t r i n e of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity and i t s attendant e f f e c t on the Communist 
world as w e l l as the T h i r d World, the former USSR, the United 
S t a t e s and many other c o u n t r i e s have resolved to accept by 
t r e a t y a genuine waiver of immunity i n matters covering shipping 
and t r a d i n g a c t i v i t i e s . I n r e a l i t y , however, i t remains to be 
seen whether these p o s i t i v e p o l i c i e s based on compromise between 
the d o c t r i n e of absolute immunity and r e s t r i c t i v e immunity would 
promote harmony i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l commercial i n t e r c o u r s e , i n view 
of the f a c t t h a t some cou n t r i e s have remained adamant or 
o b s t i n a t e to the c a l l by leading Western i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s , 
t h a t immunity be r e s t r i c t e d . 3 1 
(4) R e s t r i c t i v e Immunity and I t s Implications 
I t i s true that "an equal has no dominion over an e q u a l . " 
However, i n the l a s t twenty years and perhaps i n much e a r l i e r 
2 9Brownlie, op. c i t . a t p. 337. 
3 0 I b i d . 
3 1See ILC Report (1986) where B r a z i l , B u l g a r i a , China, 
Ecuador, Hungary, Japan, Poland, Portugal, Sudan, S y r i a , 
T h a i l a n d , T r i n i d a d and Tobago, USSR, Venezuela have expressed 
t h e i r d e s i r e to s t i l l follow the doctrine of absolute immunity. 
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times i n Continental European c o u n t r i e s the pendulum appears to 
be swinging towards the acceptance of the doctrine of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i n the Western world and t h i s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
may be due to the p r e s s i n g need of s t a b i l i t y , equity, good f a i t h 
and s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i c e i n contemporary world of commercial 
t r a n s a c t i o n s . 3 2 A considerable number of eminent w r i t e r s , given 
t h i s s t a t e of a f f a i r s , thus suggested t h a t the p r a c t i c e whereby 
a d i s t i n c t i o n i s made between a c t a jure imperii and acta jure 
gestionis be i n s t i t u t e d as a prelude to e s t a b l i s h i n g r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity. Thus a s t a t e a c t i n g as a p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l must not 
be accorded immunity and hence must be e q u a l l y subjected to 
l i a b i l i t y as would an i n d i v i d u a l under s i m i l a r c ircumstances. 3 3 
Although i t appears t h a t a m a j o r i t y of l e a d i n g l e g a l s c h o l a r s i n 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law have a l l agreed t h a t immunity be r e s t r i c t e d , 
there i s without doubt the problem of developing a uniform or 
acceptable means by which to promote a workable and p r a c t i c a l 
c r i t e r i o n l i k e l y to command the acceptance of a l l and sundry. 3 4 
The d i s t i n c t i o n between a c t a jure imperii and act a j u r e 
gestionis, although i n theory may appear q u i t e a t t r a c t i v e and 
3 2The i n c r e a s e i n s t a t e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n commercial 
transactions throughout the world prompted the c a l l f o r 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i n order to promote j u s t i c e i n the market 
place. See gene r a l l y , Brownlie, op. c i t . , pp. 323-345; 
Higgins (1982) 29 NILR 265. 
3 3See Mann, The State Immunity Act 1978 (1979) 50 p. 43; 
Brownlie, op. c i t . , pp. 332-345; Lauterpacht (1951) 28 BYIL; 
Reoovodd (1986) V. 200 Hague R e c u e i l ; Badr, State Immunity 
(1984) . 
3 4See ILC Report (1986); S o r n a r a j a h , Problems i n Applying 
the R e s t r i c t i v e Theory of Sovereign Immunity, 1982 ICLQ 31 p. 
661; ILC Report (1986), e.g., S t a t e P r a c t i c e . 
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apposite, however, i n r e a l i t y i t i s d i f f i c u l t to define and 
perhaps very cumbersome to apply. 3 5 The acceptance of the 
p r i n c i p l e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i s to some extent p r e d i c a t e d 
on the reasoning that s t a t e s do not always act as a " p u b l i c 
person" and t h a t there are i n s t a n c e s i n which a s t a t e may a c t i n 
i t s c a p a c i t y as a p r i v a t e person, arguably f a l l i n g completely 
ou t s i d e the confines of t r a d i t i o n a l l y acceptable governmental 
f u n c t i o n s . 3 6 In r e p l y to the above alluded theory, Professor 
Hyde although a proponent of the r e s t r i c t i v e theory argues t h a t , 
"A s t a t e never a c t s i n a p r i v a t e capacity, even when the 
a c t i v i t y i n which i t p a r t i c i p a t e s i s one commonly confined to 
and c a r r i e d on by the p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l . " 3 7 
I n view of the d i f f i c u l t i e s and u n c e r t a i n t i e s a s s o c i a t e d 
w ith the d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity and the f a c t t h a t 
s c h o l a r s are not a l l agreed as to how to apply the concept, 
prompted De Paepe to propose the o b j e c t i v e t e s t which f o r want 
of proper d i r e c t i o n was l a t e r r e s t a t e d by A. Weiss, 3 8 a prominent 
former judge of the Permanent Court of I n t e r n a t i o n a l J u s t i c e a t 
the Hague of which he was appointed Vice President i n 1922, as 
f o l l o w s : 
" I t would seem a s u r e r t e s t to admit that the nature alone of 
the a c t should be taken i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n . . . . Thus the 
d i s t i n c t i o n s j u s t mentioned disappear; the judge need not 
c o n s i d e r i n t e n t i o n ; h i s duty becomes a simple on, s i n c e i t 
3 5 L a u t e r p a c h t , op. c i t . ; F i t z m a u r i c e (1933) BYIL XIV. 
3 6The P h i l i p p i n e Admiral (1977) AC 373 (JC) ; Trendtex 
Trading v. C e n t r a l Bank of N i g e r i a (1977) QB 529 (CA) ; I 
Congreso d e l P a r t i c o (1983) 1 AC 244 (HL) . 
3 7See Hyde, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (11-844, Vol. 1 ) . 
3 8Academie de Droit I n t e r n a t i o n a l , Recueil l e s Cours (192) 
V o l . 1, pp. 545-6. 
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involves merely a question of f a c t : An a c t performed by a 
government i s presented f or h i s j u d i c i a l a p p r e c i a t i o n ; to 
determine whether he may pass upon i t , he has but one question 
to ask: I s the a c t by i t s nature such t h a t i n no case could i t 
be performed by other than by a s t a t e , or i n i t s name; i n such a 
case i t i s an a c t of p u b l i c a u t h o r i t y (puissance publique) ; i t 
i s a p o l i t i c a l a c t which may not, without i n f r i n g i n g upon the 
sovereignty of such a s t a t e , be submitted to the judgment of a 
foreign a u t h o r i t y . There i s a c l e a r l a c k of j u r i s d i c t i o n . On 
the contrary, i f the a c t i s by i t s n a t u r e such as any p r i v a t e 
person could engage i n , as, for i n s t a n c e , a c o n t r a c t or a loan, 
the act, whatever i t s purpose, i s a p r i v a t e a c t , and the f o r e i g n 
court has j u r i s d i c t i o n . And thus we must conclude t h a t 
j u r i s d i c t i o n may not be d e c l i n e d even i f the c o n t r a c t i s touched 
with an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c h a r a c t e r , a s , f o r i n s t a n c e , i f i t 
concerns the purchase of a warship or an order of munitions, and 
arms for i t s a r s e n a l s . I t i s of no importance t h a t a p r i v a t e 
c i t i z e n does not o r d i n a r i l y make such c o n t r a c t s , or on such a 
s c a l e or to the same purpose. I f i t i s the question of a 
con t r a c t or an a c q u i s i t i o n , t h a t i s enough. I t i s the nature 
and not the purpose t h a t i s to be c o n s i d e r e d . " 3 9 
The o b j e c t i v e t e s t according to Judge Weiss' approach 
follows the p r i n c i p l e by which i s s u e s regarding immunity are 
determined by r e l i a n c e on the nature of the s t a t e a c t i v i t y t h a t 
p r e c i p i t a t e d the l i t i g a t i o n . 4 0 Thus whether the l o c a l forum w i l l 
d e c l i n e j u r i s d i c t i o n or not i s p r e d i c a t e d on the nature or form 
of the act and i f need be, s p e c i f i c a l l y on the commercial 
a c t i v i t y i n dispute. The t e s t , i t i s suggested, determines 
whether the t r a n s a c t i o n entered i n t o by the s t a t e can p o s s i b l y 
be denoted as one by i t s very nature or form to be a sovereign 
or non-sovereign a c t ( i . e . , p r i v a t e a c t ) . Thus i f i t i s 
c h a r a c t e r i s e d as one of acta jure imperii then according to 
Judge Weiss immunity must be allowed. 4 1 While on the other hand, 
39 I b i d . 
4 0 I b i d . 
4 1 I b i d . 
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i f the a c t i v i t y i s one by i t s very nature an a c t i v i t y that any 
p r i v a t e person would undertake, then immunity be denied. 4 2 I n 
t h i s regard a d i s t i n c t i o n i s simply being suggested between acts 
jure imperii and a c t s jure gestionis. But i s such a d i s t i n c t i o n 
easy and r e a l i s t i c ? I think not, for such an approach would be 
quite c o n f u s i n g and l i k e l y to pose d i f f i c u l t i e s for the judge. 
The most f o r c e f u l argument i n support of absolute immunity 
and the p l e a to abandon the d i s t i n c t i o n between sovereign and 
non-sovereign a c t s was c l e a r l y s t a t e d by S i r Geral Fitzmaurice 
(as he then was). 
"The d i s t i n c t i o n between the sovereign and non sovereign 
a c t s of a s t a t e i s a r b i t r a r y and u n r e a l , and which i s not easy 
to apply i n p r a c t i c e and which might become much more d i f f i c u l t 
to a p p l y i f s t a t e s c a r e to take the appropriate measures; one 
which, moreover, must always l e a v e a s o r t of no man's land of 
a c t i o n s capable of being regarded as coming within e i t h e r 
c a t e g o r y . The c o n c l u s i o n seems to be t h a t the only sound course 
i s to adhere to the s t r i c t d o c t r i n e of complete immunity, any 
d e p a r t u r e s from i t i n s p e c i f i c c a s e s being regulated by 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l convention." 4 3 
I t i s hard today to take i s s u e with the argument p o s i t e d 
by S i r G e r a l F i t z m a u r i c e , for i n r e a l i t y the a p p l i c a t i o n of the 
r e s t r i c t i v e d o c t r i n e i s not at a l l easy given the attendant 
d i f f i c u l t i e s a s s o c i a t e d with modern-day a c t i v i t i e s of s t a t e s and 
the q u e s t i o n of i n d i r e c t impleading. Twenty-four years l a t e r 
Lord Denning a l s o made a s i m i l a r observation i n Rahimtoola v. 
Nizam of Hyderabad i n which he expressed h i s doubts as regards 
the m o d a l i t i e s of the r e s t r i c t i v e d o c t r i n e . According to him 
the r e s t r i c t i v e theory i s "a most e l u s i v e t e s t . " But i n the 
4 2 I b i d . 
" F i t z m a u r i c e , op. c i t . , a t pp. 101-122. 
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same judgment he a l s o advocated t h a t the law of absolute 
immunity had f a l l e n i n t o d i s f a v o u r and th e r e f o r e declared i t 
u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . 4 4 I n f a c t , i t d i d not take long before the 
shortcomings of the d o c t r i n e of s t a t e immunity became apparent. 
Many therefore s t a r t e d q u e s t i o n i n g the r a t i o n a l e behind t h i s 
ancient concept and whether i t s l e g i t i m a c y can p o s s i b l y be 
supported by cogent r e a s o n i n g . 4 5 Those having second thoughts, 
that i s , judges and s c h o l a r s , about the appropriateness of t h i s 
doctrine s t a r t e d a new c r u s a d e 4 6 i n support of the r e s t r i c t i v e or 
r e l a t i v e theory of immunity. 4 7 F i r s t i t appeared as though the 
proponents were throwing t h e i r e f f o r t s unto the uncharted sees. 
But of l a t e as a r e s u l t of the i n c r e a s e i n commercial a c t i v i t i e s 
by sovereign s t a t e s and the multitude of l i t i g a t i o n before 
domestic courts the world over has given impetus to t h e i r c a l l 
for a complete or p a r t i a l abandonment of the do c t r i n e of s t a t e 
immunity, 4 8 to avoid the problem whereby the r i g h t s of p r i v a t e 
companies are trampled upon whil e c o u n t r i e s involved i n 
4 4 (1957) 3 A l l ER 404. 
4 5See S i n c l a i r , op. c i t . , a t pp. 113-284; ILC Report (1986). 
4 6See Lauterpacht, op. c i t . ; S i n c l a i r , op. c i t . ; Dunbar, 
Cont r o v e r s i a l Aspects of Sovereign Immunity i n the Case Law of 
Some States (1971) 132 R e c u e i l des Cours 203-351. A good 
example of the crusade can be seen i n the E n g l i s h p r a c t i c e where 
Lord Denning mounted a crusade to challenge the E n g l i s h approach 
of absolute immunity. 
4 7See Lord Denning 1s d e c i s i o n i n Trendtex Trading v. C e n t r a l 
Bank of Nigeria (1977) 1 A l l ER 881. 
4 8 0 f l a t e many companies have sued c o u n t r i e s i n E n g l i s h and 
American co u r t s . C o u n t r i e s such as N i g e r i a , Z a i r e , Libya, 
Pakistan, Tanzania, Morocco, Uganda, e t c . , have been sued i n 
foreign courts. 
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commercial t r a n s a c t i o n s hide behind the doctrine of absolute 
immunity to i n s u l a t e themselves from l i a b i l i t y . 
The debate between adherents of s t a t e immunity and 
adherents of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i s f a r from over and t h i s may 
be due to the h o r i z o n t a l nature of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l order, 
which i n the main a l s o makes i t d i f f i c u l t for the a p p l i c a t i o n of 
the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 4 9 Thus even i f a domestic court should 
r u l e t h a t immunity be denied, the enforcement of the s a i d 
judgment, i . e . , execution forcee, would be d i f f i c u l t to execute 
and may i n most cases c r e a t e acrimony and disrepute among 
n a t i o n - s t a t e s . Furthermore, i t would appear s t a t e p r a c t i c e i n 
r e s p e c t of t h i s area of the law i s scanty and q u i t e u n s e t t l e d . 
There i s therefore no usus i n support of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 
(5) The Change of Heart i n American P r a c t i c e 
The United S t a t e s a f t e r having struggled with the Supreme 
Court's d e c i s i o n of 1812 i n the Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 
suddenly changed i t s p o s i t i o n i n 1952 when the department i s s u e d 
the famous Tate l e t t e r , thus abandoning the doctrine of absolute 
immunity. 
That the import of the Tate l e t t e r found expression i n 
A l f r e d D u n h i l l of London, I n c . v. Republic of Cuba cannot ex 
hypothesi be doubted when the Supreme Court, narrowly though i t 
may appear, endorsed the d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity, and 
r u l e d t h a t the repudiation of a commercial debt cannot be 
4 9Sonarajah, op. c i t . 
147 
c h a r a c t e r i s e d as an a c t of s t a t e and t h e r e f o r e such an a c t i o n be 
denied immunity i n view of the p r e v a i l i n g change i n the p r a c t i c e 
of some s t a t e s . The court went on to argue as f o l l o w s : 
"We d e c l i n e to extend the a c t of s t a t e d o c t r i n e to a c t s 
committed by f o r e i g n s o v e r e i g n s i n the course of t h e i r p u r e l y 
commercial operations. Because the a c t r e l i e d on by respondents 
i n t h i s case was an a c t a r i s i n g out of the conduct by Cuba's 
agents i n the operation of c i g a r b u s i n e s s f o r p r o f i t , the a c t 
was not an a c t of s t a t e . " 5 0 
The court was a l s o persuaded by the f a c t t h a t an i n c r e a s i n g 
number of Western i n d u s t r i a l i s e d c o u n t r i e s have accepted the 
doctrine of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 
Further, the l e a d i n g case i n American p r a c t i c e that 
ushered i n the method by which p u b l i c a c t i v i t i e s were 
s p e c i f i c a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d from commercial a c t i v i t i e s under the 
r e s t r i c t i v e theory was V i c t o r y Transport I n c . v. Comisana 
General de Abastecimientos y T r a n s p o r t e s , 5 1 i n which the court 
took a reasonable approach based on e c l e c t i c i s m to designate 
which public a c t s must be accorded immunity as f o l l o w s : 
(1) I n t e r n a l a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a c t s , such as expulsion of an 
a l i e n . 
(2) L e g i s l a t i v e a c t s , such as n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . 
(3) Acts concerning the armed f o r c e s . 
(4) Acts concerning d i p l o m a t i c a c t i v i t y . 
(5) Public loans. 
5 0 (1976) 4 2 5 US 682, p. 318. 
5 1 (1964) 336 F. 2d 354 2nd C i v . 
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T h i s method of d i s t i n c t i o n has found favour with other 
c o u r t s 5 2 and therefore was followed without h e s i t a t i o n i n 
subsequent c a s e s . 5 3 The preference given to the doct r i n e of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity p r e s e n t l y i n American courts, however, 
ta k e s i t s a u t h o r i t y from the 197 6 Foreign Sovereign Immunity 
Act. L e t us consider seriatim some of i t s modalities. 
(6) Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976; US Law Since that Time 
The adoption of l e g i s l a t i o n to regulate the question of 
sove r e i g n immunity i n the United States simply cannot be 
questioned, i n the l i g h t of the f a c t that such l e g i s l a t i o n was 
much needed to r e s t o r e the competence of U.S. courts to 
adequately review cases d e a l i n g with commercial disputes between 
p r i v a t e e n t i t i e s and foreign sovereign s t a t e s , a function 
c l e a r l y a l l o c a t e d to the State Department p r i o r to the enactment 
of the FSIA. 5 4 
To be p r e c i s e , the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of the 
Unit e d S t a t e s i n great d e t a i l c o d i f i e s the r e s t r i c t i v e theory of 
immunity according to American experience. The Act s e t s f o r t h a 
5 2See Von Mehien, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 
1976 (1978) 17 Colum J Tr a n s n a t i o n a l L 33. 
5 3Rovin S a l e s Co. v. S o c i a l i s t Republic of Romania (1975) 
403 F. Supp. 1298, 1302 MD I I I ; Isbrandtsen Tankers I n c . v. 
P r e s i d e n t of I n d i a 446 F.2d 1198 (2d C i r . ) c e r t , denied, (1977) 
404 US 985; Transp Corp v. T S/T Manhattan (1975) 405 F.Supp. 
1244, 1246 SDNY. 
5 4See S i n c l a i r , op. c i t . , a t pp. 161-169; C a r l , Foreign 
Sovereigns i n American Courts; The United States Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act i n P r a c t i c e (1979) 33 SWLJ p. 1009 (now 
SMU Law Review); Feldman (1986) 35 ICLQ p. 302. 
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f e d e r a l long-arm s t a t u t e and o t h e r p r o c e d u r e s f o r a d j u d i c a t i n g 
c l a i m s a g a i n s t f o r e i g n governments and t h e i r a g e n c i e s b e f o r e 
A m e r i c a n c o u r t s ( 1 6 0 8 ) ; i t f u r t h e r p r o v i d e s o r v e s t s i n t h e 
j u d i c i a r y t h e o v e r a l l a u t h o r i t y i n d e t e r m i n i n g as t o whether 
c e r t a i n a c t i v i t i e s o f f o r e i g n s t a t e s a r e c o m m e r c i a l o r not 
( 1 6 0 2 ) ; t h e A c t a l s o i n e v e r y r e s p e c t g i v e s l e g i s l a t i v e g u i d a n c e 
i n r e s p e c t of venue p r o v i s i o n s f o r t a k i n g l e g a l a c t i o n a g a i n s t 
f o r e i g n s t a t e s and t h e i r a g e n c i e s ( 1 3 9 1 ( f ) ) . The A c t p r o v i d e s 
inter alia f o r t h e e n f o r c e m e n t o f j udgments a g a i n s t f o r e i g n 
governments i n c e r t a i n c l e a r c u t c a s e s a d j u d g e d u n l i k e l y t o 
v i o l a t e the p r i n c i p l e s o f p u b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, e.g., 
c o m m e r c i a l p r o p e r t y of a s o v e r e i g n (1010) ; t h e A c t i n s h o r t 
g e n e r a l l y p r o v i d e s through 1609-1611 a c o m p l e t e e l i m i n a t i o n o f 
i n rem and q u a s i i n rem j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r f o r e i g n s t a t e s , 5 5 b u t 
i n t u r n a l l o w s j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r a f o r e i g n s o v e r e i g n i n r e s p e c t 
of in personam j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
(7) J u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e F e d e r a l C o u r t s 
P r i m a r i l y S e c t i o n 28 USC 1330 o f t h e F S I A c l e a r l y c o n f e r s 
j u r i s d i c t i o n on f e d e r a l d i s t r i c t c o u r t s w i t h o u t any l i m i t 
w h a t s o e v e r on the amount i n d i s p u t e . S e c t i o n 1604 s p e c i f i c a l l y 
i s t h e s o u r c e of immunity t o f o r e i g n s t a t e s , however, e x c e p t i o n s 
l e a d i n g t o d e n i a l of immunity a r e s e t f o r t h u n d e r S e c t i o n 1605-
1607, 1605 and 1606, r e s p e c t i v e l y . Thus C o n g r e s s s u c c e e d e d i n 
28 USC §§ 1609-1611. 
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p u t t i n g t o r e s t q u e s t i o n s r e g a r d i n g a b s o l u t e s o v e r e i g n immunity 
i n A m e r i c a n p r a c t i c e . S e c t i o n 1 3 30(a) f o r example g r a n t s 
s u b j e c t m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n i n r e s p e c t o f a n o n - j u r y c i v i l 
a c t i o n a g a i n s t a f o r e i g n s o v e r e i g n s t a t e where i t app e a r s 
w i t h o u t doubt t h a t t h e s t a t e i n q u e s t i o n cannot c l a i m o r be 
g r a n t e d immunity. S e c t i o n 1330(b) g i v e s a l l o w a n c e t h a t 
p e r s o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n be t a k e n i f t h e c o u r t prima facie has 
j u r i s d i c t i o n under S e c t i o n 1330 (a) and s e r v i c e o f p r o c e s s i s 
p r o v i d e d o r a l l o w e d under S e c t i o n 1608. 5 6 
A f o r e i g n s t a t e w h i c h by agreement o r i m p l i e d l y w a i v e d 
immunity w i l l be s u b j e c t e d t o j u r i s d i c t i o n . Thus once a w a i v e r 
i s made by a c o u n t r y i t c a n n o t be r e c a n t e d o r withdrawn e x c e p t 
i n a manner a s r e q u i r e d by t h e command o f S e c t i o n 1605 (a) o f t h e 
F S I A . 
G i v e n t h e s t r e n g t h o f S e c t i o n 1605, a f o r e i g n s t a t e may be 
s u e d i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , i f a c l a i m a n t c an l e g i t i m a t e l y show 
t h a t t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e f o r e i g n s t a t e i n i s s u e f a l l w i t h i n 
s u c h e x c e p t i o n s s e t out i n 1605. P r i o r t o t h e enactment o f t h e 
F S I A t h e r e was no c l e a r c u t means o f s e c u r i n g i n personam 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . 5 7 However, t h e F S I A h as now opened t h e gate f o r 
c e r t a i n c l a i m s g i v i n g r i s e t o damages i n t o r t s t o be made w i t h i n 
t h e meaning o f c o m m e r c i a l a c t i v i t i e s . 5 8 Arguably, however, 
5 6 S e e G r a y v. Permanent M i s s i o n o f P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c o f 
Congo t o t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s (1978) SDNY 433 F.Supp. 816, 821. 
" C a r l , op. c i t . See a l s o Pennoyer v. N e f f (1877) 95 US 714 
w h i c h d e a l s i n d e t a i l w i t h t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r under 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n , i . e . , j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
5 8 2 8 USC § 1605 (a) 5. 
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s u f f i c i e n t minimum c o n t a c t t e s t must be f o l l o w e d o r a p p l i e d t o 
d e t e r m i n e t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e f o r e i g n s t a t e s c o n d u c t i n 
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , i n o r d e r t o s a t i s f y t h e due p r o c e s s 
r e q u i r e m e n t under the U.S. C o n s t i t u t i o n . S 9 
(8) P r e l i m i n a r y I s s u e s w i t h R e s p e c t t o Commencement o f A c t i o n 
S e c t i o n 1609 under F S I A e l i m i n a t e s t o t a l l y p r e j u d g m e n t 
a t t a c h m e n t s and j u r i s d i c t i o n a l a t t a c h m e n t s o f t h e p r o p e r t y o f a 
f o r e i g n s t a t e s i t u a t e d i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . Thus t o a t t a c h t h e 
p r o p e r t y o f a f o r e i g n s t a t e , p r o p e r j u r i d i c a l methods must be 
f o l l o w e d ; f o r example, to a c h i e v e t h i s end, a c o m p l a i n t would 
have t o be f i l e d under R u l e 3 o f f e d e r a l r u l e s o f c i v i l 
p r o c e d u r e , and s e r v i c e o f p r o c e s s r e g a r d i n g t h i s m a t t e r must be 
e f f e c t e d by f o l l o w i n g one o f t h e o p t i o n s e n u m e r a t e d under 
S e c t i o n 1 6 0 8 ( a ) . I f by chance t h e d e f e n d a n t s t a t e i s i n d i r e c t l y 
i m p leaded, r e g a r d must be g i v e n t o S e c t i o n 1 6 0 3 ( b ) w h i c h means 
s e r v i c e c a n d u l y be made on an o f f i c e r o r manager o f t h e 
i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y or agency i n q u e s t i o n , e.g., s t a t e - o w n e d a i r l i n e 
o r p o s s i b l y l e t t e r s r o g a t o r y c o u l d be u s e d a s a means o f s e r v i n g 
t h e d e f e n d a n t s t a t e . 1 6 0 8 ( b ) . 
S e c t i o n 1610(a) of t h e F S I A t o u c h e s on m a t t e r s r e l a t i n g t o 
p o s t judgment attachments o f t h e p r o p e r t y o f t h e f o r e i g n s t a t e 
( d e f e n d a n t ) . S e c t i o n 1610(a) p e r m i t s e x e c u t i o n o n l y i f t h e r e i s 
a prima facie c a s e t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y i n c o n t r o v e r s y i s u s e d i n 
5 9 I n t h i s l i g h t , s t r i c t a d h e r e n c e t o t h e due p r o c e s s o f t h e 
U.S. C o n s t i t u t i o n i s r e q u i r e d ; s e e g e n e r a l l y t h e U.S. 
C o n s t i t u t i o n . 
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c o m m e r c i a l o r t r a d i n g a c t i v i t y i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , i . e . , where 
a s a m a t t e r o f p r i n c i p l e a l i n k a g e can p o s s i b l y be proved 
between t h e c l a i m and judgment. S e c t i o n 1 6 1 0 ( b ) , on t h e o t h e r 
hand, a l l o w s a t t a c h m e n t where c o m m e r c i a l a c t i v i t y i n the U n i t e d 
S t a t e s i s a t i s s u e w i t h o u t g i v i n g e x c e p t i o n t o i t s r e l a t i o n to 
t h e c l a i m on w h i c h t h e judgment i s t o be d e t e r m i n e d . 
(9) C o m mercial A c t i v i t y under F S I A 
The f o r e m o s t p r o v i s i o n o f t h e F S I A i s S e c t i o n 1 6 0 5 ( a ) . I t 
s p e c i f i c a l l y d e a l s w i t h " c o m m e r c i a l a c t i v i t y . " And t h e term 
c o m m e r c i a l , a l t h o u g h d i f f i c u l t t o d e f i n e o r e x p l o r e i n r e g a r d t o 
s o v e r e i g n immunity, i s d e t e r m i n e d by t h e n a t u r e t e s t r a t h e r than 
by t h e p u r p o s e t e s t . 6 0 A c o m m e r c i a l a c t i v i t y may t h u s be d e f i n e d 
i n r e s p e c t o f t h e n a t u r e o f t h e a c t i v i t y i n i s s u e a s f o l l o w s : 
"A commercial a c t i v i t y means e i t h e r a r e g u l a r course of 
commercial conduct or a p a r t i c u l a r commercial t r a n s a c t i o n or 
a c t . The commercial c h a r a c t e r of an a c t i v i t y s h a l l be 
determined by r e f e r e n c e t o the nature of the course of conduct 
or p a r t i c u l a r t r a n s a c t i o n or a c t , r a t h e r than by re f e r e n c e to 
i t s purpose." 6 1 
The r e s t a t e m e n t , a l t h o u g h i n t h e r e a l s e n s e i s n o t law, o f f e r s a 
d e f i n i t i o n t h a t c a n be h e l p f u l t o t h e c o u r t s t h u s : 
"An a c t i v i t y i s deemed commercial, even i f c a r r i e d out by 
a s t a t e i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y , i f i t i s concerned with production, 
s a l e or purchase of goods; h i r i n g or l e a s i n g of property; 
borrowing or l e n d i n g of money; performance of or c o n t r a c t i n g f or 
the performance of s e r v i c e s ; and s i m i l a r a c t i v i t i e s of the kind 
t h a t a re c a r r i e d on by nature or j u r i d i c a l persons. The f a c t 
t h a t the goods, property, money or s e r v i c e s may be used f or 
p u b l i c or government purpose does not a l t e r the commercial 
c h a r a c t e r of the a c t i v i t y . " 6 2 
6 0 S e e S e c t i o n 1605 (a) 2. 
6 1 S e e S e c t i o n 1604 (d) o f F S I A . 
" R e s t a t e m e n t 3 r d o f t h e F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s Law § 453 
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A l t h o u g h i t a p pears t h e s e d e f i n i t i o n s w i l l c e r t a i n l y be 
h e l p f u l , a f u r t h e r r e f l e c t i o n , however, shows t h a t i t c a n n o t be 
a d e q u a t e l y a p p l i e d i n c e r t a i n d i f f i c u l t c a s e s , e s p e c i a l l y where 
t h e p u b l i c and commercial a c t s of a f o r e i g n s t a t e a r e 
i n t e r t w i n e d and a l m o s t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y d i r e c t e d t o a c h i e v i n g a 
p a r t i c u l a r d e v e l o p m e n t a l g o a l . These problems a r e commonly 
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h d e v e l o p i n g or E a s t E u ropean c o u n t r i e s where 
p r i v a t i s a t i o n i n promoting development i s a t i t s l o w e s t l e v e l 
w h i l e t h e p u b l i c s e c t o r assumes a dominant p o s i t i o n . 6 3 The m a j o r 
problem w i t h t h e r e s t a t e m e n t d e f i n i t i o n i s t h a t i t i s g e n e r a l 
and would not be a b l e to s t a n d t h e t e s t o f g i v i n g g u i d a n c e a s t o 
how t o a d e q u a t e l y f o r m u l a t e a c r i t e r i o n t h a t c o u l d b e s t be u s e d 
t o d i s t i n g u i s h between governmental and c o m m e r c i a l a c t s o f 
f o r e i g n s t a t e s . The FSIA d e f i n i t i o n , on t h e o t h e r hand, i s 
s i m p l y m e c h a n i c a l and t h e r e f o r e must be a p p l i e d on c a s e - b y - c a s e 
b a s i s i n o r d e r t o a v o i d problems. A r g u a b l y , t h e h o r i z o n t a l 
n a t u r e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r d e r and t h e a t t e n d a n t p a r a l l e l 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f t h e r e a s o n i n g b e h i n d t h e d o c t r i n e o f s o v e r e i g n 
immunity i n c o u n t r i e s of t h e w o r l d a r e more i n t r i g u i n g i s s u e s t o 
c o n s i d e r t h a n t h e need to s i m p l y d i s t i n g u i s h between acts jure 
imperii and acts jure gentionis . 6 4 The h e a r t o f t h e p r o b l e m 
[Comment B ] . 
6 3 S e e F r i e d m a n , Changing S o c i a l Arrangements i n S t a t e 
T r a d i n g S t a t e s and t h e i r E f f e c t on I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1959) 24 
Law and Contemporary Problems 350. See a l s o g e n e r a l l y 
S o r n a r a j a h , op. c i t . 
6 4 S e e S o r n a r a j a h , op. c i t . 
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seems t o be p r e d i c a t e d on t h e p r o p e r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e 
d i s p u t e a t hand and how b e s t a l o c a l forum c o u l d p o s s i b l y 
r e s o l v e o r a p p l y t h e r e s t r i c t i v e t h e o r y b a s e d on t h e n o t i o n of 
s t a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a s d e r i v e d from t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f p u b l i c 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w . 6 3 The s u g g e s t e d method o f d e t e r m i n i n g t h e 
n a t u r e of c o m m e r c i a l a c t i v i t y i s n o t r e a l i s t i c and t h u s r e s o l v e s 
the problem p a r t l y i n r e s p e c t o f t h e c r i t e r i a f o r m u l a t e d under 
FSIA S e c t i o n 1 6 0 5 ( a ( ) 2 ) . A r g u a b l y S e c t i o n 1 6 0 5 ( a ) ( 2 ) i s 
b a s i c a l l y an A m e r i c a n s e l f - i m p o s e d l i m i t a t i o n which may not 
c a r r y w e i g h t on t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l p l a n e . 
The a p p r o a c h f o l l o w e d i n V i c t o r y T r a n s p o r t I n c . v. 
C o m i s a r i a G e n e r a l de A b a s t e c i m i e n t a s y T r a n s p o r t e s , r e g a r d i n g t h e 
a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity where 
s o v e r e i g n and n o n - s o v e r e i g n a c t s were d i f f e r e n t i a t e d h a s now 
become a dead l e t t e r o r p e r h a p s i n s i g n i f i c a n t i n t h e l i g h t o f 
the enactment o f t h e F S I A l e g i s l a t i o n o f 1976 w hich a s a m a t t e r 
of i t s r a d i c a l a p p r o a c h h a s t o t a l l y e c l i p s e d t h e V i c t o r y 
T r a n s p o r t a u t h o r i t y . 
(10) C o n t a c t s and D i r e c t E f f e c t A pproach 
S u i t s a g a i n s t f o r e i g n s o v e r e i g n s a r e now p o s s i b l e i n t h e 
U n i t e d S t a t e s a f t e r t h e p a s s i n g o f t h e F S I A , e s p e c i a l l y when t h e 
s u b j e c t m a t t e r i n i s s u e i s r e l a t e d t o a c t i v i t i e s c o n s i d e r e d 
c o m m e r c i a l . 6 6 Thus t h r e e c o n d i t i o n s must e x i s t i f s u c h s u i t s a r e 
6 5 L a u t e r p a c h t , op. c i t . 
6 6 S e e S e c t i o n 1603(d) o f F S I A . 
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t o be e n t e r t a i n e d i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u r t s . The f i r s t i s 
r e l a t e d t o a s i t u a t i o n where a f o r e i g n s o v e r e i g n ' s c o m m e r c i a l 
a c t i v i t y i s c a r r i e d on i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . 6 7 The s e c o n d c o v e r s 
an a c t d u l y p e r f o r m e d i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h a 
t r a d i n g a c t i v i t y o f a f o r e i g n s o v e r e i g n s t a t e i n some t h i r d 
c o u n t r y . 6 8 The t h i r d may encompass a s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h a 
c o m m e r c i a l a c t i v i t y o f a s o v e r e i g n s t a t e has produced a d i r e c t 
o r an i n d i r e c t i m p a c t or e f f e c t i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s . 6 9 I n 
N a t i o n a l A m e r i c a n Corp. v. F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c o f N i g e r i a , 7 0 t h e 
d e f e n d a n t s t a t e , i n v o k e d t h e maxim par in parem nom habet 
imperium i n o r d e r t o a v o i d l i a b i l i t y , but t h e c o u r t r u l e d t h a t 
t h e t r a n s a c t i o n i n q u e s t i o n and t h e c e n t r a l i s s u e r e g a r d i n g 
l e t t e r s o f c r e d i t met t h e d i r e c t e f f e c t c r i t e r i o n under S e c t i o n 
1 6 0 5 ( a ) ( 2 ) o f t h e F S I A . Hence th e d e f e n c e o f s o v e r e i g n immunity 
s h o u l d be d e n i e d s i n c e t h e b e n e f i c i a r i e s o f t h e c o n t r a c t i n 
d i s p u t e s u f f e r e d a l o s s i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . I t must a l s o be 
n o t e d t h a t t h e minimum c o n t a c t t e s t then e s t a b l i s h e d i n S h a f f e r 
v. H e i t n e r gave s t r e n g t h t o the d e c i s i o n . The same r e s u l t was 
r e a c h e d i n H a r r i s C o r p o r a t i o n v. N a t i o n a l Framenn R a d i o and 
T e l e v i s i o n . 7 1 However, i t appears t h e C o u r t t u r n e d d e a f e a r s t o 
t h e c a l l t h a t immunity be d e n i e d i n t h e Exchange N a t i o n a l Bank 
' " C a r l , op. c i t . 
6 8 I b i d . 
6 9 I b i d . 
7 0448 F.Supp. 622 
7 1 (1982) 1 1 t h C i r 
(1978) 634 SDNY. 
691 F.2d 1344. 
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C a s e . 7 2 T h e r e t h e c o u r t s i m p l y r u l e d t h a t non-payment o f 
p r o m i s s o r y n o t e s d i d not i n a c t u a l f a c t produce a l o g i c a l l y 
s u f f i c i e n t c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e forum a s r e q u i r e d by t h e 1976 
F S IA. A g a i n i n H e l i c o p t e r o s N a t i o n a l e s de Colombia SA v. 
E l i z a b e t h H a l l , 7 3 t h e c o u r t t o o k a more c a u t i o u s approach by 
r u l i n g t h a t mere p u r c h a s e s i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d not be 
c h a r a c t e r i s e d as s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s o f j u r i s d i c t i o n i n r e s p e c t o f 
a p u r p o r t e d t r a n s a c t i o n t o t a l l y u n r e l a t e d t o t h e c a u s e o f 
a c t i o n . 
An e f f e c t i v e a p p r o a c h by w h i c h t h e s e a p p a r e n t l y e l u s i v e 
problems c o u l d be r e s o l v e d i s t o u s e t h e A c t e f f e c t i v e l y by 
f i r s t d e f i n i n g and a p p l y i n g t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e A c t t o t h e 
a c t i v i t y i n i s s u e so a s t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e a c t i v i t y f a l l s 
w i t h i n the domain o f t h e a c t , and t h e n c h a r a c t e r i s e t h e a c t i v i t y 
i n c o n t r o v e r s y w hether i t i s c o m m e r c i a l or g o v e r n m e n t a l . 
Although t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between a c t s j u r e imperii and a c t s j u r e 
gentionis i s not a t a l l e a s y , i t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t c o n s t a n t 
p r a c t i c e c o u l d b r i n g t h e p r o b l e m u n d e r c o n t r o l . 
I n V e r l i n d e n BV v. C e n t r a l Bank o f N i g e r i a , 7 4 a f o r e i g n 
company sued a f o r e i g n s o v e r e i g n s t a t e i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , a s 
a r e s u l t o f a f a i l e d cement c o n t r a c t , and t h e i s s u e was whether 
an a l i e n p r i m a f a c i e d o m i c i l e d a b r o a d c o u l d sue a f o r e i g n 
s o v e r e i g n s t a t e i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . I t was h e l d t h a t t h e 
7 2 (1984) SDNY 595 F.Supp. 502. 
7 3 (19 8 4) 104 S C t 1868. 
7 4 (19 8 3 ) 461 US 480. 
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p l a i n t i f f had t h e r i g h t t o sue but f a i l e d t o show s u f f i c i e n t 
d i r e c t e f f e c t o f t h e c o mmercial a c t i v i t y i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o 
command j u r i s d i c t i o n under S e c t i o n 1 6 0 5 ( a ) ( 2 ) of t h e F S I A . 
I n C a r e y v. N a t i o n a l O i l Corp.'* t h e L i b y a n Government-
owned o i l company had v i o l a t e d t h e terms of a c o n t r a c t s i g n e d 
w i t h a New York c o r p o r a t e e n t i t y . The c o u r t was q u i c k t o 
d e c l i n e j u r i s d i c t i o n on t h e ground t h a t t h e d i s p u t e d i d n o t 
f u l f i l t h e minimum c o n t a c t t e s t , but f a i l e d t o go as f a r a s t o 
r u l e on w h e t h e r t h e v i o l a t i o n o r t h e b r e a c h of t h e c o n t r a c t had 
any d i r e c t e f f e c t on t h e p a r e n t company i n New York. I t s i m p l y 
a v o i d e d t h e p r a c t i c e o f p i e r c i n g t h e c o r p o r a t e v e i l . 
(11) A r b i t r a t i o n C l a u s e s 
One o t h e r a r e a worth m e n t i o n i n g or c o n s i d e r i n g i s t h e 
t h o r n y q u e s t i o n o f a r b i t r a t i o n c l a u s e s a s r e g a r d s t h e 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t r a n s n a t i o n a l c o n t r a c t between a p l a i n t i f f 
company and a d e f e n d a n t c o u n t r y . The U n i t e d S t a t e s law i n t h i s 
l i g h t does n o t l a y b a r e c l e a r l y t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l p r oblem 
u s u a l l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h w a i v e r s i n t r a n s n a t i o n a l c o n t r a c t s . 
E a r l i e r c a s e s 7 6 so f a r d e c i d e d i n U.S. c o u r t s seemed t o i n d i c a t e 
by i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t t h e mere p r e s e n c e of an a r b i t r a t i o n c l a u s e 
i n a c o n t r a c t must be c o n s t r u e d t o mean t h a t immunity had been 
w a i v e d , h ence t h e d o m e s t i c c o u r t c o u l d t a k e j u r i s d i c t i o n . 7 7 
7 5 (1978) SDNY 453 Supp. 1099. 
7 6 S e e S o r n a r a j a h , op. c i t . , a t pp. 682-684. 
7 7 I b i d . a t pp. 682-683. 
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The r e a s o n i n g a l l u d e d t o may p e r h a p s c o n v i n c e t h e 
m i n o r i t y , however, t h e m a j o r i t y s i m p l y would d i s m i s s i t a s 
f a u l t y and h i g h l y l i k e l y t o b r i n g a b o u t d i s r e p u t e , f o r i t 
a ppears g i v e n i t s t o t a l e f f e c t t o r u n c o u n t e r t o usus and 
t h e r e f o r e not s u p p o r t e d by s t a t e p r a c t i c e . A m e r i c a n c o u r t s a r e , 
however, now moving away from t h e i r e a r l i e r p o s i t i o n s 7 8 t o 
embrace a new p o s i t i o n q u i t e s i m i l a r t o t h e S t a t e Immunity A c t 
o f U.K., 1978. Thus i t i s p r u d e n t t o a r g u e t h a t t h e p r a c t i c e 
whereby c o u r t s t a k e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r a d i s p u t e a u t o m a t i c a l l y 
b ecause of t h e e x i s t e n c e of an a r b i t r a t i o n c l a u s e i n 
t r a n s n a t i o n a l c o n t r a c t s be d i s c o n t i n u e d o r s i m p l y d i s c a r d e d f o r 
i t compounds the problem. 
E x p r o p r i a t i o n C l a i m s 
(a) A f o r e i g n s t a t e w i l l n ot be a c c o r d e d immunity i f t h e 
i s s u e i s i n r e s p e c t o f p r o p e r t y r i g h t s b l a t a n t l y e x p r o p r i a t e d i n 
v i o l a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. T h i s may i n c l u d e p r o p e r t y 
e x p r o p r i a t e d w i t h o u t c a u s e o r c o m p e n s a t i o n and a l s o t a k i n g s t h a t 
c o u l d be d e s c r i b e d a s a r b i t r a r y and p e r h a p s d i s c r i m i n a t o r y . 
These s i t u a t i o n s a r e n o t t h a t common, b u t i f t h e y do o c c u r , a 
c l a i m can c l e a r l y be a l l o w e d i n U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u r t s . F o r t h i s 
e x c e p t i o n t o a p p l y , however, i t must be b o r n e i n mind t h a t t h e 
p r o p e r t y must be p r e s e n t i n t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e U n i t e d 
S t a t e s h a v i n g a c l e a r c u t o r r e a l c o n n e c t i o n w i t h a c o m m e r c i a l 
a c t i v i t y c a r r i e d on i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s by t h e f o r e i g n s t a t e 7 9 
7 8 I b i d . a t p. 684. 
7 9 S e e S e c t i o n 1605(a) o f t h e F S I A . 
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" o r t h a t p r o p e r t y o r any p r o p e r t y exchanged f o r such p r o p e r t y i s 
owned o r o p e r a t e d by an agency or i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y of a f o r e i g n 
s t a t e and t h a t agency or i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y i s engaged i n a 
c o m m e r c i a l a c t i v i t y i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . " 8 0 1 6 0 5 ( a ) ( 3 ) . T h i s 
s e c t i o n i s s i m p l y a means t o r e d r e s s n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of p r o p e r t y 
w i t h o u t prompt o r adequate compensation as r e q u i r e d by 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
(b) P r o p e r t y r i g h t s a r e c o v e r e d under 1 6 0 5 ( a ) ( 4 ) . Under 
t h i s s e c t i o n , a f o r e i g n s t a t e w i l l not be g i v e n immunity i f 
" r i g h t s i n immovable p r o p e r t y s i t u a t e d i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a r e 
i n i s s u e . " I n o r d e r t o t a k e advantage of t h e a l l u d e d p r o v i s i o n , 
a p l a i n t i f f must have a f f e c t i v e p o s s e s s o r y r i g h t s or i n t e r e s t i n 
t h e l a n d l o c a t e d i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . I n s h o r t , t h e lex situs 
must be U.S. 
Non-Commercial T o r t s 
Under S e c t i o n 1 6 0 5 ( a ) ( 5 ) , a f o r e i g n s t a t e i s not immune i n 
t o r t a c t i o n s , a s f o l l o w s : 
" i n which money damages are sought a g a i n s t a foreign s t a t e for 
p e r s o n a l i n j u r y or death, or damage to or l o s s of property, 
o c c u r r i n g i n the United S t a t e s and caused by the t o r t i o u s a c t or 
omission of t h a t f o r e i g n s t a t e or of any o f f i c i a l or employee of 
t h a t f o r e i g n s t a t e w h i l e a c t i n g w i t h i n the scope of h i s o f f i c e 
or employment; except t h i s paragraph s h a l l not apply to: 
(A) any c l a i m based upon the e x e r c i s e or performance or 
the f a i l u r e to e x e r c i s e or perform a d i s c r e t i o n a r y function 
r e g a r d l e s s of whether the d i s c r e t i o n be abused or 
8 0 S e c t i o n 1 6 0 5 ( a ) (3) o f t h e F S I A . S p e c i f i c a l l y the p r o p e r t y 
and a c t i v i t y must a l l be s u b s t a n t i a l l y l i n k e d w i t h t h e U n i t e d 
S t a t e s . 
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(B) any c l a i m a r i s i n g out of m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n , abuse 
of process, l i b e l , s l a nder, m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , d e c e i t , or 
i n t e r f e r e n c e with c o n t r a c t r i g h t s . " 8 1 
The t o t a l e f f e c t of t h i s s e c t i o n seemed t o f o l l o w t h e 
A m erican Law I n s t i t u t e ' s Second R e s t a t e m e n t o f C o n f l i c t of Laws 
S.145 w hich i s by e v e r y measure i d e n t i c a l t o t h e F o r e i g n T o r t s 
A c t p r e p a r e d by C anadian c o m m i s s i o n e r s . However, i t would 
appear 1605(2) f o l l o w s t h e r e a s o n i n g b e h i n d t h e lex loci 
delicti. I n sum, American c o u r t s must a l w a y s be e c l e c t i c i n 
a p p l y i n g t h i s s e c t i o n o f t h e a c t so a s t o a v o i d c r e a t i n g 
a c r imony o r p o l i t i c a l embarrassment. 
C o u n t e r c l a i m s 
Immunity i s not a v a i l a b l e i f a f o r e i g n s t a t e i n i t i a t e s 
p r o c e e d i n g s a g a i n s t a p r i v a t e e n t i t y i n t h e c o u r t s o f t h e U n i t e d 
S t a t e s , d u l y met w i t h a c o u n t e r c l a i m . S e c t i o n 1607 o f t h e F S I A , 
r e a d s a s f o l l o w s : 
" I n any a c t i o n brought by a f o r e i g n s t a t e , or i n which a 
f o r e i g n s t a t e i n t e r v e n e s , i n a c o u r t of the U n i t e d S t a t e s or of 
a s t a t e the foreign s t a t e s h a l l not be accorded immunity with 
r e s p e c t to any counterclaim 
(a) for which a f o r e i g n s t a t e would not be e n t i t l e d to 
immunity under Section 1605 of t h i s had such c l a i m been brought 
i n a separate a c t i o n a g a i n s t the f o r e i g n s t a t e or 
(b) ensuing out of the t r a n s a c t i o n or o c c u r r e n c e t h a t i s 
the subject matter of the c l a i m of the f o r e i g n s t a t e or 
(c) to the extent t h a t the c o u n t e r c l a i m does not seek 
r e l i e f exceeding i n amount or d i f f e r e n t i n k i n d from t h a t sought 
by the foreign s t a t e . " 8 2 
3 1 S e e S e c t i o n 1605 ( a ) ( 5 ) . 
82 c S e c t i o n 1607 d e a l s w i t h p r o b l e m s r e l a t i n g t o 
c o u n t e r c l a i m s . 
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G i v e n i t s b r o a d i m p o r t , i f a f o r e i g n s t a t e o r s t a t e agency i s 
su e d i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and t h e s a i d d e f e n d a n t s t a t e answers 
t h e c o m p l a i n t w i t h o u t f i r s t r a i s i n g t h e f o r e i g n s o v e r e i g n 
immunity d e f e n c e , t h e p r e s u m p t i o n i s t h a t t h e s t a t e has waived 
t h e d e f e n c e o f immunity. The d e c i s i o n i n Aboydid v. Singapore 
A i r l i n e L t d 8 3 b e a r s a s t r i k i n g s i m i l a r i t y t o t h e p o s i t i o n a l l u d e d 
t o above. A p r o p e r r e v i e w o f t h e c a s e o f N a t i o n a l C i t y Bank v. 
R e p u b l i c o f C h i n a , 8 4 shows t h a t i t s compromise outcome perhaps 
forms t h e b a s i s o f F S I A 1 6 0 7 ( c ) , a l t h o u g h S e c t i o n 1607(c) seemed 
t o l i m i t an u n r e l a t e d c o u n t e r c l a i m a s r e g a r d s t h e p r i n c i p a l 
amount s o u g h t o r t h e p r i n c i p a l c l a i m d u l y made by t h e f o r e i g n 
s t a t e . 8 5 One d i f f i c u l t l i n g e r i n g problem, however, w i t h 
c o u n t e r c l a i m s u n d e r S e c t i o n 1607 can c l e a r l y be seen i n terms o f 
u n r e l a t e d c o u n t e r c l a i m s . 
A t t a c h m e n t and E x e c u t i o n 
P r i o r t o t h e enactment o f t h e FSIA, American c o u r t s had 
l o n g h e l d t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y o f a f o r e i g n s o v e r e i g n s t a t e be 
a c c o r d e d i m m u n i t y from e x e c u t i o n , a r r e s t and a t t a c h m e n t . 8 6 
8 3 (19 8 6 ) 67 NY 2d 450, 503 NYS 2d 555, 494 NE 2d 1055. 
8 4 (1955) 348 US 356. 
8 5 S e c t i o n 1 6 0 7 ( c ) must be c a r e f u l l y c o n s i d e r e d and one must 
a l s o be e c l e c t i c when a p p l y i n g i t . See a l s o S e c t i o n 70 of t h e 
R e s t a t e m e n t S e c o n d o f F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s Law which a l s o d e a l s 
w i t h some a s p e c t s o f a f f i r m a t i v e r e c o v e r y . E.g., F i r s t N a t i o n a l 
C i t y Bank v . Banco P a r a e l Comercia E x t e r i o r de Cuba (1983) 462 
US 611 t o u c h e s on v e r y s a l i e n t i s s u e s r e g a r d i n g c o u n t e r c l a i m s , 
w a i v e r s and a f f i r m a t i v e r e c o v e r y b e f o r e U.S. c o u r t s . 
8 6 S e e S i n c l a i r , op. c i t . , a t p. 222. 
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S e c t i o n 1610 of t h e F S I A has, however, ch a n g e d t h e p r i o r 
p o s i t i o n h e l d by American c o u r t s . Thus s u b j e c t t o c e r t a i n 
c o n d i t i o n s , immunity w i l l not be a v a i l a b l e t o a f o r e i g n s t a t e 
where th e p r o p e r t y i s b e l i e v e d t o be i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and 
u s e d i n c o m m e r c i a l a c t i v i t y , o r where t h e f o r e i g n s t a t e i n t h e 
a b s e n c e o f any p r e s s u r e t h e r e o f has t a k e n l e a v e t o w a i v e 
immunity. 8 7 A g e n c i e s , h a v i n g a t t a i n e d i n d e p e n d e n t j u r i s t i c 
p e r s o n a l i t y from t h e s t a t e , a r e not immune unde r t h e same 
c o n d i t i o n s . The A c t p r o h i b i t s prejudgment a t t a c h m e n t a s a 
method by w h i c h j u r i s d i c t i o n i s o b t a i n e d , b u t i t may, however, 
be p e r f e c t l y used, i f t h e need be, i n t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f a 
c l a i m l i k e l y t o be s u c c e s s f u l o r t o p r o t e c t t h e j u s t i f i e d 
e x p e c t a t i o n o f a l i t i g a t i n g p a r t y i f t h e s t a t e h a s e x p l i c i t l y 
w a i v e d immunity. 1 6 1 0 ( d ) . S e c t i o n 1611 on t h e o t h e r hand s t i l l 
a c c o r d s a b s o l u t e immunity t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n 
r e s p e c t of t h e i r p r o p e r t y . Thus n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g S e c t i o n 1610, a 
f o r e i g n s t a t e s h a l l be a c c o r d e d immunity from a t t a c h m e n t and 
e x e c u t i o n i f 
"(1) the property i s t h a t of a f o r e i g n c e n t r a l bank or 
monetary a u t h o r i t y held for i t s own account, u n l e s s such bank or 
a u t h o r i t y , or i t s parent f o r e i g n government, has e x p l i c i t l y 
waived i t s immunity from attachment i n a i d of e x e c u t i o n , or from 
execution notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the 
bank, a u t h o r i t y or government may purport to e f f e c t except i n 
accordance with the terms of the waiver or 
(2) the property i s or i s intended to be used i n 
connection with a m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y . " 8 8 
8 7 S e c t i o n 1610 of F S I A d e a l s w i t h p r o b l e m s r e l a t i n g t o 
e x e c u t i o n w h i c h p r i o r t o t h e p r o m u l g a t i o n o f t h e a c t n e v e r found 
f a v o u r w i t h t h e S t a t e Department. 
8 8 S e e S e c t i o n 1611(a) and (2) of F S I A . 
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Many commentators have argued s t r o n g l y i n s u p p o r t of t h e 
U.S. l e g i s l a t i o n on s o v e r e i g n immunity and t h i s i n a l l 
p r o b a b i l i t i e s one wou l d be h a r d put t o c h a l l e n g e i n t h e l i g h t o f 
th e f a c t t h a t p r i o r t o t h e enactment o f t h e A c t , t h e U.S. was 
s e a r c h i n g d e s p e r a t e l y i n one way or t h e o t h e r t o r e s t o r e the 
needed competence o f U.S. c o u r t s t o a d e q u a t e l y d e c i d e i s s u e s 
r e l a t i n g t o p r i v a t e c l a i m s a g a i n s t f o r e i g n s t a t e s b e f o r e U.S. 
c o u r t s . 8 9 F o u r m a j o r p r o b l e m s , however, s t i l l r e m a i n u n r e s o l v e d , 
i . e . , t h e p o l i t i c a l a c t s o f s t a t e s , e x e c u t i o n f o r c e e , 
j u r i s d i c t i o n and t h e t h o r n y i s s u e o f A c t of S t a t e . I n sum t h e 
A c t needs t o be amended i n r e s p e c t o f i t s approach t o 
j u r i s d i c t i o n , a r b i t r a t i o n and a t t a c h m e n t and s e i z u r e i n 
e x e c u t i o n so a s t o be c u r r e n t w i t h usus i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
The Change o f H e a r t i n B r i t i s h P r a c t i c e 
The p r a c t i c e whereby f o r e i g n s t a t e s a r e a c c o r d e d a b s o l u t e 
immunity i n d o m e s t i c c o u r t s was c l e a r l y e n t r e n c h e d i n E n g l i s h 
j u r i s p r u d e n c e o v e r a h u n d r e d and f i f t y y e a r s . That t h i s 
p r a c t i c e p r e v a i l e d i n E n g l i s h c o u r t s w i t h an i n e x o r a b l e 
i n f l e x i b i l i t y c a n t r u l y be s e e n i n t h e d e c i s i o n s handed down i n 
The P a r l e m e n t B e i g e , f o l l o w e d by The P o r t o A l e x a n d r e , The 
C r i s t i n a and K r a j i n e r v . The T a s s Agency t o mention t h e main 
o n e s . 9 0 The judgment i n t h e K r a j i n a , t r e a t e d t h e T a s s Agency as 
a department o f t h e S o v i e t Union w i t h o u t any independent 
8 9 S e e S o r n a r a j a h , op. c i t . , a t p. 685. 
9 0 S e e S i n c l a i r , op. c i t . , pp. 121-128. 
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j u r i d i c a l p e r s o n a l i t y and a l l o w e d t h e c l a i m f o r immunity. I n 
f a c t , t h i s d e c i s i o n was r e c e i v e d w i t h d i s f a v o u r and t h u s 
prompted p u b l i c d i s q u i e t on t h e problems a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e 
c o n t i n u e d a d h e r e n c e t o t h e m o d a l i t i e s o f s t a t e immunity. L o r d 
C h a n c e l l o r E a r l J o w i t t , h a v i n g t a k e n c o g n i z a n c e o f t h e 
s h o r t c o m i n g s of t h e e n t r e n c h e d p r a c t i c e o f s t a t e i mmunity by 
E n g l i s h c o u r t s , p a v e d t h e way f o r t h e s e t t i n g up o f an I n t e r -
D e p a r t m e n t a l Committee 9 1 t o s t u d y t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r h e r e i n under 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Such g r e a t names i n t h e law a s S i r D o n a l d 
S o m e r v e l l ( c h a i r m a n ) , S i r Hersch L a u t e r p a c h t , P r o f e s s o r Hanson, 
S i r E r i c B e c k e t t , S i r D a v i s Dobson, S i r Kenneth Roberts-Wory and 
S i r R o b e r t Speed were s e l e c t e d t o s t u d y t h e s o v e r e i g n i m m u n i t y 
q u e s t i o n . 9 2 The committee s t a r t e d work on J u l y 13, 1951, and 
came out w i t h i t s c o n c l u s i o n i n 1953 t h a t a s a r e s u l t o f s h a r p 
d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e p r a c t i c e o f s t a t e s , i t would n o t be l e g a l l y 
f e a s i b l e t o c o r r e c t l y determine i t s e x a c t p l a c e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law. The s t a t u s o f t h e committee th u s was d e c l a r e d functus 
officio,93 w i t h o u t any s u c c e s s . 
I t took B r i t a i n some time t o make a momentous change a f t e r 
t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e s e imminent men (of t h e law) t o c l e a r t h e 
unbeaten p a t h o f t h e law. Then somewhere i n 1977 t h e P r i v y 
C o u n c i l i n The P h i l i p p i n e A d m i r a l r e s o r t e d t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f 
t h e r e s t r i c t i v e i m m unity 9 4 by s u p p o r t i n g t h e i d e a t h a t a c l a i m o f 
9 1Mann, The S t a t e Immunity A c t 1978 (1978) 49 B Y I L 45. 
9 2 I b i d . a t pp. 45-46. 
" i b i d , a t p. 46. 
9 4 (19 7 6) 1 A I L ER 78. 
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sovereign immunity be denied t o a f o r e i g n sovereign s t a t e i f 
there i s a cle a r i n d i c a t i o n t h a t the a c t i v i t y i n issue i s 
commercially based. 9 5 The P r i v y Council thus decided t o f o l l o w 
the r e s t r i c t i v e d o c t r i n e as many w i l l agree, because the concept 
c l e a r l y appears "more consonant w i t h j u s t i c e . " 9 6 This r a d i c a l 
idea as i t may be r e c a l l e d was pr e v i o u s l y w e l l a r t i c u l a t e d i n 
Ralumtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad, by Lord Denning as f o l l o w s : 
" I f the d i s p u t e b r i n g s i n t o question, f o r i n s t a n c e , the 
l e g i s l a t i v e or i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a n s a c t i o n s of a f o r e i g n 
government, or the p o l i c y of i t s ex e c u t i v e , the court should 
grant immunity i f asked t o do so because i t does offend the 
d i g n i t y of a f o r e i g n s o v e r e i g n to have such a dispute canvassed 
i n the domestic c o u r t of another country; but i f the di s p u t e 
concerns, f o r example, the commercial t r a n s a c t i o n s of a f o r e i g n 
government (whether c a r r i e d on by i t s own departments or 
agencies or by s e t t i n g up s e p a r a t e l e g a l e n t i t i e s ) a t i t a r i s e s 
p r o p e r l y w i t h i n the t e r r i t o r i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n of our c o u r t s , 
there i s no ground f o r g r a n t i n g immunity. 9 7 
Again Lord Denning r e a f f i r m e d h i s p o s i t i o n i n support of 
the r e s t r i c t i v e d o c t r i n e i n Thai-Europe Tapioca Services Ltd. v. 
Government of Pakistan, M i n i s t r y of Food and A g r i c u l t u r e , 
Directorate of A g r i c u l t u r e Supplies. 9 8 Lord Denning's d i c t a i n 
t h i s case, without doubt, continues t o s t i l l have a compelling 
impact the world over and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the Commonwealth. 
These ideas ( i . e . , Lord Denning's p o s i t i o n ) were f u r t h e r made 
known i n Trendtex and also a t the intermediate stages of the 
l i t i g a t i o n i n I Congreso d e l P a r t i c o (a more complex case). 
9 5Higgins (1982) 29 Neth I n t LR 266. 
9 6 I d . at p. 266 (1977) AC 373. 
9 7 (19 5 8) AC 377, 422. 
9 8 (1975) 3 A l l ER. 
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The United Kingdom which up to 1970 was a leading exponent 
of the d o c t r i n e of absolute immunity has now given up the o l d 
order and thus embraced the r e s t r i c t i v e d o c t r i n e . This p o s i t i o n 
i s f i r m l y expressed i n Trendtex and I Congreso del P a r t i c o , 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . The question of sovereign immunity i n the United 
Kingdom i n respect of t r a d i n g a c t i v i t i e s of states has p r i m a r i l y 
now become a s t a t u t o r y law." Ever since 1978, however, the 
English courts have been made to take another hard look a t the 
t o t a l import of the d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 1 0 0 
The State Immunity Act of the United Kingdom (1978) 
The law of sovereign immunity i n the United Kingdom, as a 
matter of f a c t , was wholly or p a r t l y designed t o r a t i f y the 
European Convention, 1 0 1 but seemed to have gone as f a r as t o 
cover other important areas of the law as t o promote a modicum 
of j u s t i c e or fairness t o both the p r i v a t e l i t i g a n t and f o r e i g n 
sovereign states. The Act, i t would appear, goes f u r t h e r i n 
many respects than the s a i d convention i n r e s t r i c t i n g immunity 
t o f o r e i g n s t a t e s , 1 0 2 but c l e a r l y follows i t s language and 
i n s p i r a t i o n t o a degree. 
"See The State Immunity Act (1978); Delaume (1979) 73 AJIL 
185; B i r d (1979) 13 I n t Lawyer 619. 
1 0 0Alcom v. Republic of Colombia (1984) AC 580 (HL) ; See 
also Fox (1985) 34 ICLQ 115. 
1 0 1Brownlie, op. c i t . , p. 337. 
1 0 2See Delaume, op. c i t . ; Mann, op. c i t . 
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The Act lays down or provides a l b e i t a general r u l e of 
immunity, which gives immunity t o f o r e i g n states from the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of English c o u r t s , s u b j e c t , however, t o a l i s t of 
exceptions c a r e f u l l y d r a f t e d t o promote the modalities of the 
doctrine of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. Section 1(1) f o r example 
reads as f o l l o w s : "A s t a t e i s immune from the j u r i s d i c t i o n of 
the courts of the United Kingdom except as provided i n the 
f o l l o w i n g provisions of t h i s p a r t of the A c t . " 1 0 3 The onus i n 
t h i s regard, however, i s upon the p l a i n t i f f t o show cause why 
the case by every estimation f a l l s w i t h i n the domain of one of 
the l i s t e d exceptions of the Act (SS 2-11) . There are ten 
enumerated rul e s of exception t o the general r u l e of immunity. 
Arguably, only the f i r s t exception of the Act confers 
j u r i s d i c t i o n i n any meaningful way on English c o u r t s . 1 0 4 These 
exceptions i n some respect only remove immunity which might 
l o g i c a l l y otherwise e x i s t i n respect of f o r e i g n s t a t e s . Which 
means tha t there i s s t i l l the need t o request leave i n order t o 
serve notice outside B r i t a i n under Order 11 of the r u l e s of the 
Supreme Court, t h a t i s , i f there i s no other way a v a i l a b l e t o 
serve the defendant or perhaps i f the defendant i n question 
refuses to submit t o the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the courts of the 
United Kingdom. These exceptions i n the Act s t r i c t l y speaking 
are much "wider" than those approved generally under the 
European Convention. 1 0 5 
1 0 3The United Kingdom State Immunity Act 1978, Section 1 ( 1 ) . 
1 0 4 I b i d . 
1 0 51978 Act S 3(1) a and also issues regarding exceptions. 
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I t may be r e c a l l e d t h a t the 197 6 Sovereign Immunity Act of 
the United States purports t o operate on the p r i n c i p l e o f a 
f e d e r a l long-arm s t a t u t e as a means of providing or making the 
process less cumbersome i n respect of questions regarding 
a d j u d i c a t o r y j u r i s d i c t i o n . The B r i t i s h Act, on the other hand, 
f o l l o w s a procedure q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from that of FSIA, by simply 
f o l l o w i n g a method by which service of process i s e f f e c t e d 
through d i p l o m a t i c channels (Sec. 12(1)). Section 12(7), 
however, provides t h a t service of process i n respect of Section 
12 (1) " S h a l l not be construed as a f f e c t i n g any rules of cou r t 
whereby leave i s required f o r service of process outside the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . " 1 0 6 Order 11 i s th e r e f o r e not aff e c t e d as f a r as 
the 1978 Act i s concerned i n view of the import of the sections 
a l l u d e d t o . 
The B r i t i s h Act does not completely eliminate the 
mechanical d i s t i n c t i o n between acta jure imperii and acta jure 
gestionis but t e c h n i c a l l y purports t o embrace common sense and 
f l e x i b i l i t y i n respect of i n t e r p r e t i n g Section 3(3) i n 
connection w i t h Section 3(1) (2) . 
Exceptions t o Immunity under the 1978 Act 
The r e l e v a n t p o r t i o n of these exceptions l i k e l y t o be 
contested i n most courts can be st a t e d as follows: 
"(2) A s t a t e may submit a f t e r the dispute g i v i n g r i s e to 
the proceedings has a r i s e n or by a p r i o r w r i t t e n agreement t h a t 
i t i s to be governed by the law of the United Kingdom i s not to 
be regarded as a submission. 
1 0 6 I b i d . , Section 12(7). 
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3 -(1) A s t a t e i s not immune as r e s p e c t s proceedings 
r e l a t i n g to 
(a) a commercial t r a n s a c t i o n e n t e r e d i n t o by the s t a t e ; 
or 
(b) an o b l i g a t i o n of the s t a t e which by v i r t u e of a 
con t r a c t (whether a commercial t r a n s a c t i o n or not) 
f a i l s to be performed w h o l l y or p a r t l y i n the 
United Kingdom. 
(2) T h i s s e c t i o n does not apply i f the p a r t i e s to the 
dispute are s t a t e s or have otherwise agreed i n w r i t i n g ; and 
subsection 1 (b) above does not apply i f the c o n t r a c t (not being 
a commercial t r a n s a c t i o n ) was made i n the t e r r i t o r y of the s t a t e 
concerned and the o b l i g a t i o n i n q u e s t i o n i s governed by i t s 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e law. 
(3) I n t h i s s e c t i o n "commercial t r a n s a c t i o n " means 
(a) any c o n t r a c t f o r the supply of goods or s e r v i c e s ; 
(b) any loan or other t r a n s a c t i o n f o r the p r o v i s i o n of 
finance and any guarantee or indemnity i n r e s p e c t 
of any such t r a n s a c t i o n or of any other f i n a n c i a l 
o b l i g a t i o n ; and 
(c) any other t r a n s a c t i o n or a c t i v i t y (whether of a 
commercial, i n d u s t r i a l , f i n a n c i a l , p r o f e s s i o n a l or 
other s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r ) i n t o which a s t a t e e n t e r s 
or i n which i t engages o t h e r w i s e than i n the 
e x e r c i s e of sovereign a u t h o r i t y ; 
but n e i t h e r paragraph of Subsection (1) above a p p l i e s to a 
con t r a c t of employment between a s t a t e and an i n d i v i d u a l . 
(4) A s t a t e i s not immune as r e s p e c t s proceedings 
r e l a t i n g to cont r a c t of employment between the s t a t e and an 
i n d i v i d u a l where the c o n t r a c t was made i n the United Kingdom or 
the work is. to be wholly or p a r t l y performed t h e r e . 1 0 1 
The above stated p r o v i s i o n s o f the Act, as compared t o 
other Acts, p a r t i c u l a r l y t h a t of the European Convention, can be 
said t o be a l i t t l e broader i n respect of the corresponding 
provisions as regards commercial a c t i v i t i e s . 1 0 8 
Section 3(3) i n every respect covers contracts and 
f i n a n c i a l transactions of a l l kinds, hence the English courts 
w i l l have no d i f f i c u l t i e s i n determining questions r e l a t i n g t o 
the exercise of sovereign power or a u t h o r i t y . Thus such 
See Section 3(1) (a) (b) 2, 3, and 4 ( 1 ) . 
See Section 3(1)a of 1978 Act. 
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problems as the purpose and nature t e s t associated w i t h the 
Trendtex case w i l l simply f a l l w i t h i n the confines of Section 
3(3) (a) . 1 0 9 Again questions regarding l e t t e r s of c r e d i t could be 
construed t o f a l l under Section 3 ( 3 ) b . l l u The decision handed 
down i n the K r a j i n a v. Tass Agency, f o r example, w i l l not 
survive the s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y e s t a b l i s h e d by the Act, since a 
strong showing of governmental a c t i v i t y or a u t h o r i t y i n respect 
of the t o r t committed w i l l be required. " A c t i v i t y " i s theref o r e 
w e l l covered under 3(3) (c) , as t o n e u t r a l i s e these types of 
problems. 
The combined e f f e c t of Section 391) (b) and Section 3(1) (a) 
can be c a r e f u l l y applied by the courts of United Kingdom t o deny 
immunity t o f o r e i g n states i n respect of non-commercial 
t r a n s a c t i o n s or a c t i v i t i e s , since i t would appear Section 3(1)a 
w i l l be l e f t standing on one l e g without any major impact. 
While Section 3(1) (b) given i t s cl e a r import can i n many 
respects be used t o determine issues r e l a t i n g t o o b l i g a t i o n . A 
good example i s the i n t e r e s t i n g case of Rayne, Ltd. v. Dept. of 
Trade 1 1 1 per Kerr LJ. The Act c e r t a i n l y w i l l f a l l f a r short of 
p r o v i d i n g the r i g h t answers i n the I Congreso del Partido case, 
i n view p a r t i c u l a r l y of the thorny question regarding the Marble 
Islands and one wonders as t o whether Section 10 of the Act 
1 0 9See H a r r i s , Cases and Mat e r i a l s on I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law 
(1991) p. 308. 
1 1 0 I b i d . 
1 1 1 (1989) Ch. 72 195. 
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could possibly produce the needed comfort and acceptable 
guidance. 
I n d i r e c t Impleading 
At common law the doctrine of s t a t e immunity i s invoked t o 
pro t e c t a foreign state from both d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t impleading 
i n terms of proceedings against a property i n i t s possession or 
i n which i t simply has a prima facie i n t e r e s t or c l a i m . 1 1 2 
Sovereign immunity, however, i s not a v a i l a b l e t o states under 
Section 10, and the relevant sections provide as f o l l o w s : 
"10(1) This s e c t i o n a p p l i e s to 
(a) admiralty proceedings and 
(b) proceedings on any cla i m which could be made the s u b j e c t of 
a d m i r a l t y proceedings. 
(2) A s t a t e i s not immune as r e s p e c t s 
(a) an act i o n i n rem ag a i n s t a s h i p belonging t o t h a t s t a t e ; or 
(b) an act i o n i n personam for e n f o r c i n g a c l a i m i n connection 
w i t h such a ship i f , a t the time when the cause of a c t i o n arose, 
the s h i p was i n use or intended f o r use f o r commercial 
purposes. " 1 1 3 
Section 6(4) to some extent deals w i t h one aspect of i n d i r e c t 
impleading as follows: 
"A court may e n t e r t a i n proceedings a g a i n s t a person other 
than a s t a t e notwithstanding t h a t the proceedings r e l a t e to 
property 
(a) which i s i n the po s s e s s i o n or c o n t r o l of a s t a t e ; or 
(b) i n which a s t a t e claims an i n t e r e s t , i f the s t a t e 
would not have been immune had the proceedings been brought 
a g a i n s t i t or i n a case w i t h i n paragraph (b) above, i f the c l a i m 
i s n e i t h e r admitted nor supported by prima facie e v i d e n c e . " 1 1 4 
1 1 2The Parlement Beige (1880) 5 PD 197; The J u p i t e r (1924) 
p. 236; The C r i s t i n a (1938) AC 485; The Arantzazu Mendi (1939) 
AC 256. 
1 1 3See The 1978 Act § 10(1) and ( 2 ) . 
1 1 4 I b i d . 6(4) a, b. This aspect of the Act i s w e l l d r a f t e d 
and w i l l c e r t a i n l y ease tension and perhaps confusion. 
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The question t o answer here i s whether Section 6(4) could 
have prevented the p l a i n t i f f s i n D o l l f u s Mieg from p r e v a i l i n g . 
No one can t e l l i n retrospect as t o how the court would have 
reacted i f the 1978 Act had been i n existence then, but i t would 
appear the d e c i s i o n could have gone e i t h e r way, i n the l i g h t of 
i t s post-war f l a v o u r i n respect of an a c t i o n in personam against 
the three s t a t e s who were the b a i l o r s . Some scholars 1 1 5 however 
are of the o p i n i o n t h a t the p l a i n t i f f s would have f a i l e d i f the 
said l i t i g a t i o n took place today, because of Section 3 (3c) of 
the Act. 
The 1978 Act i n general embraces or seemed t o support the 
r e j e c t i o n of the s t a t e immunity r u l e or the denial of immunity 
i n the P h i l i p p i n e Admiral case coupled w i t h i t s clear support of 
the views expressed by Lord Denning i n the Thai-Europe Tapioca 
case, as regards actions in personam. 
Waivers of Immunity and Counterclaims 
I t i s c l e a r now t h a t the r u l e i n Kahan v. Pakistan 
Federation 1 1 6 w i l l not stand today i n view of the s t a t u t o r y 
d i r e c t i o n o f Section 2(2) of the Act, which means t h a t 
submission t o j u r i s d i c t i o n today can only be done before a court 
but not by any other means. Section 2(1) of the Act, f o r 
example, provides t h a t "A state i s not immune as respects 
proceedings i n respect of which i t has submitted t o the 
1 1 5See H a r r i s , op. c i t . , at p. 308; Mann, op. c i t . , n. 92. 
1 1 6 (1951) 2 KB 1003 (CA) . 
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j u r i s d i c t i o n of the courts of the United Kingdom." 1 1 7 The s t a t e 
i n one way or the other i s perceived t o have submitted t o the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of U.K. courts i f i t has i n s t i t u t e d the a c t i o n or 
has intervened or taken any steps i n the a c t i o n i n respect of 
making a claim known or by defending a claim on i t s m e r i t s . 
These provis i o n s do clear the way f o r the courts t o be i n a 
p o s i t i o n t o make or draw inferences from the conduct of a s t a t e 
rather than i t s commercial a c t i v i t y . Section 2(3) subject t o 
s t r i c t q u a l i f i c a t i o n s i n respect of (a) subsection (4) and (b) , 
Subsection (5) a l l correspond t o the European Convention 
A r t i c l e s 1 ( 1 ) , 3 and 13, res p e c t i v e l y . 
Execution 
The Act i n general as regards execution f o l l o w s a 
p r i n c i p l e s i m i l a r t o tha t of the European Convention. Section 
13(2) c l e a r l y corresponds t o A r t i c l e 23 of the European 
Convention. 1 1 8 Thus even i f a sta t e can not q u a l i f y f o r immunity 
i n respect of one of the exceptions, i t s p r o p e r t y i n r e a l terms 
i s not t o be subjected t o execution i n s a t i s f a c t i o n of a 
judgment or a r b i t r a t i o n award. 1 1 9 This i s , however, subject t o 
such e s s e n t i a l exceptions as t o g i v i n g consent i n w r i t i n g and 
secondly i f there i s a clear showing t h a t the p r o p e r t y i n issue 
1 1 7See Section 2(1) attempts t o s i m p l i f y the r u l e s r e l a t i n g 
to exceptions t o immunity i n the U.K. and i t s dominions. 
1 1 8Delaume, op. c i t . , p. 194. 
1 1 9 I b i d . ; Section 13(2) c l e a r l y corresponds t o the European 
Convention, i . e . , A r t i c l e 23, although i t w i l l appear the l e g a l 
d r a f t i n g s t y l e i s d i f f e r e n t . 
174 
i s intended or being used f o r commercial purposes. 1 2 0 A c e n t r a l 
bank i s , however, given a special p r o t e c t i o n under 14(4) as 
fo l l o w s : 
"Property of a s t a t e ' s c e n t r a l bank or other monetary 
a u t h o r i t y s h a l l not be regarded f o r the purposes of Subsection 
(4) of S e c t i o n 13 above as i n use or intended f o r use for 
commercial purposes; and where any such bank or a u t h o r i t y i s a 
separate e n t i t y S u b s e c t i o n s (1) to (3) of t h a t S e c t i o n s h a l l 
apply to i t as i f r e f e r e n c e s to a s t a t e were r e f e r e n c e s to the 
bank or a u t h o r i t y . " 1 2 1 
I n p r a c t i c e , however, the property of a c e n t r a l bank w i l l be 
subject t o execution i f there i s a waiver evidenced by w r i t i n g . 
This aspect of the act promotes a f a i r balancing of r i g h t s and a 
modicum of f a i r n e s s t o a l l . 
I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d , f o r example, t h a t as a r e s u l t of a 
c a r e f u l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of commercial purpose exception t o the 
fa c t s i n the case of Alcorn v. Republic of Colombia, 1 2 2 j u s t i c e 
was allowed t o p r e v a i l , thus preventing execution against the 
embassy bank account of the Republic of Colombia (Section 
13(4) ) . 
Supplementary Prov i s i o n s : Persons E n t i t l e d t o Immunity 
Section 14(1) provides inter alia t h a t 
"The immunities and p r i v i l e g e s c o n f e r r e d by t h i s p a r t of 
t h i s Act apply to any f o r e i g n or commonwealth s t a t e other than 
1 2 0See Section 13 (4) . 
1 2 1See the supplementary p r o v i s i o n of the 1978 Act, Section 
14(4). Where a c l e a r meaning of Subsection 4 of Section 13 i s 
given t o avoid confusion and m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
1 2 2 I n t h i s case the cou r t took t o a road of eclectism with 
the aim of analysing the f a c t s of the case o b j e c t i v e l y . Alcorn 
c l e a r l y shows w i t h o u t doubt t h a t the debate on sovereign 
immunity i s f a r from over. 
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the United Kingdom; and references to a s t a t e i n c l u d e r e f e r e n c e s 
to 
(a) the sovereign or other head of t h a t s t a t e i n h i s 
p u b l i c c a p a c i t y ; 
(b) the government of that s t a t e ; and 
(c) any department of that government, but not to any 
e n t i t y ( h e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d to as a separate e n t i t y ) which i s 
d i s t i n c t from the executive organs of the government of the 
s t a t e and capable of suing or being sued." 1 2 3 
States more of t e n than not have used the p r o t e c t i v e s h i e l d under 
t h i s Act t o avoid being impleaded. I n f a c t , i t had s u c c e s s f u l l y 
worked i n favour of some countries but had f a i l e d t o support the 
claim of other countries. I n the Trendtex case, f o r example, 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria argued f o r c e f u l l y t h a t the 
Central Bank, according t o i t s domestic law, was p a r t o f the 
state and not at a l l an independent j u r i d i c a l person. The 
court, however, r e j e c t e d the claim and thus r u l e d i n favour of 
the p l a i n t i f f s without o f f e r i n g any convincing answers t o the 
argument p o s i t e d i n respect of the status of the sa i d C e n t r a l 
Bank. This aspect of the Act arguably i s bound t o be a breeding 
ground f o r a more complex state immunity l i t i g a t i o n i n the 
f u t u r e . A r t . 27(1) of the European Convention and Section 14(1) 
of the U.K. Act seemed to fo l l o w the same p r i n c i p l e s but i t 
would appear the U.K. Act i s more t i g h t l y d r a f t e d . 
Miscellaneous Considerations 
A p r o v i s i o n i s herein made whereby the Queen (or Her 
Majesty) could through an Order i n Council r e s t r i c t or extend 
1 2 3See Section 14(1) of the Act 1978; t h i s p r o v i s i o n has the 
same import and e f f e c t as tha t of the European Convention but i n 
some respects appears more e x p l i c i t . 
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immunities t o f o r e i g n s t a t e s . The relevant p o r t i o n of the Act 
provides as f o l l o w s : 15(1). 
"(1) I f i t appears to her Majesty t h a t the immunities 
and p r i v i l e g e s c o n f e r r e d by t h i s p a r t of t h i s Act i n r e l a t i o n to 
any s t a t e 
(a) exceed those accorded by the law of the s t a t e i n 
r e l a t i o n to the United Kingdom; or 
(b) are l e s s than those r e q u i r e d by any t r e a t y , 
convention or other i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreement to which t h a t s t a t e 
and the United Kingdom a r e p a r t i e s . " 1 2 4 
I t i s worth mentioning Section 21 (a) f o r i t e x p l i c i t l y 
denotes a c e r t i f i c a t e from the Secretary of State as conclusive 
evidence on any question r e l a t i n g t o 
"(a) "whether any country i s a s t a t e f o r the purposes of 
part 1 of t h i s Act, whether any t e r r i t o r y i s a c o n s t i t u e n t 
t e r r i t o r y of a f e d e r a l s t a t e f o r those purposes or as to the 
person or persons to be regarded f o r those purposes as the head 
or government of a s t a t e . " 1 2 5 
Section 15(1), which a l l o c a t e s powers t o Her Majesty to 
r e s t r i c t or extend immunities, arguably seemed t o resemble or 
follow some aspects of Chief J u s t i c e Marshall's t h e s i s i n the 
Schooner Exchange i n respect of the power of the sovereign to 
l i m i t or extend immunity. 
The State Immunity Act of U.K. makes cl e a r when a s t a t e i s 
to be accorded immunity and the f a c t o r s t o consider t o deny 
immunity. The B r i t i s h Act t h e r e f o r e does not confer 
j u r i s d i c t i o n on English c o u r t s e x p l i c i t l y . 1 2 6 Rule § 12(7) i n a 
1 2 4Section 15(1) deals w i t h the e f f e c t of the Order i n 
Council, which can be used a t any time given the circumstances. 
1 2 5Section 21(a) although f a l l s under a miscellaneous and 
supplementary r u b r i c gives a c l e a r explanation as t o the meaning 
of a federal government i n respect of p a r t 2 of the 1978 Act. 
126See Section 1(1) of the Act 1978; Sormarajah, op. c i t . , 
p. 680. 
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way requires a p l a i n t i f f t o s a t i s f y the command of order 11 
which deals w i t h t e r r i t o r i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n and service of process 
i n l i t i g a t i o n i n v o l v i n g sovereign s t a t e s . 1 2 7 The American 
approach, on the other hand, r e l i e s on the a u t h o r i t y of the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l shoe and Section 1603(e), r e s p e c t i v e l y . Whether 
the English approach t o the problem at hand would be more 
f e a s i b l e than t h a t of the United States i s open t o debate. 
However, i t appears the B r i t i s h approach i s more o b j e c t i v e l y 
based and w i l l c e r t a i n l y minimize cumbersome j u r i s d i c t i o n a l 
problems and perhaps avoid resentment from other countries ever 
ready t o challenge the d i r e c t e f f e c t approach c l e a r l y associated 
w i t h the U.S. A c t . 1 2 8 
For i t i s hard t o f i n d any rule s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law t o support 
the d i r e c t e f f e c t approach c l e a r l y entrenched i n American 
p r a c t i c e . 
I n sum, one can c e r t a i n l y detect some major d i f f e r e n c e s 
between the U.S. Act and the U.K. Act. The U.S. Act i n respect 
t o many e s s e n t i a l issues r e l a t i n g t o state immunity appears less 
e x p l i c i t and less f o r t h r i g h t i n terms of d e f i n i t i o n s o f 
commercial a c t i v i t i e s of states and p a r t i c u l a r l y problems l i k e l y 
t o face the courts i n respect of state property used f o r 
commercial purposes. The scorecards on the whole favour the 
English Act 1978. The English Act i n many respects i s t h e r e f o r e 
1 2 7 (19 5 7 ) 3 A l l ER 4 64. See also Lord W i l b e r f orce 1 s 
re a c t i o n i n respect of the issues r e l a t i n g t o the I Congreso 
(1981) 3 WLR a t p. 345. 
1 2 8See the U.S. Act § 1605(a)(2) where two a l i e n s t r i e d t o 
have t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s resolved before the U.S. f e d e r a l c o u r t . 
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b e t t e r d r a f t e d and covers more grounds than the U.S. Act and the 
European Convention. 
In Verlinden BV. v. Central Bank of N i g e r i a , 488 F.Supp. 
1284 (SDNY 1980) casually considered elsewhere, the D i s t r i c t 
Court held t h a t 
"The Act imposes a s i n g l e , f e d e r a l standard to be a p p l i e d 
uniformly by both s t a t e and f e d e r a l c o u r t s hearing c l a i m s brought 
against f o r e i g n s t a t e s . I n consequence, even though the p l a i n t i f f ' s 
claim i s one grounded upon common law, the case i s one t h a t ' a r i s e s 
under' a f e d e r a l law because the complaint compels the a p p l i c a t i o n of 
the Uniform F e d e r a l Standard governing a s s e r t i o n s of sovereign 
immunity. I n s h o r t , the Immunities Act r e j e c t s an e s s e n t i a l f e d e r a l 
element i n t o a l l s u i t s brought a g a i n s t f o r e i g n s t a t e s . " 
The D i s t r i c t Court r u l e d i n favour of N i g e r i a and thus dismissed 
the complaint f i l e d by Verlinden BV, a Dutch corporation w i t h 
i t s p r i n c i p a l o f f i c e s i n Europe—Netherlands. 
The question t o ask i s whether a f o r e i g n company 
incorporated i n Europe—The Netherlands—can sue a f o r e i g n s t a t e 
i n the United States. Although the p r i v a t e claim was allowed 
against Nigeria, they made i t c l e a r t h a t although the p l a i n t i f f 
had the r i g h t t o sue as a r e s u l t of the f a i l e d cement con t r a c t , 
i t f a i l e d to show or o f f e r evidence of s u f f i c i e n t d i r e c t e f f e c t 
of the commercial a c t i v i t y i n issue i n the United States t o 
command j u r i s d i c t i o n under 1605(a) (2) of the FSIA. As can 
c l e a r l y be seen, the language of the 1976 Act appears too broad 
and could lead t o u n c e r t a i n t i e s i n respect of questions r e l a t i n g 
to j u r i s d i c t i o n where the p l a i n t i f f and the defendant a l l happen 
to be foreigners. 
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Lord Denning's t e s t or approach i n The Thai-Europe v. 
Government of Pakistan (1975) 3 A l l ER 966-67 seemed most 
appealing and convincing than the FSIA Section 1605 (a) (2 ) , thus 
"This t e s t would apply to a l l the exceptions which I have 
s t a t e d . I would s t r e s s p a r t i c u l a r l y the n e c e s s i t y t h a t the d i s p u t e 
should a r i s e p r o p e r l y w i t h i n the t e r r i t o r i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n of our 
c o u r t s . By t h i s I do not mean merely that i t can be brought w i t h i n the 
r u l e f o r s e r v i c e out of the j u r i s d i c t i o n under RSC and 11, v. 1. I 
mean t h a t the disp u t e should be concerned with property a c t u a l l y 
s i t u a t e w i t h i n the j u r i s d i c t i o n of our courts or with commercial 
t r a n s a c t i o n s having a most c l o s e connection with England such t h a t , by 
the presence of p a r t i e s or the nature of the dispute, i t i s more 
p r o p e r l y cognisable here than elsewhere." 
Anyone would be hard put i n t a k i n g issue w i t h the argument 
advanced by Lord Denning f o r he touched wisely on the d i f f i c u l t 
problems r e l a t i n g t o j u r i s d i c t i o n qua sovereign immunity 
l i t i g a t i o n . 1978 Act c l e a r l y gives s t a t u t o r y e f f e c t t o the 
views expressed by Lord Denning i n the Thai-Europe Tapioca case. 
Some D i f f i c u l t i e s Associated w i t h the Application of the Theory 
of R e s t r i c t i v e or Relative Immunity 
Sovereign immunity or s t a t e immunity denotes a process 
whereby immunity i s granted t o a foreign s t a t e from the 
p r e s c r i p t i v e and enforcement j u r i s d i c t i o n of a n a t i o n a l 
a u t h o r i t y or a domestic cou r t . I n t h i s respect a s t a t e i s given 
absolute immunity from being impleaded without i t s consent 
before the domestic courts of another state. Before 1900 t h i s 
law p r e v a i l e d i n many states without question, however, i n 
recent times many have c a l l e d f o r the r e l e g a t i o n t o the 
background the currency of s t a t e immunity, 1 2 9 thus suggesting i n 
1 2 9Lauterpacht, op. c i t . ; Sucharitkul, op. c i t . ; Feldman, 
op. c i t . ; Mann, op. c i t . 
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i t s place the theory of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. These proponents 
of the theory of the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity, however, have f a i l e d 
t o formulate a c r i t e r i o n by which judges can be aided i n i t s 
a p p l i c a t i o n without d e v i a t i n g from general i n t e r n a t i o n a l law or 
the law of nations. 
The major problem which the courts would have t o face i s 
t h a t the r e s t r i c t i v e theory depends wholly on a method whereby 
governmental and commercial acts of s t a t e s are a b s t r a c t l y or 
mechanically d i s t i n g u i s h e d t o determine whether t o accord 
immunity or not. So f a r the approach has become cumbersome and 
e l u s i v e . Even domestic courts w i t h i n a given sovereign s t a t e 
have d i f f e r e d i n t h e i r reasoning or quest t o formulate a 
reasonable standard l i k e l y t o be acceptable t o a l l and sundry. 
And some municipal courts i n a great number of countries have 
not even had the opportunity t o consider the subject. This 
s t a t e of a f f a i r s , one would argue, i s r i g h t l y responsible f o r 
the p e r s i s t e n t divergence i n the p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s . Most of 
the states that have r e c e n t l y f o l l o w e d the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity 
s u r p r i s i n g l y are leading i n d u s t r i a l i s e d c o u n t r i e s from the 
West, 1 3 0 while on the other hand a l a r g e m a j o r i t y of developing 
countries follow or embrace the m o d a l i t i e s of s t a t e immunity, 1 3 1 
perhaps because of shared a p p r e c i a t i o n of the innate s u p e r i o r i t y 
of the state, underdeveloped economic systems and the value 
placed, on state organs and e n t i t i e s as regards l e g a l a u t h o r i t y , 
130See Brownlie, op. c i t . , at pp. 323-45; ILC Report (1986). 
131See generally the ILC Report (1982, 1984, 1986) . 
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ownership and r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . I n other words, to these 
developing c o u n t r i e s where the p u b l i c sector i s t o t a l l y 
c o n t r o l l e d by the sovereign and given greater prominence i n 
n a t i o n a l economic planning, the d i s t i n c t i o n between acta jure 
imperii and acta jure gestionis i s simply meaningless or 
i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l . I f t h i s be the case, then can i t be s a i d t h a t 
the d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity has a t t a i n e d opinio generis 
juris generalise I t h i n k not, f o r I stand i n support of 
P r o f e s s o r Brownlie's p o s i t i o n thus: 
"There i s c e r t a i n l y a t r e n d toward a r e s t r i c t i v e 
p r i n c i p l e , but the p i c t u r e contains c o n t r a r y elements. At l e a s t 
s i x t e e n s t i l l accept the p r i n c i p l e of absolute immunity, 
a c c o r d i n g to which immunity i s granted except i n cases i n which 
the defendant s t a t e has consented to the e x e r c i s e of 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . Many s t a t e s , i n c l u d i n g the U.S. and U.S.S.R., 
agree by t r e a t y to waive immunity i n r e s p e c t of shipping and 
other commercial a c t i v i t i e s , and i t c o u l d be s a i d that such 
t r e a t i e s assume a broad d o c t r i n e of immunity or they are part of 
a c o n t r a r y t r e n d . Reference to t r e a t y p r a c t i c e should include 
mention of the B r u s s e l s Convention of 1926, which subjected 
v e s s e l s engaged i n trade owned or operated by foreign s t a t e s to 
the l o c a l j u r i s d i c t i o n as i f they were p r i v a t e persons. This 
Convention r e c e i v e d only t h i r t e e n r a t i f i c a t i o n s and cannot be 
regarded as of general s i g n i f i c a n c e . " 1 3 2 
Lord Denning a l s o argued f o r c e f u l l y i n Rahimtoola v. Nizam of 
Hyderabad t h a t "there i s no uniform p r a c t i c e . There i s no 
uniform r u l e . So there i s no help there." Dr. Helmut 
St e i n b e r g e r i n h i s learned a r t i c l e a l s o argued that 
" S i m i l a r p r o v i s i o n s , with some v a r i a t i o n s , i n the United S t a t e s , 
B r i t i s h and Canadian Acts ( r e s p e c t i v e l y , see 1605 ( a ) , Sec. 5 and 
Sec. 3 ) , however, i f a p p l i e d to conduct j u r e imperii of the 
f o r e i g n s t a t e w i l l meet o b j e c t i o n s under general i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law. So f a r , d e s p i t e lower court d e c i s i o n s under the United 
S t a t e s Act i n L e t e l i e r v. Republic of C h i l e , 488 F.Supp. 665, 
688 DDC 1980 and De Sanchez v. C e n t r a l Bank of Nicaragua, 515 
F.Supp. 900, 914, such a p p l i c a t i o n does not have the support of 
Brownlie, op. c i t . , a t p. 329. 
182 
s t a t e p r a c t i c e s u f f i c i e n t l y u n i v e r s a l to allow derogation from 
g e n e r a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l law." 1 3 3 
I n view of the f a c t t h a t the i n t e r n a t i o n a l order i s 
h o r i z o n t a l i n s t r u c t u r e , 1 3 4 an imposition of s t a t e l e g i s l a t i o n 
couched i n s i m p l i s t i c terms wholly i n f l u e n c e d by sentiments 
l a c k i n g of s u f f i c i e n t s t a t e p r a c t i c e w i l l prompt resentment and 
di s r e p u t e . In t h i s respect there i s bound to be a c o n f l i c t 
between the hor i z o n t a l order and the v e r t i c a l order. I f t h i s 
p e r s i s t s , the r a t i f i c a t i o n of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreement on 
sovereign immunity w i l l become d i f f i c u l t . 1 3 5 The va r i o u s 
l e g i s l a t i o n passed i n the U.S., U.K., Canada, Pakis t a n , 
A u s t r a l i a , Singapore and South A f r i c a i n r e s p e c t of the 
r e s t r i c t i v e doctrine l a c k s u f f i c i e n t u n i v e r s a l p r a c t i c e and 
th e r e f o r e cannot be c h a r a c t e r i s e d as r e p r e s e n t i n g the new order 
or the law of nations by which a l l nations of the world could be 
bound, i n as much as the doctr i n e l a c k s the two c o n s t i t u e n t 
elements of customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, t h a t i s corpus and 
animus. 1 3 6 The concept, arguably t h e r e f o r e l a c k s a hallmark of 
consensus on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l plane. 
Encyclopedia of Public I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1987) p. 440. 
1 3 4 S o r n a r a j a h , op. c i t . 
1 3 5So f a r i t i s becoming quite d i f f i c u l t f o r a l l c o u n t r i e s 
to agree as to how immunity i s to be r e s t r i c t e d . The 1986 ILC 
Report supports t h i s argument. 
1 3 6See Bin Cheng (1965), 5 Indian J o u r n a l of I n t . Law, pp. 
249-250. 
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Some S p e c i f i c D i f f i c u l t i e s Normally A s s o c i a t e d with P o l i t i c a l 
Acts of S t a t e s 
P o l i t i c a l a c t s of independent foreign sovereign s t a t e s i n 
terms of l e g i s l a t i o n and u n i l a t e r a l p o l i c i e s cannot be 
questioned or pronounced upon by domestic courts. These 
p o l i t i c a l a c t s of s t a t e s f a l l under the r u b r i c act of state and 
t h e r e f o r e p reclude domestic courts from i n q u i r i n g into the 
v a l i d i t y of t h ese s a i d a c t s done w i t h i n the t e r r i t o r y of foreign 
s t a t e s . The Act of S t a t e , however, would not apply i n respect 
of i s s u e s r e l a t i n g to crimes against humanity or serious 
v i o l a t i o n of human r i g h t s where i n t e r n a t i o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n or 
u n i v e r s a l j u r i s d i c t i o n i s r e a d i l y assured. As i t may be 
r e c a l l e d , the Act of S t a t e doctrine was applied i n Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino 1 3 7 although i t appeared Cuba 
v i o l a t e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. But i n t h i s l i g h t , the v i o l a t i o n 
was not t h a t s e r i o u s as to be c h a r a c t e r i s e d as v i o l a t i n g j u s 
cogens. The court, however, changed i t s p o s i t i o n i n A l f r e d 
H i l l , notwithstanding the f a c t t h a t the two cases appear s i m i l a r 
i n many r e s p e c t s . 1 3 8 I n s p i t e of the f a c t t h a t the r e s t r i c t i v e 
d o c t r i n e i s g a i n i n g ground, i t cannot be a p p l i e d i n respect of 
i s s u e s r e l a t i n g to p o l i t i c a l a c t s of s t a t e s . The growing demand 
on s t a t e s to improve the q u a l i t y of l i v e s of t h e i r c i t i z e n s has 
prompted most s t a t e s i n the developing world and i n the 
c e n t r a l l y c o n t r o l l e d economies to become s t a t e t r a d e r s , where by 
1 3 7(1964) 376 US 398, 428. 
1 3 8 (19 7 6 ) 4 2 5 US 682. 
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some happenstance p o l i t i c a l and commercial d e c i s i o n s more often 
than not get intertwined. In t h i s regard the concept of 
sovereign immunity i n t e r a c t s or merges with the a c t of s t a t e 
doctrine, thus weakening the e f f e c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n of the 
doctrine of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity which i s wholly based on the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between acta jure imperii (actes de puissance 
publique) and acta jure gestionis (actes de gestion). P r o f e s s o r 
Fawcett e x p l a i n s the problem as f o l l o w s : 
" F i r s t imperium denotes l e g a l c a p a c i t y , under 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l or i n t e r n a t i o n a l , to perform an a c t of s t a t e or 
conclude an i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreement; but the performance of a 
non-sovereign act jure gestionis may a l s o be i n the e x e r c i s e of 
a p u b l i c f u n c t i o n . 1 , 1 3 9 
Here Fawcett i s suggesting that the "demarcation between 
the p o l i t i c a l and economic a c t i v i t i e s of the s t a t e have become 
b l u r r e d . " 1 4 0 Granted t h i s , then can a s t a t e be sued before 
foreign courts i f a p o l i c y taken i n i t s t e r r i t o r y was geared 
towards the p r o t e c t i o n of i t s c i t i z e n s and t h e r e f o r e amounts to 
acta jure imperii but at the same time a l s o amounts to a breach? 
The answer i s i n the negative but the House of Lords and the 
Court of Appeals seemed to r u l e otherwise. A c a r e f u l reading of 
Trendtex shows tha t the l e t t e r of c r e d i t was prima facie a 
commercial a c t , however, the government p o l i c y to slow down the 
shipment of cement to Lagos i n order to avoid the cement being 
destroyed by sea water and thus rendered u s e l e s s was a 
governmental a c t . The i s s u e r a i s e d h e r e i n was a l s o brought up 
139 Fawcett (1948) xxv BYIL, p. 35. 
1 4 0 I b i d . 
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i n the case of I Congreso d e l Partido; there the Cuban 
government argued t h a t the dispute d i d not have any s i g n i f i c a n t 
r e l a t i o n s h i p with B r i t a i n and t h a t the a r r e s t i n question was i n 
f a c t prompted by an a c t j u r e imperii of the Cuban government 
which cannot be questioned i n the courts of B r i t a i n . 1 4 1 The 
House of Lords r u l e d t h a t immunity be denied to Cuba, but 
somehow looked beyond the nature of the co n t r a c t or 
t r a n s a c t i o n , 1 4 2 which Dr. Mann had r e f e r r e d to as "a type of 
immunity ratione materiae et personae, a s a n c r o s a n c t i t y of a 
foreign a c t of s t a t e i n the guise of personal immunity." 1 4 3 But 
i n r e a l i t y as i t may be r e c a l l e d the House of Lords was j u s t 
t r y i n g to be o b j e c t i v e i n i t s quest to o f f e r cogent reasons for 
the judgment. 
Arguably, i n the absence of a coup d'etat i n C h i l e , the 
Cuban government would not have i n t e r f e r e d with the d e l i v e r y of 
the cargoes. S i m i l a r l y , without a coup i n N i g e r i a against 
Gowan, perhaps e v e r y t h i n g would have gone very w e l l with the 
cement c o n t r a c t . The d e c i s i o n s i n S p a c i l v. Crowe 1 4 4 and i n IAM 
v. OPEC 1 4 5 show how d i f f i c u l t i s s u e s r e l a t i n g to p o l i t i c a l a c t s 
of s t a t e s can be. The p o s i t i o n t h a t was taken by Lord Denning 
i n Rahimtoola v. The Nizam of Hyderabad, although followed the 
1 4 1 I Congreso d e l P a r t i d o (1977) 1 Lloyds Rep 536. 
1 4 2 I b i d . 
143Mann (1982) 31 ICLQ 573, 574. 
1 4 4 (1974) 480 F.2d 614. 
1 4 5 (1981) 469 F.3d 1354. 
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doctrine of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity, but somewhat seemed a t the 
same time to support i n v a r i a b l y the d e c i s i o n s of Judge Choy and 
Wisdom J , r e s p e c t i v e l y . 1 4 6 I t i s submitted th a t given the 
complex nature of these cases and the t r o u b l i n g question of 
p o l i t i c a l a c t s of s t a t e s , the d i s t i n c t i o n between acta jure 
imperii and acta jure gestionis appears woefully inadequate f o r 
i t i s simply a halfway house l e g a l doctrine which may r e q u i r e , 
some would say, a l b e i t a high standard of j u d i c i a l 
statesmanship. 
Some Preliminary Thoughts on N a t i o n a l i z a t i o n and R e s t r i c t i v e 
Immunity 
I t i s cumbersome i f not impossible to apply the d o c t r i n e 
of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity to the act of taking PROPERTY by a 
sovereign s t a t e i n i t s own t e r r i t o r y , because the essence of the 
a c t of s t a t e d o c t r i n e i s to prevent the making of an i n q u i r y by 
one s t a t e i n t o the v a l i d i t y of the p u b l i c a c t s of another 
s t a t e . 1 4 7 Modern developments i n t h i s area of the law are f a r 
from c e r t a i n and some courts have rendered c o n f l i c t i n g d e c i s i o n s 
not i n the l e a s t h e l p f u l . One important i s s u e t h a t must be 
c a r e f u l l y grappled with, however, i s whether n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n by 
a foreign sovereign country can be c h a r a c t e r i s e d as commercial 
a c t or sovereign a c t i n a foreign court. This problem, as a 
1 4 6 S p a c i l v. Crowe (1974) 480 F.2d 614; I AM v. OPEC (1981) 
469 F.3d 1354. 
1 4 7Brownlie, op. c i t . at pp. 507-8; See a l s o Munch, 98 Hague 
R e c u e i l (1959 I I I ) ; R. Wallace, op. c i t . a t pp. 48-50; St a r k e , 
An In t r o d u c t i o n to I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law 1994, chapter 4. 
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matter of f a c t , has given E n g l i s h and American courts food for 
thought but w i l l c e r t a i n l y not fade away. An argument or theory 
which has f a i l e d to f i n d favour with s c h o l a r s 1 4 8 and perhaps some 
courts i s that n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n be regarded as a commercial a c t 1 4 9 
based on the presumption t h a t the i n i t i a l agreement g i v i n g b i r t h 
to the investment or t r a n s f e r of technology i s the s o l e 
underlying f a c t o r t h a t must be considered, s i n c e i t e n t a i l s the 
meeting of the minds r a t h e r than the p o l i t i c a l a c t i n r e s p e c t of 
the n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n . 
The FSIA, f o r example, denies immunity to s t a t e s "where 
ri g h t s i n property i n v i o l a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law are i n 
i s s u e . " 1 5 0 A s i m i l a r p o s i t i o n was taken by Lord Denning i n the I 
Congreso but i n an e a r l i e r case of Uganda Co. Holdings L t d v. 
Government of Uganda, 1 5 1 Donaldson J followed the m o d a l i t i e s of 
the act of s t a t e by r e f u s i n g to express any opinion s p e c i f i c a l l y 
on the v a l i d i t y of the purported l e g i s l a t i o n passed i n Uganda. 
And i n 1978 Duff J d i s m i s s e d a charge a g a i n s t Libya i n Carey v. 
National O i l C o r p o r a t i o n 1 5 2 i n which the quest by the p l a i n t i f f 
was simply to c h a r a c t e r i s e the Libyan a c t i o n i n i s s u e as acta 
jure gestionis. These i s s u e s regarding n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n are 
therefore f a r from s e t t l e d and t h e r e i s no a u t h o r i t y as to 
Sornarajah, op. c i t . a t pp. 671-676. 
1 4 9 I b i d . a t pp. 673-675. 
1 5 0FISA: S e c t i o n 1605 ( a ) ( 3 ) . 
1 5 1 (1979) 1 Lloyds LR 481, 488. 
1 5 2 (1978) 453 F.Supp. 1097 (SDNY) . 
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whether the doctrine of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity can be of help to 
judges i n r e s p e c t of governmental actions of f o r e i g n s t a t e s 
c l e a r l y taken w i t h i n t h e i r borders. These d i f f i c u l t i e s , I 
b e l i e v e , might have prompted Sornarajah to argue thus: 
"American j u d i c i a l opinion i s d i v i d e d on whether immunity should 
be a t t a c h e d to a f o r e i g n n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n decree. The FSIA's 
d i r e c t i o n t h a t a 'taking i n v i o l a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law' 
should not be p r o t e c t e d by immunity i s not h e l p f u l f o r the 
obvious reason that there i s l i t t l e unanimity as to what amounts 
to such t a k i n g . " 1 5 3 
The a p p l i c a t i o n of r e s t r i c t i v e i n determining i s s u e s r e s p e c t i n g 
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n i s simply inadequate and l i k e l y to c r e a t e 
harassment, which means the nature t e s t coupled with the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between sovereign and governmental a c t s have become 
t o t a l l y redundant or i n e f f e c t i v e . So f a r i t appears t h a t 
l e g i s l a t i o n i n respect of r e s o l v i n g the problem of sovereign 
immunity has met with d i f f i c u l t i e s . 1 5 4 Thus, i f a l l s t a t e s 
r e s o r t to l e g i s l a t i o n without acceding to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
agreement, what then becomes of the world? The end r e s u l t would 
be c o n f l i c t of laws and perhaps i t s attendant problems of forum 
shopping. I t i s p o s s i b l e a l s o that every country would develop 
a d i f f e r e n t method or approach i n c l a s s i f y i n g governmental a c t s 
and commercial a c t s . I n t h i s regard, confusion would become the 
order of the day. 
Sornarajah, op. c i t . at 673. 
1 5 4See for example Senator Mathias' b i l l — S . 1071 [131 Cong 
Rec S 5370, 3 May 1985]. See a l s o Mr. Glickman's b i l l on 31 
J u l y 1985. See a l s o Fox (1985) 34 ICLQ 115 for her thorough 
a n a l y s i s of the problem. See a l s o generally (1986) F i n a l Report 
of Dr. S u c h a r i t k u l . 
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Furthermore, which of the many i n t e r r e l a t e d governmental 
organs or e n t i t i e s can be c a t e g o r i s e d i n t o separate compartments 
to q u a l i f y for immunity and what about the thorny question 
regarding i n d i r e c t impleading of s t a t e s ? I t would be most 
expedient i f municipal court judges are given a l a t i t u d e of 
freedom to put t h e i r l e g a l reasoning to work -so as to allow the 
law to grow i n s t e a d of l i m i t i n g them by the e f f e c t of r e g i o n a l 
and l o c a l l y couched l e g i s l a t i o n geared towards the p r o t e c t i o n of 
the i n d i v i d u a l t r a d e r or c o r p o r a t i o n s . Arguably, the d o c t r i n e 
of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i s i n need of c a r e f u l development and 
therefore not a panacea to r e s o l v i n g these complex problems 
apparently created by the i n c r e a s e i n t r a d i n g a c t i v i t i e s of 
s t a t e s . The approach followed by Lord Denning i n l a y i n g bare 
the shortcomings of absolute s o v e r e i g n immunity'" i n E n g l i s h 
p r a c t i c e , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Trendtex 1 5 6 w i l l c e r t a i n l y help promote 
the development of the law of s o v e r e i g n immunity. Given the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s a s s o c i a t e d with the a p p l i c a t i o n of the doctrine of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity, common sense w i l l c e r t a i n l y not be 
offended to conclude th a t r e s t r i c t i v e immunity needs f u r t h e r i n -
depth study before s t a t e s can be duly j u s t i f i e d i n throwing 
t h e i r support behind i t . 
In the United S t a t e s , for example, the r e had been a c a l l 
that the 1976 Sovereign Immunity Act be amended. Senator 
Mathias' b i l l , S 107 (131 Cong Rec S 5370, 3 May 1985) and Mr. 
1 5 5 S i n c l a i r , op. c i t . at pp. 150-159. 
1 5 6 (1977) QB 529 Court of Appeal per Lord Denning. 
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Glickman's b i l l on 31 J u l y 1985 are signs of the drawbacks or 
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n s a s s o c i a t e d with the s a i d 1976 Act. 
I n the United Kingdom, the i s s u e i n Alcorn undoubtedly 
prompted B r i t i s h judges and s c h o l a r s to take another hard look 
a t the prospects of l e g i s l a t i o n . And t h i s i n the main has been 
w e l l a n a l y s e d by Lady Fox, i n her exposition on the problem. 
Furthermore i t i s on record th a t members of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Law Commission have disagreed on the question whether the r u l e 
of absolute immunity be discarded or allowed to e x i s t as a r u l e 
of customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. The d r a f t a r t i c l e s t h e r e f o r e 
r e p r e s e n t a compromise between absolute and r e s t r i c t i v e immunity 
d o c t r i n e s . I n short, the l e g i s l a t i v e instruments passed on 
s t a t e immunity i n the USA, UK, Singapore, Pakistan, South 
A f r i c a , Canada and A u s t r a l i a represent i n many respects how 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s understood i n these countries. These 
l e g i s l a t i v e instruments which are now i n place and wholly 
p r e d i c a t e d on the doctrine of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity cannot 
t h e r e f o r e be accepted as evidence of general i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
I t i s apposite, t h e r e f o r e , that a d i s t i n c t i o n be drawn between 
these n a t i o n a l instruments and customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, thus 
w h i l e one i s v e r t i c a l i n nature, i . e . , domestic law, the other 
i s prima facie, p u b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, and t h e r e f o r e 
h o r i z o n t a l i n nature. Thus to a candid mind, these n a t i o n a l 
instruments simply represent the opinio individualis juris 
generalis of each of the seven c o u n t r i e s mentioned above. I n 
sum, the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i s a doctrine of dubious 
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provenance coupled with a l o t of u n c e r t a i n t i e s . C e r t a i n l y 
municipal courts w i l l be b e t t e r o f f without i t . 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PRIVATE SUITS AGAINST AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
IN FOREIGN COURTS 
Pr e l i m i n a r y Observations 
The currency of the concept of r e s t r i c t i v e or r e l a t i v e 
immunity seemed not to have found favour with A f r i c a n countries, 
except the v e r y few, 1 c u r r e n t l y seduced by the seemingly growing 
appeal of the r e s t r i c t i v e theory, which has now become w e l l 
grounded i n the p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s i n the Western world. 2 Most 
of these A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s have turned deaf ears to the c a l l to 
c r o s s c a r p e t because of the f a c t t h a t municipal courts i n these 
c o u n t r i e s have not had ample chance to consider the main i s s u e s 
r e l a t i n g to r e s t r i c t i v e immunity and i n c i d e n t a l l y the 
j u r i s p r u d e n c e of these c o u n t r i e s remains s i l e n t or appears not 
to give room or allowance t h a t the sovereign be sued i n her own 
c o u r t . 3 Some p r i v a t e claims i n these countries of l a t e , 
however, have been p r e f e r r e d a g a i n s t sovereigns before t h e i r own 
c o u r t s s p e c i f i c a l l y i n the spheres of c i v i l r i g h t s , t o r t claims 
^ e e The Current P r a c t i c e of Egypt, South A f r i c a , Malagasy 
and Togo: But i t would appear Egypt was the f i r s t of countries 
i n A f r i c a to embark on the bandwagon of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 
2See the Report of The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission: From 
1979-1988. 
3J.H. P r i c e , P o l i t i c a l I n s t i t u t i o n s of West A f r i c a (1975); 
Sanders, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Jurisprudence i n A f r i c a n Context (1979); 
Nkrumah K., C l a s s Struggle i n A f r i c a (1981): Premobilised 
a u t h o r i t a r i a n government became more pronounced i n A f r i c a 
coupled with m i l i t a r y d i c t a t o r s h i p : The Amin Regime, the 
E t h i o p i a n Revolution, e t c . , are good examples; Dubois, W.E.B., 
The World and A f r i c a (1972). 
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and d e c l a r a t o r y adjudication, but i t would appear t h a t such 
claims are not that popular i n these c o u n t r i e s s i n c e one runs 
the r i s k of being s i l e n c e d by the c o e r c i v e apparatus of the 
power of the sovereign, 4 which knows no i n t e r n a l or e x t e r n a l 
superior. In f a c t , most A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s have a very 
conservative view of the t r a d i t i o n a l notion of s t a t e immunity 
because these countries b e l i e v e s t e a d f a s t l y t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law i s based on the patent p r i n c i p l e s of s t a t e e q u a l i t y c l e a r l y 
derived from the concept of sovereignty but not s u b j e c t i o n . 
The p o s i t i o n of the Third World was w e l l a r t i c u l a t e d by 
Venezuela i n a reply to the questionnaire s e n t to i t s f o r e i g n 
m i n i s t r y by the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission thus: 
"Venezuela a l s o expressed concern a t the f a c t t h a t the 
Commission had opted f or a system which a l l o w s numerous 
exceptions to the sovereign immunity of s t a t e s and t h e i r 
property. This d e t r a c t s from the general p r i n c i p l e t h a t s t a t e s 
are immune among themselves and, i n the opinion of Venezuela, i s 
p r e j u d i c i a l to the developing c o u n t r i e s , where owing to the l a c k 
of p r i v a t e c a p i t a l the s t a t e has to undertake d i v e r s e and v a r i e d 
a c t i v i t i e s r e l a t e d to the i n t e r n a t i o n a l economy and commercial 
r e l a t i o n s . In t h i s connection, i t was s t r e s s e d t h a t the 
developing countries should endeavour to ensure t h a t , i n the 
f i n a l t e x t , the exceptions to or l i m i t a t i o n s on the so v e r e i g n 
immunity of s t a t e s and t h e i r property are fewer i n number or 
l e s s e r i n scope." 5 
Given the p o l i t i c a l changes that have taken p l a c e a f t e r 
the Second World War coupled with the r a d i c a l change i n the 
functions of the s t a t e p a r t i c u l a r i t y i n the T h i r d World, most of 
4Minogue, M., and Molloy, J . (ed) , A f r i c a n Aims and 
A t t i t u d e s : Selected Documents (1974); T.O. E l i a s , A f r i c a and 
the Development of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1988), pp. 106-117; 
Nkrumah, Dark Days i n Ghana (1967) ; J . Waddis, Armies and 
P o l i t i c s (1977). 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission's Report V o l . I I p a r t one 
1988 p. 90. 
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these s t a t e s have taken to t r a d i n g i n the l i g h t of the paucity 
of finance c a p i t a l i n order to promote the welfare of t h e i r 
c i t i z e n s . The p o s i t i o n taken by Venezuela i s therefore a 
c o r r e c t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n or a true p i c t u r e or c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of 
the T h i r d World. These T h i r d World c o u n t r i e s have become s t a t e 
t r a d e r s because governments i n these c o u n t r i e s are regarded as 
the s o l e p r o v i d e r s of goods and s e r v i c e s . 6 Indeed, one would 
argue th a t governmental functions i n t h i s connection are not 
l i m i t e d to only m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s , f oreign a f f a i r s , 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e and matters of education but a l s o 
encompass such f u n c t i o n s as t r a d i n g i n goods and s e r v i c e s , 
banking, shipping, a i r l i n e s e r v i c e s , p o s t a l s e r v i c e s and other 
important commercial a c t i v i t i e s . These manifestations are 
c l e a r l y expressed i n A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s where the government i s 
given g r e a t e r prominence i n n a t i o n a l economic planning except 
perhaps i n South A f r i c a , where c a p i t a l i s r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e and 
amply supported by her w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d c a p i t a l market and 
economic s t r u c t u r e . 7 E f f o r t s t h e r e f o r e to a c c e l e r a t e economic 
p r o s p e r i t y i n order to promote p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y can be 
designated l o g i c a l l y as the d r i v e behind the reason why the 
6 T h i s i s common with most T h i r d World c o u n t r i e s hence the 
p o s i t i o n advocated by Venezuela i s a c o r r e c t representation of 
the s i t u a t i o n i n T h i r d World c o u n t r i e s . Lack of c a p i t a l and the 
prevalence of p r e m o b i l i s e d p o l i t i c a l systems may be responsible 
f o r the dominance of the government i n a l l spheres of commercial 
l i f e . 
7South A f r i c a has a w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d stock market and 
c a p i t a l market and many c o u n t r i e s have i n v e s t e d h e a v i l y i n t h i s 
country. The s a n c t i o n s l e v i e d on South A f r i c a and the number 
of c o u n t r i e s with investments i n the country could be taken as 
an example. See Dugard, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law 1994 p. 20. 
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Third World and p a r t i c u l a r l y A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s have entered the 
market pla c e . I f t h i s be l o g i c a l l y tenable, then one w i l l 
c e r t a i n l y be hard put to take i s s u e with the reason why A f r i c a n 
countries have become very conservative i n the c a l l t h a t 
sovereign immunity be r e s t r i c t e d . I t i s worth noting, however, 
to point out that, i n addition to the T h i r d World, some 
coun t r i e s i n the West and the E a s t have a l s o taken to t r a d i n g as 
a means of providing revenue for t h e i r t r e a s u r i e s . T h i s i s w e l l 
explained i n the words of Professor Friedmann when he argued 
thus: 
"The p r i n c i p l e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law t h a t f o r e i g n 
government cannot be held s u b j e c t to the j u r i s d i c t i o n of any 
municipal court of another country, because such assumption of 
j u r i s d i c t i o n would v i o l a t e the p r i n c i p l e of s o v e r e i g n e q u a l i t y 
of the nations, has i n c r e a s i n g l y been s t r a i n e d , as one 
government a f t e r another has proceeded to engage i n commercial 
t r a n s a c t i o n s with i n t e r n a t i o n a l r a m i f i c a t i o n s . Such a c t i v i t i e s 
and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s extend f a r beyond the S i n o - S o v i e t b l o c . 
For example, the major shipping l i n e s of I t a l y a r e government-
c o n t r o l l e d ; and i t i s almost forgotten t h a t during and f o l l o w i n g 
World War I , the United States Merchant Navy was state-owned. 
C e r t a i n l y , the once prevalent theory t h a t a s t a t e e x e r c i s e d 
government a c t i v i t i e s proper only as long as i t d i d not e n t e r 
trade has long been abandoned. Even i n the United S t a t e s , i t 
has been repeatedly held that the e x e r c i s e of economic and 
commercial operations i s as much a proper governmental a c t i v i t y 
as any of the more t r a d i t i o n a l government f u n c t i o n s . " 8 
True, the doctrine of absolute immunity became an unchallenged 
jurisprudence i n the courts of most Western c o u n t r i e s u n t i l 
quite r e c e n t l y when i t s currency was challenged or thrown i n t o 
doubt 9 i n America, B r i t a i n , Canada, A u s t r a l i a , Canada, P a k i s t a n , 
Singapore and South A f r i c a , due perhaps to the gre a t i n c r e a s e i n 
Friedmann (1959), Law and Contemporary Problems, V o l . 24, 
352. 
9Lauterpacht (1951) BYIL. 
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commercial a c t i v i t i e s of n a t i o n s t a t e s 1 0 and the need to create 
equity and f a i r n e s s on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l plane i n respect of 
t r a n s n a t i o n a l b u s i n e s s t r a n s a c t i o n s . 1 1 I t i s now c l e a r from the 
jurisprudence of these c o u n t r i e s t h a t immunity i s r e a d i l y 
a v a i l a b l e or recognised only f o r sovereign a c t s while on the 
other hand, i t i s not recognised for non sovereign a c t s , 
e s s e n t i a l l y commercial i n outlook. 1 2 Thus while the great wind 
of change had prompted the West to make a momentous change to 
embracing r e s t r i c t i v e theory, the T h i r d World had consolidated 
i t s c onservative views i n support of s t a t e immunity, although 
o c c a s i o n a l l y f l e x i b l e and r e a s o n a b l e 1 3 i n a quest to accommodate 
the s e l f - g e n e r a t e d p r e f e r e n c e f o r the r e s t r i c t i v e theory by the 
Western i n d u s t r i a l i s e d c o u n t r i e s . A good example of a Third 
World conservatism i s w e l l evidenced by China's r e p l y to the ILC 
questionnaire regarding exceptions to s t a t e immunity i n these 
c a r e f u l l y formulated words. 
"The Chinese Government maintains t h a t the j u r i s d i c t i o n a l 
immunity of s t a t e s and t h e i r property i s a l o n g - e s t a b l i s h e d and 
u n i v e r s a l l y r e c o g n i z e d p r i n c i p l e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law based on 
the sovereign e q u a l i t y of s t a t e s . The d r a f t a r t i c l e s on the 
s u b j e c t formulated by the Commission need to s p e l l out the 
s t a t u s of t h i s p r i n c i p l e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
"The d r a f t a r t i c l e s should a f f i r m the p r i n c i p l e mentioned 
above and, on the b a s i s of a thorough study of the p r a c t i c e of 
1 0Friedmann, op. c i t . ; S i n c l a i r , 167 Hague R e c u e i l 113 1980 
(11) • 
n S e e Higgins (1982) 2a Neth I n t LR, 265. 
1 2See the U.S. Act 1976; The U.K. Act 1978; The Singapore 
Act 1979; The P a k i s t a n i Act 1981; The South A f r i c a n Act 1981; 
The Canadian Act 1982; r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
l jSee g e n e r a l l y The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission's Report, 
1980-1988. 
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s t a t e s , i n c l u d i n g the s o c i a l i s t and developing c o u n t r i e s , 
p r a g m a t i c a l l y i d e n t i f y those 'exceptions' whose n e c e s s i t y and 
reasonableness are borne out by r e a l i t y of ownership, p o s s e s s i o n 
and use of immovable property, ship engaged i n commercial 
s e r v i c e , so as to accommodate the present s t a t e and the 
development of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic and commercial l i n k s . " 1 4 
S i m i l a r p o s i t i o n s have been taken by Indonesia, Sudan, N i g e r i a , 
Ecuador, S y r i a , Thailand, B r a z i l , T r i n i d a d and Tobago, 1 5 to 
mention a few. I t should be observed, therefore, t h a t according 
to the ILC report, s e v e r a l developing countries have expressed 
strong preference for the preservation of the r u l e of s t a t e 
immunity. 1 6 And t h e i r views i n t h i s regard cannot be ignored 
s i n c e the impetus to proper e f f e c t i v e change i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law i n these modern times has come from the b a t t a l i o n of s t a t e s 
from the T h i r d World. 1 7 Thus the r e s o r t to l e g i s l a t i o n as a 
means of p r o t e c t i n g the r i g h t s of the p r i v a t e t r a d e r by the 
advanced co u n t r i e s of the world had i n recent times p r e c i p i t a t e d 
an avalanche of p r i v a t e claims against not only A f r i c a n 
c o u n t r i e s 1 8 but other c o u n t r i e s 1 9 as w e l l before f o r e i g n n a t i o n a l 
1 4See ILC report Vol. I I part one 1988 p. 63. 
1 5Brownlie, P r i n c i p l e s of Public I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law 1990 pp. 
327-328. I L Commissions report from 1980-88. 
1 6See M a t e r i a l s on J u r i s d i c t i o n a l Immunities of S t a t e s and 
the Property. Part V r e p l i e s to questionnaires, pp. 557-645. 
1 7Higgins, op. c i t . , p. 265. A good example could be 
l i k e n e d unto the r o l e the Third World played g e n e r a l l y and 
s p e c i f i c a l l y i n the d r a f t i n g of the law of the sea. 
1 8D.J. H a r r i s , I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1991), pp. 286-319; C a t e r 
and T r i b l e , I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1991), pp. 549-699; S i n c l a i r 167 
Hague R e c u e i l 113 1980 I I ; Sucharitkul, Immunities of Fo r e i g n 
S t a t e s before National A u t h o r i t i e s , Hague R e c u e i l (1976), 1, 91. 
1 9 S i n c l a i r , op. c i t . 
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a u t h o r i t i e s . 2 0 However, i n the l i g h t of the conservative views 
o f f i c i a l l y expressed by A f r i c a n s t a t e s i n support of absolute 
immunity, these s a i d p r i v a t e s u i t s or claims, as the record 
shows, have been f i e r c e l y fought or challenged i n such c o u n t r i e s 
as B r i t a i n , America, Germany, Canada, France, I t a l y and Belgium. 
Nigeria, for example, had been sued i n America 2 1, England 2 2, and 
Germany23, r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
I t i s the purpose of t h i s study to delve i n t o p r i v a t e 
s u i t s or claims i n s t i t u t e d a g a i n s t some A f r i c a n s t a t e s i n 
foreign courts with the view to e x p l o r i n g i n general why a l l 
these countries r e s i s t e d t h ese p r i v a t e claims or refused to 
submit to the j u r i s d i c t i o n of these f o r e i g n a u t h o r i t i e s and the 
impact thereof on i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. L e t us now consider 
seriatim these important c a s e s . 
A f r i c a n States before Foreign C o u r t s : Evidence of R e s i s t a n c e to 
the R e s t r i c t i v e Rule as of R i g h t 
Nigeria before E n g l i s h , American and German Courts 
Having a l r e a d y c o n s i d e r e d the Trendtex case c a s u a l l y 
elsewhere, I s h a l l attempt again to give i t f u r t h e r a t t e n t i o n i n 
2 0E.g., Cuba, Colombia, I n d i a , China, Indonesia, Pakistan, 
Canada, I r a n , to mention a few. 
2 1National American Corporation v. Federal Rep. of N i g e r i a 
(1978) 448 F.Supp. 622. 
2 2Trendtex Trading Corporation v. C e n t r a l Bank of N i g e r i a 
(1977) QB 529. 
2 3Yousef Nada v. C e n t r a l Bank of N i g e r i a , Dec. 2, 1975, 
P r o v i n c i a l Court of F r a n k f u r t . 
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the hope tha t one can understand why Nigeria r e s i s t e d a l l the 
p r i v a t e claims brought a g a i n s t i t before national a u t h o r i t i e s , 
namely, the United Kingdom, the United S t a t e s , and the 
Democratic Republic of Germany, and i n so doing present a 
complete order of events l o g i c a l l y leading to the s a i d s u i t s 
brought a g a i n s t N i g e r i a . 
I n 1975, an A f r i c a n nation having been g r e a t l y endowed 
with a high-grade o i l decided to embark on a p r e s t i g i o u s 
p r o j e c t of modernisation a t a breakneck speed, and thus 
c o n t r a c t e d to buy larg e q u a n t i t i e s of Portland Cement, a 
product, a l b e i t c r u c i a l or important to the development of the 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e of the country. But Nigeria, without f i r s t 
t a k i n g pains to consider the c a p a c i t y of her harbours and docks, 
u n f o r t u n a t e l y overbought the Portland Cement i n i s s u e . Before 
long, the Lagos harbour became congested with ships i n queue 
w a i t i n g i m p a t i e n t l y to unload. This i n f a c t a f f e c t e d other 
e s s e n t i a l goods being imported into the country. S t i l l more 
v e s s e l s were coming i n every day with others h u r r i e d l y moving 
towards Lagos. The Nigerian government having been p l a c e d i n 
t h i s d i f f i c u l t p o s i t i o n i n regard to the congestion at the Lagos 
harbour t e c h n i c a l l y repudiated i t s contracts. This l e d to an 
avalanche of p r i v a t e s u i t s brought by many s u p p l i e r s i n s e v e r a l 
c o u n t r i e s . According to the records of the s a i d t r a n s a c t i o n s , 
N i g e r i a bought a t o t a l of 20 m i l l i o n tons of cement p r i c e d a t 
about $1.2 b i l l i o n s , coupled with a promise to pay demurrage 
which was merged with the main contract. In response to these 
p r i v a t e s u i t s , N i g e r i a pleaded that being an independent s t a t e , 
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i t could not be impleaded before a n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y and 
therefore invoked the maxim--par in parem non habet imperium or 
par in parem non habet jurisdictionem to avoid l i a b i l i t y . These 
s u i t s may be c h a r a c t e r i s e d as among the most enormous commercial 
disputes i n h i s t o r y . 
Nigeria before E n g l i s h Courts 
Trendtex Trading Corporation v. C e n t r a l Bank of N i g e r i a 2 4 
In J u l y 1975 an i r r e v o c a b l e l e t t e r of c r e d i t worth $14 
m i l l i o n was e s t a b l i s h e d by the C e n t r a l Bank of N i g e r i a i n favour 
of a Swiss company f o r the payment of 240,000 tons of cement 
which the s a i d p l a i n t i f f had n e g o t i a t e d i n good f a i t h with an 
E n g l i s h company. The cement, per the terms of the c o n t r a c t , was 
to be shipped to N i g e r i a for the s o l e purpose of b u i l d i n g an 
army barracks. The p l a i n t i f f s shipped the cement as r e q u i r e d by 
the terms of the s a l e c o n t r a c t but as a r e s u l t of congestion i n 
Lagos, i . e . , the port of discharge, the new m i l i t a r y government 
h a s t i l y introduced a system of import c o n t r o l s coupled with 
i n s t r u c t i o n s to Midland Bank to r e f u s e payments for any shipment 
of cement without p r i o r a u t h o r i z a t i o n . T h i s prompted Trendtex 
to sue for the p r i c e of the cement, and for demurrage, 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . At the Court of F i r s t I n s t a n c e , Mocaatta J . 
granted Trendtex the i n j u n c t i o n i t prayed f o r i n the amount of 
$13,968, 190, which must be r e t a i n e d i n the j u r i s d i c t i o n u n t i l 
f u r t h e r notice. The C e n t r a l Bank appealed t h a t i t be immune 
2 4 (1977) QB 529. 
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s i n c e i t was a department of s t a t e without any independent 
j u r i s t i c p e r s o n a l i t y . Donaldson J . acceded to the pleadings of 
the C e n t r a l Bank of N i g e r i a and thus s e t aside the w r i t because 
he was s a t i s f i e d with proof th a t the bank was a department of 
the Republic of N i g e r i a . The p l a i n t i f f s , however, were 
s u c c e s s f u l on appeal to the Court of Appeal. Lord Denning MR 
(as he then was) r u l e d t h a t immunity be denied to the C e n t r a l 
Bank of N i g e r i a . In h i s judgment he made some i n t e r e s t i n g 
a n a l y s e s which cannot be allowed to pass away l i k e an ex 
cathedra gospel, one such a n a l y s i s can be stated thus: 
"Seeing t h a t the r u l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law have changed and do 
c h a n g e — a n d t h a t the c o u r t s have given e f f e c t to the changes 
without an a c t Parliament, i t f o l l o w s to my mind inexorably 
t h a t the r u l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, as e x i s t i n g from time to 
time, do form p a r t of our E n g l i s h law. I t follows, too, that a 
d e c i s i o n of t h i s c o u r t — a s to what was the r u l i n g of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law 50 or 60 y e a r s a g o — i s not binding on t h i s 
c o u r t today. I n t e r n a t i o n a l law knows no r u l e of stare decisis. 
I f t h i s c o u r t today i s s a t i s f i e d t h a t the r u l e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law on a s u b j e c t has changed from what i t was 50 or 60 years 
ago, i t can g i v e e f f e c t to t h a t change—and apply the change i n 
our E n g l i s h law without w a i t i n g f o r the House of Lords to do 
i t . " 2 5 
A l l t h a t Lord Denning was t r y i n g to put across was t h a t the 
d o c t r i n e of absolute immunity had become obsolete and that a new 
regime, i . e . , the r e s t r i c t i v e theory or p r i n c i p l e , has now 
gained grounds to such heights as to command the need f o r 
change. And t h a t the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity has become pa r t of 
E n g l i s h law. His learned colleague Shaw L J embraced t h i s 
argument with f u l l support thus g i v i n g way to the a p p l i c a t i o n of 
the concept of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. Stephenson L J on the other 
2 5 I b i d . 
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hand, however, took i s s u e with Lord Denning's argument, 
f o r c e f u l l y arguing that 
" I t i s c l e a r l y d i f f i c u l t i f not i m p o s s i b l e to prove t h a t 
governments have acted on the ' r u l e ' of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity by 
f a i l i n g to plead immunity f o r o r d i n a r y commercial t r a n s a c t i o n s . 
How do you prove that the g e s t a t i o n of new r u l e i s over and t h a t 
i t has come to b i r t h ? Or t h a t an o l d r u l e has grown and 
developed i n t o a new form?" 
He f u r t h e r asked, 
"Have c i v i l i s e d s t a t e s agreed t h a t the d o c t r i n e of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity s h a l l be binding upon them i n t h e i r 
d e a l i n g s with one another? The answer i s d o u b t f u l ; many have. 
I s there evidence that Great B r i t a i n has e v e r a s s e n t e d to the 
d o c t r i n e ? The answer must be no." 2 6 
The learned judge, as can be gathered from h i s judgment, 
was i n favour of a cautious approach, i . e . , u n t i l such time t h a t 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity i s changed by the House of 
Lords or a f f e c t e d by s t a t u t o r y means or i f need be the new 
regime, i . e . , r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i s aided by opinio juris. 
Has there been a change, and i f so, was Lord Denning r i g h t 
when he observed that there has been a change? Although the 
judgments handed down by Lord Denning and Stephenson L J were 
h i g h l y commendable, arguably, Lord Denning's p o s i t i o n t h a t there 
had been a change i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and t h a t the change be 
a u t o m a t i c a l l y incorporated i n t o E n g l i s h law simply i n v i t e s 
c r i t i c i s m and therefore cannot be commendable de lege ferenda, 
unless perhaps he was r e f e r r i n g to a w e l l s e t t l e d r e g i o n a l 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law or the e x i s t e n c e of a m u l t i l a t e r a l t r e a t y , 
droit spontane or an i n s t a n t customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. In 
the absence of such assumptions, then Lord Denning appeared to 
2 6 I b i d . at 570. 
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have been c l e a r l y trapped i n r e l y i n g on a s e l e c t i v e approach to 
e s t a b l i s h i n g customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. For at the time that 
Trendtex came up f o r a d j u d i c a t i o n , the United Kingdom had not 
yet r a t i f i e d the European Convention.' 7 I f t h i s be the case, 
then d i d Lord Denning base h i s argument on conjecture? The 
answer may be i n the a f f i r m a t i v e i n so f a r as general customary 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s c r e a t e d by s t a t e p r a c t i c e backed by c e r t a i n 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s duly supported by opinio juris.28 Thus a new 
general customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s formed provided there i s 
no p r a c t i c e i n e x i s t e n c e that c o n f l i c t s with i t . 2 9 Arguably, 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i n t h i s connection i s not a p r i n c i p l e of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law but r a t h e r an emerging doctrine which does not 
command adequate s t a t e p r a c t i c e except i n some leading countries 
of the West. 3 0 Hence the argument p o s i t e d by Lord Denning that 
there had been a change i n the e x i s t i n g customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law from a b s o l u t e sovereign immunity to r e s t r i c t i v e immunity was 
ex facie erroneous i n some respect and therefore cannot stand 
the t e s t of o b j e c t i v e a n a l y s i s . Dr. V i l l i g e r i n h i s exposition 
of t h i s s u b j e c t matter as regards the formation of customary 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law argues t h a t , 
2 7 T h i s i s a f a c t because the Act was enacted i n 1978 and 
thus paved the way for the European Convention to be r a t i f i e d . 
2 8Akehurst, 1974 BYIL pp. 1-53. 
2 9 I b i d . , p. 53. 
3 0See the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission Report 1988, but i t 
would appear the A s i a n - A f r i c a n C o n s u l t a t i v e Committee might have 
expressed some l i m i t e d d e s i r e i n p r i n c i p l e to embrace the 
r e s t r i c t i v e p r i n c i p l e . But these d e c l a r a t i o n s are not 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the T h i r d World. 
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" A l l s t a t e s p a r t i c i p a t e as equals i n the formative 
process of customary law, and the c o n d i t i o n s f o r the formation 
of a customary r u l e are such t h a t even a s t a t e ' s p a s s i v e conduct 
has to be q u a l i f i e d to be of any s i g n i f i c a n c e . I f a s t a t e 
opposes a customary r u l e from the e a r l y s t ages on wards, the 
s t a t e w i l l not be bound qua p e r s i s t e n t o b j e c t o r . And i f many 
s t a t e s o b j e c t , the r u l e w i l l never a r i s e . " 3 1 
At the time that Lord Denning handed down h i s judgment i n 
Trendtex, many countries of the world d i d o f f e r o p p o s ition to 
the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity r u l e 3 2 and even i n Western Europe some 
coun t r i e s d i f f e r from others i n the a p p l i c a t i o n of the s a i d 
r u l e . 3 3 Stephenson LJ's p o s i t i o n i n re s p e c t to the p l a c e of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i n En g l i s h p r a c t i c e appears commendable and 
accurate de lege lata, for he f e l t bound not only by the 
previous Court of Appeal r a t i o i n the Thai-Europe case, but 
a l s o with regard to whether there had been a change i n customary 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law per Lord Denning's p o s i t i o n on the s u b j e c t . 
C e r t a i n l y answers sent back i n response to the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law 
Commission's questionnaires show t h a t there had not been a 
change i n t h i s area of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 3 4 Stephenson L J 
arguably therefore was c o r r e c t i n h i s e x p o s i t i o n on t h i s s u b j e c t 
matter, i . e . , the i s s u e r e s p e c t i n g a change i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law. 
Without doubt the Trendtex d e c i s i o n w i l l continue to evoke 
mixed or doubtful reactions from lawyers, t e x t w r i t e r s and 
3 1 V i l l i g e r , Customary I n t e r n a t i o n a l and T r e a t i e s (1985) p. 
39. 
3 2See the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission's Report 1980-1988. 
3 3See S i n c l a i r , op. c i t . 
3 4 I L C report, op. c i t . 
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judges. In the f i r s t p l a c e , the s t a t u s of the Central Bank 
r a i s e d an u n s e t t l e d i s s u e which d e f i e s an easy answer. 
Secondly, i t i s e q u a l l y submitted that the i s s u i n g of the l e t t e r 
of c r e d i t was prima facie, a commercial endeavour but the 
d i r e c t i v e given by the de facto government i n order to avoid a 
d i s a s t e r or p o s s i b l y to serve a p u b l i c i n t e r e s t cannot ex 
hypothesi be d i s m i s s e d without any cogent reasons. Arguably, 
the court chose an easy way out for the three judges would have 
been hard put to come up with a c l e a r a u t h o r i t y to support the 
c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of the governmental a c t i o n t h a t was taken to 
ease the congestion a t the Lagos port as acta jure gestionis, 
l e t alone the p o l i c y argument i n regard to paving the way for 
other e s s e n t i a l commodities to be brought i n t o the country. I f 
the court had concentrated on the breach r a t h e r than the 
t r a n s a c t i o n as was p o s t u l a t e d by Lord Wilberforce i n I Congreso, 
the d e c i s i o n c e r t a i n l y could have gone e i t h e r way. True, those 
who have long advocated t h a t the d o c t r i n e of absolute immunity 
had become obsolete or simply become an empty r e l i c of t r a d i t i o n 
w i l l embrace Lord Denning's judgment without question coupled 
with a comforting applause. However, a c a r e f u l a n a l y s i s w i l l 
show t h a t he f a i l e d to o f f e r any adequate support f o r the reason 
why he chose i n c o r p o r a t i o n over transformation. The only 
argument he o f f e r e d was t h a t i ncorporation would pave the way 
fo r the courts to q u i c k l y recognise a change i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law. 3 5 With the g r e a t e s t respect, such an argument i s not 
3 5Trendtex (1977) QB 548-557. 
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convincing and therefore open to question. Quite a p a r t from 
t h i s , i t i s submitted that the incorporation theory i n i t s 
absolute form i s l i m i t e d i n r e a l i t y by the operation of the 
concept of stare decisis, which although might not be accepted 
i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s ex hypothesi accepted i n E n g l i s h law. 3 6 
P r i o r to the d e c i s i o n i n Trendtex, for example Lord Denning had 
r u l e d i n Thaker v. Home Se c r e t a r y 3 7 that, " i n my opinion, the 
r u l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law only become pa r t of our law i n so f a r 
as they are accepted and adopted by u s . " 3 8 His p o s i t i o n 
therefore i n Trendtex simply c o n t r a d i c t s h i s e a r l i e r p o s i t i o n 
and that of Lord Atkin's judgment i n Chung Chi Cheung v. The 
King, 3 9 that, 
"The c o u r t s acknowledge the e x i s t e n c e of a body of r u l e s 
which n a t i o n s accept among themselves. On any j u d i c i a l i s s u e 
they seek to a s c e r t a i n what the r e l e v a n t r u l e i s , and having 
found i t , they w i l l t r e a t i t as incorporated i n t o domestic law, 
so f a r as i t i s not i n c o n s i s t e n t with r u l e s enacted by s t a t u t e s 
or f i n a l l y d e c l a r e d by t h e i r t r i b u n a l s . " 4 0 
Again, Lord Denning's p o s i t i o n i n r e s p e c t of the d o c t r i n e 
of incorporation runs counter to Lord Macmillan's judgment i n 
the C r i s t i n a , 4 1 where he held that municipal c o u r t s must be 
e c l e c t i c i n acknowledging customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law as p a r t of 
domestic law, and that such a step must be undertaken only i f 
3 6See T. Ingman The E n g l i s h Legal Process, 5th Ed. (1994) . 
3 7 (19 7 4) IQB 684. 
3 8 I b i d . , a t 701. 
3 911939 AC 160. 
4 0 I b i d . a t 167. 
4 11938 AC 485. 
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there i s adequate evidence to support the f a c t t h a t the custom 
i n i s s u e had a t t a i n e d the hallmark of consent. Can i t be s a i d 
therefore t h a t the r u l e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity had a t t a i n e d a 
hallmark of consent amongst c i v i l i s e d s t a t e s of the world a t the 
time the Trendtex d e c i s i o n was handed down? The answer i s i n 
the negative f o r no one can a t t e s t to the e x i s t e n c e of a 
normative r u l e a t the moment. 
I t i s submitted t h a t the Appeal Court i n Trendtex was 
faced with two rationes decidendi and arguably the p o s i t i o n 
taken by the s a i d court on both the f i r s t r a t i o and the second 
r a t i o appears l e s s c o n v i n c i n g and i n t e l l e c t u a l l y unbalanced, for 
general i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, ex abundanti cautela does not lend 
support to some of the c r u c i a l arguments made i n upholding the 
r e s t r i c t i v e p r i n c i p l e . 
(1) That the s t a t u s of the C e n t r a l Bank was prima facie 
i n c o n c l u s i v e . 
(2) That the C e n t r a l Bank of N i g e r i a , be considered pari pasu 
to the s t a t u s of the Bank of England i s non sequitur for 
these banks operate i n d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l systems—one 
E n g l i s h — w i t h high subsystem autonomy and the other 
N i g e r i a n — w i t h p r e m o b i l i s e d a u t h o r i t a r i a n system. 
(3) That Lord Denning's argument i n re s p e c t of the f a c t that 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law has changed simply begs the question. 
Stephenson L J ' s p o s i t i o n on t h i s very i s s u e therefore 
appears to be the c o r r e c t approach. 
(4) That evidence i s abound worldwide i n support of the view 
that e n t i t i e s w ith independent j u r i s t i c p e r s o n a l i t y within 
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a p o l i t y be duly e n t i t l e d to immunity cannot be disputed. 
Thus the f a c t t h a t an agency i s a separate e n t i t y per se 
i s not c o n c l u s i v e that i t be denied immunity. Much 
therefore depends on the circumstances and the comparative 
data before the lex fori. 
(5) That the court should have shed some l i g h t on the i n t e r n a l 
c r i s i s which prompted the breach. 
I t i s hard to t e l l as to what the outcome would have been i f the 
case had been a d j u d i c a t e d before the House of Lords. Obviously, 
s e t t l i n g the case on the s p i r i t of entente cordiale was 
p r e f e r r e d to the rigorous process of l i t i g a t i n g the matter 
before the House of Lords. In the end N i g e r i a s e t t l e d the s u i t 
by paying C r e d i t S u i s s e $8 m i l l i o n . In the main, Lord Denning's 
a p p l i c a t i o n of the nature t e s t and the argument i n re s p e c t of a 
change i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law gave Trendtex the winning goal. I n 
t h i s respect, Lord Denning abandoned the s t a t e - v o l u n t a r i s t view 
and q u i c k l y embraced the u n i v e r s a l i s t view. 
N i g e r i a before German Courts 
Nonresident P e t i t i o n v. Central Bank of N i g e r i a D i s t r i c t 
Court, Frankfurt, Judgment of December 2, 1975—Docket No. 3/8 0 
186/75. 
I n Youssel M. Nada Establishment v. C e n t r a l Bank of 
N i g e r i a , 4 2 the p e t i t i o n e r entered into a s a l e c o n t r a c t to supply 
4 2Yousef Nada v. C e n t r a l Bank of Nige r i a , Dec. 2, 1975, 
P r o v i n c i a l Court of F r a n k f u r t . 
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240, 000 tons of cement to the M i n i s t r y of Defence of N i g e r i a . 
The contract s p e c i f i e d t h a t an i r r e v o c a b l e , t r a n s f e r a b l e , 
d i v i s i b l e and confirmed l e t t e r of c r e d i t be opened i n favour of 
the p e t i t i o n e r . I n 1975, the Central Bank of Nigeria, the 
respondent, opened an i r r e v o c a b l e l e t t e r of c r e d i t , as required 
per the terms of the said c o n t r a c t , duly payable i n A u s t r i a at 
the p l a i n t i f f ' s bank. Furthermore a demurrage was agreed 
thereof "without any l i m i t " upon proper presentation of v a l i d l y 
s p e c i f i e d commercial documents. The p e t i t i o n e r d e l i v e r e d more 
than h a l f of the t o t a l consignment ordered, i . e . , 140, 000 tons 
of cement between the p e r i o d o f 17th A p r i l and 1st September 
1975. The purchase p r i c e of t h i s p a r t i a l d e l i v e r y was paid, as 
required by the command of the c o n t r a c t . But as a r e s u l t of 
congestion at the Lagos harbour, the Nigerian M i n i s t r y of 
Transportation introduced a p o l i c y r e s t r i c t i n g the number of 
ships carrying cement i n t o N i g e r i a , and t h i s gave the Nigerian 
port a u t h o r i t i e s the power t o deny s u p p l i e r s the r i g h t t o ship 
cement to Nigeria without f i r s t g i v i n g two months' p r i o r n o t i c e . 
The p l a i n t i f f thus was not allowed t o supply the r e s t of the 
consignment of cement c a l l e d f o r i n the c o n t r a c t . This n a t i o n a l 
p o l i c y prompted the p l a i n t i f f t o sue the Central Bank f o r the 
demurrage t h a t became due because of the delay at the Lagos 
harbour and any other f u t u r e delays r e l a t i n g t o the ten ships 
w a i t i n g to unload. The p l a i n t i f f also sued f o r i n c i d e n t a l cost 
f o r s e l l i n g the undelivered cement t o other buyers below the 
contract p r i c e . I n view o f these i n f r a c t i o n s , the s u i t 
regarding the attachment of the respondent's funds was granted. 
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The respondent, the Central Bank of Nigeria, challenged the 
attachment order on the grounds th a t the court lacked 
j u r i s d i c t i o n and t h a t the venue of the court was an improper 
one. The d i s t r i c t court was quick i n r e j e c t i n g the sa i d 
defences based on the f o l l o w i n g formulated reasons: 
"The German court has j u r i s d i c t i o n , and venue was 
p r o p e r l y l a i d f o r the attachment. Contrary to respondent's 
contention, the respondent i s not immune from the j u r i s d i c t i o n 
of German c o u r t s . According to Section 20 of the GVG, German 
j u r i s d i c t i o n does not extend to persons who, i n accordance with 
customary r u l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law or on the b a s i s of t r e a t i e s 
or other p r o v i s i o n s of the law, are exempt from i t . I n the 
i n s t a n t case, these p r e r e q u i s i t e s f or an exemption are not 
p r e s e n t . We need not decide whether, based on the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s a s signed to i t , the respondent d i s c h a r g e s 
sovereign f u n c t i o n s , and whether, under Nigerian law the 
respondent a c t s as a j u r i s t i c person and c a r r i e s out i n whole or 
i n p a r t s the a u t h o r i t y of the s t a t e i n f u l f i l m e n t of 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s under p u b l i c law. The p e t i t i o n e r c o r r e c t l y 
p o i n t s out t h a t i n accordance with general case law, l e g a l 
p u b l i c a t i o n s , and w r i t i n g s on i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, separate l e g a l 
e n t i t i e s of a f o r e i g n s t a t e enjoy no immunity." 4 3 
The German court followed the doctrine of r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity by making a d i s t i n c t i o n between governmental a c t i v i t i e s 
acta jure imperii and non-governmental a c t i v i t i e s acta jure 
gestionis, and concluded t h a t there were no recognised r u l e s of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law which precluded municipal courts from 
e x e r c i s i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n over s u i t s against a fo r e i g n independent 
s t a t e i n regard t o i t s non-governmental a c t i v i t y . The approach 
of the German court seemed t o f o l l o w the current trend i n the 
Western world which had been slanted towards the acceptance of 
the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity without f i r s t delving s p e c i f i c a l l y i n t o 
the p r a c t i c e of states the world over as to whether there had 
" i n t e r n a t i o n a l Legal Materials (1977), p. 502. 
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been a change i n customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. Secondly, Section 
23 of ZPO should not have been a p p l i e d to foreign s t a t e s 
p r i m a r i l y because of h i s t o r i c a l reasons s i n c e i n essence the 
s a i d act was s p e c i f i c a l l y enacted to accord immunity to foreign 
s t a t e s from the j u r i s d i c t i o n of German c o u r t s . 
Thirdly, a c r i t i c a l review of events r e l a t i n g to the 
formation of the s a l e c o n t r a c t would r e v e a l t h a t the case had no 
clo s e connection with Germany s i n c e the c o n t r a c t i n i s s u e was 
concluded outside Germany by L i e c h t e n s t e i n T r u s t , with the 
request that payment be made i n A u s t r i a . Subsequently, however, 
the l e t t e r of c r e d i t was amended i n order to pave the way for 
payment to be made i n Germany as w e l l . 
Fourthly, the court f a i l e d to con s i d e r i n d e t a i l , i n 
respect of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law as to whether a for e i g n c r e d i t o r 
had the r i g h t to sue N i g e r i a i n Germany, and i f so, whether 
German public i n t e r e s t was a t stake. I n V e r l i n d e n BV v. C e n t r a l 
Bank of Nigeria, a non-resident company sued N i g e r i a before U.S. 
courts out of the same cement c o n t r a c t i n i s s u e , the court r u l e d 
t h a t the a l i e n company f a i l e d to show s u f f i c i e n t d i r e c t e f f e c t 
as required under Section 1605 (a) (2) of the FSIA. As matter of 
p r i n c i p l e the U.S. court took i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n the e f f e c t of 
due process and the s p e c i f i c command of the FSIA to deny 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . 4 4 On the other hand, however, the German court 
f a i l e d to take i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n the i n t e r n a l c r i s i s t h a t 
prompted the breach and d i d not go as f a r as p o s s i b l e to examine 
4 4See FSIA, 1605 (a) (2) . 
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the i n t e r e s t of the a l i e n v i s - a - v i s the i n t e r e s t of the r e p u b l i c 
of N i g e r i a i n r e s p e c t of customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
I t ought a l s o to be c l e a r l y emphasised that the argument 
p o s i t e d on p o i n t of law as regards N i g e r i a ' s foreign reserve was 
i n c o n c l u s i v e per the order of attachment i n respect of the p l e a 
made f o r immunity by N i g e r i a . Furthermore, the e x e r c i s e of 
j u r i s d i c t i o n does not mean that enforcement measures be taken. 
I t would have been most prudent i f the German court had taken 
pains to delve i n t o what a s s e t s were a v a i l a b l e and whether as a 
matter of law these a s s e t s were dedicated to the j u r e imperii of 
N i g e r i a or not. Simply put, the F r a n k f u r t court f a i l e d to c a s t 
l i g h t on these important i s s u e s and thus consecrated an anomaly 
t h a t once an e n t i t y i s c h a r a c t e r i s e d as independent i t can never 
c l a i m immunity. While on the other hand, i f an agency i s 
c h a r a c t e r i s e d as an a l t e r ego of the s t a t e , immunity i s r e a d i l y 
a v a i l a b l e , without f i r s t determining as to whether the s t a t u s of 
the s a i d agency i s c o n c l u s i v e or not. C e r t a i n l y the overlap of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and n a t i o n a l laws complicates the whole i s s u e 
of s t a t e immunity i n t h i s area of the law. I t i s submitted, 
however, t h a t the court e r r e d i n a t t a c h i n g Nigeria's a s s e t s f o r 
such a measure lacked usus and t h e r e f o r e contrary to general 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
N i g e r i a before American Courts: Part One 
While i n the United Kingdom and Germany the C e n t r a l Bank 
was designated as the p r i n c i p a l defendant, however, i n the U.S., 
the p l a i n t i f f , a Delaware corporation, j o i n t l y sued or commenced 
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l e g a l a c t i o n against the Republic of N i g e r i a and the C e n t r a l 
Bank of Nigeria, with i t s p r i n c i p a l p l a c e of bu s i n e s s i n Lagos, 
the c a p i t a l of Nigeria. I n other words, i n Nat i o n a l American 
Corporation v. Federal Republic of N i g e r i a and C e n t r a l Bank of 
N i g e r i a , 4 5 the Nigeria government and the C e n t r a l Bank were 
j o i n t l y sued to recover i n excess of $14,000,000, an amount 
representing an unpaid balance i n consequence of a f a i l e d cement 
co n t r a c t and unpaid demurrage charges due thereunder the s a i d 
c o n t r a c t . The complaint a l l e g e d inter alia t h a t Morgan Guaranty 
had been expressly n o t i f i e d by C e n t r a l Bank to re f u s e payment 
for cement d e l i v e r i e s and demurrage charges u n l e s s p l a i n t i f f 
could prove that i t had obtained two months advance n o t i c e of 
each ship designated to tr a n s p o r t cement to the Lagos harbour, 
with v a l i d documents confirming the express order i n i s s u e . The 
4 5 (19 7 8 ) 4 4 8 F.Supp. 622. See the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Reports 
regarding the C a l c u l a t i o n of the Demurrage, pp. 161 V,D)KID, 
Vol. 63. 
V e s s e l Tonnage 
c a r r i e d 
A r r i v a l D e p a r t u r e s Number o f Da y s on 
Demurrage 
T o t a l 
C e n t r a l L i f e 500 MT 8 / 2 7 / 7 5 8 / 7 / 7 6 347 l e s s 1 l a y day = 346 
d a y s 
$ 6 0 , 5 5 0 
Naimbana 2 ,730 MT 9 / 4 / 7 5 1 1 / 2 3 / 7 5 81 l e s s 3 l a y d a y s = 78 
d a y s 
$ 7 4 , 5 2 9 
J o t i n a 5 ,600 MT 9 / 1 2 / 7 5 1 / 2 5 / 7 6 136 l e s s 6 l a y d a y s $ 2 5 4 , 8 0 0 
R i o Doro 10,500 MT 1 0 / 6 / 7 5 7 / 1 0 / 7 6 279 l e s s 10 l a y days « 
269 d a y s 
S 9 8 8 , 5 7 5 
C h e r r y f i e l d 10 ,800 MT 1 0 / 8 / 7 5 6 / 1 2 / 7 6 249 l e s s 10 l a y days = 
239 d a y s 
$ 9 0 3 , 4 2 0 
Joboy 7, 500 MT 9 / 2 2 / 7 5 1 / 2 4 / 7 6 125 l e s s 8 l a y da y s = 
117 d a y s 
$ 3 0 7 , 1 2 5 
TOTAL DEMURRAGE 
DUE 
$ 2 , 5 8 8 , 9 9 9 
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p l a i n t i f f thus construed N i g e r i a ' s a c t i o n s as an a n t i c i p a t o r y 
breach and t h e r e f o r e sued praying t h a t funds of Nigeria 
government on d e p o s i t with Morgan Guaranty be attached. The 
defendant t h e r e a f t e r f i l e d a c r o s s motion t h a t being a sovereign 
s t a t e , i t cannot be impleaded and t h a t the attachment be 
vacated. Weinfeld J held t h a t 
"The c o r p o r a t i o n had presented a prima f a c i e case upon 
i t s c l a i m and was e n t i t l e d to an attachment t h a t the f a c t of the 
agreement was signed by the M i n i s t r y of Defence on behalf of the 
N i g e r i a government d i d not a u t o m a t i c a l l y e n t i t l e the defendants 
to s o v e r e i g n immunity; and t h a t p a r t i a l a s signees of the 
c o r p o r a t i o n ' s c l a i m were not i n d i s p e n s a b l e p a r t i e s . " 4 6 
Many i s s u e s were r a i s e d i n t h i s important case, but i t would be 
expedient to concentrate on the three most important ones, 
namely, the b a s i s of j u r i s d i c t i o n , sovereign immunity defence 
and the a c t of s t a t e defence. 
As may be r e c a l l e d , Section 1330 of the FSIA c l e a r l y 
confers j u r i s d i c t i o n on f e d e r a l d i s t r i c t courts without any 
l i m i t on the amount i n controversy. Thus a foreign s t a t e i s 
immune as provided under 1605-1607. But i t would appear th a t 
the 1976 FSIA came i n t o e f f e c t a f t e r the s u i t at hand was 
commenced, hence the Act cannot be applied. The judge therefore 
simply took j u r i s d i c t i o n of the case not on in personam b a s i s 
but r a t h e r on quasi in rem b a s i s . 
N i g e r i a , i n furtherance of the quest to challenge the 
s u i t , pleaded t h a t i t be accorded immunity on the grounds that 
the funds h e l d by Morgan Guaranty belong to the government of 
N i g e r i a and t h a t the funds were to be used for a governmental 
4 6(1977) ILM, p. 505. 
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purpose, i . e . , to s a t i s f y governmental o b l i g a t i o n s . The court 
i n r e p l y r e l i e d on such a u t h o r i t i e s as Aero-Trade I n c . v. 
Republic of H a i t i , 4 7 Aero-Trade I n c . v. Banque Na t i o n a l e de l a 
Republique D ; H a i t i , 4 8 to deny the request for immunity. 
Furthermore, i t was argued on behalf of N i g e r i a t h a t the 
ac t i o n taken as a r e s u l t of the congestion a t the Lagos harbour 
was an a c t of sta t e i n a form of p u b l i c p o l i c y , i n order to 
avoid a n a t i o n a l d i s a s t e r , i n so f a r as the congestion had 
created shortage of other e s s e n t i a l commodities i n N i g e r i a . 
Arguably, t h i s defence may stand the a c i d t e s t , but t h i s a r e a of 
the law i s most complicated f o r the r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t a t e 
immunity and a c t of s t a t e i s not at a l l c l e a r c u t . 4 9 A l l t h a t the 
Ni g e r i a government was t r y i n g to o f f e r i n support of immunity 
was the i s s u e that was overlooked by the appeal court i n 
Trendtex but f u l l y analysed i n the I Congreso Case. Thus i n the 
National American case the defendant was t r y i n g to argue t h a t 
although the l e t t e r of c r e d i t was a commercial a c t , the 
governmental order of two months p r i o r n o t i f i c a t i o n i n r e s p e c t 
of shipment of cement to Nigeria ex hypothesi was a p o l i t i c a l 
d e c i s i o n taken i n Nigeria and th e r e f o r e cannot be reviewed 
before a for e i g n municipal court because the d e c i s i o n was taken 
to p r o t e c t n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . Should a novel approach be 
followed wholly d i f f e r e n t from the do c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e 
4 7376 F.Supp. 1281 SDNY (1974). 
4 8376 F.Supp. 1286 SDNY (1974). 
4 9Higgins, op. c i t . , p. 275. 
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immunity because the argument cuts i n t o the heart of the whole 
controversy? The answer perhaps i s yes. However, i n s p i t e of 
the Act of S t a t e argument, the judge r u l e d i n favour of National 
American Corporation. 
At the same time t h a t the a l l u d e d case was being l i t i g a t e d 
Chenax and Nikkei a l l e g e d s i m i l a r p l i g h t s and therefore both 
made an a p p l i c a t i o n to seek an i n t e r v e n t i o n under r u l e 24 (b) 
Fed R C i v Proc. But both National American Corporation and the 
Republic of N i g e r i a opposed t h e i r i n t e r v e n t i o n . Judge Goetted 
r u l e d t h a t 
"While the c o n t r a c t s a l l r e l a t e to the purpose of cement, 
t h e i r l e g a l and f a c t u a l d i s p a r i t y , the n e c e s s i t y of a d d i t i o n a l 
proof due to the s e p a r a t e documentation, and the p o t e n t i a l 
p r e j u d i c e to the e x i s t i n g p a r t i e s combine to cause the court, i n 
i t s d i s c r e t i o n , to deny i n t e r v e n t i o n under r u l e 2 4 ( b ) . " 5 0 
An i n t e r v e n t i o n of t h i s nature w i l l c e r t a i n l y f a i l without f i r s t 
c o n s u l t i n g with the o r i g i n a l l i t i g a t i n g p a r t i e s i n respect of 
any p o t e n t i a l p r e j u d i c e to t h e i r r i g h t s . The judgment leaves 
much to be d e s i r e d because the attachment of N i g e r i a ' s foreign 
r e s e r v e was c o n t r a r y to general i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. The judge 
simply ignored the i s s u e s r e s p e c t i n g mixed a c t i v i t y of s t a t e s 
t h a t i t was an i n t e r n a l c r i s i s which prompted the import 
c o n t r o l . 
N i g e r i a before American Courts: Part Two 
Texas Trading and M i l l i n g Corporation v. F e d e r a l Republic 
of N i g e r i a , 5 1 as i t i s w e l l known a l s o grew out of the 1975 
5 0 (1977) ILM p. 514 c e r t . 
5 1 (1981) 647 F.2d 300, denied 71 LED 2d 301 1982. 
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N i g e r i a Cement Contract, and therefore deserves some a t t e n t i o n . 
These four appeals appear remarkable i n a l l r e s p e c t s and thus 
followed the same f a c t pattern already considered i n N a t i o n a l 
American Corp. v. Federal Republic of N i g e r i a . The four of the 
109 c o n t r a c t s were negotiated with American companies and these 
companies were Texas Trading and M i l l i n g Corp., Decor by N i k k e i 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n c . , E a s t European Import-Export I n c . and Chenax 
Majesty I n c . In simple terms these four p l a i n t i f f s were t r a d i n g 
companies s p e c i f i c a l l y involved i n the business of "buy and 
s e l l , " but were not i n d u s t r i a l corporations. These four 
companies sued N i g e r i a because Nigeria repudiated the cement 
co n t r a c t i n question. And i n response to the s u i t s , N i g e r i a 
invoked the sovereign immunity plea. Judge Kaufman i n a lengthy 
judgment r e j e c t e d the plea for immunity as f o l l o w s : 
" F i n a l l y , c u rrent standards of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law 
concerning sovereign immunity add content to the 'commercial 
a c t i v i t y phrase of the FSIA. Section 1602 of the Act, e n t i t l e d 
F indings and D e c l a r a t i o n s of Purpose,' c o n t a i n s a c r y p t i c 
r e f e r e n c e to i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, but f a i l s wholly to adopt i t . " 
He continued: 
"Under each of these three standards, N i g e r i a ' s cement c o n t r a c t s 
and l e t t e r s of c r e d i t q u a l i f y as 'commercial a c t i v i t y . ' Lord 
Denning, w r i t i n g i n Trendtex Trading Corp. v. C e n t r a l Bank of 
N i g e r i a 1977 2 WLR 356 369, 1 A l l ER 881, with h i s u s u a l 
e r u d i t i o n and c l a r i t y , s t a t e d : ' I f a government department goes 
i n t o the market p l a c e s of the world and buys boots or c e m e n t — a s 
a commercial t r a n s a c t i o n — t h a t government department should be 
s u b j e c t to a l l the r u l e s of the market p l a c e . ' N i g e r i a ' s 
a c t i v i t y here i s i n the nature of a p r i v a t e c o n t r a c t f o r the 
purchase of goods i t s purpose to b u i l d roads, army b a r r a c k s , 
whether i s i r r e l e v a n t . Accordingly courts i n other n a t i o n s have 
uniformly h e l d N i g e r i a ' s 1975 cement purchase program and 
appurtenant l e t t e r s of c r e d i t to be commercial a c t i v i t y and have 
denied the defence of sovereign immunity we f i n d defendants 
a c t i v i t y here to c o n s t i t u t e commercial a c t i v i t y . " 5 2 
(1981) ILM p. 630. 
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N i g e r i a t h e r e f o r e f a i l e d i n her attempt to challenge the 
growing appeal of the r u l e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity which then 
had already become f i r m l y grounded i n American p r a c t i c e . The 
court simply chose to apply the FSIA to the f a c t s of the case 
coupled with the well-known d i s t i n c t i o n between governmental and 
non-governmental a c t i v i t i e s . One important observation worth 
making, however, i s t h a t i f the C e n t r a l Bank q u a l i f i e d as a 
p u b l i c e n t i t y without any independent j u r i s t i c p e r s o n a l i t y , then 
i t may arguably c l a i m immunity under customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law 
ratione personae i n r e s p e c t of i t s a c t i v i t i e s qua N i g e r i a acta 
jure imperii. But here i t would appear t h a t both the C e n t r a l 
Bank and the government of N i g e r i a were a l l j o i n e d i n the s u i t 
and therefore the problem of d e l i m i t i n g the sphere of acta jure 
imperii v i s - a - v i s the conduct of the C e n t r a l Bank never came up. 
No s t a t e can be forced to submit to the j u r i s d i c t i o n of a 
foreign court without i t s consent and the American concept of 
minimum c o n t a c t 5 3 could be d e s c r i b e d as an opinio individualis 
juris generalis, an American self-imposed l o c a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law concept e a r l i e r on developed by i t s courts which arguably 
runs counter to general p u b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. The judgment 
on the whole was s u p e r f i c i a l and questionable without any 
convincing supporting a u t h o r i t y . I t would have been i n order i f 
the court had s e r i o u s l y c onsidered the nature of the c o n t r a c t 
and the nature of the breach. 
53 (1945) 326 US 310. 
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Uganda before E n g l i s h Courts 
In the Uganda Co. (Holdings) Ltd. v. the Government of 
Uganda, 5 4 the p l a i n t i f f , an E n g l i s h company, i n s t i t u t e d a mareva 
i n j u n c t i o n i n order to prevent or enjoin the defendants from 
di s p o s i n g a consignment of tea stored i n a warehouse i n London. 
Th i s was followed by another a p p l i c a t i o n seeking leave to i s s u e 
a w r i t for s e r v i c e out of the j u r i s d i c t i o n , on the defendants i n 
Uganda. A f t e r f u r t h e r review both a p p l i c a t i o n s were allowed. 
The p l a i n t i f f s , per the terms of the w r i t s , claimed an 
indemnity i n the amount of £240, 185.48 which they had p a i d as 
guarantors of the Ugandan company (borrowers). The p l a i n t i f f s 
a l s o demanded h a l f the s a i d amount as con t r i b u t i o n due between 
co-guarantors—because t h e i r counterparts, i . e . , the co-
guarantors i n t h i s endeavour had f a i l e d to make h a l f the 
c o n t r i b u t i o n due. The defendants were sued because the 
p l a i n t i f f s claimed th a t the government of Uganda had succeeded 
to the l i a b i l i t i e s of the Uganda s u b s i d i a r y by v i r t u e of the 
compulsory government a c q u i s i t i o n decrees passed during the 
r e i g n of I d i Amin. Consequently, the Ugandan government was 
impleaded. The defendants i n turn sought to s e t a s i d e the w r i t 
and a l l subsequent proceedings on the grounds tha t being a 
f o r e i g n government, they cannot be impleaded before E n g l i s h 
c o u r t s . Donaldson J r u l e d i n favour of the Ugandan government 
thus: 
"(1) The d e c i s i o n s of the Court of Appeal i n Thai-Europe 
case and the Trendtex case were not r e c o n c i l a b l e and the court 
had to e l e c t which a u t h o r i t y to follow, p. 486, c o l . 2. 
5 4 (1979) 1 Lords Rep 481. 
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(2) The d e c i s i o n i n Thai-Europe would be followed s i n c e 
that was a d e c i s i o n which was based on a t l e a s t one and p o s s i b l y 
three previous d e c i s i o n s of the Court of Appeal and was a 
d e c i s i o n which a s s e r t e d the d o c t r i n e of precedent and t h e r e f o r e 
had more weight as a precedent. See p. 486, c o l . 2, p. 487, 
c o l . 1. The d e c i s i o n i n Trendtex c a s e broke new grounds i n two 
r e s p e c t s i n t h a t the f i r s t was the d e c i s i o n t h a t the d o c t r i n e of 
r e s t r i c t i v e sovereign immunity a p p l i e d to a c t i o n s in personam 
and the second was t h a t t h e r e was an exception to the r u l e of 
s t a r e d e c i s i s and t h e r e f o r e t h a t d e c i s i o n c a r r i e d l e s s weight i n 
that i t denied or modified the d o c t r i n e of precedent. See p. 
487, c o l . 1. 
(3) The a p p l i c a t i o n would be determined i n favour of the 
defendant. See p. 487, c o l . 1. 
(4) Even i f the d e c i s i o n i n the Trendtex case had 
applied, the a p p l i c a t i o n would s t i l l have been determined i n 
favour of the defendants s i n c e the l i t i g a t i o n would have 
involved the c o u r t i n e x p r e s s i n g an o p i n i o n on the meaning and 
e f f e c t of the Ugandan l e g i s l a t i o n i n a s u i t to which the 
government of t h a t s t a t e was a p a r t y and i t could not be h e l d 
that the r e s t r i c t i v e d o c t r i n e of s o v e r e i g n immunity extended 
t h i s f a r . P. 487, C o l . 2, p. 488, c o l . " 5 5 
The p l a i n t i f f s i n t h i s case chose a path c l e a r l y marked 
not to delve i n t o the i s s u e r e l a t i n g to Act of State, for i f 
such a cause of a c t i o n were taken the p l a i n t i f f s would be hard 
put to prove t h e i r case s i n c e domestic courts are precluded by 
general i n t e r n a t i o n a l law from i n q u i r i n g i n t o the v a l i d i t y of 
u n i l a t e r a l p o l i c i e s taken or l e g i s l a t i o n passed by f o r e i g n 
s t a t e s within t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s . Quite apart from t h i s , the Act 
of State doctrine i s complicated and i n a l l p o s s i b i l i t i e s could 
create d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r the p l a i n t i f f s i n t h e i r quest to implead 
the Ugandan government. Thus the c a s e i n s t e a d was pleaded only 
on the question of sovereign immunity without f i r s t i n q u i r i n g as 
to whether the d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity can be s o l e l y 
applied i n respect of a p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n taken w i t h i n the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of a sovereign s t a t e . Although Donaldson J d i d not 
55 I b i d , a t 481. 
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go as f a r as to explore the t e c h n i c a l i s s u e s r e l a t i n g to Act of 
St a t e , i n s t e a d he decided r a t h e r to follow Thai-Europe a u t h o r i t y 
because i t was adequately clothed with the doctrine of precedent 
and t h e r e f o r e c a r r i e d more weight than Trendtex which appears to 
be wrongly decided. But arguably, had Trendtex been applied i t 
would run the r i s k of being challenged on many grounds and on 
the thorny question of Act of State which c e r t a i n l y would give 
the Ugandan government a w e l l grounded defence on the m e r i t s . 
I n short, such an approach would not have been a v i a b l e option 
because n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n per se i s not i l l e g a l i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law. I n any event, can i t be conceded that Uganda v i o l a t e d 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law f o r f a i l i n g to pay compensation? Such an 
argument w i l l c e r t a i n l y c a r r y weight but again w i l l the E n g l i s h 
court have j u r i s d i c t i o n s i n c e the Ugandan government had made 
promises of paying compensation to those a f f e c t e d by the 
compulsory a c q u i s i t i o n decrees? The answer may be i n the 
negative. 
I t i s submitted that Donaldson was somewhat cautious 
because i n Trendtex the s t a t u s of the Cen t r a l Bank was 
i n c o n c l u s i v e f o r i t would appear the Central Bank was an a l t e r 
ego or department of the r e p u b l i c of Nigeria s i n c e the C e n t r a l 
Bank acted as a s t a b i l i s i n g agent i n c o n t r o l l i n g the n a t i o n a l 
currency, managing the exchange c o n t r o l , acts as a n a t i o n a l 
t r e a s u r y , pays foreign debts and f i n a l l y i s s u e s notes. 
Further, Donaldson J f e l t bound by Thai-Europe because he 
was doubtful as to whether the d e c i s i o n i n Trendtex was i n order 
without f i r s t providing evidence to support the purported change 
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i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. The b a s i c problem of the case seemed to 
impinge on the c o n f l i c t between par in parent non habet 
jurisdictionem and princeps in alterius territorio privatus and 
whether foreign decrees could be questioned i n E n g l i s h c o u r t s . 
As was expected, the Uganda company holdings was appealed, but 
on the eve of the Court of Appeal hearing, the p l a i n t i f f s gave 
up t h e i r quest to pursue the s u i t and thus s e t t l e d t h e i r claims 
with the new Uganda government. 
Egypt before Indian Courts 
In A l i Akbar v. United Arab R e p u b l i c , 5 6 one A l i Akbah f i l e d 
a s u i t against the United Arab Republic and the M i n i s t r y of 
Economy, Supplies, Importation Department of the Republic of 
Egypt for having v i o l a t e d the terms of a s a l e c o n t r a c t signed 
between the two of them, wherein the r e p u b l i c of Egypt had 
agreed to purchase tea from the a p p e l l a n t under c e r t a i n d e l i c a t e 
c o n t r a c t u a l terms. The defendant r e s i s t e d the s u i t on the 
grounds that being a sovereign s t a t e , i t cannot be impleaded 
before a n a t i o n a l j u d i c i a l a u t h o r i t y . T h i s was followed by a 
number of appeals which the a p p e l l a n t l o s t one a f t e r the other. 
F i n a l l y A l i Akbah appealed to the Supreme Court of I n d i a 
i n the hope to secure a judgment based on the currency of the 
doctrine of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. The Supreme Court, however, 
was not moved and t h e r e f o r e r u l e d t h a t absolute immunity 
applied. The court a f t e r a c a r e f u l c o n s t r u c t i o n of Sections 83-
(1966) HIR SC 230. 
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87B of the c i v i l procedure code r u l e d that the s u i t was barred 
by S e c t i o n 86 of the CCP, s i n c e the consent of Egypt must be 
procured before i t can be sued i n I n d i a . 
The Supreme Court f u r t h e r offered the following 
e x p l a n a t i o n s : 
" J u s t as an independent sovereign s t a t e may s t a t u t o r i l y 
p r o v i d e f o r i t s own r i g h t s and l i a b i l i t i e s to sue and be sued, 
so can i t provide f o r the r i g h t s and l i a b i l i t i e s of foreign 
s t a t e s to sue and be sued i n i t s municipal c o u r t s . That being 
so, i t would be l e g i t i m a t e to hold t h a t the e f f e c t of Section 
86(1) i s to modify to a c e r t a i n extent the doc t r i n e of immunity 
r e c o g n i s e d by i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. When such consent i s granted 
as r e q u i r e d by S e c t i o n 86 ( 1 ) , i t would not be open to a foreign 
s t a t e t o r e l y on the d o c t r i n e of immunity under i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law, because the municipal courts i n I n d i a would be bound by the 
s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s such as those contained i n the Code of 
C i v i l Procedure." 5 7 
The court simply followed the command and e f f e c t of pro v i s i o n 86 
subs e c t i o n 1 of the CCP to uphold the deci s i o n s of the lower 
c o u r t s which had been based on the maxim, par in parem nonhabet 
imperium, although i t would appear a t that time that Egypt had 
a l r e a d y jumped onto the bandwagon of the doctrine of r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity. 5 8 
United Arab Republic before American Courts 
I n another case of H i l l v. U.A.R.,59 i n which the United 
Arab Republic was sued for a s p e c i f i c l e g a l i n f r a c t i o n , an order 
was entered t h a t the s u i t a gainst U.A.R. be vacated. But f o r 
some other remaining i s s u e s r e l a t i n g to procedure, i . e . , s e r v i c e 
5 7 C f . M.K. Nawaz, Essays on I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, 1976, p. 323. 
5 8See S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , pp. 251-255. 
5 9(1961) SDNY No. 144-16. 
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of process on the U.A.R. Consul General, the ca s e was continued 
where a request was made to the State Department as to whether 
immunity be granted. In r e p l y the l e g a l a d v i s o r of the State 
Department offered the following advice: 
" I t i s contrary to the gen e r a l p o l i c y of the Department 
to make a d e c i s i o n regarding sovereign immunity i n a case the 
f a c t s of which do not c a l l f o r such d e c i s i o n . I n t h i s 
connection, i t i s noted t h a t there i s pending b e f o r e the cou r t 
an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a holding t h a t the purported s e r v i c e of 
process by the Marshal on A p r i l 24, 1959 i s i n e f f e c t i v e to b r i n g 
the United Arab Republic w i t h i n the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the court, 
and that d e c i s i o n on th a t question has been w i t h h e l d pending 
f u r t h e r hearing by the court on May 17, 1961. 
"Thus, i t appears t h a t any d e c i s i o n of the Department of 
S t a t e that i t does not recognize immunity of the U.A.R. as a 
fo r e i g n sovereign i n t h i s case would a p p a r e n t l y not prevent 
d i s m i s s a l of the s u i t , i f the court decided t h a t under the r u l e s 
of the forum there i s no j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e United Arab 
Republic because of i n e f f e c t i v e s e r v i c e of p r o c e s s . See Oster 
v. Dominion of Canada, 144 F.Supp. 746." 6 0 
I t i s submitted that t h i s aspect of the law i s u n s e t t l e d , hence 
one i s burdened with the problem of determining the p a r t i c u l a r 
from the t o t a l i t y of w r i t i n g s on s e r v i c e of pr o c e s s as regards 
the person of the sovereign to r e s o l v e the problem. The main 
question to grapple with, however, i s whether a sovereign s t a t e 
can be served by the mere presence of i t s p o l i t i c a l 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e within the j u r i s d i c t i o n . And can the envoy or 
the foreign m i n i s t r y refuse to accept the p r o c e s s ? The envoy 
could e x e r c i s e the p r i v i l e g e of r e f u s i n g the s e r v i c e of process, 
and i t would appear i n E n g l i s h law that the a u t h o r i t y i n Duncan 
v. Caromel L a i r d and Co. 6 1 may s t i l l be regarded as per s u a s i v e 
6 0 I b i d . 
6 1 (1924) AC 624. 
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notwithstanding the t h r u s t and a u t h o r i t y of the 1978 Act. But 
again i t must be c l e a r l y s t a t e d that the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic R e l a t i o n s gives the diplomatic agent f u l l immunity. 
Thus under g e n e r a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, a sovereign s t a t e i s not 
under any o b l i g a t i o n to cooperate with the forum state i n 
resp e c t of a c c e p t i n g a s e r v i c e of process. 
T u n i s i a before United S t a t e s Courts 
I n H e l l e n i c L i n e s v. Moore, 6 2 a l i b e l a c t i o n in personam 
was f i l e d a g a i n s t the Republic of T u n i s i a i n the D i s t r i c t of 
Columbia. Here, a duly f i l e d summons was addressed to the 
Tu n i s i a n Ambassador to the United S t a t e s , but Mr. Moore, the 
United S t a t e s Marshal, refused to serve the Ambassador because 
of h i s d i p l o m a t i c s t a t u s . I n a move to compel the Marshal, 
H e l l e n i c L i n e s f i l e d an a c t i o n f or mandamus i n an appropriate 
F e d e r a l Court demanding inter alia t h a t the United States 
Marshal be l e g a l l y compelled to perform the duties of h i s 
o f f i c e . The Court of Appeal i n d i s m i s s i n g the act i o n ruled as 
fol l o w s : 
"Although we have h e l d t h a t d i p l o m a t i c immunity i s 
v i o l a t e d by j o i n i n g a d i p l o m a t i c o f f i c e r as a defender to a 
s u i t , C a r r e r a v. C a r r e r a , 84 U.S. App DC 333, 174 F.2d 496 
(1949), we have never decided whether i t i s v i o l a t e d by s e r v i c e 
of p r o c e s s on a d i p l o m a t i c o f f i c e r i n an attempt to j o i n , not 
him, but h i s sending s t a t e . There i s l i t t l e a u t h o r i t y i n 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law concerning whether s e r v i c e of process on a 
d i p l o m a t i c o f f i c e r as an agent of h i s sending country i s an 
a t t a c k on h i s person, freedom or d i g n i t y p r o h i b i t e d by 
d i p l o m a t i c immunity. . . . We requested the views of the 
Department of S t a t e concerning the e f f e c t of s e r v i c e i n t h i s 
type of c a s e on i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s and on the performance 
of d i p l o m a t i c d u t i e s . The Department r e p l i e d t h a t s e r v i c e would 
(1965) DC C i r 345 F.2d 978, 980-981. 
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p r e j u d i c e the United S t a t e s r e l a t i o n s and would probably impair 
the performance of diplomatic f u n c t i o n s . We conclude t h a t the 
purposes of diplomatic immunity f o r b i d s e r v i c e i n t h i s c a s e . 
Therefore, the Ambassador i s not s u b j e c t to s e r v i c e of p r o c e s s 
and the r e t u r n was adequate." 6 3 
I t would appear i n t h i s case that the United S t a t e s Department 
of State decided to resolve the matter by simply r e f u s i n g to 
i n c u r the burden of searching for the p a r t i c u l a r i n an a l r e a d y 
scanty l i t e r a t u r e on the i s s u e of s e r v i c e of process and 
discovery i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. Again, a sovereign s t a t e has a 
p e r f e c t r i g h t to r e s i s t such an a c t i o n because i t m i l i t a t e s 
a g a i n s t the normative r u l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. Perhaps the 
s e r v i c e could have been done through a p u b l i c note. 
Za i r e before E n g l i s h Courts 
In Planmount Ltd. v. Republic of Z a i r e , 6 4 the p l a i n t i f f s 
entered i n t o an agreement to c a r r y out r e p a i r s f o r the Republic 
of Zaire, on the residence of h i s e x c e l l e n c y , the Ambassador of 
Z a i r e . The agreement s t a r t e d on a good f o o t i n g only to be 
d e r a i l e d by misunderstanding, whereupon the p l a i n t i f f Planmount 
Ltd . sought leave to i s s u e a w r i t a g a i n s t the R e p u b l i c of Z a i r e 
f o r the balance due on the contract of the s a i d r e p a i r s . The 
Republic of Z a i r e f o r c e f u l l y r e s i s t e d the claim by arguing t h a t 
i t be accorded immunity because of i t s s t a t u s as an independent 
sovereign s t a t e . The p l a i n t i f f s r e p l i e d t h a t the d o c t r i n e of 
s t a t e immunity did not apply to p r i v a t e a c t s or commercial 
" i b i d . 
6 41981 1 A 11 ER 1110. 
227 
a c t i v i t i e s of s t a t e s and t h e r e f o r e the request t h a t the w r i t be 
s e t aside be denied. The court of f i r s t i n s t a n c e r u l e d i n 
favour of the defendants, while on appeal the court took a 
d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n by r u l i n g f o r the p l a i n t i f f s . Lloyd J's 
judgment follows the r e s t r i c t i v e approach thus: 
"Assuming I am r i g h t t h a t the defendants never had 
absolute immunity i n E n g l i s h law, the only remaining question i s 
whether, on the f a c t s of the p r e s e n t case, the defendants were 
a c t i n g i n a governmental c a p a c i t y or whether they were a c t i n g 
i n a p r i v a t e or commercial c a p a c i t y . That i s a question which 
often g i v e s r i s e t o d i f f i c u l t y , as i t d i d i n the Congreso case; 
but i t g i v e s r i s e to no such d i f f i c u l t y i n the present case On 
the f a c t s a l l e g e d by the p l a i n t i f f s t h i s i s a simple case of the 
defendants' 'mere r e f u s a l to foot the b i l l f o r the work done,' 
to use the language of Walter L J i n the Congreso c a s e . " 
He continued: 
"To my mind, i t i s hard to imagine a c l e a r e r case of an a c t or 
t r a n s a c t i o n of a p r i v a t e or commercial nature than the r e p a i r s 
to the ambassador's r e s i d e n c e . The case i s on a l l fours with 
the Empire of I r a n c a s e . I t follows t h a t the defence of 
sovereign immunity i s not a v a i l a b l e . No other ground for 
s e t t i n g a s i d e s e r v i c e of the w r i t has been advanced i n the 
evidence or r e l i e d on by c o u n s e l . I n my judgment t h i s i s a 
proper case f o r s e r v i c e out of the j u r i s d i c t i o n under RSC Ord 11 
§ 1 (f) ." 6 5 
A c a r e f u l reading of L l o y d J's judgment w i l l show c l e a r l y 
that he was i n f l u e n c e d by arguments p o s i t e d by Lord Denning M.R. 
i n Trendtex and Hispano American Mercantil SA v. C e n t r a l Bank 
of N i g e r i a 6 6 and such othe r s as I Congreso, and claims against 
the Empire of I r a n . 6 7 The f a c t s t i l l remains t h a t Z a i r e r e s i s t e d 
the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the court because of i t s s t a t u s as an 
I b i d . , p. 1114. 
(1979) 2 Lloyd's Rep 277. 
(1963) 45 V 57. 
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i n t e r n a t i o n a l person and not because i t cannot pay the balance 
due on the agreement. 
Somali Democratic Republic before American Courts 
In Transamerican Steamship Corporation v. Somali 
Democratic R e p u b l i c 6 8 (Somali Shipping Agency A p p e l l a n t s ; an 
American shipper brought an action against Somali Democratic 
Republic and i t s shipping agency for d e c l a r a t o r y and monetary 
r e l i e f , as a r e s u l t of a dispute a r i s i n g out of a delay i n 
respect of a purported payment and i t s attendant consequences, 
wherefore Transamerican's ship, M.V. Klaus Leonhardt, was 
detained a f t e r the discharge of i t s cargo i n Somalia, of which 
Transamerican a l l e g e d was costing the company about $10,000 a 
day. Although e f f o r t s were made to pay the amount due i n 
question, but no a c t i o n was immediately taken by the agency to 
r e l e a s e M.V. Klaus Leonhardt to avoid Transamerican i n c u r r i n g 
almost $100,000 i n c o s t . When e f f o r t s to have t h i s problem 
reso l v e d proved unsuccessful, Transamerican sued SDR and the 
shipping agency i n f e d e r a l d i s t r i c t court. 
The court of f i r s t instance r u l e d t h a t the Somalia 
Democratic Republic "had neither waived sovereign immunity nor 
engaged i n commercial a c t i v i t i e s that would s u b j e c t i t to s u i t 
i n the United S t a t e s under the FSIA and t h e r e f o r e the Court 
lacked s u b j e c t matter j u r i s d i c t i o n . " 6 9 The court on the other 
6 8 (1985) 787 F.2d 998. 
6 9 I b i d . 
229 
hand, however, r u l e d t h a t i t had j u r i s d i c t i o n over claims 
against the Somalia shipping agency but not the person of the 
Somali r e p u b l i c . This prompted Transamerican to appeal a g a i n s t 
the s u i t j o i n i n g the Somalia Democratic Republic, followed by a 
cross appeal by the Somali agency on the d e n i a l of i t s motion to 
dismiss. 
On appeal Judge Tamm r u l e d t h a t the Somalia Democratic 
Republic was not e n t i t l e d to immunity and the argument regarding 
forum non conveniens and motion to d i s m i s s f i l e d on behalf of 
the agency a l l f a i l e d . He a l s o s t a t e d t h a t : 
"We t h e r e f o r e conclude t h a t the SDR has not s u s t a i n e d i t s 
burden of proving the i n a p p l i c a b i l i t y of S e c t i o n 1605(a)(2) 
exception and t h a t the Somali government has p a r t i c i p a t e d i n 
commercial a c t i v i t y i n the U n i ted S t a t e s . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t 
thus has s u b j e c t matter j u r i s d i c t i o n over Transamerican's c l a i m 
a g a i n s t the SDR under S e c t i o n 1330." 7 0 
The r e p u b l i c of Somalia t h e r e f o r e l o s t her quest to challenge 
the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the c o u r t based on the d o c t r i n e of sovereign 
immunity which was at l e a s t walking on one l e g i n the p r a c t i c e 
of American c o u r t s . The judgment was of a doubtful a u t h o r i t y 
since the i s s u e s were s o l e l y determined by what the lex fori 
perceived to be the law. The d e c i s i o n c e r t a i n l y was not based 
on usus. 
Libya before American Courts 
I n Caney v. National O i l Corp., 7 1 the Libyan government-
owned o i l company had entered i n t o c o n t r a c t s for the s a l e of o i l 
7 0 I b i d . , p. 1003. 
^ I n t e r n a t i o n a l L Reports 1982, p. 232 [(1979) 592 F.2d 
673] . 
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to f o r e i g n companies. The contract was terminated as a r e s u l t 
of p o l i t i c a l measures taken by the Libyan government. And the 
main i s s u e was whether Libya and the Libyan government-owned 
corporation were e n t i t l e d to immunity and secondly whether the 
Libyan a c t i o n could be c h a r a c t e r i s e d to have had a d i r e c t e f f e c t 
w i t h i n the United S t a t e s , and t h i r d l y , whether Libya per a l l the 
companies involved i n t h i s drama, and i t s o i l company, could a l l 
be amenable to NOC's f a i l u r e to d e l i v e r under the September 1973 
c o n t r a c t coupled with the breaches of the 1974 c o n t r a c t and 
a l s o f o r such other overcharges on the charter p a r t i e s i n t h i s 
apparently d i f f i c u l t l i t i g a t i o n . The damages sought were about 
$1.6 b i l l i o n . The court r u l e d as follows: 
"Appellants c l a i m , most r e l e v a n t l y , that the events 
i n v o l v e d i n t h i s case come w i t h i n the exception to immunity 
which a l l o w s us j u r i s d i c t i o n where a claim i s based on 'an a c t 
o u t s i d e the t e r r i t o r y of the United States i n connection with a 
commercial a c t i v i t y of the f o r e i g n s t a t e elsewhere and t h a t a c t 
causes a d i r e c t e f f e c t i n the United S t a t e s ' 28 USC § 
1 6 0 5 ( a ) ( 2 ) . We f i n d no d i r e c t e f f e c t i n the United S t a t e s here. 
"We assume t h a t Congress chose the language i n the a c t 
p u r p o s e f u l l y . S e c t i o n 1605(a)(2) speaks of a c t s which have a 
d i r e c t e f f e c t i n the United S t a t e s . The l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y of 
t h i s s e c t i o n makes c l e a r t h a t i t embodies the standard s e t out 
i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 US 310, 316 66 S Ct 
154 158, 90 L Ed 96 (1945), that i n order to s a t i s f y the due 
p r o c e s s requirements, a defendant over whom j u r i s d i c t i o n i s to 
be e x e r c i s e d must have ' c e r t a i n minimum contacts with the forum 
s t a t e such that the maintenance of the s u i t does not offend 
t r a d i t i o n a l notions of f a i r p l a y and substantive j u s t i c e . ' That 
standard has not been met h e r e . " 7 2 
The judgment of the d i s t r i c t court d i s m i s s i n g the s u i t 
a g a i n s t L ibya for l a c k of j u r i s d i c t i o n was affirmed. One 
c e r t a i n l y would be hard put to take i s s u e with the judgment 
7 2 I b i d . , p. 234. 
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since the p o l i t i c a l measures taken by Libya could be 
c h a r a c t e r i s e d as f a l l i n g w i t h i n the domain of Act of State and 
ex hypothesi therefore seemed not to have had a d i r e c t e f f e c t i n 
the United S t a t e s . A f t e r a l l , no one w i l l blame the court for 
being e c l e c t i c when i t r u l e d or p o s t u l a t e d thus: 
"PETCO i s a Bahamian c o r p o r a t i o n . Though a s u b s i d i a r y of 
NEPCO, i t was a s e p a r a t e c o r p o r a t e e n t i t y , and we w i l l not have 
'pierce the corporate v e i l . ' The c a n c e l l a t i o n of the c o n t r a c t s 
between NOC and PETCO, and the overcharge on the c h a r t e r s , had a 
d i r e c t e f f e c t on PETCO as a p a r t y to those c o n t r a c t s , but not i n 
the United S t a t e s . " 7 3 
Quite apart from these, i t would be hard to show cause as to the 
continuous and perhaps s y s t e m a t i c commercial a c t i v i t i e s of NOC 
or Libya i n the United S t a t e s . The p o l i t i c a l measures may have 
had a d i r e c t e f f e c t on a l l the companies involved i n t h i s 
commercial t r a n s a c t i o n , however, i t s d i r e c t e f f e c t i n the United 
States was f a r from s e t t l e d and t h e r e f o r e l o g i c a l l y 
i n c o n c l u s i v e . J u r i s d i c t i o n i n t h i s case, t h e r e f o r e , could not 
be procured under the FISA. 
The People's Republic of Congo before Canadian Courts 
In Venne v. Government of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, '4 the Republic of Congo pleaded t h a t i t be accorded 
immunity at f i r s t i n s t a n c e but the p l e a was r e j e c t e d because 
according to the Quebec Court of Queen's Bench, "The absolute 
theory of sovereign immunity had now been superseded by the 
r e s t r i c t i v e theory, so t h a t a f o r e i g n s t a t e was e n t i t l e d to 
7 3 I b i d . 
7 4 (1983) I L Reports, p . l . 
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immunity only i n respect of p u b l i c , sovereign a c t s . " I s such a 
p o s i t i o n c o r r e c t or was i t merely based on conjecture? Such a 
p o s i t i o n seemed to run counter to s t a t e p r a c t i c e and the ILC 
r e p o r t on the s u b j e c t . On appeal, however, the Supreme Court of 
Canada took a d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n , thus r u l i n g i n favour of the 
R e p u b l i c of Congo (Government of Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Venne). 
The case can s h o r t l y be r e l a t e d as follows: the p l a i n t i f f 
was employed as an a r c h i t e c t to prepare plans for the 
c o n s t r u c t i o n of the n a t i o n a l p a v i l i o n of the Republic of Congo. 
The purported agreement f o r the s e r v i c e s i n question was made 
through an a c c r e d i t e d diplomatic representative of the Congo as 
w e l l as by an envoy of the Congo Foreign A f f a i r s . Soon a 
d i s p u t e ensued between the two p a r t i e s , whereupon the p l a i n t i f f 
prayed i n h i s s u i t that he be p a i d for the s e r v i c e s rendered. 
As a l r e a d y s t a t e d , the p l e a for immunity at the t r i a l l e v e l was 
r e j e c t e d but on appeal the Supreme Court r u l e d i n favour of the 
sovereign s t a t e i . e . , Congo, as follows, with Laskin J and H a l l 
J d i s s e n t i n g . 
"(1) The Democratic Republic of the Congo had acted i n a 
s o v e r e i g n r a t h e r than a commercial c a p a c i t y i n s e c u r i n g the 
s e r v i c e s of Mr. Venne and was t h e r e f o r e e n t i t l e d to sovereign 
immunity. The f a c t t hat the government had acted through i t s 
d i p l o m a t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n Canada and i t s Department of 
Foreign A f f a i r s was evidence of the sovereign nature of the a c t . 
"(2) S i n c e the government was thus e n t i t l e d to sovereign 
immunity even under the r e s t r i c t i v e theory i t was unnecessary to 
determine whether that theory had become p a r t of Canadian law. 
" (3) The question whether a c o n t r a c t was a purely p r i v a t e and 
commercial a c t or p u b l i c a c t done for sovereign purposes should 
be determined, i n so f a r as i t might be r e l e v a n t , by the court 
i n the l i g h t of a l l the evidence without p l a c i n g on e i t h e r p a r t y 
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the burden of rebutting any presumption about the nature of the 
t r a n s a c t i o n s . 1 , 7 5 
This case seemed i d e n t i c a l to Planmount Ltd. and t h a t of 
the Empire of I r a n case, however, i t would be presumed that the 
four j u s t i c e s who r u l e d i n favour of the Republic of Congo might 
have been persuaded by the f o r c e of evidence submitted i n the 
quest for immunity. The E n g l i s h c o u r t and the German court 
have, however, mutatis mutandis, denied immunity based 
s p e c i f i c a l l y on the commercial element i n v o l v e d i n Planmount 
Ltd., and the Empire of I r a n c a s e s , r e s p e c t i v e l y . But the 
argument posited by Laskin J with whom H a l l J agreed th a t "the 
absolute theory of sovereign immunity was no longer accepted by 
most s t a t e s and could not be regarded as p a r t of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law" i s simply non sequitur, u n l e s s , of course, the l e a r n e d 
judge was also r e f e r r i n g to a r e g i o n a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l law because 
evidence of s t a t e p r a c t i c e the world over i n respect of 
customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law does not support such a view. 7 6 To 
the contrary, the p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s i n regard to the 
r e s t r i c t i v e approach i s f a r from s e t t l e d and many co u n t r i e s of 
the world have not had the chance even to d e a l j u d i c i a l l y with 
the s u b j e c t matter herein under c o n s i d e r a t i o n . I t i s not the 
purpose of the present w r i t e r , however, to conclude th a t the 
t h r u s t and t o t a l import of Judge L a s k i n ' s d i s s e n t was not 
commendable. C e r t a i n l y he o f f e r e d a good i n s i g h t i n r e s p e c t of 
7 5 I b i d . , p. 24. 
7 oBrownlie, op. c i t . , 327-328; I Law Commission Report 1980-
1988. 
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the s u b j e c t f o r there was consensus ad idem i n respect of the 
agreement signed between the Republic of Congo and Venne, which 
as a matter of p r i n c i p l e must be honoured except where the 
sovereign r i g h t s of the s t a t e w i l l be a f f e c t e d or i f the dispute 
could b e t t e r be r e s o l v e d amicably through some other means. 
A r b i t r a t i o n , Default Judgment and the Question of Enforcement 
under U.S. Law 
N i g e r i a before S w i t z e r l a n d and American Courts 
I n I p i t r a d e I n t e r n a t i o n a l S.A. v. Federal Republic of 
N i g e r i a , 7 7 the Federal Republic of Nigeria and I p i t r a d e 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l , S.A. duly entered i n t o a contract for the 
purchase and s a l e of cement. Under the terms of the contract, 
N i g e r i a agreed t h a t the v a l i d i t y and the performance of the s a i d 
cement c o n t r a c t s h a l l be governed by Switzerland law and t h a t i n 
case of any dispute a r i s i n g thereunder, the dispute would be 
submitted to a r b i t r a t i o n i n P a r i s , France, for r e s o l u t i o n . Soon 
t h e r e a f t e r v a r i o u s disagreements arose with respect to the 
c o n t r a c t . I p i t r a d e t h e r e f o r e followed the command of the 
c o n t r a c t c a l l i n g f o r a r b i t r a t i o n proceedings. The Federal 
Republic of N i g e r i a d e c l i n e d to p a r t i c i p a t e , arguing that i t be 
granted immunity. I n view of t h i s plea, the a r b i t r a t o r 
nonetheless proceeded with the a r b i t r a t i o n , r u l i n g inter alia 
t h a t under Swiss law N i g e r i a was bound by the terms of the 
" i n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Reports 1982, p. 196 [(1978) 465 F.Supp. 
824] . 
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cement contract thus granting I p i t r a d e ' s c l a i m s a g a i n s t N i g e r i a . 
Further, i t was s t a t e d i n c l e a r terms t h a t under Swiss law an 
a r b i t r a t o r ' s word was f i n a l and t h e r e f o r e cannot be reversed. 
Having been intimated that N i g e r i a had some a s s e t s i n the United 
S t a t e s , " I p i t r a d e f i l e d i n the United S t a t e s D i s t r i c t Court a 
p e t i t i o n to confirm a r b i t r a t i o n award under the p r o v i s i o n of the 
convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
A r b i t r a l Awards, to which the award was s u b j e c t . " And the main 
i s s u e a t t h i s juncture was whether N i g e r i a could be amenable to 
the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the courts of the United S t a t e s i n t h i s very 
i n s t a n c e . The court ruled i n favour of I p i t r a d e as f o l l o w s : 
"The award i s s u b j e c t to the United Nations Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign A r b i t r a l Awards to 
which the United S t a t e s , France, N i g e r i a , and S w i t z e r l a n d are 
each s i g n a t o r i e s . A r t i c l e V of the Convention s p e c i f i e s the 
only grounds on which r e c o g n i t i o n and enforcement of a f o r e i g n 
a r b i t r a t i o n award may be r e f u s e d 9 USC § 201. None of the 
enumerated grounds e x i s t s i n the i n s t a n t c a s e . The Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act, which c o d i f i e s e x i s t i n g law with 
r e s p e c t to s u i t s a g a i n st f o r e i g n s t a t e s i n the United S t a t e s 
c o u r t s , gives Federal d i s t r i c t c o u r t s o r i g i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n 
a g a i n s t a foreign s t a t e as to any c l a i m f o r r e l i e f i n personam 
with respect to which the f o r e i g n s t a t e i s not e n t i t l e d to 
immunity under Sections 1605-1607 of t h i s t i t l e or any 
a p p l i c a b l e i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreement. 28 USC §1330." 
The court further r u l e d that: 
"The l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y of t h i s s e c t i o n e x p r e s s l y s t a t e s t h a t 
an agreement to a r b i t r a t e or to submit to the laws of another 
country c o n s t i t u t e s an i m p l i c i t waiver. H Rep No. 94-1487, 94th 
Cong., 2nd Sess. r e p r i n t e d i n 1976 U.S. Code, Cong, and Admin. 
News a t 6604, 6617. Consequently, Respondent's agreement to 
a d j u d i c a t e a l l disputes a r i s i n g under the c o n t r a c t i n accordance 
with Swiss law and by a r b i t r a t i o n under I n t e r n a t i o n a l Chamber of 
Commerce r u l e s c o n s t i t u t e s a waiver of s o v e r e i g n immunity under 
the Act. 
withdrawal." 
This waiver cannot be revoked by a u n i l a t e r a l 
78 
78 I b i d p. 198. 
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In the f i n a l a n a l y s i s a d e f a u l t judgment was entered 
aga i n s t N i g e r i a . True, N i g e r i a without question agreed per the 
cement c o n t r a c t t h a t i n case of any disputes a r i s i n g under the 
contract, both p a r t i e s must submit t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s to 
a r b i t r a t i o n . There was t h e r e f o r e evidence of party autonomy i n 
re s p e c t of what law must apply. A f u r t h e r r e f l e c t i o n , however, 
of the argument t h a t an agreement to a r b i t r a t e or submit to the 
laws of the country of the locus of the a r b i t r a t i o n , i . e . , the 
lex voluntatis, c o n s t i t u t e s an i m p l i c i t waiver i s simply non 
sequitur f o r such an argument cannot stand the t e s t of any 
c r i t i c a l a n a l y s i s , and i t i s h i g h l y p o s s i b l e that such an 
approach would run counter to general i n t e r n a t i o n a l law 7 9 i n view 
of the f a c t t h a t the waiver theory l a c k s usus and opinio juris.80 
Hence the "waiver" argument could be d e s c r i b e d as an i n d i v i d u a l 
opiniones juris of the United S t a t e s arguably lacking of 
consensus from other s u b j e c t s / l a w makers of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
community, i . e . , other s u b j e c t s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. Nigeria 
could t h e r e f o r e c h a l l e n g e the d e c i s i o n of the Federal d i s t r i c t 
court as of r i g h t i n r e s p e c t of the erroneous conclusion that, 
once a country has acceded to the course of a r b i t r a t i o n , there 
i s an i m p l i c i t waiver of j u r i s d i c t i o n and therefore immunity i s 
consequently waived. N i g e r i a , however, should have agreed to 
the a r b i t r a t i o n , u n l e s s the a r b i t r a l agreement was procured 
7 9See H. S t e i n b e r g e r , State Immunity i n Encyclopedia of 
P u b l i c I n t e r n a t i o n a l (1987) pp. 428-466. 
8 0See Brownlie, op. c i t . , pp. 7-9; V i l l i g e r , op. c i t . 
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through fraud, which a c t u a l l y was not what happened i n t h i s 
case. 
Tanzania before American Courts 
In B i r c h Shipping Corporation v. Embassy of the United 
Republic of Tanzania 8 1 the p l a i n t i f f , a B i r c h Shipping 
Corporation entered into a contract with the United Republic of 
Tanzania for the shipment of a load of corn from New Orleans to 
Tanzania. In f a c t , the purchase of the s a i d corn was duly 
financed by the United States Department of A g r i c u l t u r e . The 
p a r t i e s a f t e r negotiations agreed i n c l e a r terms t h a t any 
dispute a r i s i n g out of the shipping c o n t r a c t be submitted to 
a r b i t r a t i o n and t h a t a "court judgment could be entered upon any 
award rendered pursuant to the a r b i t r a t i o n agreement." 8 2 Soon 
t h e r e a f t e r a dispute arose, which i n f a c t was a r b i t r a t e d i n New 
York, r e s u l t i n g i n an award against the Republic of Tanzania. 
The P l a i n t i f f then f i l e d a p e t i t i o n i n the United S t a t e s 
D i s t r i c t Court of the Southern D i s t r i c t of New York, to have the 
s a i d monetary award confirmed pursuant to S e c t i o n 9 of the 
United S t a t e s A r b i t r a t i o n Act 9 USC § 9. And the court having 
c a r e f u l l y considered the i s s u e s i n t h i s case confirmed the 
p e t i t i o n on August 21, 1980, i n the amount of 89,168.56, 
notwithstanding the f a c t that the defendant f a i l e d to e n t e r an 
appearance. T h i s was followed by a w r i t of garnishment which 
1I L Reports 82 p. 524 [(1970) 507 F.Supp. 3 1 ] . 
2 I b i d . , 525. 
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was again confirmed and served upon American S e c u r i t y Bank, 
where the defendant s t a t e maintains a bank account for the 
operation of her embassy. Tanzania q u i c k l y moved to quash the 
w r i t based on the p r i n c i p l e s of sovereign immunity. However, 
the court denied the motion by r u l i n g t h a t 
"The l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y makes c l e a r t h a t a c t i v i t y of 
t h i s type i s w i t h i n the s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n of 'commercial 
a c t i v i t y ' s e t f o r t h i n 28 USC § 1603(d). 
"As the d e f i n i t i o n i n d i c a t e s , the f a c t t h a t goods or 
s e r v i c e s to be procured through a c o n t r a c t are to be used for a 
p u b l i c purpose i s i r r e l e v a n t ; i t i s the e s s e n t i a l l y commercial 
nature of an a c t i v i t y or t r a n s a c t i o n that i s c r i t i c a l . " 8 3 
The defendant s t a t e argued f u r t h e r by submitting an 
a f f i d a v i t t h a t the funds i n the attached account were purposely 
used to "pay the s a l a r i e s of the s t a f f , pay for i n c i d e n t a l 
purchases and s e r v i c e s necessary and i n c i d e n t to the operation 
of the Embassy i n i t s diplomatic a c t i v i t y as the o f f i c i a l 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the government of the United Republic of 
Tanzania i n the United S t a t e s . " 8 4 But the court refused to 
accede to the argument advanced by Tanzania, thus r u l i n g that 
"The only s i g n i f i c a n t q uestion, then, i s whether i t i s proper 
to a t t a c h an account which i s not used s o l e l y f o r commercial 
a c t i v i t y . C e r t a i n l y the s t a t u t e p l a c e s no such r e s t r i c t i o n upon 
property which may be attached, nor i s t h e r e anything i n the 
l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y i n d i c a t i n g t h a t Congress contemplated such a 
l i m i t a t i o n . C e n t r a l Bank accounts a r e exempt, but that 
exception i s not a p p l i c a b l e to accounts used f o r mixed purposes. 
See H Rep No. 94-1487. " 8 5 
3 I b i d . , pp. 526-528. 
4 I b i d . , p. 526. 
5 I b i d . , p. 527. 
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The question i n respect of waiver of immunity i s not 
c l e a r c u t . And over the years t h i s thorny i s s u e has i n one way 
or the other c r e a t e d d i f f i c u l t i e s and u n c e r t a i n t i e s i n the law. 
Courts i n the United S t a t e s , for example, have always r u l e d t h a t 
any s t a t e that agrees by the meeting of the minds to submit to 
a r b i t r a t i o n i n the forum s t a t e , i n r e a l i t y had i m p l i c i t l y waived 
i t s r i g h t to immunity. This was c l e a r l y followed i n I p i t r a d e 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l S.A. v. Federal Republic of N i g e r i a and i n the 
B i r c h Shipping Corporation v. Embassy of the United Republic of 
Tanzania case, r e s p e c t i v e l y . But the question to grapple w i t h 
i s whether such a d e c i s i o n i s i n l i n e with general i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law. Although s c h o l a r s i n America may answer the question i n 
the a f f i r m a t i v e , t h e i r views arguably are i n the minority, f o r a 
m a j o r i t y of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law s c h o l a r s w i l l challenge the 
a u t h o r i t y of such a d e c i s i o n as l a c k i n g of general p r a c t i c e or 
USUS. Under general i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, a s t a t e i s not presumed 
to have waived i t s r i g h t to immunity based on the mere f a c t t h a t 
i t has acceded to a p r o v i s i o n i n an a r b i t r a t i o n c o n t r a c t w i t h 
i t s p r i v a t e partner t h a t the contract be governed by the law of 
the forum s t a t e or some other s t a t e . The law i n t h i s connection 
has been c l e a r l y s t a t e d i n the United Kingdom S t a t e Immunity 
Act, 1978, S e c t i o n 2 ( 2 ) . The d e c i s i o n s i n I p i t r a d e 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l S.A., and B i r c h Shipping Corporation i n r e s p e c t of 
waiver of immunity therefore leaves much to be d e s i r e d . Thus 
fo r a waiver to be v a l i d i t must be e x p r e s s l y given by the 
competent organ of the foreign s t a t e . 
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Another important question to consider i s whether a bank 
account of a diplomatic m i s s i o n can be attached. Undoubtedly 
t h i s question poses d i f f i c u l t problems which must be approached 
with care. In 1977 the West German C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Court, while 
considering i s s u e s i n r e s p e c t of the general bank account of the 
P h i l i p p i n e Embassy, r u l e d t h a t : 
"A g e n e r a l bank account of the embassy of a f o r e i g n s t a t e 
which e x i s t s i n the s t a t e of the forum and the purpose of which 
i s to cover the embassy c o s t s and expenses are not s u b j e c t to 
forced e x e c u t i o n . " 8 6 
Again i n Alcorn v. Republic of Colombia, i t was held t h a t an 
embassy account which has been c r e a t e d f o r the day to day 
expenses of the Colombian Embassy cannot be attached by v i r t u e 
of Section 1 3 ( 2 ( b ) . 
Lord Diplock s t a t e d t h a t : 
"The c r e d i t b a l a n c e i n the c u r r e n t account kept by the 
diplomatic m i s s i o n of the s t a t e as a p o s s i b l e s u b j e c t matter of 
the enforcement j u r i s d i c t i o n of the c o u r t i s , however, one and 
i n d i v i s i b l e — u n l e s s i t can be shown by the judgment c r e d i t o r who 
i s seeking to a t t a c h the c r e d i t balance by garnishee proceedings 
that the bank account was earmarked by the f o r e i g n s t a t e s o l e l y 
(save f o r de minimis e x c e p t i o n s ) f o r being drawn upon to s e t t l e 
l i a b i l i t i e s i n c u r r e d i n commercial t r a n s a c t i o n s . " 8 7 
The argument advanced by Lord Diplock seemed more 
persuasive than the one o f f e r e d i n the B i r c h Shipping 
Corporation. For the p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s i n r e s p e c t of execution 
has been quite uniform i n g r a n t i n g immunity from enforcement 
measures even where the p l e a f o r immunity had been denied by the 
8 6B Verf GE, Vol 4 6 p. 342, or see U.N. M a t e r i a l s on 
j u r i s d i c t i o n a l immunities of s t a t e and t h e i r property (1982) St 
Leg. Ser B/20 p. 297. 
8 7 (1984) AC 580; 640. 
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forum s t a t e . I t was only of recent l e g i s l a t i o n and p r a c t i c e 
t h a t immunity to enforcement measures seemed to be r e s t r i c t e d i n 
the U.S., e.g., 1610(a), the U.K. Sec. 13(4), Canada Sec. 11(1), 
Pakistan, Singapore and South A f r i c a , r e s p e c t i v e l y . But s t i l l a 
g r e a t e r number of c o u n t r i e s would normally grant immunity i n 
r e s p e c t of enforcement measures, e.g., China, S o v i e t Union, 
B r a z i l , S y r i a , Sudan, e t c . Again, s t i l l others arguably would 
support the view t h a t immunity be accorded to f o r e i g n s t a t e s 
from enforcement measures only with regard to property 
designated for a p u b l i c purpose—acta jure imperii. T h i s , 
however, lea v e s open the question as to how a bank account i s to 
be c h a r a c t e r i s e d as regards enforcement measures. I s i t to be 
done by the lex fori or by the standards of general 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law? Simply put, the evaluation of the bank 
account of Tanzania i n B i r c h Shipping Corporation was simply 
inadequate and the i s s u e regarding the waiver simply runs 
counter to s t a t e p r a c t i c e , i . e . , general i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
L e g i s l a t i o n per se i s t h e r e f o r e not a panacea to r e s o l v i n g t h i s 
thorny question of waiver. Hence courts must be e c l e c t i c i n 
c o n s i d e r i n g t h i s e l u s i v e s u b j e c t matter. 
The Republic of Guinea before American Courts 
In Maritime I n t e r n a t i o n a l Nominees Establishment v. the 
Republic of Guinea, 8 8 the p e t i t i o n e r a L i e c h t e n s t e i n corporation 
and the Republic of Guinea entered into an agreement f o r the 
I L Reports 1982 p. 535. 
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establishment of a company geared towards the shipment of 
bauxite mined i n Guinea to the U.S.. The agreement contained a 
clause which s t a t e d t h a t a l l d i s p u t e s were to be re s o l v e d 
amicably through a r b i t r a t i o n which must be conducted "by 
a r b i t r a t o r s s e l e c t e d by the P r e s i d e n t of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Centre f or Settlement of Investment Disputes ( I C S I D ) . " 8 9 I t so 
happened that ICSID i s l o c a t e d i n the c a p i t a l of the United 
States, Washington, D.C., "and i n conformity with Rule 13 of 
ICSID's Rules of Procedure f o r A r b i t r a t i o n Proceedings, s e s s i o n s 
of i t s t r i b u n a l s are h e l d i n Washington u n l e s s another s u i t i s 
agreed upon by the p a r t i e s and approved by ICSID." 
The company t h a t was formed was known as Societe 
d'Economie Mixte de Transports Maritimes (SOTRAMAR) and i t was 
to have a " c i v i l p e r s o n a l i t y and f i n a n c i a l autonomy." A dispute 
arose between the two p a r t i e s , i . e . , the Republic of Guinea and 
the p e t i t i o n e r L i e c h t e n s t e i n . The p e t i t i o n e r thereupon asked 
the Republic of Guinea t h a t i t be given an approval to have the 
dispute s e t t l e d through a r b i t r a t i o n . But the humble request 
f e l l on deaf e a r s . T h i s prompted the p e t i t i o n e r to seek an 
order to compel a r b i t r a t i o n pursuant to the U.S. A r b i t r a t i o n Act 
9 USC § 1 et seq 1976. Although adequate n o t i c e was given to 
Guinea as to the date and p l a c e of the a r b i t r a t i o n , Guinea never 
"showed up" at the hearing. A f t e r two years of extensive 
a r b i t r a t i o n proceedings, an award n e v e r t h e l e s s was duly made i n 
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favour of the p e t i t i o n e r . A p e t i t i o n was t h e r e a f t e r f i l e d to 
confirm the award and to enforce the judgment. Shortly before 
the motion, Guinea asked f o r continuance, which was granted. At 
a scheduled date, a f t e r the continuance, Guinea s u r p r i s i n g l y 
r a i s e d the o b j e c t i o n that the court did not have j u r i s d i c t i o n 
over the person of the r e p u b l i c of Guinea. The court a f t e r 
r e l y i n g on s e v e r a l a u t h o r i t i e s r u l e d against the Republic of 
Guinea. 
The counsel for Guinea, i n order to n e u t r a l i s e the odds 
a g a i n s t i t s c l i e n t , o f f e r e d the following argument i n defence of 
Guinea: 
"A waiver should be found only where there i s both an 
agreement to a r b i t r a t e i n another country and the agreement to 
be bound by the laws of another country." 9 0 
The c o u r t r e p l i e d that such an argument was "too c o n s t r i c t e d a 
view." And t h e r e f o r e went on to conclude that "by agreeing to 
a r b i t r a t i o n t h a t could be expected to be held i n the United 
S t a t e s , Guinea waived i t s immunity before t h i s court w i t h i n the 
meaning of 28 USC § 1605(a) (1) 1976. " 9 1 This part of the r u l i n g 
i s c o n t r a r y to general i n t e r n a t i o n a l law because i t c l e a r l y 
l a c k s usus. 
The court simply followed e a r l i e r a u t h o r i t i e s such as 
V e r l i n d e B.V.V. C e n t r a l Bank of Nigeria, Libya American O i l Co. 
v. S o c i a l i s t People's Libyan Arab Jameehurya 9 2 and of course 
9 0 I b i d . , p. 538. 
9 1 I b i d . 
9 2 (19 8 0) DDC 11175 F.Supp. 482. 
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I p i t r a d e I n t e r n a t i o n a l S.A. v. F e d e r a l Republic of N i g e r i a to 
support i t s d e c i s i o n . S i m i l a r arguments o f f e r e d by the present 
w r i t e r elsewhere against the American approach to waivers i n the 
main could a l s o r i g h t l y be made i n Maritime I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Nominees Establishment. I t appears, however, t h a t Guinea waited 
f o r f a r too long before c h a l l e n g i n g the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the 
court. Which means tha t the p l e a f o r sovereign immunity should 
have been made at the outset, i . e . , when the a r b i t r a t i o n 
question came up, but not at the stage where a confirmation 
measure was being demanded by the p l a i n t i f f through a motion. 
Again i t i s submitted t h a t the s a n c t i o n i n g of enforcement 
measures against Guinea was c o n t r a r y to g e n e r a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law because t h i s p art of the law i s u n s e t t l e d , and t h a t i s why 
some leading courts have refused to s a n c t i o n w r i t s for 
enforcement measures as i n Alcorn and the P h i l i p p i n e s Embassy 
c a s e s . 
I s Resistance by A f r i c a n S t a t e s to S u i t s i n Foreign Courts 
L e g a l l y J u s t i f i e d ? 
Having taken pains to review these c a s e s , one common trend 
appears d i s c e r n i b l e i n the pleadings of a l l these A f r i c a n 
s t a t e s , and that i s they a l l o f f e r e d i n t h e i r defence the 
absolute immunity r u l e . How i s i t t h a t such a defence appears 
common? And where can the p r a c t i c e be designated to have come 
from? Many beli e v e i t came from Europe and t h e r e f o r e was 
r e c e i v e d through c o l o n i a l i s m , but others b e l i e v e t h a t the 
concept of princeps legibus solutus, i . e . , the King can do no 
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wrong, had e x i s t e d i n A f r i c a long before the coming of Europeans 
to A f r i c a , 9 3 but was r a t h e r passed on from generation to 
generation through o r a l t r a d i t i o n r a t h e r than through j u d i c i a l 
means, i . e . , case law. A c a r e f u l review of l e g a l h i s t o r y , 
however, shows t h a t the concept might have been w e l l developed 
by Europeans with i t s modern v e r s i o n c l e a r l y adumbrated by Chief 
J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l i n h i s c l a s s i c judgment i n the Schooner 
Exchange. I f t h i s be the case, then do these A f r i c a n s t a t e s 
have the r i g h t to plead t h a t they be accorded immunity i n 
f o r e i g n c o u r t s ? The answer would have to be i n the a f f i r m a t i v e 
and nothing e l s e . For before 1900 the immunity of a s t a t e from 
the j u d i c i a l process of another s t a t e was absolute and t h i s i n 
the main was rooted i n two c a r d i n a l p r i n c i p l e s and that i s the 
notion of s o v e r e i g n t y and the e q u a l i t y of s t a t e s . 9 4 This 19th 
century i d e a of sovereign immunity thus came into being before 
the new s t a t e s of A f r i c a gained independence from European 
c o l o n i a l powers. 
I n 1914, f o r example, there e x i s t e d i n the world only 51 
s t a t e s . Europe had 24 c o u n t r i e s followed by America with 21 
c o u n t r i e s . A s i a had 4, while A f r i c a had 2, i . e . , E t h i o p i a and 
L i b e r i a . 9 5 Egypt became independent i n 1922 and South A f r i c a 
9 3Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped A f r i c a (1982) pp. 31-73; 
Sanders, op. c i t . , To E l i a s — A f r i c a and Development of 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1988); B a s i l Davidson, The Search for A f r i c a 
(1994). 
9 4 S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t ; S i n c l a i r , op. c i t . ; Lauterpacht, op. 
c i t ; Brownlie, op. c i t . ; R i e s e n f e l d , Sovereign Immunity i n 
P e r s p e c t i v e , 1986 V a n d e r b i l t J of T r a n s n a t i o n a l Law, Vol. 19, 1. 
9 5 P r i c e , op. c i t . ; J . Dugard, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law—A South 
A f r i c a n P e r s p e c t i v e , 1994, pp. 41-56. 
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became a country shor t l y a f t e r the war i n 1926. 9 6 But over the 
years many countries have gained independence i n A f r i c a , and one 
important i s s u e that must be confronted head-on i s whether these 
new A f r i c a n s t a t e s are aut o m a t i c a l l y bound by a l l the r u l e s of 
customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, i . e . , i n e x i s t e n c e before s e l f -
determination was attained. There i s unanimous consensus t h a t 
these s t a t e s must be bound by a l l these l a w s . 9 7 Although t h i s 
notion had been c r i t i c i s e d by Professor Tunkin, 9 8 h i s p o s i t i o n 
seemed to be i n the minority. Granted t h i s , then can these 
s t a t e s , a f t e r having gained independence, c h a l l e n g e the 
le g i t i m a c y of any new emerging customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, 
i . e . , the concept of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity? The answer i s yes 
with some exceptions. And t h i s i s c l e a r l y e x p l a i n e d by Dr. 
Akehurst as follows: 
"Provided that the s t a t e opposes the r u l e i n the e a r l y 
days of the r u l e ' s e x i s t e n c e (or formation) and m a i n t a i n s i t s 
o p p o s i t i o n . c o n s i s t e n t l y t h e r e a f t e r . " 9 9 
Thus any opposition that comes a f t e r the r u l e had been 
e s t a b l i s h e d w i l l not count. This i s f u r t h e r supported by Dr. 
V i l l i g e r i n the following formulated words: 
"A customary r u l e does not a r i s e and e x i s t a t once and 
f o r a l l . Rather, the r u l e has to be confirmed r e p e a t e d l y by 
i n s t a n c e s of s t a t e p r a c t i c e meeting c e r t a i n q u a l i f i c a t i o n s and 
accompanied by opinio juris. Now s t a t e p r a c t i c e not only 
c r e a t e s and confirms the r u l e , but a l s o c o n s t a n t l y d e f i n e s i t s 
9 6Dugard, op. c i t . , p. 62. 
9 7See Akehurst, op. c i t . , p. 
9 8Tunkin, Remarks on the J u r i d i c a l Nature of Customary Norms 
i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1961) 49 C a l i f L Rev 419, 428. 
9 9See Akehurst, op. c i t . , p. 24. 
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content. I f the substance of s t a t e p r a c t i c e changes, so w i l l 
the content of the customary r u l e . " 
He concluded by saying that " i f a s t a t e opposes a 
customary r u l e from the e a r l y stages onwards, the s t a t e w i l l not 
be bound qua p e r s i s t e n t o b j e c t o r . And i f many s t a t e s object, 
the r u l e w i l l never a r i s e . " 1 0 0 
I n the l i g h t of the w r i t i n g s of these leading scholars, 
one may not be wrong i n arguing th a t these A f r i c a n s t a t e s have 
the r i g h t to ch a l l e n g e any emerging customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law 
th a t i n one way or the other a f f e c t s t h e i r general i n t e r e s t . 
The concept of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity appears to be emerging but 
has not yet been w e l l grounded i n the p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s . 1 0 1 
P r o f e s s o r Brownlie, i n making h i s p o s i t i o n known as to the 
p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s i n r e s p e c t of the r e s t r i c t i v e p r i n c i p l e , 
c a r e f u l l y observed t h a t although there i s c u r r e n t l y a trend 
toward the r e s t r i c t i v e p r i n c i p l e , a t l e a s t many countries s t i l l 
accept the d o c t r i n e of absolute immunity. 1 0 2 I n other words, the 
r e s t r i c t i v e p r i n c i p l e does not have s u f f i c i e n t support of nation 
s t a t e s the world over, as to be g e n e r a l l y considered customary 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. There i s th e r e f o r e an already e s t a b l i s h e d 
p r a c t i c e t h a t c o n f l i c t s with the r e s t r i c t i v e p r i n c i p l e , and t h i s 
g i v e s d i s s e n t i n g s t a t e s the r i g h t to challenge i t s legitimacy 
wherever i t may be ap p l i e d . These A f r i c a n s t a t e s and many other 
s t a t e s , t h e r e f o r e , could r e s i s t the r e s t r i c t i v e p r i n c i p l e as of 
100. V i l l i g e r , op. c i t pp. 38-39. • r 
101 See Ushakov, op. c i t . 
102 Brownlie, op. c i t p. 328. 
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r i g h t because the doctrine of absolute immunity i s not dead 
accurate. I t would not serve any good purpose, t h e r e f o r e , to 
make p r e d i c t i o n s by simply r e l y i n g on conject u r e , as many 
sc h o l a r s have done i n pr e d i c t i n g the demise of the d o c t r i n e of 
sovereign immunity, without f i r s t taking pains to s e r i o u s l y 
delve i n t o the p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s the world over. 
A Russian scholar, Dr. Ushakov, i n h i s s t u d i e s of t h i s 
s u b j e c t and i n respect of the argument al l u d e d to above, took 
i s s u e with Dr. Such a r i t k u l , the S p e c i a l Rapporteur, as f o l l o w s : 
"The p o s i t i o n and p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s are thus by no means 
uniform. No conclusion whatsoever can be drawn from them as t o 
any emerging trend i n favour of the concept of l i m i t e d immunity. 
At the very l e a s t , the matter c a l l s f o r f u r t h e r in-depth 
s t u d y . " 1 0 3 
Many A f r i c a n countries have voiced t h e i r opposition to the 
p r i n c i p l e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity and inexorably moving to 
challenge i t s l e g a l b a s i s and there i s no evidence of a tre n d 
where these c o u n t r i e s have taken steps to c o d i f y the s a i d r u l e 
except South A f r i c a , which of l a t e had followed the f o o t s t e p s of 
the West by enacting the r u l e i n t o her s t a t u t e books. And those 
A f r i c a n s t a t e s sued by p r i v a t e e n t i t i e s i n foreign c o u r t s have 
a s s e r t e d t h e i r claims to the exi s t e n c e of a l e g a l r i g h t 1 0 4 or 
r u l e derived from the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Can these 
a c t s , a s s e r t i o n s or pleadings c o n c r e t e l y made by these A f r i c a n 
s t a t e s before n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t i e s be c h a r a c t e r i s e d as s t a t e 
1 0 3Ushakov, op. c i t . , p. 56. 
1 0 4See supra the p r i v a t e claims i n s t i t u t e d a g a i n s t N i g e r i a , 
Tanzania, Guinea, Congo, Libya, Uganda, Egypt, T u n i s i a , Zambia, 
and Mozambique, e t c . 
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p r a c t i c e ? Some l e a d i n g s c h o l a r s 1 0 5 have answered yes, for 
i n t e r e s t a r t i c u l a t i o n i n r e s p e c t of s t a t e p r a c t i c e can be 
i n f e r r e d from the conduct of s t a t e s . I n e v i t a b l y , however, the 
i s s u e as to whether a s t a t e has acceded to a p a r t i c u l a r custom 
by i t s conduct c r e a t e s d i f f i c u l t i e s and u n c e r t a i n t i e s and over 
the years had fea t u r e d w e l l i n t r a n s n a t i o n a l l i t i g a t i o n . These 
A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s seemed to r e s i s t the r e s t r i c t i v e p r i n c i p l e 
because i t l a c k s usus and t h e r e f o r e f e l t not obligated to follow 
i t . In other words, the p s y c h o l o g i c a l element of opinio juris 
sive necessitatis i s l a c k i n g . 
The r e s i s t a n c e of A f r i c a n s t a t e s to p r i v a t e s u i t s i n foreign 
courts warrants the f o l l o w i n g c o n c l u s i o n s . 
(1) The purpose of the s t a t e i s to enable i t s c i t i z e n s to 
develop to become t h e i r b e s t s e l v e s , so i n a sense, the 
end of the s t a t e i s both e t h i c a l and p o l i t i c a l 
( p u b l i c ) , thus promoting a 'surplus of p l e a s u r e over 
p a i n ' . The main f u n c t i o n s of the s t a t e t h e r e f o r e 
comprise, the maintenance of s e c u r i t y , s t a b i l i t y 
w e l f a r e and economic growth. The s t a t e , f o r that 
matter never a c t s as a p r i v a t e person because i t i s 
endowed with POTESTAS IMPERII to promote the p u b l i c 
good. 
D'Amato, The concept of Custom i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law 
(1971); H.W.A. Thirlway, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Customary Law and 
C o d i f i c a t i o n (1972); V i l l i g e r , op. c i t . ; M. Akehurst, op. c i t . 
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(2) The r e l a t i o n s between Sovereign s t a t e s i n 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law are based on PAX C I V I L I S ( i e between 
equals as s t a t e s ) . Thus a s t a t e c e r t a i n l y w i l l 
surrender a fundamental r i g h t i f i t i s s u b j e c t e d to 
the j u r i s d i c t i o n of a foreign court or forc e d by a 
p r i v a t e s u i t to defend i t s e l f before n a t u r a l j u d i c i a l 
a u t h o r i t i e s . 
(3) R e s t r i c t i v e immunity i s not an I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law 
because i t l a c k s USUS - s e t t l e d p r a c t i c e and OPINIO 
JURIS, hence A f r i c a n s t a t e s and other developing 
s t a t e s , d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d by the s a i d r u l e , have a 
p e r f e c t r i g h t as su b j e c t s of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law t o 
argue tha t they be accorded immunity. And t h e s e 
arguments are s t a t e p r a c t i c e and thus could p r e v e n t 
the ANIMUS of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity from germinating. 
(4) Most A f r i c a n s t a t e s are the r e f o r e s a y i n g t h a t the 
CORPUS and ANIMUS of Sovereign immunity s u r v i v e d 
because no general p r a c t i c e has emerged to support 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. I n other words, r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity could r i g h t l y only be regarded as an emerging 
p r i n c i p l e . 
(5) The p r i v i l e g e s and immunities of Diplomatic agents and 
missions under the Vienna Conventions have become 
LEGES SPECIALES, and thus was d e r i v e d from the 
p r i n c i p l e of NE IMPEDIATUR LEGATIO. T h i s means t h a t by 
l i c e n s e the ambassador i s not amenable to the laws of 
the forum and therefore not under any o b l i g a t i o n t o 
accept a s e r v i c e of p r o c e s s , t h a t i s , i f the sending 
s t a t e i s being sued i n the r e c e i v i n g s t a t e . These 
ideas w i l l be explored i n d e t a i l i n the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE PRACTICE OF AFRICAN STATES IN THE MATTER OF 
JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF STATES: 
IS IT STILL ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY OR RESTRICTIVE IMMUNITY? 
In t r o d u c t i o n 
Many would no doubt be wondering as to the cu r r e n t 
p o s i t i o n of A f r i c a n s t a t e s on the s t a t e immunity controversy. 
T h e i r c u r i o s i t y i s understandable, because s t a t e p r a c t i c e i s 
q u i t e scanty i n the region. And t h i s i s due to the f a c t t h a t 
t h e r e i s p a u c i t y of n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n and municipal court 
d e c i s i o n s on the s u b j e c t . I t i s therefore the purpose of t h i s 
study to explore the r u l e of s t a t e immunity and the p r a c t i c e of 
s t a t e s i n A f r i c a and p o s s i b l y to l a y down a framework of l e g a l 
t h e o r i e s to support the f a c t t h a t r e s i s t a n c e to p r i v a t e s u i t s 
brought a g a i n s t A f r i c a n s t a t e s before foreign courts or f o r e i g n 
n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t i e s can arguably be construed to represent 
s t a t e p r a c t i c e i n as much as these A f r i c a n s t a t e s i n one way or 
the other appear to be making claims duly derived from general 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, i . e . , the maxim par in parent non habet 
imperium or par in parent non habet jurisdictionem. But before 
we delve i n t o the above mentioned i s s u e s , i t i s apposite f i r s t 
to explore the f a c t that sovereign immunity had e x i s t e d i n 
A f r i c a i n a form of o r a l customary t r a d i t i o n a l law long before 
Europeans s e t foot on the Continent. 
253 
Pre-Colonial A f r i c a and E a r l y A f r i c a n D y n a s t i e s 
A f r i c a i s an old world and i t s c i v i l i z a t i o n precedes many 
ancient c i v i l i z a t i o n s . The h i s t o r y of famous indigenous A f r i c a n 
s t a t e s from 300-1500 A.D., i n c i d e n t a l l y however, has not been 
w e l l documented and f u l l y u n r a v e l l e d by h i s t o r i a n s . But over 
the years some h i s t o r i a n s eager i n s e a r c h of knowledge on A f r i c a 
have indeed uncovered very important h i s t o r i c a l events hidden i n 
the archaeological remains of such a n c i e n t indigenous A f r i c a n 
s t a t e s as Egypt, E t h i o p i a , Ghana, Kenem-Bornu, Mali and Songhai. 
B a s i l Davidson, i n h i s e x p o s i t i o n on A f r i c a n h i s t o r y , o f f e r e d a 
f o r c e f u l explanation thus: 
"And kingdoms i n A f r i c a a r e , indeed, among the o l d e s t 
p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s anywhere. They emerge i n A f r i c a from 
times even before time began. They loom out of the mists of 
a n t i q u i t y l i k e the unknown ghosts of a n c e s t r a l n a t i o n s that have 
no c e r t a i n p l a c e or name, and yet a r e not to be denied. And the 
deeper the probings of modern s c h o l a r s h i p , the more these 
'ghosts' of r o y a l a u t h o r i t y a c q u i r e f a c t and presence, for we 
l i v e happily i n a p e r i o d when o l d p r e j u d i c e begins to give way 
to new understanding, to an understanding, perhaps above a l l , 
that the h i s t o r y of humankind i s a s i n g l e g r e a t r i v e r i n t o which 
a myriad t r i b u t a r i e s flow." 1 
Davidson's p o s i t i o n has been supported by R. Maury,2 R.S. Smith, 3 
Walter Rodney,4 Henri Labouret, 5 to mention a few. 
^ a s i l Davidson, The Search f o r A f r i c a (1994) p. 19. This 
book i s very important to the understanding of A f r i c a n h i s t o r y . 
2R. Maury, B u l l e t i n d ' l I n s t i t u t F r a n c a i s e d ' A f r i c a Noire 
IX (1947). 
3R.S. Smith, The Kingdom of Yoruba (London, 1969). 
4See Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped A f r i c a 
(1982) . 
5See Henri Labouret, A f r i c a Before the White Man (1962). 
See also USSR I n s t i t u t e of H i s t o r y , A H i s t o r y of A f r i c a (1918-
1967). 
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T.O. E l i a s a l s o t e l l s us th a t : 
"Examples of some famous d y n a s t i e s are that of Kanem-
Bornu i n n o r t h - e a s t e r n N i g e r i a which has had r u l e r s i n unbroken 
s u c c e s s i o n f o r 1,000 years u n t i l the middle of the nineteenth 
century; again, Songhai dynasty l a s t e d some 800 y e a r s . " 6 
I t i s t r u e that n e o l i t h i c A f r i c a n dynasties have had 
tremendous i n f l u e n c e on the r e s t of A f r i c a . But t h i s e r a or 
epoch soon gave way to the development of new ideas which spread 
southward and westward, c r y s t a l l i s i n g i n t o d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l and 
p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i e s which were wholly conditioned on k i n s h i p 
bonds of union. Some of these s o c i e t i e s developed along 
h o r i z o n t a l p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e s while others developed along 
c e n t r a l i s e d p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e s . 7 These kinship groups soon 
grew i n t o powerful dynasties r u l e d by c h i e f s , kings and 
emperors, whose p o s i t i o n s were held sacred. The king or emperor 
of these s o c i e t i e s served as the a x i s of the p o l i t i c a l unity, 
i d e n t i t y and strength of the r u l e d . There was therefore a 
s a c r e d r e l a t i o n s h i p between the king or emperor and i t s 
s u b j e c t s . 
Some Concrete Examples of Personal Sovereigns 
Ancient Egypt, according to recorded h i s t o r y , had the 
o l d e s t c u l t u r e i n A f r i c a . According to h i s t o r i a n s , i t was one 
of the o l d e s t c u l t u r e s i n the h i s t o r y of mankind. 8 The 
6T.O. E l i a s , A f r i c a and the Development of I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Law, op. c i t . , p. 13. 
7See Walter Rodney, op. c i t . , pp. 33-71. 
8See B a s i l Davidson, op. c i t . , p. 19-25. See a l s o Walter 
Rodney, op. c i t . , pp. 33-71. 
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c i v i l i z a t i o n of pharaonic Egypt could thus be t r a c e d back to 
3500 B.C.,9 but i t s continued growth was destroyed by the Romans 
when they extended t h e i r hegemony to the northern part of 
A f r i c a . The l e g a l p o s i t i o n of the pharaohs, as we a l l know, was 
sacred and absolute. 1 0 
Egypt had powerful d y n a s t i e s , e.g., the Fatimid dynasty 
(969 A.D. to 1170 A.D.), had an unbroken s u c c e s s i o n of lea d e r s 
who e s t a b l i s h e d a powerful c e n t r a l government. The p o l i t i c a l 
power of the Fatimid dynasty was absolute and i t s decrees were 
such that i t cannot be challenged or co n t r o v e r t e d . I t appointed 
members of the dynasty to c o l l e c t taxes and to supervise land 
ownership. The dynasty thus acted as the e x e c u t i v e , l e g i s l a t u r e 
and a judge. The succeeding d y n a s t i e s of Ayyubids and the 
Mameluks a l s o wielded absolute powers which were g r e a t l y used i n 
the b u i l d i n g of "canals, dams, bridges and aqueducts and i n 
st i m u l a t i n g commerce with Europe." 1 1 
The c i v i l i z a t i o n of E t h i o p i a can a l s o be t r a c e d back to 
the f i r s t century A.D.,12 when the Kingdom of Axum was founded. 
Feudal E t h i o p i a was therefore born out of Axum dynasty which had 
a Sabean o r i g i n . According to Walter Rodney, 
"The Emperor of E t h i o p i a was addressed as 'Conquering 
Lion of the Tri b e of Judah, E l e c t of God, Emperor of E t h i o p i a , 
9See B a s i l Davidson, op. c i t . , p. 319, where he was able to 
t r a c e the h i s t o r y of Egypt i n d e t a i l . 
1 0 B a s i l Davidson and Walter Rodney have a l l confirmed the 
powerful p o s i t i o n of the Pharaoh i n t h e i r w r i t i n g s : B a s i l 
Davidson, op. c i t . ; W. Rodney, op. c i t . 
1 1See Walter Rodney, op. c i t . , p. 49. 
1 2 I b i d . 
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King of Ki n g s . ' I n p r a c t i c e , however, the 'Solomonic' l i n e was 
not unbroken." 1 3 
Feudal E t h i o p i a was r u l e d by a r o y a l family 1 4 whose 
p o s i t i o n was absolute. The emperor appointed judges and had 
co n t r o l over the army and many other governmental i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
Again the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the emperor and the ruled was 
sacred and a b s o l u t e . The emperor was "King of Kings" and 
the r e f o r e h i s powers were not l i m i t e d by any other power from 
w i t h i n or from without. The Amharic dynasty had o v e r a l l control 
over the empire by c o n s o l i d a t i n g i t s power base through 
C h r i s t i a n i t y and l i t e r a t e c u l t u r e . 1 5 Everything within the 
kingdom thus was done to g l o r i f y the emperor and i t s r o y a l 
family. 
The Ghana Empire, according to h i s t o r i a n s , e x i s t e d from 
300-1087 A. D.16 According to Dr. Rodney, i t was made up of 
strong l i n e a g e kings or c h i e f s , and competent commanders of the 
army. The emperor appointed sub-chiefs of the provinces, who 
were men of g r e a t l e a r n i n g and of God. Besides these powerful 
o f f i c e s t h e r e were a l s o other o f f i c e s ranging from that of a 
judge, t r a d i t i o n a l communication personnel who were responsible 
f o r the d i s s e m i n a t i o n of the law or the command of the king or 
c h i e f . Dr. Rodney says, 
"The Western Sudanic empires of Ghana, Mali and Songhai have 
become by words i n the s t r u g g l e to i l l u s t r a t e the achievements 
1 3 I b i d . , p. 50. 
1 4 I b i d . 
1 5 I b i d . , p. 50. 
16T.O. E l i a s , op. c i t . , pp. 6-7, 7. 
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of the A f r i c a n past. That i s the a r e a to which A f r i c a n 
n a t i o n a l i s t s and progressive whites p o i n t when they want to 
prove t h a t A f r i c a n s too were capable of p o l i t i c a l , 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and m i l i t a r y greatness i n the epoch b e f o r e the 
white men."17 
Under the Ghana Empire, the king was endowed with absolute power 
and the members of h i s r u l i n g c o u n c i l were a l s o r e s p e c t e d and 
therefore were beyond reproach. The p o s i t i o n of the head of the 
empire was very powerful and thus knows no other s u p e r i o r . The 
power of the king was i n a l i e n a b l e , i m p r e s c r i p t i b l e , i n v i s i b l e 
and e x c l u s i v e . By v i r t u e of these a t t r i b u t e s the king of 
ancient Ghana was e n t i t l e d to obedience from every c i t i z e n . 
Although there were other sacred a u t h o r i t i e s w i t h i n the empire, 
however, a l l these i n s t i t u t i o n s of power d e r i v e d t h e i r a u t h o r i t y 
d i r e c t l y from the king. 1 8 
These s a i d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of absolute power were commonly 
a s s o c i a t e d with the Pharaonic era, the E t h i o p i a n d y n a s t i e s , the 
Mali Empire and the Songhai Empire. The l o c a l sovereign 
therefore wielded enormous power and thus could not be 
impleaded. H i s t o r i c a l l y the p r i n c i p l e of princep legibus 
solutus or the king can do no wrong, or the king i s above the 
law, or the law i s the command of the king, r e p r e s e n t s the 
absolute a u t h o r i t y of the king. This l e g a l i d e a e x i s t e d i n 
A f r i c a long before Europeans took over A f r i c a . 1 9 But the idea 
"Walter Rodney, op. c i t . , p. 56. 
1 8Henri Labouret, op. c i t . , where a thorough h i s t o r i c a l 
a n a l y s i s i s presented of old A f r i c a , d e t a i l i n g the p o s i t i o n of 
kings and c h i e f s . 
1 9 B a s i l Davidson, The A f r i c a n Past, C h r o n i c l e s from 
A n t i q u i t y to Modern Times (1964). 
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d i d not develop i n t o s u b s t a n t i v e law backed by case law. I t , 
however, e x i s t e d i n a form of a l e g a l o r a l t r a d i t i o n passed on 
from generation to g e n e r a t i o n . 2 0 In f a c t , during the epoch of 
pharaonic Dynasty, E t h i o p i a n dynasty and the Ghana Empire, an 
i n d i v i d u a l would c e r t a i n l y be r i s k i n g h i s l i f e i f he ever t r i e d 
to implead the king or the emperor i n h i s own court. And i t was 
simply impossible f o r an i n d i v i d u a l i n another kingdom or empire 
to dare implead the l e a d e r of the Empire of Ghana i n the l o c a l 
court of h i s j u r i s d i c t i o n . Such a c t i o n s could l e a d to war and 
therefore were never encouraged or contemplated. 2 1 
The i n t r o d u c t i o n of European jurisprudence i n t o A f r i c a , as 
a r e s u l t of c o l o n i a l i s m , however, r e i n f o r c e d the idea. The 
h i s t o r y of E t h i o p i a , f o r example, shows tha t the p r i n c i p l e of 
princeps legibus solutus could be t r a c e d back to ancient times. 2 2 
Thus c e r t a i n A f r i c a n peoples d i d have t h e i r own concept of 
absolute s o v e r e i g n t y before the establishment of colonies i n 
A f r i c a by Europeans. The i n t r o d u c t i o n of the E n g l i s h common 
law, French c i v i l law, Spanish law, Roman-Dutch law and 
Portuguese law i n t o A f r i c a , however, redefined the c l a s s i c a l 
modern notion of sovereign immunity, which has so f a r become 
entrenched i n the p r a c t i c e of A f r i c a n s t a t e s u n t i l today. 2 3 J.E. 
2 0A.F.C. Ryder, Benin and the European (1485-1877) London 
(1969). 
2 1Bruce W i l l i a m s , Forebears of Menes i n Nubia: Myth or 
R e a l i t y ? J o u r n a l of Near E a s t e r n Studies 46 No. 1 (1987); B a s i l 
Davidson, op. c i t . ; W. Rodney, op. c i t . 
2 2The h i s t o r i e s of Egypt, E t h i o p i a , Ghana, Mali, Songhai 
support the s a i d p r i n c i p l e . 
2 3See T.O. E l i a s , J u d i c i a l Process, op. c i t . , for a c l e a r 
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Casely Hayford i n order to put the record s t r a i g h t s u c c i n c t l y 
postulated i n 1922 that 
"Before even the B r i t i s h came into r e l a t i o n s with our people, we 
were a developed people having our own i n s t i t u t i o n s , having our 
own ideas of government." 2 4 
The C o l o n i a l E r a 
The scramble f or A f r i c a and the period of c o l o n i a l r u l e i n 
A f r i c a witnessed a wholesale introduction of European law and 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i n t o A f r i c a . 2 5 These took the form of t r e a t i e s 
signed between European powers and the indigenous l e a d e r s of 
A f r i c a , i . e . , the c h i e f s and other t r a d i t i o n a l l e a d e r s . 2 6 The 
E n g l i s h and the French, i n fa c t , as the h i s t o r y shows, took 
greater share of the colonised t e r r i t o r i e s of A f r i c a and 
therefore had g r e a t e r spheres of in f l u e n c e i n economic, l e g a l , 
commercial, s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l matters tha t a f f e c t e d these 
overseas dependencies. 2 7 
a n a l y s i s of the process of how European laws were introduced 
i n t o A f r i c a . 
2 4Cf., Walter Rodney, op. c i t . , p. 33; Ca s e l y Hayford was a 
leading Ghanaian a c t i v i s t or n a t i o n a l i s t . 
25T.O. E l i a s , A f r i c a and Development of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law 
(1988) pp. 17-23; same author, The J u d i c i a l Process i n 
Commonwealth A f r i c a (1977) pp. 1-24. 
26T.O. E l i a s , A f r i c a and the Development of I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Law, pp. 3-18; George Padmore, A f r i c a , How B r i t a i n Rules A f r i c a 
(1936). 
2 7Rodney, How Europe Under-Developed A f r i c a (1982); Joseph 
Anane and Godfrey Brown, A f r i c a i n Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries (1970). 
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The r u l e over A f r i c a n t e r r i t o r i e s was e s t a b l i s h e d 
p r i m a r i l y by annexation and conquest but a l s o by c e s s i o n . 2 8 This 
then gave the v a r i o u s European powers the a u t h o r i t y to manage 
the a f f a i r s of the c o l o n i e s t h a t came under t h e i r sway. 
The Spanish and the Portuguese a l s o had overseas 
dependencies i n A f r i c a , but t h e i r spheres of i n f l u e n c e dwindled 
when the other European powers entered the "scramble for 
A f r i c a . " Thus between 16th and 18th c e n t u r i e s the sphere of 
infl u e n c e of Spain and Portug a l became somewhat minimal, f or i t 
would appear these two c o u n t r i e s had a div i d e d a t t e n t i o n . 2 9 
Spain, f o r example, had to de a l with her i n t e r e s t i n L a t i n 
America while Portugal expended some of her energies on B r a z i l 
and other areas of i n t e r e s t around the globe, even though 
h i s t o r y a t t e s t s to the f a c t t h a t the f i r s t voyage to the A f r i c a n 
Continent was undertaken by the Portuguese. 3 0 
See T.O. E l i a s ' a r t i c l e i n A f r i c a n Law: Adaptation and 
Development, e d i t e d by H i l d e r Kuper and Leo Kuper (1965) pp. 
184-196. 
2 9 I b i d . 
3 0See Dr. Nkrumah, The Challenge of the Congo (1974) pp. 1-
6; see Also F.D. Lugard, The Portuguese A f r i c a , Harvard 
U n i v e r s i t y Press (1959). 
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THE PATTERN OF BALKANIZATION OF AFRICA ACCORDING 
TO COLONIAL POWER BOUNDARIES 
A. 
Former B r i t i s h Colonies 
Ghana Lesotho 
N i g e r i a Sudan 
S i e r r a Leone Swaziland 
Botswana South A f r i c a 
Egypt Uganda 
Cameroon/British Tanzania 
French Zambia 
Malawi Zimbabwe 
Kenya Mauricius 
Gambia 
B. 
Former French Colonies 
A l g e r i a Niger 
Benin Mauritania 
Burkina Faso Morocco 
Senegal Seychelles 
Cameroon/French Dji b o u t i 
B r i t i s h Togo 
C e n t r a l A f r i c a n Republic Gabon 
Madagascar Guinea 
Mali Ivory Coast 
Chad Congo 
Camoros Tu n i s i a 
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c . 
Former Spanish Colonies 
Spanish Sahara 
Spanish Guinea or E q u a t o r i a l Guinea 
I t appears the French and Spanish r u l e d Canary I s l a n d s and 
Madagascar one time or another. (This may apply to other French 
t e r r i t o r i e s . ) 
Former Portuguese Colonies 
Angola Guinea B i s s a u 
Cape Verde Mozambique 
Former B e l g i a n Colonies 
Zaire—now the Republic of Congo 
Rwanda 
Burundi 
Former I t a l i a n Colonies 
Somalia 
B r i e f occupation of E t h i o p i a by f o r c e of arms 
Libya 
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G. 
Former German Colonies 
(1) N a m i b i a — l a t e r given to South A f r i c a under the mandate 
system 
(2) Tanzania for some time before i t was given to the B r i t i s h as 
mandate t e r r i t o r y 
(3) T r a n s v o l t a T o g o l a n d — f o r some time before being given to the 
B r i t i s h as a t r u s t t e r r i t o r y 
H. 
American and B r i t i s h / D u t c h Colonies 
L i b e r i a — f o r m e r American colony 
South Africa--former B r i t i s h / D u t c h colony 
E r i t r e a — f o r m e r l y p a r t of E t h i o p i a i s snow independent ( s t a t e 
s u c c e s s i o n ) 
How the E n g l i s h Version of Sovereign Immunity Found I t s Way i n t o 
A f r i c a 
The B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l p o l i c y created room f o r the 
p r i n c i p l e s and p r a c t i c e s of E n g l i s h common law to be introduced 
i n t o her c o l o n i e s . And the p r i n c i p l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law 
grounded i n the p r a c t i c e of the UK were also introduced i n t o 
these c o l o n i e s . 3 1 The B r i t i s h Crown was quite e c l e c t i c i n i t s 
approach and therefore gave deference or due r e c o g n i t i o n to 
A f r i c a n law and such immemorial customs and usages th a t appear 
not to run counter to her c o l o n i a l p o l i c y . E n g l i s h law 
31T.O. E l i a s , The J u d i c i a l Process i n Commonwealth A f r i c a 
(1977) pp. 1-18, 59-78; T.O. E l i a s , B r i t i s h C o l o n i a l Law (1962); 
A.N. A l l o t t , Essays i n A f r i c a n Law (1960); E l i a s , The Adaptation 
of Imported Law i n A f r i c a , Journal of A f r i c a n Law 1960 v o l . IV 
no. 2 . 
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therefore was introduced i n t o such c o u n t r i e s as Ghana, Ni g e r i a , 
S i e r r a Leone, Gambia, Botswana, Malawi, Kenya, Lesotho, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Uganda, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Mauricius, and Zambia 
through i n d i r e c t r u l e . 3 2 The r e c o g n i t i o n given to A f r i c a n law or 
customary law i n B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l t e r r i t o r i e s somewhat cr e a t e d 
what some would simply regard as " p a r a l l e l p o s s i b i l i t i e s , " which 
i n turn gave b i r t h to problems of c o n f l i c t of laws, 3 3 e.g., 
i n t e r n a l c o n f l i c t of laws and p r i v a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
With respect to f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , the B r i t i s h Crown 
represented these c o l o n i e s as b e s t as i t could. As Judge E l i a s 
puts i t s u c c i n c t l y : 
"Once the v a r i o u s powers had p a r c e l l e d out the Continent 
and consolidated t h e i r boundaries by i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r e a t i e s , the 
e x i s t i n g s o v e r e i g n t i e s of the o l d kingdoms and c i t y s t a t e s 
became submerged under the new s o v e r e i g n t i e s of the metropolitan 
powers. . . . I n view of the s u b s t i t u t e d s o v e r e i g n t i e s of the 
European s t a t e s for those of the t e r r i t o r i e s grouped i n t o the 
new p o l i t i c a l aggregations, the h i s t o r i c a l modes of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r c o u r s e were c l o s e d to these indigenous s t a t e s 
and kingdoms. The new e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s became a matter of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, i d e n t i f i e d w i t h those of European r u l e r s . 
Boundary and trade agreements were concluded between the 
metropolitan powers based i n Europe." 3 4 
Thus save a few t e r r i t o r i e s , namely, Southern Rhodesia and 
l a t e r N i g e r i a , 3 5 which were allowed or given some l i m i t e d 
l a t i t u d e to act i n r e s p e c t of e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s based on powers 
s p e c i f i c a l l y delegated from the B r i t i s h government, e x t e r n a l 
3 2See E l i a s ( j u d i c i a l process) (1974) pp. 1-18. 
3 3 I b i d . 
3 4See E l i a s , A f r i c a and Development of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law p. 
19. 
3 5See Sanders, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Jurisprudence i n A f r i c a n 
Context (1979) p. 70. 
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a f f a i r s i n one way or the other remained e x c l u s i v e l y i n the 
hands of the s a i d c o l o n i a l power. 3 6 Thus B r i t i s h p o l i c y on 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law applied with the same force and v a l i d i t y i n 
the c o l o n i e s as i n Westminster ( i n UK) .J' This means t h a t 
whatever p o s i t i o n B r i t a i n took i n r e s p e c t of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law 
was r e c e i v e d i n t o municipal laws of these colonies en block,38 
t h a t i s , whether these colonies be s e t t l e d , ceded or annexed. 
The d o c t r i n e of sovereign immunity was t r u l y introduced i n t o 
commonwealth A f r i c a through i n d i r e c t r u l e ( i . e . , through the 
Crown Colony System of government thus: 
The King or Queen 
The i n f l u e n c e of The S e c r e t a r y of P o l i c y Statements 
B r i t i s h p u b l i c S t a t e f o r the coming from 
opinion Colonies Westminster 
The Governor--resident i n the Colonies 
The L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l Executive C o u n c i l 
( i n the C o l o n i e s ) (in the Colonies) 
I n other words, the doctrine of sovereign immunity found i t s way 
i n t o commonwealth A f r i c a through the s t r u c t u r e of government 
which was i n s t i t u t e d i n these t e r r i t o r i e s . I t was a l s o 
3 6 I b i d . 
3 7 I b i d . 
38 E l i a s , J u d i c i a l Process pp. 1-18, 
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introduced into A f r i c a through order i n c o u n c i l or through the 
common law, i . e . , through stare decisis. 
The Secretary of State f o r the C o l o n i e s , normally a 
Cabinet minister, was responsible for the everyday running of 
a l l c o l o n i a l t e r r i t o r i e s . He was given s u p e r v i s o r y powers and 
t h e r e f o r e had the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of informing Parliament about 
the conditions of the Colonies. His l e g a l p o s i t i o n a l s o gave 
him powers to advise the King or the Queen on the appointment of 
governors (who were i n a c t u a l f a c t appointed i n the name of the 
King). 
The governor represented the Crown i n matters of 
government. His duties were to formulate and execute p o l i c i e s ; 
the appointment and d i s c i p l i n e of c i v i l s e r v a n t s ; and i f need 
be, the d i s m i s s a l of these c i v i l s e r v a n t s , i n c l u d i n g judges and 
other o f f i c e r s of the j u d i c i a r y . These c i v i l s e r v a n t s as a 
matter of B r i t i s h t r a d i t i o n held o f f i c e i n B r i t i s h Commonwealth 
at the pleasure of the Crown. The governor p r e s i d e d over both 
the l e g i s l a t i v e and executive c o u n c i l s and t h e r e f o r e i n most 
cases had o v e r a l l control over these two bodies. The enactment 
of laws i n the l e g i s l a t i v e c o u n c i l was s u b j e c t to the assent of 
the governor which could be withheld a t the governor 1s freedom 
of choice or a c t i o n . 3 9 The governor acc o r d i n g to E n g l i s h 
c o n s t i t u t i o n law was bound to seek the a d v i c e of the executive 
c o u n c i l i n matters r e l a t i n g to the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the colony. 
But i n f a c t , he had the d i s c r e t i o n e i t h e r to follow the advice 
3 9J.H. Pric e , P o l i t i c a l I n s t i t u t i o n s of West A f r i c a (1975) 
pp. 14-20. 
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or r e j e c t i t , or simply follow whatever p o l i c y he thought 
appropriate i n a given case. However, he must inform the 
Se c r e t a r y of S t a t e i f he went beyond the powers granted to him. 
The p o s i t i o n of the governor, as can be seen, was absolute and 
si n c e he r e p r e s e n t e d the i n t e r e s t of the Crown he was immune 
from s u i t before the l o c a l c o u r t s , 4 0 as w e l l as the government of 
the Crown Colony. 
One important common feature of the reception of these 
E n g l i s h laws i n t o Commonwealth A f r i c a follows an i n v a r i a b l e 
formula thus: 
"The common law, the do c t r i n e of e q u i t y and s t a t u t e s of 
ge n e r a l a p p l i c a t i o n i n England a t a named date s h a l l be 
a p p l i c a b l e i n the p a r t i c u l a r t e r r i t o r y so f a r as l o c a l 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s permit and i t i s not modified by express l o c a l 
l e g i s l a t i o n . 4 1 
Thus, q u i t e a p a r t from l o c a l l e g i s l a t i o n E n g l i s h law and 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law a p p l i e d with f u l l force provided these laws do 
not c o n f l i c t w i t h l o c a l l e g i s l a t i o n . 
The " r e c e i v e d E n g l i s h law," i . e . , E n g l i s h common law which 
was introduced i n t o commonwealth A f r i c a , covered such areas of 
the law as c i v i l and c r i m i n a l law as w e l l as procedure and 
evidence and any other branch of E n g l i s h law that would be 
u s e f u l i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the c o l o n i e s . The element of 
E n g l i s h law seemed l e s s strong i n jurisprudence and p u b l i c 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law but i t would appear the teachings of the 
D u a l i s t School of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law was p r e f e r r e d to the Monist 
4 0 I b i d . 
4 1 E l i a s , J u d i c i a l Process, p. 1. 
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School of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law. 4 2 T h i s p r a c t i c e continued even 
a f t e r these countries were granted independence. 
In the l i g h t of the preceding observations i t i s submitted 
that the s u b j e c t and content of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law as p r a c t i c e d 
i n England during c o l o n i a l times were about the same i n the 
c o l o n i e s . 4 3 Thus before independence a l l the i n s t i t u t i o n s of 
government i n Commonwealth A f r i c a ex hypothesi followed the 
doctrine of absolute immunity which was then w e l l accepted and 
entrenched i n B r i t i s h p r a c t i c e . 4 4 
I t i s i n s t r u c t i v e to note tha t with the exception of 
Egypt, the d o c t r i n e of absolute immunity was never challenged i n 
Commonwealth A f r i c a u n t i l quite r e c e n t l y when South A f r i c a 
changed her p o s i t i o n by embracing the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 4 5 
The r u l e of absolute immunity i n f a c t has remained the p r a c t i c e 
of A f r i c a n countries to date because the post-independence 
4 2 E l i a s , J u d i c i a l Process, op. c i t . , p. 14. 
4 3See The Gold Coast Courts Act of 24th day of J u l y (1874) 
now repealed, Ghana Courts Ordinance: Chap. 4, S e c t i o n 83 reads 
as follows: 
"Subject to the terms of t h i s or any other ordinance, the 
common law, the doctrines of equity and the s t a t u t e s of 
general a p p l i c a t i o n which were i n force i n England on the 
24th day of July, 1874, s h a l l be i n f o r c e w i t h i n the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of the c o u r t s . " 
4 4Most former E n g l i s h Colonies s t i l l f o l l o w E n g l i s h 
p r i n c i p l e s of law and the p r a c t i c e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
Perhaps some countries of l a t e might be changing t h e i r p o s i t i o n s 
i n respect to E n g l i s h a u t h o r i t i e s . Ghana, N i g e r i a , S i e r r a 
Leone, Gambia, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Swaziland, Botswana, 
Zimbabwe, The Sudan, e t c . , before independence followed E n g l i s h 
law to the l e t t e r . 
4 5See W. Bray and M. Beukes, Recent Trends i n the 
Development of State Immunity i n South A f r i c a n Law (1981) 7 
SAYIL 13 (Foreign States Immunities Act 1981) . 
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r e p u b l i c c o n s t i t u t i o n of these new A f r i c a n s t a t e s d i d not give 
any allowance t h a t the sovereign be sued i n i t s own court. The 
various r e p u b l i c a n c o n s t i t u t i o n s i n place simply were s i l e n t on 
t h i s matter s i n c e the d o c t r i n e of absolute immunity was well 
entrenched i n the s a i d c o l o n i e s p r i o r to gaining independence. 
This i s even more so because these new A f r i c a n s t a t e s are 
more i n t e r e s t e d i n p r e s e r v i n g t h e i r hard-won independence or 
statehood than i n throwing t h e i r weight behind an emerging 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law which seems h i g h l y l i k e l y to adversely a f f e c t 
i t . And those A f r i c a n s t a t e s sued i n recent times before 
foreign courts have a l l v i g o r o u s l y r e s i s t e d as of r i g h t the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of the f o r e i g n court based on sovereign immunity, 
i . e . , par in parent non habet jurisdictionem.*6 In Trendtex 
Trading Corporation v. C e n t r a l Bank of N i g e r i a , the Federal 
Republic of N i g e r i a r e s i s t e d the j u r i s d i c t i o n of E n g l i s h courts 
on the grounds t h a t the Mareva i n j u n c t i o n i s s u e d against i t s 
C e n t r a l Bank i n r e s p e c t of the f a i l e d cement contract was 
contrary to i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i n as much as the C e n t r a l Bank's 
funds were immune, by general i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, i . e . , from 
execution. The s a i d p l e a found favour with Donaldson J who 
4 6Planmount L t d . v. Republic of Z a i r e (1981) 1 AIL ER 1100 
64 ILR p. 268; B i r c h Shipping Corp. v. Embassy of the United 
Republic of Tanzania (1980) 507 F.Supp. 3111; The Kingdom of 
Morocco v. Soueta Immobiliare Forte Barchetto (1979) 65 ILR; 
Democratic Republic of Congo v. Venre (1971) 22 ILR 3rd 669 684; 
Libya American O i l Co. v. Libya (1980) 482 F.Supp. 1175; 
TransAmerican Steamship Corp. v. Somali Democratic Rep. 767 R.2d 
988 1004; Trendtex Trading Corp. v. C e n t r a l Bank of Nigeria 
(1977) 2 WLR 356 (Court of Appeal); Libyan Arab S o c i a l i s t 
People's J a n a h i r i y a v. Russbeton SRL (ILR 8763) I t a l y Court of 
Cassation 1989; Texas Trading and M i l l i n g Corp. v. Fed. Rep. of 
Nigeria, 2nd C i r . Ayr 16 1981 (2v I n t ' L Leg Mat Ls Ono (1981)). 
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r u l e d t h a t the i n j u n c t i o n be set asi d e . However, on appeal the 
p l a i n t i f f was granted leave to appeal to the House of Lords. I n 
t h i s r e s p e c t was Trendtex decided per incuriaml Some are l i k e l y 
to agree, but i f c a r r i e d to i t s l o g i c a l conclusion i t would 
appear Trendtex was not decided per incuriam s i n c e the appeal 
court could not reconsider the same i s s u e s over again. Again i n 
the Uganda Co. Holdings Ltd. v. Government of Uganda, the 
p l a i n t i f f s i n s t i t u t e d a claim of indemnity a g a i n s t the 
Government of Uganda as a r e s u l t of the compulsory government 
a c q u i s i t i o n decrees passed by the Amin government and a l s o f o r 
the subrogation of the s a i d government to a l l the l i a b i l i t i e s of 
the two companies i n i s s u e . The Ugandan Government q u i c k l y 
challenged the w r i t , arguing that being a sovereign s t a t e , i t 
cannot be sued before E n g l i s h courts. Donaldson L J found f o r 
the Ugandan Government, thus d e c l i n i n g to follow Trendtex, 
because i n h i s view there was a c o n f l i c t between Trendtex and 
Thai-Europe. 
In the l i g h t of these d e c i s i o n s , can i t be argued t h a t 
pleadings based on customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law duly presented as 
a l e g a l p o s i t i o n before foreign courts be designated as s t a t e 
p r a c t i c e ? Many w i l l no doubt take i s s u e with the above 
supposition. However, a further r e f l e c t i o n w i l l show t h a t 
claims or a s s e r t i o n s made i n concrete terms or in abstracto i n 
regard to a l e g a l r i g h t or l e g a l r u l e can be r e f e r r e d to as 
s t a t e p r a c t i c e . 4 7 
4 7Thirlway, op. c i t . , p. 58; Akehurst, op. c i t . , p. 4. 
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Dr. Akehurst i n c o n s i d e r i n g t h i s s u b j e c t o f f e r s the 
following explanation: 
"Customary law i s c r e a t e d by s t a t e p r a c t i c e . S t a t e 
p r a c t i c e means any a c t or statement by a s t a t e from which view 
about customary law can be i n f e r r e d . I t i n c l u d e s p h y s i c a l a c t s , 
d e c l a r a t i o n s i n a b s t r a c t o (such as g e n e r a l assembly r e s o l u t i o n s , 
n a t i o n a l law, n a t i o n a l judgments and o m i s s i o n s . " 4 8 
His argument or e x p l a n a t i o n i s e q u a l l y shared by such s c h o l a r s 
as Dr. V i l l i g e r , 4 9 Dr. T h i r l w a y , 5 0 and Professor Wolfke. 5 1 Dr. 
Danieleko, f o r example, a l s o argued i n support of the 
supposition as f o l l o w s : 
" I t was assumed t h a t a custom-generating p r a c t i c e should 
be made up of c o n c r e t e m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of a c t u a l conduct 
i n v o l v i n g a s s e r t i o n s of a r i g h t or c l a i m which i s enforced 
a g a i n s t other s t a t e s . The concept of a c t u a l p r a c t i c e 
encompasses not only a c t i v e p r a c t i c e but a l s o negative p r a c t i c e 
c o n s i s t i n g i n h a b i t u a l a b s t e n t i o n s from s p e c i f i c a c t i o n s . " 5 2 
Furthermore, the w r i t i n g s of these learned p u b l i c i s t s have 
equally been confirmed by the I C J i n i t s judgment i n the Asylum 
Case 5 3 and the C o n t i n e n t a l S h e l f Cases. 5 4 I f t h i s be the 
consensus of the day, then the s a i d pleadings which were 
submitted by N i g e r i a and Uganda as claims before E n g l i s h courts 
represent s t a t e p r a c t i c e or l e g a l p o s i t i o n , or what these 
countries b e l i e v e to be the law s i n c e the s a i d a s s e r t i o n s were 
Akehurst, op. c i t . , p. 53. 
4 9 V i l l i g e r , op. c i t . 
5 0Thirlway, op. c i t . 
5 1Wolfke, op. c i t . 
5 2Danieleko, op. c i t . , pp. 85-86. 
5 3 (19 5 0) I C J Reports 277. 
5 4 (1985) I C J Reports 29. 
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r e f l e c t i v e of customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. The d o c t r i n e of 
absolute immunity t h e r e f o r e can be seen from the p r a c t i c e of the 
fo l l o w i n g c o u n t r i e s , because the s a i d claims show how 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s understood. Countries from Commonwealth A f r i c a 
and Francophone co u n t r i e s have a l l argued that they be accorded 
immunity. 
These co u n t r i e s have expressed opinio non juris i n r e s p e c t of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 
N i g e r i a Uganda 
Lib y a Zambia 
Za i r e — n o w Republic of Congo Guinea 
E t h i o p i a Mozambique 
Tanzania Ivory Coast 
Morocco Rep. Democratique du Congo 
Congo Tu n i s i a 
Somalia A l g e r i a 
*Egypt did challenge the j u r i s d i c t i o n of foreign courts but i t 
follows the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 
I t should be observed, on the other hand, t h a t s e v e r a l 
governments i n A f r i c a have i n c l e a r terms expressed some 
preference f o r more absolute r u l e of sovereign immunity. 5 5 
5 5See B l a u s t e i n - F l a n z , Constitutions of the Countries of the 
World; the work deals with the Con s t i t u t i o n of A f r i c a n s t a t e s . 
For complaints see Doc No. AALCC/IM/87/2, a paper e n t i t l e d 
J u r i s d i c t i o n a l immunities of s t a t e s prepared f o r a meeting of 
l e g a l a d v i s e r s of these countries but see g e n e r a l l y Ibou D i a i t e , 
Les C o n s t i t u t i o n s A f r i c a i n e s et l e d r o i t I n t e r n a t i o n a l Annales 
A f r i c a i n e s (1971-72), 33-51. 
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Ghana, S i e r r a Leone, Botswana, Gambia, Malawi, Kenya, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Mauricius and Cameroon, f o r example, have 
republican c o n s t i t u t i o n s i n which the l o c a l sovereign i s 
accorded absolute immunity i n i t s spheres of operation. 5" And 
the d e c l a r a t i o n s made by these c o u n t r i e s before the OAU suggest 
that they a l l support a r e g i o n a l agreement wholly predicated on 
the charter. Parts of A r t i c l e 3 can be s t a t e d as follows: 
"(1) The sovereign e q u a l i t y of a l l member s t a t e s 
(2) Non-interference i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of s t a t e s 
(3) Respect for the s overeign and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of 
each s t a t e and f o r i t s i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t to independent 
e x i s t e n c e 
(4) Peaceful s e t t l e m e n t of d i s p u t e s by n e g o t i a t i o n s , 
mediation, c o n c i l i a t i o n or a r b i t r a t i o n . " 5 7 
I t must be s t a t e d u n e q u i v o c a l l y t h a t A f r i c a n countries 
having s u c c e s s f u l l y r i d themselves of c o l o n i a l r u l e and 
desperately faced with the t a s k of nation b u i l d i n g are not ready 
to compromise t h e i r s overeignty and the e q u a l i t y they enjoy 
among the community of s t a t e s . A r t i c l e 3 Section 1 to 3 
undoubtedly represent s e t t l e d u n i v e r s a l r u l e among n a t i o n - s t a t e s 
and therefore, ex hypothesi, could be regarded as r u l e s of 
general i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. A r t i c l e 3 Subsection l 5 8 c l e a r l y 
r e s t a t e s the c l a s s i c a l notion of e q u a l i t y of s t a t e s , i . e . , the 
independence and e q u a l i t y of s t a t e s which i n some in s t a n c e s 
i m p l i c i t l y d e r i v e s i t s force from the maxim par in parem non 
5 6See P.F. Gonidec, Les d r o i t e A f r i c a i n s (1968); the 
independence c o n s t i t u t i o n s of t hese c o u n t r i e s a l s o support the 
p o s i t i o n taken by the present w r i t e r . 
"See OAU Charter A r t i c l e 3. 
5 8 I b i d . 
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habet imperium. A r t i c l e 3 Section l 5 9 i s therefore a c o r o l l a r y 
of sovereign immunity. A f r i c a n s t a t e s , having signed the 
c h a r t e r , are ready to adopt an i n t e r n a l as w e l l as e x t e r n a l 
n a t i o n a l i s m s p e c i f i c a l l y geared toward the promotion of t h e i r 
l e g a l sovereignty. The sovereign s t a t e , according to A f r i c a n 
l e a d e r s , i s one and i n d i v i s i b l e and therefore there i s no 
d i s t i n c t i o n between i t s p u b l i c law capacity and p r i v a t e law 
c a p a c i t y . This idea was borrowed from n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n 
movements, i n view of the f a c t , t h a t these r a d i c a l groups during 
the Cold War days t o t a l l y leaned toward the M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t 
teachings of the former USSR, now Russia. For A f r i c a n s t a t e s , a 
s t a t e i s not amenable to the j u r i s d i c t i o n of municipal courts 
f o r the mere f a c t t h a t i t has ventured into commerce because i t 
i s l e g i t i m a t e l y i n v e s t e d with potestas imperil, i n order to 
promote the p u b l i c good for the betterment of i t s c i t i z e n s i n 
economic, s o c i a l and n a t i o n a l b u i l d i n g . 
C e r t a i n l y , the i n t r o d u c t i o n of common law i n t o 
Commonwealth A f r i c a could be s i n g l e d out as one of the reasons 
why these A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s adhere to the p r i n c i p l e of s t a t e 
immunity. Although European countries are modulating t h e i r 
p o s i t i o n s r e s p e c t i n g s t a t e immunity, i t would appear, however, 
t h a t most A f r i c a n s t a t e s have turned a deaf ear to the c a l l t h a t 
immunity be r e s t r i c t e d . 
The f o l l o w i n g c o u n t r i e s as of now, however, follow the 
d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 6 0 
5 9 I b i d . 
6 0Brownlie, op. c i t . , pp. 327-328. 
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These countries support r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 
(1) South A f r i c a , e.g., has a l e g i s l a t i o n i n p l a c e 
(2) Togo 
(3) Madagascar 
(4) Lesotho 
(5) Egypt 
Pri o r to 1981, however, South A f r i c a d i d follow the 
c l a s s i c a l notion of sovereign immunity, 6 1 a concept c l e a r l y 
borrowed from E n g l i s h p r a c t i c e . 
How the French Version of Sovereign Immunity Found i t s Way i n t o 
A f r i c a 
The French c o l o n i a l p o l i c y i n A f r i c a followed about the 
same pattern as that of the B r i t i s h . However, the French p o l i c y 
d i f f e r e d somewhat i n t h a t while the B r i t i s h followed a p o l i c y of 
i n d i r e c t r u l e , the French, on the other hand, followed the 
p r i n c i p l e of d i r e c t r u l e . 6 2 In other words, the French p o l i c y 
d i d not give any r e c o g n i t i o n whatsoever to A f r i c a n law i n the 
t e r r i t o r i e s that came under t h e i r domination. This means i n 
r e a l terms that no room was given to the f l o w e r i n g of A f r i c a n 
law alongside French law. 6 3 Hence t h e r e were no p a r a l l e l 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s created w i t h i n the l e g a l systems of these 
colonised t e r r i t o r i e s as to c r e a t e problems of c o n f l i c t of law. 6 4 
6 1See Dugard, op. c i t . , pp. 151-158. 
62T.O. E l i a s , Adaptation and Development, op. c i t . 
6 3 I b i d . 
6 4 l b i d . 
276 
Thus any c i t i z e n w i t h i n these c o l o n i e s who q u a l i f i e s as evolves 
or assimilados was considered a French c i t i z e n and therefore 
d i r e c t l y "placed" under French law. 6 5 I t i s i n s t r u c t i v e to note 
t h a t these French overseas t e r r i t o r i e s were l e g a l l y regarded as 
an i n t e g r a l p a r t of metropolitan France and therefore 
governmental p o l i c i e s and i n t e r n a t i o n a l law designed for France 
a p p l i e d with the same force and v a l i d i t y i n these overseas 
t e r r i t o r i e s of France. The French a l s o without exception 
adopted not only the machinery, but the procedures of the Code 
Napoleon to the l e t t e r i n these c o l o n i e s . 6 6 And t h i s i s 
e x e m p l i f i e d by the force and e f f e c t of the p o l i c y of 
a s s i m i l a t i o n and d i r e c t r u l e . 
t e r r i t o r i e s as members of the French community concluded with 
France having r e t a i n e d some form of j u d i c i a l a s s o c i a t i o n with 
the C o n s e i l d'etat and the Cour de C a s s a t i o n of France, thus 
e s t a b l i s h i n g a system of r e f e r e n c e s and appeals, from t h e i r 
h i g h e s t l o c a l t r i b u n a l s to those of F r a n c e . 6 7 
Thus any l e g a l controversy th a t crops up within these 
overseas t e r r i t o r i e s which d e f i e s s o l u t i o n i s always r e f e r r e d to 
France f o r r e s o l u t i o n . This arguably means that the c i v i l law 
of France was a p p l i e d to the colonies as though the l i t i g a t i n g 
p a r t i e s were before a French court. Thus i n t e r n a t i o n a l law as 
understood i n France undoubtedly followed the same pattern i n 
these c o l o n i s e d t e r r i t o r i e s . 6 8 I t may be r e c a l l e d that i t was 
"Almost a l l the post-independence agreements with these 
65 I b i d . 
66 I b i d . 
67 I b i d p. 191. • r 
68 See Sanders, op. c i t pp. 227-232. 
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through the pleadings which were made on be h a l f of France i n the 
Schooner Exchange that prompted C h i e f J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l to the 
r u l e t h a t immunity be granted to France based on the maxim par 
in parem non habet jurisdictionem.69 Ever s i n c e t h a t day, 
France, i t would appear, might have taken the view t h a t immunity 
be granted to foreign sovereign s t a t e s i r r e s p e c t i v e of whether 
the a c t i v i t i e s of the s t a t e i n i s s u e be p r i v a t e or p u b l i c , 
although there i s evidence to support the f a c t t h a t Bodin's 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l writings might have had an e a r l i e r i n f l u e n c e on 
the p r a c t i c e of France i n the area of the law of sovereign 
immunity. 7 0 
I t i s submitted that before the F i r s t World War France 
followed the doctrine of absolute immunity without any 
r e s e r v a t i o n s . 7 1 The Moroccan Loan Case 7 2 and t h a t of the Hanu 
Krew v. Minister del'Afghanistan 1922, 7 3 which were l i t i g a t e d 
before French courts, f i r m l y followed the p r i n c i p l e of absolute 
immunity. 7 4 However, a f t e r the F i r s t World War, the p o s i t i o n of 
France became somewhat ambivalent. France thus followed s t a t e 
S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , p. 207. 
70T.O. E l i a s , op. c i t . , A f r i c a and the Development of 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, p. 63; George Sabine and Thomas Thorson, op. 
c i t . ; A. Appadorae, op. c i t . 
7 1 S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , p. 208. 
7 2S. 1935-1-103. 
7 3 C a s s . reg., Jan. 23, 1933, S 1933-1-249. 
7 4 S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . 
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immunity a t one time, while at the same time threw i t s support 
behind the r e s t r i c t i v e approach at other t i m e s . 7 5 
The argument a l l u d e d to above i s e s s e n t i a l to the 
understanding of the a t t i t u d e of former French colonies i n 
r e s p e c t of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. And given the French p o l i c y of 
a s s i m i l a t i o n and d i r e c t r u l e , i t i s p l a u s i b l e to s t a t e more 
c l e a r l y t h a t whatever i n t e r n a t i o n a l law a p p l i e d i n the municipal 
courts of France a l s o a p p l i e d with the same weight i n the l o c a l 
c ourts of these dependencies. Thus when the r u l e of s t a t e 
immunity was upheld i n France, i t a l s o found i t s way in t o A f r i c a 
as a r e s u l t of French c o l o n i a l p o l i c y . However, no one can t e l l 
what might have happened to t h i s r u l e a f t e r independence was 
gained by these French-speaking c o u n t r i e s . Thus when France 
embraced the d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity, most of these 
A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s might arguably have done the same, since the 
l e g a l system of these A f r i c a n countries were structured to 
follow the procedures of the Code Napoleon. Although the 
argument advanced h e r e i n may be open to debate, there i s the 
tendency of some French-speaking c o u n t r i e s s t i l l w i l l i n g to 
follow today the same p r i n c i p l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law adhered to 
by the Cour d'appel de Rennes. Thus, l o g i c a l l y , any authority 
coming out of t h i s c ourt i s l i k e l y to c a r r y weight i n French-
speaking A f r i c a . 7 6 I t i s important to note, however, that the 
p o s i t i o n of French-speaking c o u n t r i e s as a t now i s obscure. 
7 5 I b i d . , pp. 203-218. 
7 6Sanders, op. c i t . , pp. 227-232; E l i a s , op. c i t . , A f r i c a 
and the Development of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law. 
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Evidence forthcoming so f a r i n d i c a t e s t h a t only Togo and 
Madagascar have decided to follow the r e s t r i c t i v e p r i n c i p l e . 7 7 
Again the p o s i t i o n of T u n i s i a and Cameroon appears obscure and 
not at a l l c l e a r - c u t , 7 8 but i t would appear t h a t these c o u n t r i e s 
i n the past have followed absolute immunity. 
In f a c t , the French-speaking c o u n t r i e s of West A f r i c a are 
somewhat reserved i n these matters but appear, however, not to 
be a g a i n s t the t r a d i t i o n a l notion of s t a t e immunity because 
evidence a t t e s t s to the f a c t t h a t those French-speaking 
co u n t r i e s sued i n foreign courts have a l s o f i e r c e l y r e s i s t e d the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of the foreign court. 
In the l i g h t of the Charter of the OAU, i . e . , A r t i c l e 3 
Subsection 1, and the d e c l a r a t i o n s made by A f r i c a n s t a t e s , one 
would not be wrong i n saying that c o u n t r i e s such as A l g e r i a , 
Benin, Burkina-Faso, Central A f r i c a n Republic, D j i b o u t i , Gabon, 
Republic of Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, 
Niger, S e y c h e l l e s , Chad, Camoros and Congo B r a z a v i l l e would 
r a t h e r p r e f e r that the r u l e of absolute sovereign immunity be 
maintained. 7 9 
The Portuguese and Spanish c o l o n i a l p o l i c i e s i n A f r i c a 
followed the same d i r e c t i o n as t h a t of France. But i t would 
appear that the Portuguese approach was more s t r i n g e n t . Thus 
7 7Brownlie, op. c i t . , p. 328. 
7 8 I b i d . 
7 9 T h i s i s so because there i s no evidence of the p r a c t i c e of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i n A f r i c a , except some few c o u n t r i e s such 
as South A f r i c a , Togo, Egypt, Lesotho and Madagascar. 
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Spain and Portugal as a matter of con v i c t i o n followed a theory 
where t h e i r overseas dependencies were simply considered a l b e i t 
an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the land mass of metropolitan Europe. In 
f a c t , whatever law a p p l i e d i n Spain and Portugal a t that time 
applied with equal f o r c e and v a l i d i t y i n t h e i r overseas 
dependencies as though these c o l o n i e s were e n t i r e l y occupied by 
Ib e r i a n s of Europe. Again, i t i s c l e a r from t h i s a n a l y s i s that 
i n so f a r as Portuguese and Spanish countries were concerned, no 
room was given to customary A f r i c a n law to f l o u r i s h . The 
attempt here to study the r e l a t i o n s h i p between these A f r i c a n 
s t a t e s and t h e i r former c o l o n i a l master i s to p r e c i s e l y 
determine how the d o c t r i n e of absolute immunity got i n t o A f r i c a 
during the epoch of c o l o n i a l i s m . 
A f r i c a n S t a t e s S e l f - D e t e r m i n a t i o n and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law 
A f r i c a i s a ver y v a s t continent s t r e t c h i n g over 12 m i l l i o n 
square m i l e s , i . e . , 30.3 m i l l i o n square kilometres. I n f a c t , i t 
forms about o n e - f i f t h of the t o t a l s urface mass of the earth. 
By every e s t i m a t i o n , i t i s the second l a r g e s t continent, second 
to A s i a i n t o t a l " l a n d s u r f a c e . " The l a t e Osagyfo Dr. Kwame 
Nkrumah having taken cognizance of the s i z e of A f r i c a , i t s 
people, d i v e r s i t y i n c u l t u r e and language, o f f e r e d the following 
pi e c e s of advic e . 
" I n A f r i c a where so many d i f f e r e n t kinds of p o l i t i c a l , 
s o c i a l and economic c o n d i t i o n s e x i s t , i t i s not an easy t a s k to 
g e n e r a l i s e on p o l i t i c a l and socio-economic p a t t e r n s . Remnants 
of communalism and f e u d a l i s m s t i l l remain and i n p a r t s of the 
conti n e n t ways of l i f e have changed very l i t t l e from t r a d i t i o n a l 
p a s t . I n other a r e a s a high l e v e l of i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and 
u r b a n i s a t i o n has been a c h i e v e d . Yet i n s p i t e of A f r i c a ' s s o c i o -
economic and p o l i t i c a l d i v e r s i t y , i t i s p o s s i b l e to d i s c e r n 
c e r t a i n common p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l and economic c o n d i t i o n s and 
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problems. These d e r i v e from t r a d i t i o n a l p a s t , common 
a s p i r a t i o n s and from shared experience under i m p e r i a l i s m , 
c o l o n i a l i s m and neo-colonialism. There i s no p a r t of the 
continent which has not known oppression and e x p l o i t a t i o n , and 
no p a r t which remains outside the process of the A f r i c a n 
r e v o l u t i o n . " 8 0 
In view of the advice, i t would be most expedient to 
approach the s u b j e c t before us with utmost e c l e c t i c i s m . I n 
1945, only four A f r i c a n s t a t e s were independent. And these 
c o u n t r i e s were E t h i o p i a , L i b e r i a , Egypt and South A f r i c a . The 
war, however, changed everything. Thus those c o u n t r i e s under 
bondage s t a r t e d questioning the legitimacy of c o l o n i a l i s m , 
although i t would appear such demands had been made e a r l i e r on, 
but the surge i n nationalism which came to the fore a f t e r the 
Second World War was considerable and probably on account of the 
change from c l a s s i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l law to modern i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law. 8 1 And a l s o perhaps because of the a b o l i t i o n of the concept 
of jus ad bellum, i . e . , the r i g h t of a s t a t e to r e s o r t to war 
whenever such a measure serves i t s best i n t e r e s t . 
The change from c l a s s i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l law to modern 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law was al s o aided by the Briand-Kellog Pact of 
1928, which p r o h i b i t e d the r e s o r t to aggressive war as a means 
of s e t t l i n g disputes between s t a t e s . 8 2 According to P r o f e s s o r 
Tunkin, i t was c l a s s i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l law which gave b i r t h to 
8 0Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, C l a s s Struggle i n A f r i c a , 6th Ed. 1981 
p. 9. 
8 1See Tunkin i n Essays on I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law i n Honour of 
Krichna Rao (edited by M.K. Nawaz) (1976) pp. 48-52. 
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c o l o n i a l i s m and i m p e r i a l i s t i c domination of A f r i c a and A s i a , 8 3 
while modern i n t e r n a t i o n a l law paved the way for c o u n t r i e s of 
A f r i c a and A s i a to f i g h t f o r independence. Professor Tunkin 
fu r t h e r argues f o r c e f u l l y thus: 
"The i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i n f o r c e before the October 
Revolution comprised p r i n c i p l e s and norms l e g i t i m a t i n g c o l o n i a l 
domination i n i t s d i f f e r e n t forms. The r i g h t of a c q u i s i t i o n of 
'no man's t e r r i t o r i e s ' (the c o l o u r e d i n h a b i t a n t s of these 
t e r r i t o r i e s were not taken i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n , the r i g h t of 
conquest, imposed t r e a t i e s , spheres of i n f l u e n c e , c o l o n i e s , 
p r o t e c t o r a t e s , e t c . ) belonged to such i n s t i t u t i o n s of c l a s s i c 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. They e x i s t e d s i d e by s i d e with democratic 
p r i n c i p l e s of c l a s s i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, being i n c o n f l i c t with 
Although Professor Tunkin over the years has been 
c r i t i c i s e d for having introduced propaganda int o i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law, 8 5 the above argument thus s t a t e d i n respect of c l a s s i c 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law cannot ex hypothesi be disputed. True, Dr. 
Akehurst seems to take i s s u e with Professor Tunkin on t h i s 
matter, 8 6 but i n h i s own book, he seems to have followed the same 
l i n e of argument i n order to d i s c e r n c e r t a i n p e c u l i a r a t t i t u d e s 
of the T h i r d World towards i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 8 7 
The quest f o r s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n or d e c o l o n i s a t i o n became 
the c r i de guerre of A f r i c a n s t a t e s immediately a f t e r the Second 
World War. The war i n f a c t had a great e f f e c t on everybody and 
" I b i d . 
8 4 I b i d . , p. 51, 
8 5See Akehurst, op. c i t . , p. 496, 
8 6 I b i d . 
87, See M. Akehurst, A Modern In t r o d u c t i o n to I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Law (1987) pp. 19-22. 
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t h e r e f o r e a t t i t u d e s q u i c k l y changed. 8 8 This continued i n a more 
w e l l organised manner a f t e r the founding of the U.N. The 
c a t a l y t i c force and impetus for decolonisation thus took root 
when the 1960 General Assembly Resolution 1514 XV was adopted. 
Ever s i n c e the adoption of t h i s r e s o l u t i o n the r u l e s of 
engagement regarding i n t e r n a t i o n a l law have never been the same. 
Dr. Anand i n e x p l a i n i n g the force behind the a t t i t u d e of 
A s i a and A f r i c a s t a t e s towards i n t e r n a t i o n a l law e x p l a i n s t h a t 
" I n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s no longer the almost e x c l u s i v e 
p r e s e r v e of the peoples of European blood by whose consent i t 
used to be s a i d , ' e x i s t s and for the settlement of whose 
d i f f e r e n c e s i t i s a p p l i e d or at l e a s t invoked' R. P a l (1957) 
176k of I L L 158. As i t must now be assumed to embrace other 
peoples, i t c l e a r l y r e q u i r e s t h e i r consent no l e s s . Second, a t 
l e a s t p a r t of t h i s law, c r e a t e d by, and for, a few prosperous 
i n d u s t r i a l nations, with a common c u l t u r a l background and s t r o n g 
l i b e r a l i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c f e a t u r e s , i s hardly s u i t a b l e for the 
p r e s e n t heterogeneous world s o c i e t y . The m a j o r i t y i n t h i s 
expanded world community c o n s i s t s of small, weak, poor, 
v u l n e r a b l e , t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y and i n d u s t r i a l l y underdeveloped 
former c o l o n i e s f i l l e d w i t h resentment against t h e i r c o l o n i a l 
r u l e r s and needing and demanding the p r o t e c t i o n of the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y . T h i s new majority has new needs and new 
demands and they want to mould the law according to t h e i r 
needs." 8 9 
The explanation o f f e r e d by Dr. Anand can o b j e c t i v e l y be 
construed as an adequate assessment of the a t t i t u d e of T h i r d 
World c o u n t r i e s towards modern i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. Thus the 
adoption of the s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n clause into A r t i c l e 1 of the 
The evidence i s c l e a r l y manifested i n the number of 
c o u n t r i e s that became independent a f t e r the war. Perhaps Dr. 
Tunkin was r i g h t i n h i s argument i n favour of contemporary 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law as opposed to c l a s s i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. (See 
the Charter of the United Nations.) 
8 9See Anand, A t t i t u d e of Asian-African S t a t e s towards 
C e r t a i n Problems of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law i n F. Snyder and 
S a t h i r a t h e r (1987) pp. 10-19. 
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two i n t e r n a t i o n a l covenants on Human Rights, although w e l l 
d i l u t e d by some r e s e r v a t i o n s from a few Western s t a t e s , d i d not 
slow down the speed a t which A f r i c a n s t a t e s gain independence 
from t h e i r c o l o n i a l masters. The General Assembly f u r t h e r 
adopted Resolution 2625 (xxv). The adoption of t h i s r e s o l u t i o n 
thus destroyed the concept of c o l o n i a l i s m f o r good. Many 
Afr i c a n countries s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r took c o n t r o l of t h e i r 
d e s t i n i e s and therefore a f f e c t e d the pace of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
Professor F a l k i n h i s e x p o s i t i o n on the question of 
decolonisation o f f e r s the f o l l o w i n g e x p l a n a t i o n : 
"The new s t a t e s are being asked to accord r e s p e c t to a 
system of law used i n p r i o r decades to l e g a l i z e the c o l o n i a l 
s t r u c t u r e of a u t h o r i t y t h a t h e l d t h e i r s o c i e t i e s i n p r o t e c t i v e 
custody. I t i s n a t u r a l t h a t h o s t i l i t y of the new s t a t e s towards 
c o l o n i a l i s m s p i l l s over to i n f l u e n c e t h e i r a t t i t u d e s towards 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. O'Connell's l o g i c a l c ontention t h a t the new 
s t a t e s cannot question the b i n d i n g q u a l i t y of the r u l e s of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law without undermining t h e i r own claims to 
statehood must be balanced a g a i n s t s o c i o - h i s t o r i c a l 
consciousness t h a t the new s t a t e s a r e being asked to show 
respe c t f o r the same i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e g a l system t h a t was used by 
European powers to suppress and e x p l o i t them." 9 0 
Professor F a l k ' s p o s i t i o n i s amply supported by the impact 
of the B e r l i n Congress of 1884 and the r e s u l t a n t B e r l i n Act of 
1885 and i t s i m p e r i a l i s t i c e f f e c t on the peoples of A f r i c a and 
elsewhere, which i n a way gave b l e s s i n g s to the B a l k a n i s a t i o n of 
A f r i c a according to c o l o n i a l power boundaries i r r e s p e c t i v e of 
family t i e s and t r i b a l groupings. I n s p i t e of these 
d i f f i c u l t i e s and i n j u s t i c e A f r i c a n and Asi a n c o u n t r i e s have a l l 
accepted the force and command of these laws which were i n 
Falk (1966) R e c u e i l des Coures V o l . 2 pp. 16-17. 
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e x i s t e n c e before the attainment of independence. 9 1 However, the 
presence and s o l i d a r i t y of these developing countries were f e l t 
d uring the quest by the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community to r a t i f y the 
new i n t e r n a t i o n a l law of the s e a . 9 2 I n t e r n a t i o n a l law before the 
Second World War thus was p r i m a r i l y European law, but as a 
r e s u l t of the formation of the U.N., and the subsequent 
attainment of independence by Asian and A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s , the 
s t r u c t u r e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law has assumed a global h o r i z o n t a l 
e x p a n s i o n i s t order i n many r e s p e c t s . There i s t h e r e f o r e a 
c o n f l i c t i n g balance of claims and reactions between the o l d 
order and the new order. 
Some R e f l e c t i o n s on State P r a c t i c e and I t s Implications 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l law s c h o l a r s 9 3 are agreed that customary 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s formed or c r e a t e d through s t a t e p r a c t i c e or 
Akehurst, op. c i t . , p. 27. 
92T.O. E l i a s , New Horizons i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1979) pp. 
21-35. 
"Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law 
X L V I I BYIL 1974-1975 p. 53; Thirlway, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Customary 
Law and C o d i f i c a t i o n (1972); G.M. Danielenko, Law-Making i n the 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Community (1992); Mark V i l l i g e r , Customary 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law and T r e a t i e s (1985) pp. 3-37; H. Meijers, How 
I s I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Made i x NYIL (1978) pp. 3-26; A.A. D'Amato, 
The Concept of Custom i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1971); L. Gould, An 
I n t r o d u c t i o n to I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, New York 1957; Korol Wolfke, 
Custom i n Recent I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1994) pp. 52-95; D.P. 
O'Connell, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1970) pp. 3-35; Ian Brownlie, 
P r i n c i p l e s of P u b l i c I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1990) pp. 4-11; J . 
Dugard, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, A South A f r i c a n Perspective (1994) 
pp. 23-35; Kopelmanas, Custom as a Means of the Creation of 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law x v i i i BYIL 1937 p. 127-151; Macgibbon, 
Customary I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law and Acquiescence x x x i i i BYIL 1957 
pp. 115-145. 
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s e t t l e d p r a c t i c e , i . e . , usus q u a l i t a t i v e l y aided or accompanied 
by opinio juris. I t can a l s o be formed i f usus i s c l e a r l y 
accepted by s t a t e s as r i g h t l y tenable, coupled with an 
un q u a l i f i e d f e e l i n g on the part of s t a t e s to be bound (opinio 
juris sive necessitatis) . 9 4 What then c o n s t i t u t e s s t a t e 
p r a c t i c e ? What f a c t o r s must be taken i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n to 
determine the raw m a t e r i a l s of s t a t e p r a c t i c e ? How long must 
the p r a c t i c e be i n e x i s t e n c e to command acceptance as forming 
customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law? Should i t be r i g i d l y construed 
t h a t i t be always c o n s i s t e n t as a p r e r e q u i s i t e to forming 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law? How many s t a t e s must be c l e a r l y a s s o c i a t e d 
with the p r a c t i c e to c r y s t a l l i z e i n t o law? And how important i s 
opinio juris i n t h i s regard? These a r e important questions, and 
they are being asked i n the hope t h a t answers given i n re p l y to 
these questions would help c l e a r the unbeaten path to 
understanding the d i f f i c u l t i e s a s s o c i a t e d with the p r a c t i c e of 
A f r i c a n s t a t e s i n respect of s t a t e immunity. 
In order to see our way c l e a r i n t h i s endeavour, i t i s 
apposite that the questions posed or a l l u d e d to above be f i r s t 
explored as a navigational compass or t o o l to support the s a i d 
proposition that the p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s can c l e a r l y be i n f e r r e d 
from the u n i l a t e r a l a c t i o n taken by a s t a t e or s u b j e c t s of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, before municipal c o u r t s or i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
t r i b u n a l s . This may take the form of a l e g a l claim, clothed i n 
l e g a l arguments or c o n c r e t e l y expressed i n pleadings or l e g a l 
See Dugard, p. c i t , pp. 24-25. 
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a c t i o n , duly e f f e c t e d on behalf of a government by a lawyer or a 
group of lawyers, before a n a t i o n a l j u d i c i a l authority. 
(1) What Do We Mean by State P r a c t i c e ? 
S t a t e p r a c t i c e may encompass the sum t o t a l of a c t u a l 
m a n i f e s t a t i o n of s t a t e a c t i o n or conduct which may d i r e c t l y or 
i n d i r e c t l y a f f e c t or have a bearing on i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 9 5 The 
conduct may take the form of a s s e r t i o n s i n support of a claim or 
an a c t i o n a g a i n s t a s t a t e on s p e c i f i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s s u e or 
a g a i n s t other s t a t e s where a h i s t o r i c a l r i g h t or a p r e s c r i p t i v e 
r i g h t i s a t s t a k e . 9 6 Furthermore, evidence of s t a t e p r a c t i c e can 
be found i n n a t i o n a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l court d e c i s i o n s , 
d i p l o m a t i c correspondence, p o l i c y statements by senior s t a t e 
o f f i c i a l s , statements by foreign m i n i s t e r s before i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s , n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n , r e p l i e s to questionnaires 
and d r a f t r e p o r t s of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission, t r e a t i s e 
and r e s o l u t i o n s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l bodies, e.g., the UN.97 
P r o f e s s o r McDougal says th a t the constituent elements of 
s t a t e p r a c t i c e represent a "Process of continuous i n t e r a c t i o n , 
of continuous demand and response." 9 8 
P r o f e s s o r B r i e r l y i n d e a l i n g with the above subject s a i d 
t h a t s t a t e p r a c t i c e i s "what s t a t e s do i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s with 
one another." 9 9 
9 5See V i l l i g e r , op. c i t . , pp. 4-39. 
9 6 I b i d . 
9 7 I b i d . a t 5. 
9 8 A J I L 49 (1955) 357. 
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Dr. V i l l i g e r i n h i s exposition on what i s s t a t e p r a c t i c e 
explained that 
"State p r a c t i c e on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l plane may i n c l u d e 
d i plomatic correspondence (notes aides-memoires, l e t t e r s , e t c . ) , 
general d e c l a r a t i o n s of f o r e i g n or l e g a l p o l i c y , o p i n i o n s of 
n a t i o n a l l e g a l a d v i s e r s , and i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e n to s t a t e 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . P r a c t i c e can a l s o be found i n the p o s i t i o n s 
taken by governments before i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r i b u n a l s . The 
d e c i s i o n s of t r i b u n a l s and the work of the I L C , w h i l e ex 
hypothesi unable to c r e a t e law, provide important evidence of 
customary law." 1 0 0 
The p o s i t i o n taken by Dr. V i l l i g e r seems to run somewhat counter 
to that of Professor Crawford thus. 
"The arguments of counsel before i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r i b u n a l s 
are s t i l l s t a t e p r a c t i c e , and the c o n s i s t e n t use of e s t o p p e l 
arguments, f o r t i f i e d by adoption (even i f only o r b i t e r or i n a 
s u b s i d i a r y way) by t r i b u n a l s , have l e d to the acceptance of 
estoppel as customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law." 
He argued f u r t h e r that: 
" I t i s , however, d i f f i c u l t to accept t h i s argument. The 
notion of 'customary case law' seems to i n v o l v e , a t l e a s t , a 
confusion or c o n f l a t i o n of elements i n the formation of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law which are, and ought to be, d i s t i n c t . Counsel 
for a s t a t e before an i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r i b u n a l may w e l l be agents 
of the s t a t e for the purpose of admissions, d e c l a r a t i o n s and the 
l i k e ( c f . p. 284), but i t i s d i f f i c u l t to a c c e p t t h a t t h e i r 
j u r i d i c a l arguments are an autonomous form of custom or s t a t e 
p r a c t i c e . They are, a f t e r a l l , attempting to persuade a 
t r i b u n a l whose d e c i s i o n i s only ' s u b s i d i a r y ' source of g e n e r a l 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. I t would be odd i f argument, which i s 
subordinate to d e c i s i o n , could somehow r i s e above the l a t t e r i n 
i t s formal s t a t u s as a l a w - c r e a t i n g agency." 1 0 1 
Dr. V i l l i g e r w h i l s t commenting on P r o f e s s o r Crawford's 
arguments offered the following explanation. 
"With respect, t h i s view p o s s i b l y overlooks the f a c t t h a t 
one i n s t a n c e of p r a c t i c e , such as would be found i n the p o s i t i o n 
"The Law of Nations (1963) p. 59. 
1 0 0 V i l l i g e r op. c i t . p. 5. 
1 0 1BYBIL 51 (1980) 271. 
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taken up before the I C J cannot c r e a t e law. Whereas an I C J 
judgment has eo ipso a f u n c t i o n . " 1 0 2 
Although P r o f e s s o r Crawford's argument i s w e l l taken, i t 
would appear t h a t the expressions or a s s e r t i o n s of subjects of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law before i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r i b u n a l s or perhaps 
before municipal t r i b u n a l s for the s o l e purpose of making a 
claim which i s w e l l grounded and r e f l e c t i v e of customary 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law can be designated as representing s t a t e 
p r a c t i c e and t h e r e f o r e has the p o t e n t i a l of becoming a "law-
c r e a t i n g agency." I n t h i s respect, s t a t e p r a c t i c e i s seen as a 
p o l i t i c a l and l e g a l conduct l e g a l l y a s c r i b e d to s t a t e s i n t h e i r 
c a p a c i t y to express t h e i r own views on i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s s u e s . 
And given the f a c t t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s h o r i z o n t a l i n 
s t r u c t u r e , s u b j e c t s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i n t h i s respect are 
p o s i t i v e l y seen as law makers and p o l i c y makers at the same 
time. 1 0 3 Thus a s s e r t i o n s made by sovereign s a t e s in abstracto 
with the p o s i t i v e aim of making t h e i r p o s i t i o n s known before an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l or m unicipal t r i b u n a l i n r e s p e c t of a l e g a l 
dispute i n support of a l e g a l r i g h t de lata arguably i s s t a t e 
p r a c t i c e and t h e r e f o r e may i n a l l the appropriate circumstances 
p o s i t i v e l y c o n t r i b u t e to the understanding of how s t a t e s behave 
and the means by which t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n to a r u l e i s determined. 
Dr. V i l l i g e r t h e r e f o r e has a p o i n t , 1 0 4 i n as much as actions and 
1 0 2 V i l l i g e r op. c i t . p. 40 ( s p e c i f i c a l l y see footnote 22) i n 
respect of h i s p o s i t i o n on what c o n s t i t u t e s s t a t e p r a c t i c e . He 
c l e a r l y d i s a g r e e d w i t h Prof. Crawford. 
1 0 3 B i n Cheng, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, Teaching and P r a c t i c e 1982 
p. 223. 
1 0 4See V i l l i g e r op. c i t . pp. 3-39. 
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r e a c t i o n s from sovereign s t a t e s i n respect of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
i s s u e t e c h n i c a l l y shapes and redefines s t a t e p r a c t i c e , whether 
i t be a l e g a l argument or judgment. 
A s i m i l a r argument seemed to have been made by Dr. 
Thirlway as f o l l o w s . 
"The o c casion of an act of s t a t e p r a c t i c e c o n t r i b u t i n g to 
the formation of custom must always be some s p e c i f i c d i s p u t e or 
p o t e n t i a l d i s p u t e . . . . 
The mere a s s e r t i o n in abstracto of the e x i s t e n c e of a 
l e g a l r i g h t or l e g a l r u l e i s not an a c t of s t a t e p r a c t i c e ; but 
i t may be adduced as evidence of the acceptance by the s t a t e 
a g a i n s t which i t i s sought to s e t up the claim, of the customary 
r u l e which i s a l l e g e d to e x i s t , assuming t h a t t h a t s t a t e a s s e r t s 
t h a t i t i s not bound by the a l l e g e d r u l e . More important, such 
a s s e r t i o n s can be r e l i e d on as supplementary evidence both of 
s t a t e p r a c t i c e and e x i s t e n c e of opinio juris, but o n l y as 
supplementary evidence, and not as one element to be i n c l u d e d i n 
the summing up of s t a t e p r a c t i c e for the purpose of a s s e r t i n g 
i t s g e n e r a l i t y . " 1 0 5 
Dr. Thirlway's p o s i t i o n undoubtedly w i l l be accepted by 
most i n t e r n a t i o n a l law scholars, except the p o i n t he made 
regarding the d i s t i n c t i o n between mere a s s e r t i o n in abstracto 
and r e a l a s s e r t i o n i n respect of l e g a l r i g h t s . 1 0 6 According to 
Dr. Akehurst, "The d i s t i n c t i o n between a c t s which are 
c o n s t i t u t i v e of p r a c t i c e and acts which are only confirmatory of 
i t i s s i n g u l a r l y t h i n . Indeed the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
a s s e r t i o n s made i n context of some concrete s i t u a t i o n and 
a s s e r t i o n s made in abstracto i s a l s o u n r e a l i s t i c , because i t 
emphasizes appearances at the expense of r e a l i t y . " 1 0 7 Although a 
debate of t h i s nature would promote a p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
1 0 5 T h i r l w a y op. c i t p. 58. 
1 0 6Idem. p. 58. 
1 0 7See Akehurst op. c i t . p. 4. 
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understanding of the s u b j e c t , i t should not d e r a i l our quest to 
l a y bare the e s s e n t i a l elements of s t a t e p r a c t i c e i n 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
(2) Municipal Courts and the Legal Arguments of a Defendant 
State 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s normally r e f e r r e d to as the r e l a t i o n s 
between sovereign s t a t e s i n t h e i r everyday d e a l i n g s with each 
other, i . e . , i n r e s p e c t of c e r t a i n d u t i e s , r i g h t s and 
o b l i g a t i o n s . However, evidence abounds to show t h a t i n some 
insta n c e s the i n t e r a c t i o n between an i n d i v i d u a l and the s t a t e 
can a l s o give r i s e to s t a t e p r a c t i c e . 1 0 8 Thus a c l a i m made by a 
s t a t e as of r i g h t before a n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y i n r e s p e c t of an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s s u e c e r t a i n l y can be denoted as s t a t e 
p r a c t i c e , and thus may c l e a r the path for customary 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law to be made. As i t may be r e c a l l e d , i t was 
through a c l a i m of immunity duly presented on b e h a l f of France 
i n the Schooner Exchange before a n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y t h a t l e d to 
the c r e a t i o n of the s o v e r e i g n immunity r u l e . 1 0 9 
Thus i f a p r i v a t e e n t i t y i n country Z sues country Y 
before a court i n country Z, the most r e l e v a n t i s s u e , as a 
matter of procedure, would be centred on the competence of the 
courts of country Z. And the main question to ask i s whether 
the court has j u r i s d i c t i o n to e n t e r t a i n the s u i t . As a matter 
of p r i n c i p l e anybody can be sued. However, exceptions do e x i s t 
1 0 8Macgibbon, BYBIL x x x i i 1957 p. 120. 
1 0 9The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon (1812) 7 Cranch 116. 
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under i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, respecting a c t s of s t a t e i n the 
e x e r c i s e of sovereign r i g h t s , acta j u r e imperii. These 
exceptions were absolute at one time but of l a t e some s t a t e s 
have taken steps to have the rule l i m i t e d i n scope. Further, i f 
country Y submits to the j u r i s d i c t i o n of country Z without 
question, i t means country Y has given up i t s a l l e g e d r i g h t i n 
r e s p e c t of absolute immunity without pr o t e s t or the i n c l i n a t i o n 
to a s s e r t a claim of immunity and thus embrace the r e s t r i c t i v e 
r u l e of sovereign immunity. I f , on the other hand, government 
lawyers of country Y took pains to l e g a l l y c h a l l e n g e the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of country Z, that being a sovereign country, Y 
cannot be impleaded a g a i n s t i t s w i l l , then i n r e a l terms one may 
be prompted to argue t h a t country Y s t i l l p r e f e r s the o l d order, 
i . e . , the concept of s t a t e immunity, which means t h a t country Y 
has expressed i n concrete terms the e x i s t e n c e of a l e g a l r i g h t 
or l e g a l r u l e which can be i n f e r r e d from p u b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law, e.g., p a r in parem non habet imperium or par in parem non 
habet jurisdictionem. I n t h i s respect the pleadings o f f e r e d on 
b e h a l f of Y i n terms of a c t u a l claim may be c l e a r l y construed as 
to how i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s understood i n country Y and 
t h e r e f o r e arguably represent s t a t e p r a c t i c e . 1 1 0 
I t i s submitted therefore that although there are 
d i f f e r e n c e s between an i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r i b u n a l and m unicipal 
court s , i n terms of composition and the order of operation, the 
l a t t e r r e f e r s to the same i n t e r n a t i o n a l law p r i n c i p l e s and "case 
1 1 0See v i l l i g e r op. c i t . 5, 40. 
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law" i n making judgments and the i s s u e s l i k e l y to be l i t i g a t e d 
before these courts more of t e n than not are sometimes l i m i t e d to 
controversies with a f o r e i g n element. Thus while i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
courts may as a matter of law e n t e r t a i n c o n t r o v e r s i e s only 
between su b j e c t s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, i . e . , s t a t e s , municipal 
courts on the other hand may e n t e r t a i n c o n t r o v e r s i e s between 
s t a t e s and p r i v a t e e n t i t i e s such as j u r i d i c a l persons and 
natural persons. T h i s arguably, however, does not l i m i t the 
e f f e c t of claims made before these municipal courts from 
a t t a i n i n g the same s t a t u s as one made before an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
t r i b u n a l i n re s p e c t of s t a t e p r a c t i c e . 1 1 1 I t i s f u r t h e r 
submitted that any controv e r s y or dispute a s s o c i a t e d with a 
foreign element, be i t before a municipal court or an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r i b u n a l i n which a s t a t e a s s e r t s a claim or 
challenges a cl a i m being made by the other party, represents i n 
every respect s t a t e p r a c t i c e . 1 1 2 What ther e f o r e c o n s t i t u t e s the 
element of s t a t e p r a c t i c e can be determined by what s t a t e s do 
and i n most cases what s t a t e s may say i n re s p e c t of t h e i r 
i n t e r e s t and what they p e r c e i v e as t h e i r r i g h t s as s u b j e c t s of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 1 1 3 
The heart of the matter i s whether the argument p o s i t e d 
above can be su s t a i n e d . Although a confusion seems apparent as 
regards the broad i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the element of s t a t e 
n i L a u t e r p a c h t , BYIL x (1929); R. A. Falk, The Role of 
Domestic Courts i n the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Legal Order (1964). 
1 1 2 T h i r l w a y op. c i t . ; v i l l i g e r op., c i t . 
1 1 3Wolfke op. c i t . , pp. 41-51; V i l l i g e r op. c i t . 
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p r a c t i c e , there i s at l e a s t some consensus i n support of 
p h y s i c a l deeds and ve r b a l a c t s as c o n s t i t u t i n g the element of 
s t a t e p r a c t i c e . The watchword, therefore, must cover a c t s and 
claim s of s t a t e s , hence one can argue that one of the most 
convincing evidence of s t a t e p r a c t i c e i s the p o s i t i v e 
m a n i f e s t a t i o n of a l e g a l c l a i m concretely made or e f f e c t e d 
before a n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y or an i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r i b u n a l . 
As a matter of p r i n c i p l e , i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s p r i m a r i l y 
concerned with the r i g h t s , d u t i e s , obligations and i n t e r e s t s of 
s t a t e s , and given the f a c t t h a t i t i s h o r i z o n t a l , supports the 
notion th a t whatever i s s a i d or done i n the form of a claim, 
both r e a l or put a t i v e , i n support of a p o s i t i o n r e s p e c t i n g a 
r e a l dispute i s bound to produce st a t e p r a c t i c e . T h i s i s even 
more so because every s t a t e i s a subject/law maker and t h e r e f o r e 
l o g i c a l l y has i t s own p a r t i c u l a r views i n respect of i t s 
i n t e r e s t s and r i g h t s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law which may or may not 
a c t u a l l y command opinio juris, but somehow a f f e c t s the balance 
of law making w i t h i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system. 1 1 4 A good example 
i n t h i s l i g h t could be l i k e n e d unto the claims made by N i g e r i a 
before municipal courts i n America, United Kingdom and Germany, 
r e s p e c t i v e l y , where N i g e r i a a s s e r t e d i t s claims of immunity as a 
matter of l e g a l r i g h t p roperly derived from an e s t a b l i s h e d 
customary law, which supports the view that a s t a t e may not be 
impleaded without i t s consent and that j u r i s d i c t i o n a l immunities 
be accorded to a l l nations i r r e s p e c t i v e of whether the a c t of 
1 1 4 B i n Cheng op. c i t . , pp. 216-229. 
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s t a t e i n question be p r i v a t e or p u b l i c . 1 1 5 Some other A f r i c a n 
s t a t e s have a l s o been sued i n r e c e n t times before n a t i o n a l 
a u t h o r i t i e s and the pleadings or arguments advanced before these 
foreign municipal courts on beh a l f of these A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s 
without doubt represent i n many a s p e c t s s t a t e p r a c t i c e . 1 1 6 No 
argument for that matter can be made to d i l u t e the l e g a l 
s i g n i f i c a n c e of such claims made before municipal courts, s i n c e 
such j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s are regarded as sources of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law. Marshall C.J. of the United S t a t e s of America S.C. argued 
that 
"The d e c i s i o n s of the c o u r t s of every country show how 
the law of nations i n a given c a s e i s understood i n t h a t 
country, and w i l l be considered i n adopting the r u l e which i s to 
p r e v a i l i n t h i s . " 1 1 7 
1 1 5Trendtex Trading Corp. v. C e n t r a l Bank of Nig e r i a (1977) 
Q B 529; Youssel M. Nada Es t a b l i s h m e n t v. C e n t r a l Bank of 
Nigeria, D i s t r i c t Court of F r a n k f u r t , Judgment of 2 December 
1975, Docket No. 3/80 186/75; N a t i o n a l American Corporation v. 
Federal Republic of N i g e r i a and C e n t r a l Bank of Nigeri a , 76 C i v . 
3745 GLG (1979); Texas Trading and M i l l i n g Corp. v. Republic of 
Nigeria S l i p op., 2nd C i r Ayr. 16 1981, 20 I n t ' l Leg Mat'Is 620 
(1981); Verlinden BV v. C e n t r a l Bank of N i g e r i a , Supreme Court 
of the United S t a t e s , 1983. In t h i s l i g h t one important i s s u e 
to explore i s whether N i g e r i a i s bound by the r e s t r i c t i v e 
approach to sovereign immunity. The answer may be i n f e r r e d from 
how the s a i d law a f f e c t s the i n t e r e s t of N i g e r i a . N i g e r i a , 
however, as of r i g h t can oppose the r e s t r i c t i v e r u l e s i n c e i t i s 
an emerging r u l e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. I n order to e f f e c t i v e l y 
oppose the r e s t r i c t i v e r u l e , N i g e r i a must oppose "the r u l e i n 
the e a r l y days of the r u l e ' s e x i s t e n c e or formation and 
maintains i t s opposition c o n s i s t e n t l y t h e r e a f t e r . " See Judge 
Jessup's argument i n the South West A f r i c a Cases I C J r e p o r t s , 
1966 pp. 3, 441; i n re s p e c t of the i s s u e r a i s e d . 
1 1 6 V i l l i g e r op. c i t . p. 5; Akehurst op. c i t . 1-10; Thirlway 
op. c i t . , p. 58. 
1 1 7C.F. Starke, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1994) p. 42. 
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I f J u s t i c e Marshall's argument be convincing then claims 
made by s u b j e c t s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n respect of r e a l disputes 
before municipal courts c e r t a i n l y can serve as a medium of 
ba l a n c i n g claims i n the process of making i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
Such cla i m s are therefore s t a t e p r a c t i c e whether they be made 
before municipal courts or i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r i b u n a l s , because the 
und e r l y i n g c l a i m i n d i c a t e s how customary law i s understood qua 
the d i s p u t e i n i s s u e by the defendant s t a t e . 
At the r i s k of belabouring a proposition or an argument i n 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, for which there i s perhaps recognition or 
disagreement among s c h o l a r s , c e r t a i n l y c a l l s for more evidence 
i n support of the proposition or the argument herein submitted. 
Thus i n a quest to c l a r i f y the confusion associated with s t a t e 
p r a c t i c e , Professor Wolfke's explanation would be quite h e l p f u l 
t hus: 
" I n order to avoid misunderstandings, i t seems, then, 
a d v i s a b l e to apply the term " p r a c t i c e " only i n i t s broadest 
s e n s e — t h a t i s , as the conduct of a l l organs, even of p r i v a t e 
persons, which might have any bea r i n g on i n t e r n a t i o n a l law." 1 1 8 
Hence a l l things being equal, claims or pleadings made before 
m u n i c i p a l courts by s u b j e c t s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law or s t a t e s 
which are l i k e l y to have a bearing on i n t e r n a t i o n a l law can 
t h e r e f o r e be r e f e r r e d to as s t a t e p r a c t i c e , since these s t a t e s 
have an i n t e r e s t to p r o t e c t . 
Wolfke op. c i t . p. x v i i . 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l plane r e v e a l s i t s 
what i t expects of other s t a t e s . 
Thus a s t a t e 1 s behavior on the 
concept of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and 
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Pleadings offered by l i t i g a t i n g p a r t i e s i n the Paquete 
Habana, 1 1 9 the S c o t i a , 1 2 0 the I Congreso d e l Partido, V i c t o r y 
Transport I n c . v. Comisna General d e l Abastercimentos y 
Transportos ± 2 ± and Alcom Ltd. v. Republic of Colombia 1 2 2 are a l l 
c l e a r expressions or claims made i n r e s p e c t of s t a t e p r a c t i c e a t 
the very time or period when these s a i d c o n t r o v e r s i e s came up 
f o r l i t i g a t i o n before municipal c o u r t s . The v a r i a b l e s and 
presumptions of state p r a c t i c e h e r e i n explored i n t h i s a n a l y s i s 
can be used as a guidepost i n determining the p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s 
i n r espect to s p e c i f i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s s u e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i f 
the p r a c t i c e i n is s u e seems scanty i n the area of n a t i o n a l 
l e g i s l a t i o n , diplomatic correspondence, r e p l y to q u e s t i o n n a i r e s 
on d r a f t reports of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission and, of 
course, p o l i c y statements by s e n i o r p o l i c y makers of 
governments. 
(3) Summary of Rules 
At some point of t h i s study c e r t a i n p e r t i n e n t questions 
were asked and s p e c i f i c responses to these s a i d questions can 
now be summarised as follows. 
(1) State p r a c t i c e r e p r e s e n t s the raw m a t e r i a l of 
customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and i t s p e c i f i c a l l y means p h y s i c a l 
a c t s , general d e c l a r a t i o n s i n terms of f o r e i g n and domestic 
1 1 9(1900) 175 U.S. 677. 
1 2 0 (1871) 14 Wallace 17, 188. 
1 2 1 (1981) 3 WLR 328 House of Lords. 
1 2 2 (1984) 2 WLR 70 House of Lords. 
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p o l i c i e s , c l a i m s and omissions of s t a t e s , and pleadings of f e r e d 
by n a t i o n s t a t e s before i n t e r n a t i o n a l and municipal courts. 
Customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s [therefore] created through 
uniform s t a t e p r a c t i c e and the p r a c t i c e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s . 1 2 3 
(2) The e x i s t e n c e of customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law can be 
i n f e r r e d from two main requirements, i . e . , s e t t l e d p r a c t i c e 
(usus), backed by the p s y c h o l o g i c a l element of opinio juris sive 
necessitatis.124 
(3) For p r a c t i c e to have any meaningful impact i n respect 
of the formation of customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law the I C J i n the 
North Sea c a s e s o f f e r e d the following explanation. 
"Within the p e r i o d of time i n question, short though i t 
might be, s t a t e p r a c t i c e , i n c l u d i n g t h a t of s t a t e s whose 
i n t e r e s t s a r e s p e c i a l l y a f f e c t e d , should have been both 
e x t e n s i v e and v i r t u a l l y uniform i n the sense of the p r o v i s i o n 
i n v o k e d . " 1 2 5 
Thus evidence of major i n c o n s i s t e n c y or c o n f l i c t i n the p r a c t i c e 
of s t a t e s w i l l prevent the c r e a t i o n of customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law. S c h o l a r s are a l s o agreed t h a t the duration of p r a c t i c e i s 
a l s o important i n the c r e a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, while some 
s c h o l a r s b e l i e v e t h a t the duration must be continuous from time 
immemorial, others have i n f a c t taken the view that the law can 
be c r e a t e d " i n s t a n t l y , " i . e . , droit spontane. The I C J , however, 
has only mentioned "constant p r a c t i c e " without going as f a r as 
1 2 3See Akehurst op. c i t . ; V i l l i g e r op. c i t . ; Danileko op. 
c i t . 
1 2 4Dugard op. c i t . ; Wolfke op. c i t . , p. 30-36. 
1 2 5 I C J r e p o r t s 1969 43 para 74. 
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to p o s t u l a t e that time be designated as an e s s e n t i a l f a c t o r 1 2 6 or 
p r e r e q u i s i t e to the c r e a t i o n of customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
(4) A small number of s t a t e s could c r e a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law, provided that the p r a c t i c e i n i s s u e does not c o n f l i c t with 
a r u l e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. Furthermore, the q u a n t i t y of s t a t e 
p r a c t i c e i s equally important i n the c r e a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law than the frequency and duration of p r a c t i c e , sometimes 
advanced by scholars of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. Thus f o r 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law to be created the number of s t a t e s 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the p r a c t i c e must be s i g n i f i c a n t . 1 2 7 
(5) Professor Bin Cheng says t h a t "the essence of general 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s opinio juris generalis of s t a t e s . " Opinio 
juris i s therefore an important element i n the c r e a t i o n of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. Thus, for a s t a t e p r a c t i c e to become law i t 
must be accompanied by a c o n s t i t u t i v e element, i . e , opinio 
juris.12* 
(6) I n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s h o r i z o n t a l i n s t r u c t u r e and 
therefore a s t a t e cannot be made to comply or be bound by a r u l e 
t h a t i t has opposed from the e a r l y days of the c r e a t i o n of the 
r u l e . However, i t i s important to s t a t e more c l e a r l y t h a t a l l 
new s t a t e s , whether ex-colonies, as f o r example A s i a and A f r i c a n 
s t a t e s , or those created by s t a t e s u c c e s s i o n , are bound by the 
r u l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law that e x i s t e d before these c o u n t r i e s 
1 2 6 Y B I I C 1950 11 26; PCIJ 1927 S e r i e s B No. 14 105; Akehurst 
op. c i t . pp. 15-16. 
1 2 7See Akehurst p. c i t . , pp. 16-18. 
1 2 8 I b i d . , pp. 31-37, 53. 
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became s u b j e c t s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law or simply became 
independent. 1 2 9 
(7) A s e t t l e d p r a c t i c e without any sense of obligation on 
the part of s t a t e s cannot c r e a t e customary law. Thus there must 
be shared f e e l i n g of understanding based on consensus omnium, 
i . e . , there must be a general p r a c t i c e i n support of a 
p a r t i c u l a r r u l e . 1 3 0 
(8) A t r e a t y i s an important law c r e a t i n g agency i n 
modern t i m e s . 1 3 1 I t forms p a r t of s t a t e p r a c t i c e and i t i s 
created through the meeting of the minds of s t a t e o f f i c i a l s , 
i . e . , by consensus ad idem. With the a i d of these s a l i e n t 
r u l e s , one i s i n the p o s i t i o n now to analyse the i s s u e s r e l a t i n g 
to s t a t e immunity and the p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s i n A f r i c a . 
A f r i c a n S t a t e s , Custom and the Concept of P e r s i s t e n t Objector: 
Are A f r i c a n S t a t e s Bound by the Doctrine of R e s t r i c t i v e 
Immunity? 
I t i s proposed under t h i s r u b r i c to deal with some 
i n t e r r e l a t e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s s u e s covering custom, opinio 
juris, and the p e r s i s t e n t o b j e c t o r r u l e i n respect of the 
d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 
At the outset, i t was shown that the concept of sovereign 
immunity had e x i s t e d i n A f r i c a long before European r u l e was 
1 2 9 I b i d . pp. 23-28. 
1 3 0See Brownlie op. c i t . pp. 7-9. 
1 3 1See F i t z m a u r i c e , 1953 30 BYIL 24-26; Sorensen, 1960 I I I 
101 Hague R e c u e i l 43-47. 
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e s t a b l i s h e d on the continent. European r u l e i n A f r i c a as the 
evidence shows, however, redefined and shaped the modern r u l e of 
s t a t e immunity. Now, these same European c o u n t r i e s and the 
United States of America are modulating t h e i r p o s i t i o n on s t a t e 
immunity and thus c a l l i n g on other s t a t e s to do the same i n 
order to promote j u s t i c e i n the market p l a c e . C e r t a i n l y t h e i r 
demands cannot be ignored. F i r s t , the question t h a t must be 
asked i s whether new s t a t e s are a u t o m a t i c a l l y bound by a l l the 
r u l e s of customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i n e x i s t e n c e before 
independence was a t t a i n e d . Secondly, whether the c u r r e n t change 
of p o s i t i o n by some s t a t e s from s t a t e immunity to r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity can be imposed on other s t a t e s , and t h i r d l y , whether a 
s t a t e having c o n s i s t e n t l y objected to a r u l e during i t s process 
of development could be bound by the s a i d r u l e once i t becomes 
law? 
I t would be i n order to answer the f i r s t question before 
g e t t i n g on to the others. A great m a j o r i t y of s c h o l a r s have 
answered the f i r s t question i n the a f f i r m a t i v e and t h e i r 
p o s i t i o n s are r e f l e c t i v e of customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
Professor Lauterpacht says a new s t a t e "cannot r e p u d i a t e a 
s i n g l e r u l e . " 1 3 2 Professor Waldock a l s o maintains t h a t 
"The g e n e r a l l y held view on the p o i n t undoubtedly i s t h a t 
e s t a b l i s h e d customary r u l e s do a u t o m a t i c a l l y extend the o r b i t 
operation to a new-born s t a t e nor has any s t a t e ever argued 
before the c o u r t that i t was exempt from a g e n e r a l customary 
r u l e simply because i t was a new s t a t e t h a t o b j e c t e d to the 
r u l e . I n the Right of Passage case, f o r example, i t never 
occurred to I n d i a to meet Portugal's contention as to a g e n e r a l 
customary r i g h t of passage to enclaves by saying t h a t she was a 
1 3 2 L a u t e r p a c h t , Private Law Sources and Analogies i n 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law 53 (1927). 
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new s t a t e ; nor d i d Poland—new-born a f t e r the F i r s t World War— 
ever make such a c l a i m i n any of her many cases before the 
permanent c o u r t . " 1 3 3 
Professor O'Connell has a l s o given h i s support 1 3 4 to the 
p o s i t i o n advanced by Lauterpacht and Waldock. T r a d i t i o n a l 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law f o l l o w s the p o s i t i o n advocated by Professor 
Lauterpacht and P r o f e s s o r Waldock. Thus, new s t a t e s are 
automatically bound by the e x i s t i n g r u l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, 
hence they cannot repudiate any r u l e of customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law which came i n t o e x i s t e n c e before the attainment of 
independence. 1 3 5 Communist c o u n t r i e s have, however, r e s i s t e d 
t h i s r u l e on the grounds t h a t "custom i s an implied agreement 
between s t a t e s and t h a t the new s t a t e s are not bound without 
t h e i r consent." 1 3 6 The l e a d i n g exponent of t h i s "consent 
theory," P r o f e s s o r Tunkin, however, seemed to compromise h i s 
p o s i t i o n when he s a i d t h a t 
" I f .a new s t a t e e n t e r s without r e s e r v a t i o n s i n t o o f f i c i a l 
r e l a t i o n s with other s t a t e s , t h a t means t h a t i t r e c o g n i s e s a 
c e r t a i n body of p r i n c i p l e s and norms of e x i s t i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law, which c o n s t i t u t e the b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
r e l a t i o n s . " 1 3 7 
In the l i g h t of the above observations, i t i s submitted 
that i n r e a l i t y new s t a t e s do f o l l o w norms of e x i s t i n g customary 
1 3 3 G e n e r a l Course on P u b l i c I n t e r n a l Law (1962) 106 R e c u e i l 
des Cours 1, 52. 
1 3 4See P. F a l k (1966) R e c u e i l des Coures Vol 2 pp. 16-17. 
1 3 5Akehurst, op. c i t . , p. 27. 
1 3 6C.F. Akehurst, op. c i t . , p. 27; but see g e n e r a l l y Bokor-
Szengo, New S t a t e s and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, Chapter 2 f o r c l e a r 
exposition. 
1 3 7 (1961) 49 C a l L Rev 419 428. 
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i n t e r n a t i o n a l law without question. And t h i s c e r t a i n l y i n c l u d e s 
those s t a t e s which might have been created e i t h e r by p a r t i a l or 
u n i v e r s a l s u c c e s s i o n , as for example the new s t a t e s of former 
Yugoslavia and the former USSR. But i t i s on record t h a t i n 
some i n s t a n c e s , Asian and African countries have taken i s s u e 
with c e r t a i n laws which appear to a f f e c t t h e i r i n t e r e s t 
adversely. This i s i n order for these Third World c o u n t r i e s 
a l s o have a p e r f e c t r i g h t to change the law as w e l l as the o l d 
s t a t e s . The process, however, i s cumbersome and not t h a t easy. 
Furthermore, i t i s p o s s i b l e these new s t a t e s could express t h e i r 
opinio non juris i n respect of an already e s t a b l i s h e d r u l e by 
destroying i t s g e n e r a l i t y of p r a c t i c e . For example, a f t e r 1960, 
developing s t a t e s on many occasions have i n f l u e n c e d or attuned 
the law to contemporary needs of mankind through i n t e r e s t 
a r t i c u l a t i o n , i n t e r e s t aggregation, exchange of di p l o m a t i c 
notes, neg o t i a t i o n s and p r o t e s t s . To be p r e c i s e , i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law appears to have been g r e a t l y influenced by developing s t a t e s 
through such important organizations as A s i a n - A f r i c a n L e g a l 
C o n s u l t a t i v e Committee, the L a t i n American Group, the Non-Align 
Movement, the OAU, the UN General Assembly, the I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Court of J u s t i c e , and the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission, to 
mention a few. 
I f the preceding arguments be sound and w e l l grounded i n 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, then can r e s t r i c t i v e immunity which appears 
grounded i n the p r a c t i c e of the Western world be imposed on 
other s t a t e s ? The answer i s i n the negative i n as much as 
custom i s formed or predicated on the adjustment or the 
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balancing of c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s of sovereign s t a t e s i n the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. The s t a t u t e of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Court 
of J u s t i c e , A r t i c l e 3 8 ( 1 ) ( b ) , e x p l a i n s c l e a r l y that the two 
important elements of customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law are s e t t l e d 
p r a c t i c e and opinio juris. T h i s shows t h a t for custom to be 
formed i t must be supported by usus and opinio juris sive 
necessitatis. Opinio juris sive necessitatis i s important i n 
t h i s respect, i n so f a r as i t d i s t i n g u i s h e s ordinary r u l e s of 
comity from r u l e s c o n c r e t e l y supported by l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n s . I n 
Oppenheim's I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, Jennings and Watts defined custom 
as 
"a c l e a r and continuous h a b i t of doing c e r t a i n a c t i o n s , which 
has grown up under the a e g i s of the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t these 
a c t i o n s are a c c o r d i n g to i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, o b l i g a t o r y or 
These i s s u e s were exp l a i n e d i n the Asylum case (Columbia v. 
Peru) where the court r u l e d t h a t the Colombian government had 
f a i l e d to prove the e x i s t e n c e of a custom to support her quest 
for asylum to be granted to V i c t o r Raul Haya de l a Torre, a 
Peruvian n a t i o n a l who had been i n v o l v e d i n a r e b e l l i o n to topple 
the then Peruvian government. The court r u l e d t h a t 
"The p a r t y which r e l i e s on a custom of t h i s kind must 
prove that t h i s custom i s e s t a b l i s h e d i n such a manner t h a t i t 
has become bind i n g on the other p a r t y . The Colombian government 
must prove t h a t the r u l e invoked by i t i s i n accordance with a 
constant and uniform usage p r a c t i s e d by s t a t e s i n question and 
that t h i s usage i s the e x p r e s s i o n of a r i g h t a p p e r t a i n i n g to the 
s t a t e g r a n t i n g asylum and a duty incumbent on the t e r r i t o r i a l 
s t a t e . T h i s f o l l o w s from A r t i c l e 38 of the S t a t u t e of the 
Oppenheim, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (eds.) Jennings and Watts 
(1992) p. 27. 
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Court, which r e f e r s to i n t e r n a t i o n a l custom 'as evidence of a 
g e n e r a l p r a c t i c e accepted as law.'" 1 3 9 
I n the North Sea Continental Shelf c a s e s , 1 4 0 the court 
again t r i e d to shed l i g h t on the r e l a t i o n s h i p between custom, 
s t a t e p r a c t i c e and opinio juris by c a r e f u l l y r a t i o n a l i z i n g 
d o c t r i n e and f a c t s . The i s s u e was whether A r t i c l e 6 of the 
Geneva Convention embody or c r y s t a l l i s e any e x i s t i n g customary 
law which could be a p p l i e d to bind FRG (Federal Republic of 
Germany). The court r u l e d t h a t 
"The e s s e n t i a l p o i n t i n the c onnection—and i t seems 
ne c e s s a r y to s t r e s s i t — i s t h a t even i f these i n s t a n c e s of 
a c t i o n by non-parties to the Convention were much more numerous 
than they i n f a c t are, they would not, even i n the aggregate, 
s u f f i c e i n themselves to c o n s t i t u t e opinio juris f o r , i n order 
to achieve t h i s r e s u l t , two conditions must be f u l f i l l e d . Not 
only must the a c t s concerned amount to s e t t l e d p r a c t i c e , but 
they must a l s o be such, or be c a r r i e d out i n such a way as to be 
evidence of a b e l i e f t h a t t h i s p r a c t i c e i s rendered o b l i g a t o r y 
by the e x i s t e n c e of a s u b j e c t i v e element, i s i m p l i c i t i n the 
v e r y notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis. The s t a t e s 
concerned must t h e r e f o r e f e e l t h a t they are conforming to what 
amounts to a l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n . The frequency, or even h a b i t u a l 
c h a r a c t e r of the a c t s , i s not i n i t s e l f enough." 1 4 1 
I n Nicaragua v. United States of America, 1 4 2 which r e l a t e s 
to m i l i t a r y and p a r a m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s against Nicaragua, the 
court r e a f f i r m e d i t s e a r l i e r d e c i s i o n s thus: 
"The mere f a c t t h a t s t a t e s d e c l a r e t h e i r recognition of c e r t a i n 
r u l e s i s not s u f f i c i e n t f o r the court to consider these as 
being p a r t of customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. . . . Bound as i t i s 
by A r t i c l e 38 of i t s S t a t u t e . . . the court must s a t i s f y i t s e l f 
1 3 9 (1950) I C J Rep p. 266. 
1 4 0 (1969) I C J Reports p. 3. 
1 4 1 I b i d . 
1 4 21984 LCJ Rep p. 392. 
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that the e x i s t e n c e of the r u l e i n the opinio juris of s t a t e s i s 
confirmed by p r a c t i c e . " 1 4 3 
The I C J i n these cases r e l i e d on the t h r u s t and force of 
A r t i c l e 38 (b) to support the u n d e r l y i n g p r i n c i p l e s r e s p e c t i n g 
the formation of customary law. Thus according to the court, 
s t a t e p r a c t i c e must be c o n s i s t e n t and general to c o n s t i t u t e 
customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. So i n essence custom i s made up of 
two important elements, and these a r e the 'material f a c t , ' which 
s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l a t e to the behaviour of s t a t e s and the 
'psychological element' which i s i m p l i c i t i n whatever r u l e i s 
perceived by s t a t e s to be o b l i g a t o r y . T h i s i s known or r e f e r r e d 
to as opinio juris sive necessitatis, because i t gives an 
i n d i c a t i o n as to which a c t i o n s of s t a t e s are rendered o b l i g a t o r y 
by the very essence and requirement of the r u l e of law. Opinio 
juris or b e l i e f of s t a t e s i s t h e r e f o r e one important f a c t o r 
which transforms usus i n t o custom. According to Jennings and 
Watts i n Oppenheim's i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, 
"This s u b j e c t i v e element may be deducted from v a r i o u s 
sources, i n c l u d i n g the c o n c l u s i o n of b i l a t e r a l or m u l t i l a t e r a l 
t r e a t i e s , a t t i t u d e s to r e s o l u t i o n of the United Nations General 
Assembly and other i n t e r n a t i o n a l meetings and statements by 
s t a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . " 1 4 4 
In view of the attendant requirement f o r the formation of 
customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, i t would be i n c a u t i o u s to conclude 
that r e s t r i c t i v e immunity has a t t a i n e d the s t a t u s of customary 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i n c e the d o c t r i n e l a c k s usus and opinio juris and 
therefore cannot be imposed on other s t a t e s , i f these A f r i c a n 
1 4 3 1 9 8 6 I C J Rep p. 97. 
1 4 4See Oppenheim's I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, op. c i t . , p. 28. 
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s t a t e s have expressed an opinio non juris i n respect of the 
d o c t r i n e , which they b e l i e v e i s u n f a i r and thus may work 
hardship on them. I n t h i s respect, any s t a t e which i s not 
comfortable with r e s t r i c t i v e immunity and i t i s of the b e l i e f 
t h a t i t w i l l a f f e c t i t s i n t e r e s t adversely could r e s i s t the 
d o c t r i n e as of r i g h t . And i t s expression of opinio non juris i n 
r e s p e c t of the d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity could be 
regarded as s t a t e p r a c t i c e and therefore can be added on to 
s i m i l a r e xpressions which have already been made by other 
d i s s e n t i e n t s t a t e s i n preventing r e s t r i c t i v e immunity from 
becoming a u n i v e r s a l r u l e . Based on s c h o l a r l y w r i t i n g s and the 
judgments of the I C J , an emerging r u l e cannot be imposed on 
d i s s e n t i e n t s t a t e s s i n c e i t has not reached a point of being 
w e l l r e c e i v e d and a l b e i t recognised as binding j u r i d i c a l l y as 
law. 
P r o f e s s o r B r i e r l y i n h i s w r i t i n g s o f f e r s the following 
e x p l a n a t i o n i n r e s p e c t of the above i s s u e 
" t h a t i n the absence of any i n t e r n a t i o n a l machinery for 
l e g i s l a t i o n by m a j o r i t y vote, a new r u l e of law cannot be 
imposed upon s t a t e s merely by the w i l l of any other s t a t e s . " 1 4 5 
B r i e r l y ' s p o s i t i o n i s w e l l founded and therefore f a l l s i n 
l i n e with the idea t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s a process of 
r e c o n c i l i n g c o n f l i c t i n g claims which involves a c t i o n and 
r e a c t i o n of s t a t e s qua t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . This, however, d e t r a c t s 
from the p o s i t i o n of those i n t e r n a t i o n a l lawyers who regard 
r u l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law as immutable and therefore wholly 
1 4 5See B r i e r l y , The Law of Nations 1963 at p. 52. 
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based on power p o l i t i c s . Having made a l l these observations, 
one i s now i n the p o s i t i o n to p o s t u l a t e t h a t the p r a c t i c e of a 
great majority of s t a t e s i s very c r u c i a l i n determining what i s 
law and what i s not, and whether a new law has developed and an 
old law has been r e j e c t e d or dec l a r e d o b s o l e t e . Thus new r u l e s 
would have to be supported by s e t t l e d p r a c t i c e and opinio juris, 
before they can be denoted as customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
Consent to a r u l e by a s t a t e i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community 
therefore can be i n f e r r e d from what s t a t e s say, i . e . , through 
t h e i r conduct, acquiescence or f a i l u r e to c o n t e s t the le g i t i m a c y 
of a r u l e i n i t s formative stages. Most s t a t e s i t would appear 
are more concerned with l e g a l sovereignty, i . e . , t h e i r 
independence and e q u a l i t y i n re s p e c t to other s t a t e s and 
therefore w i l l not s i t i d l e to have other s t a t e s impose t h e i r 
common w i l l on them. 
In Trendtex, where the court was faced with the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis, 
Stephenson L J took i s s u e with Lord Denning on h i s p o s i t i o n 
r e s p e c t i n g the change i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. His reasoning was 
i n order i n view of the f a c t t h a t such p o i n t s on the formation 
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law were made by the I C J i n the Asylum case, 
the North Sea Continental S h e l f cases and the Anglo-Norwegian 
F i s h e r i e s case, r e s p e c t i v e l y . Thus i n the formation of a new 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, a l l sovereign s t a t e s whether powerful or weak 
p a r t i c i p a t e as equals i n shaping the r u l e . I t i s important a l s o 
to note that i n the development of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law c o n f l i c t i n g 
claims and i n t e r e s t s of s t a t e s are brought to bear on the 
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formative process of a given r u l e . At a f u r t h e r stage of the 
process, s t a t e s are f r e e again to express t h e i r opinio juris or 
opinio non juris on the l e g a l s t a t u s of a given r u l e . Where i t 
appears many s t a t e s o b j e c t to the r u l e , the process comes to an 
end with the s a i d r u l e being r e j e c t e d . The consent of s t a t e s to 
a r u l e thus can be determined from the b e l i e f that an a c t i v i t y 
i s o b l i g a t o r y . Stephenson L J , thus, was r i g h t i n h i s reasoning 
i n Trendtex because he was able to shed l i g h t on the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s u s u a l l y a s s o c i a t e d with the change from one 
customary law to another. 1 4 6 Courts therefore can i d e n t i f y 
customary law by r e f e r e n c e to the e x i s t e n c e of two important 
i n g r e d i e n t s and t h a t i s usus ( s e t t l e d p r a c t i c e ) and opinio juris 
sive necessitatis. Professor Bin Chen and Judge Ago have a l l 
t a l k e d about i n s t a n t customary law, i . e . , droit spontane which 
may only come about as a r e s u l t of opinio juris without the a i d 
of s t a t e p r a c t i c e . T h i s phenomenon i s r a r e and only happen i n 
unique c a s e s , i n the l i g h t of the attendant rigorous process 
r e s p e c t i n g the formation of customary law. A f r i c a n s t a t e s such 
as N i g e r i a , L i b y a , Z a i r e (now Rep. of Congo), E t h i o p i a , 
Tanzania, Morocco, Congo, Somalia, Uganda, Zambia, Mozambique 
and Angola t h e r e f o r e have a p e r f e c t r i g h t to r e s i s t the doctrine 
of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity, i n as much as the s a i d r u l e i s not w e l l 
s e t t l e d i n the p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s . And these opposing claims 
c l o t h e d i n l e g a l arguments i n support of s t a t e immunity i n 
response to p r i v a t e s u i t s i n foreign courts are undoubtedly 
1 4 6Stephenson L J ' s judgment i n Trendtex 1977 2 WLR 356. 
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s t a t e p r a c t i c e , which i n r e a l i t y shows how i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s 
understood i n the above mentioned c o u n t r i e s . I n t h i s r e s p e c t 
A f r i c a n countries are simply expressing t h e i r opinio non juris 
as to the underlying p r i n c i p l e behind the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 
Some Thoughts on the P e r s i s t e n t Objector Rule 
A m a j o r i t y of scholars are agreed t h a t any s t a t e which 
opposes a r u l e r i g h t from i t s i n c e p t i o n before i t becomes law 
may not be bound by i t . 1 4 7 Furthermore, a s t a t e whose p r a c t i c e 
i s not i n favour or against the s a i d law i s s t i l l bound by the 
law, i . e . , the emerging r u l e i f i t f i n a l l y becomes law. In 
other words, once a s t a t e has subscribed to the t h r u s t and force 
of t h i s emerging r u l e , the s t a t e cannot subsequently oppose the 
r u l e or abrogate i t s o b l i g a t i o n s to the emerging r u l e when i t 
becomes w e l l accepted as law 1 4 8 i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community by 
sovereign s t a t e s . The s a i d law thus remains b i n d i n g on the 
s t a t e u n t i l the customary law i s changed. 1 4 9 
Although j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the theory i n r e s p e c t of case 
law i s scanty, at l e a s t the I C J had touched on the concept 
obiter dicta i n the Asylum Case and t h a t of the F i s h e r i e s case. 
I t was f u r t h e r taken up i n the Anglo-Norwegian F i s h e r i e s case i n 
1 4 7 F i t z m a u r i c e (1957 I I ) Hague R e c u e i l 92 99-100; Sorensen 
(1960 I I ) 101 Hague R e c u e i l ; Waldock (1962) 106 Hague R e c u e i l ; 
Akehurst, op. c i t . , note 93. 
1 4 8Akehurst, op. c i t . , p. 24. 
1 4 9Akehurst, op. c i t . , p. 13; the argument i s c a r r i e d a 
stage f u r t h e r by Judge Jessup i n the Southwest A f r i c a n case 
(1966) I C J . This point was a l s o explained by Judge Sorensen i n 
the Anglo-Norwegian F i s h e r i e s case I C J Rep 1966 p. 291. 
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which Norway argued t h a t i t was not bound by UK's argument that 
i t s t e r r i t o r i a l sea be measured from the low water point of i t s 
c o a s t a l l i n e . The court r u l e d t h a t 
"Norway can j u s t i f y the c l a i m t h a t these waters are t e r r i t o r i a l 
or i n t e r n a l on the ground t h a t she has e x e r c i s e d the necessary 
j u r i s d i c t i o n over them f o r a long period without opposition from 
other s t a t e s , a k i n d of possessio longi temporus.150 
The court f u r t h e r reasoned t h a t 
" I n t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , the court deems i t necessary to 
p o i n t out t h a t although the ten-mile r u l e has been adopted by 
c e r t a i n s t a t e s both i n t h e i r n a t i o n a l law and i n t h e i r t r e a t i e s 
and conventions, and although c e r t a i n a r b i t r a l d e c i s i o n have 
a p p l i e d i t as between s t a t e s , other s t a t e s have adopted a 
d i f f e r e n t l i m i t . Consequently, the ten-mile r u l e has not 
a c q u i r e d the a u t h o r i t y of a g e n e r a l r u l e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
I n any event, the ten-mile r u l e would appear to be 
i n a p p l i c a b l e as a g a i n s t Norway i n as much as she has always 
opposed any attempt to apply i t to Norwegian C o a s t . " 1 5 1 
The judgment of the court i n many respects seems to be highly 
s l a n t e d i n the d i r e c t i o n of the v o l u n t a r i s t or consensual theory 
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law by which s t a t e s are held responsible or 
bound by t h e i r consent to a given r u l e . Thus, according to 
Judge Sorensen, a s i n g l e d i s s e n t i n g s t a t e cannot by i t s e l f 
o b s t r u c t a custom from becoming law, however, i t w i l l not be 
bound by the r u l e i f the s a i d s t a t e maintains a c o n s i s t e n t 
o b j e c t i o n to the r u l e through i t s formative stages u n t i l 
maturity. So f a r the p e r s i s t e n t objector r u l e has found favour 
with the d r a f t e r s of the restatement of foreign r e l a t i o n s law of 
1 5 0 U n i t e d Kingdom v. Norway (1951) I C J Rep 116, 118. 
1 5 1 I b i d . 
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the United S t a t e s 1 5 2 and some leading s c h o l a r s . 1 5 3 Brownlie i n 
h i s e x p o s i t i o n of the subject explains t h a t 
"The way i n which, as a matter of p r a c t i c e , custom 
r e s o l v e s i t s e l f i n t o a question of s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s i s 
i l l u s t r a t e d f u r t h e r by the r u l e that a s t a t e may c o n t r a c t out of 
a custom i n the process of formation. Evidence of o b j e c t i o n 
must be c l e a r and there i s probably a presumption of acceptance 
which i s to be rebutted. Whatever the t h e o r e t i c a l underpinnings 
of the p r i n c i p l e , i t i s w e l l recognised by i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
t r i b u n a l s and i n the p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s . " 1 5 4 
I f the concept has gained v a l i d i t y and thus r e f l e c t i v e of 
customary law because of consistency i n s t a t e p r a c t i c e , then 
Professor Charney's belated f o r c e f u l argument a g a i n s t the 
concept of p e r s i s t e n t objector would not have any e f f e c t s i n c e 
such a p o s i t i o n f a l l s into a minority category. And given the 
f a c t t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s i s p r e d i c a t e d on m a j o r o t a r i a n 
p r i n c i p l e s , the concept i s l i k e l y to gain support s i n c e most 
s t a t e s resent majorotarian d i c t a t o r s h i p w i t h i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
community. Charney's t h e s i s thus ignores the drawbacks u s u a l l y 
a s s o c i a t e d with the majorotarian tendencies i n the formation of 
customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and he f u r t h e r a l s o sweeps the 
e f f e c t of the h o r i z o n t a l nature of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law under the 
carpet. Most s t a t e s are s e n s i t i v e to the notion of l e g a l 
sovereignty which i s a c o r o l l a r y of the concept of e q u a l i t y of 
1 5^See S t e i n , Harvard I n t Law Journal Vol 26 at p. 470-473, 
and p a r t i c u l a r l y h i s n e u t r a l p o s i t i o n on the p e r s i s t e n t o b j e c t o r 
r u l e . 
1 5 3See D.J. H a r r i s , Cases and M a t r i a l s on I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law 
(1998) 5 ed) pp. 42-43. See a l s o g e n e r a l l y Brownlie, op. c i t . 
But Professor Charney has taken i s s u e with the u n d e r l y i n g 
r a t i o n a l e behind the p e r s i s t e n t objector r u l e (1985) 26 BYIL 1. 
1 5 4Brownlie, op. c i t . , p. 10. 
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s t a t e s , and t h e r e f o r e ready to p r e s s t h e i r claims a g a i n s t any 
r u l e which m i l i t a t e s a g a i n s t t h e i r independence. 
Professor Charney's t h e s i s a l s o i n v i t e s c r i t i c i s m i n so 
f a r as the b a s i c u n d e r l y i n g p r i n c i p l e s governing t r e a t i e s are 
based on the maxim pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt, i . e . , a 
t r e a t y cannot confer o b l i g a t i o n s or b e n e f i t s on a s t a t e which 
has refused to be a p a r t y to i t . In t h i s r espect, the 
p e r s i s t e n t o b j e c t o r r u l e g i v e s sovereign s t a t e s the r i g h t to 
express r e s e r v a t i o n s to t r e a t i e s i f c e r t a i n t r e a t y r u l e s run 
counter to t h e i r i n t e r e s t . Further, the example given by 
Charney i n respect of A p a r t h e i d i s simply non sequitur because 
p e r s i s t e n t o b j e c t i o n i s not a p p l i c a b l e with respect to norms of 
jus cogens. Apartheid was delicta juris gentium or a crime 
against humanity and t h e r e f o r e should l e g i t i m a t e l y have 
a t t r a c t e d o b l i g a t i o n s erga omnes of a l l s t a t e s . Unfortunately 
the i s s u e s r e s p e c t i n g A p a r t h e i d were s e n s i t i v e because i t 
involved race r e l a t i o n s and i f i t had not been the vetoes of 
B r i t a i n , France and the United S t a t e s , South A f r i c a would have 
been ex p e l l e d from the United Nations long ago. 1 5 5 The i s s u e of 
Apartheid f a l l s i n t o a d i f f e r e n t category and cannot th e r e f o r e 
be used as a good example i n debunking the p e r s i s t e n t objector 
r u l e . Apartheid v i o l a t e d jus congens, and t h e r e f o r e could not 
be regarded as a r i g h t or a l e g i t i m a t e claim of n a t i o n a l p o l i c y . 
The r u l e of p e r s i s t e n t o b j e c t o r i s r e l e v a n t i n the case of 
A f r i c a n S t a t e s because these c o u n t r i e s have always supported 
1 5 5See Dugard, op. c i t . , p. 298; and the various S e c u r i t y 
Council Resolutions on South A f r i c a . 
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absolute immunity and thus have i n turn opposed the d o c t r i n e of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 1 5 6 The p o s i t i o n of A f r i c a n s t a t e s i s 
e q u a l l y shared by former Eastern European s t a t e s and L a t i n 
American s t a t e s . So f a r as a r e s u l t of i n t e r e s t a r t i c u l a t i o n of 
these c o u n t r i e s the u n i v e r s a l development of r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity has been prevented or blocked. These c o u n t r i e s have 
been able to block the development of the d o c t r i n e of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity because t h e i r i n t e r e s t s are d i r e c t l y 
a f f e c t e d by t h i s emerging r u l e and secondly because the number 
of these d i s s e n t i n g s t a t e s appears quite s i g n i f i c a n t . Thus 
although the doctrine of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i s emerging and 
would soon become w e l l grounded i n the p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s i n the 
West, i t i s not binding on these A f r i c a n countries because they 
have been p e r s i s t e n t i n expressing opinio non juris i n r e s p e c t 
of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. As a consequence we are l e f t w ith a 
s i t u a t i o n where there i s a p e r s i s t e n t divergence i n the p r a c t i c e 
of s t a t e s i n respect of these two competing d o c t r i n e s . I n other 
words, a normative r u l e does not e x i s t and the r e f o r e n a t i o n a l 
j u d i c i a l a u t h o r i t i e s are l e f t to f i l l i n the gaps through t h e i r 
powers to p r e s c r i b e and apply l o c a l law. This i n e f f e c t had 
prompted municipal courts to r e l y on l o c a l data i n the 
c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of the a c t i v i t i e s of s t a t e s which, to a g r e a t e r 
extent, had rendered judgments not i n the l e a s t r e f l e c t i v e of 
customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
1 5 6See the A s i a n - A f r i c a n countries' recent p r o t e s t a g a i n s t 
the U.S. 197 6 Sovereign Immunity Act; Nigeria and Libya have a l l 
o v e r t l y p r o t e s t e d the a p p l i c a t i o n of the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity to 
them. And most A f r i c a n s t a t e s sued abroad have p r o t e s t e d the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of the foreign court. 
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Dr. Akehurst, while e x p l o r i n g the i s s u e s r a i s e d above, 
argued thus: 
"Provided t h a t the s t a t e opposes the r u l e i n the e a r l y 
days of the r u l e ' s e x i s t e n c e or formation and maintains the 
opposition c o n s i s t e n t l y t h e r e a f t e r . Opposition which i s 
manifested f o r the f i r s t time a f t e r r u l e has become f i r m l y 
e s t a b l i s h e d i s too l a t e to p r e v e n t the s t a t e being bound, 
conversely, when e a r l y o p p o s i t i o n i s abandoned i t l o s e s i t s 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s to prevent the r u l e becoming binding on the 
S t a t e . " 1 5 1 
According to Brownlie, the p e r s i s t e n t objector r u l e i s 
recognised by i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r i b u n a l s and thus r e f l e c t i v e of 
s t a t e p r a c t i c e . Hence i f Akehurst and Brownlie be r i g h t i n 
t h e i r expositions of the s u b j e c t , then can i t be s a i d t h a t 
A f r i c a n countries have the r i g h t to r e s i s t the r u l e of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity or are A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s bound by the 
emerging r u l e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity? The answer to the f i r s t 
question i s i n the a f f i r m a t i v e w h i l e an answer to the second 
question i s i n the negative s i n c e evidence abounds i n 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l case law to prove t h a t such c o u n t r i e s as N i g e r i a , 
Tanzania, Zambia, Z a i r e (now Rep. of Congo), Libya, Uganda, 
Morocco, E t h i o p i a , the UAR (Egypt), Somalia, Mozambique, Angola, 
as already shown, have a l l c h a l l e n g e d the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity 
i n American, E n g l i s h , German, South A f r i c a n , Netherlands, 
I t a l i a n and Indian c o u r t s , r e s p e c t i v e l y . This means that even 
i f r e s t r i c t i v e immunity f i n a l l y c r y s t a l l i s e s i n t o customary 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s would not be bound by i t i f 
the number of A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s which r e s i s t e d i t s a p p l i c a t i o n 
had remained the same. But i f i n case the number of d i s s e n t i n g 
1 5 7See Akehurst, op. c i t . , p. 24. 
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A f r i c a n s t a t e s reduces to a bare minimum, then t h e i r expression 
of opinio non juris would become ex hypothesi inconsequential 
and t h e r e f o r e would be overwhelmed by the majority of s t a t e s i n 
favour of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. This i s simply so because i t i s 
opinio genaralis juris generalis, that i s required to determine 
the e x i s t e n c e of custom but not opinio communis juris generalis. 
I t , however, remains to be seen whether governments of great 
m a j o r i t y of s t a t e s would be w i l l i n g to support the " r u l e " of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity by g i v i n g up the r i g h t to plead t h a t they 
be accorded immunity for venturing into commerce, which i n most 
c a s e s , a t l e a s t according to T h i r d World countries, i s geared 
towards the betterment of t h e i r c i t i z e n s . 
The P o s i t i o n of A f r i c a n S t a t e s on the Sovereign Immunity 
Controversy 
Ever s i n c e the Tate l e t t e r , was written and became a 
n o t i o n a l p o l i c y of the US, most Western countries have thrown 
t h e i r support behind the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. And t h i s as the 
evidence shows was due to i n c r e a s e i n commercial a c t i v i t i e s of 
s t a t e s . So f a r A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s have remained s t e a d f a s t i n 
support of the c l a s s i c a l notion of sovereign immunity because of 
the f a c t t h a t r e s t r i c t i v e immunity adversely m i l i t a t e s a g a i n s t 
them. And those sued before f o r e i g n j u d i c i a l a u t h o r i t i e s have 
f i e r c e l y challenged the j u r i s d i c t i o n of these c o u r t s . N i g e r i a 
and L i b y a , f or example, have o f f i c i a l l y p r o t e s t e d the 
a p p l i c a t i o n of the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity to them. The response 
t h e r e f o r e by A f r i c a n s t a t e s to the emerging d o c t r i n e of 
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r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i s not favourable. Countries such as 
Egypt, South A f r i c a , Madagascar and Togo, however, follow the 
doctrine. 
One i n t e r e s t i n g development t h a t must be taken i n t o 
consideration i s that the attainment of independence, although, 
gave many A f r i c a n countries the u n f e t t e r e d c o n t r o l over whatever 
laws they chose to follow, but s u r p r i s i n g l y enough, almost a l l 
these s t a t e s , e s p e c i a l l y Commonwealth A f r i c a n s t a t e s , s t i l l 
continue to follow the law of absolute s t a t e immunity. 1 5 8 This 
a t t i t u d e i s a l s o d i s c e r n i b l e i n French-speaking c o u n t r i e s of 
A f r i c a except Togo and Madagascar. 1 5 9 
I t i s p l a u s i b l e a l s o to argue t h a t the quest f or s e l f -
determination gave root to n a t i o n a l i s m and i d e o l o g i c a l i n f l u e n c e 
from Eastern Europe, p a r t i c u l a r l y the former USSR. 1 6 0 Thus 
r a d i c a l d i a l e c t i c a l teachings covering the f u n c t i o n of the s t a t e 
and i t s i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s i n the f i e l d of commerce and 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law 1 6 1 g r e a t l y i n f l u e n c e d the p o l i c y of many s t a t e s 
This can be i n f e r r e d from A r t i c l e 3 paragraph 1-3 of the 
OAU Charter, coupled with the v a r i o u s statements made by these 
s t a t e s on i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s and p a r t i c u l a r l y on the 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission (and a l s o on such o r g a n i s a t i o n s as 
EAEC (1967); UDEACO (1962); OCAM (1965) and ECOWAS (1967)). 
1 5 9Sanders, op. c i t . , p. 221-227. I t must be submitted t h a t 
there i s no evidence of p r a c t i c e i n r e s p e c t of the doctr i n e of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i n French-speaking c o u n t r i e s except a few. 
1 6 0Guinea, for example, a f t e r independence was encouraged by 
the theory of h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m ( M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t ideas) 
and therefore followed the S o c i a l i s t b lock. T h i s was followed 
by Mozambique, Angola, Mali, Tanzania and Ghana. This was 
fu r t h e r enhanced by the Cold War or the concept of b i - p o l a r i t y 
of power. 
1 6 1Bokor-Szego, New S t a t e s and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1970) 
Chapter 2; Tunkin, op. c i t . , Theory of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law. 
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of A f r i c a i n the d i r e c t i o n of the c l a s s i c a l notion of s t a t e 
immunity. 1 6 2 T h i s was i n t e n s i f i e d between 1960 and 1990 as a 
r e s u l t of the Cold War. In f a c t , such countries as Guinea, 
Ghana, Niger, Benin, Tanzania, E t h i o p i a and Zambia were almost 
converted i n t o f o l l o w i n g the path of S o c i a l i s m immediately a f t e r 
a t t a i n i n g f u l l independence. 
The r e s t r i c t i v e immunity, as already shown elsewhere, i s 
the product of c i v i l law c o u n t r i e s of Western Europe. There i s 
no evidence, however, to support i t s e x i s t e n c e in A f r i c a during 
c o l o n i a l times or i n t h i s modern er a , although i t would appear 
some c o u n t r i e s i n A f r i c a are t r y i n g to imitate the West i n 
modulating t h e i r p o s i t i o n s . 1 6 3 
There i s a great c o n v i c t i o n i n A f r i c a that s t a t e immunity 
i s permitted by i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and t h i s has been s t a t e d 
expressis verbis i n a form of p o s i t i v e claims clothed i n l e g a l 
arguments before n a t i o n a l j u d i c i a l a u t h o r i t i e s . The absence of 
t o l e r a n c e on the p a r t of these A f r i c a n s t a t e s presupposed a 
r e g i o n a l agenda geared towards the p r o t e c t i o n of t h e i r i n t e r e s t 
a g a i n s t those s t a t e s favouring the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. The 
a t t i t u d e of A f r i c a n s t a t e s i n f a c t e x e m p l i f i e s that of Norway i n 
the Anglo-Norwegian F i s h e r i e s case and Peru i n the Asylum case, 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . Thus based on the p r i n c i p l e of aud et alteram 
162OAU debates on sovereignty and nationalism; I Law 
Commission's r e p o r t s on Sovereign Immunity. Recent AALCC 
complaints of November (1987). 
1 6 3These c o u n t r i e s are South A f r i c a , Togo, Egypt, Lesotho 
and Madagascar, e.g., i n 1970 only Egypt followed the 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i n A f r i c a . 
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partem (meaning both sides must be heard) A f r i c a n s t a t e s have 
the r i g h t to protect t h e i r i n t e r e s t s i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
community by pressing t h e i r claims before n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t i e s . 
I t i s i n s t r u c t i v e a l s o to note t h a t t h e r e i s no evidence of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i n the fol l o w i n g documents or t r e a t i e s 
signed by Afri c a n s t a t e s , e.g., the E a s t A f r i c a n Economic 
S e r v i c e s Organisation (1962), the E a s t A f r i c a n Economic 
Community (6 June 1967), the West A f r i c a n Common Market (1967) 
made up of Dahomey, now Benin, Ghana, I v o r y Coast, L i b e r i a , 
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nige r i a , Senegal, S i e r r a Leone, Togo 
and Burkina Faso; the Consei de l ' E n t e t e (1959); West A f r i c a n 
Monetary Union, c o n s i s t i n g of Dahomey, I v o r y Coast, Mali, 
Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper V o l t a (now Burkina Faso) 
with the object of r e t a i n i n g the CFA Franc; C e n t r a l A f r i c a n 
Custom Union (1966); Organization Commaine A f r i c a n e t Malgach 
Ocam (1965); West A f r i c a n Custom Union UDEAD, to mention a 
few. 1 6 4 Thus given the force and t h r u s t of the Charter of the 
OAU, p a r t i c u l a r l y A r t i c l e 3 Section 1, which embraces the 
sovereign e q u a l i t y of a l l member s t a t e s , a main c o r o l l a r y of the 
maxim p a r in parem non habet imperium, coupled with the above 
mentioned t r e a t i e s or agreements signed by A f r i c a S t a t e s , 
affords a conclusion t h a t the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity does not 
appear to f i n d favour with A f r i c a n s t a t e s except Egypt, Togo, 
Lesotho, Madagascar and South A f r i c a , c u r r e n t l y i n f l u e n c e d by 
s t a t e p r a c t i c e i n the Western world. 
1 6 4See generally Sanders, op. c i t . 
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One c r e d i b l e or a l o g i c a l l y grounded argument that has 
always been made by A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s and other developing 
s t a t e s i s t h a t , given the f a c t t h a t developing countries are 
poor and weak economically, and thus l a c k i n g of p r i v a t e c a p i t a l , 
i t has become incumbent on governments of these countries to 
undertake or venture i n t o commerce i n order to promote economic 
development. These v a r i e d and d i v e r s e a c t i v i t i e s undertaken by 
these s t a t e s are v e r y important i n the promotion of economic 
growth and p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . Thus i n the absence of such 
d i v e r s e a c t i v i t i e s , the economy of these c o u n t r i e s would become 
stagnant which i n t u r n c r e a t e s poverty, i n s t a b i l i t y and chaos. 
Most A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s i n f a c t c o n t r o l a l l means of production 
and d i s t r i b u t i o n and t h i s has slowed down the growth of p r i v a t e 
e n t e r p r i s e . The Trendtex l i t i g a t i o n as may be r e c a l l e d came 
about because of the Import Controls t h a t were i n s t i t u t e d to 
c r e a t e room f o r other e s s e n t i a l commodities to be brought int o 
the country, to a v o i d acute shortages. T h i s i s a good example 
of the v a r i e d a c t i v i t i e s which must be undertaken by a 
developing country i n order to keep the economy on good footing. 
These c o u n t r i e s t h e r e f o r e p r e f e r s t a t e immunity i n order to 
avoid being open to s u i t . 
Quite a p a r t from t h i s there i s no evidence of j u r i d i c a l 
persons or n a t u r a l persons suing America, B r i t a i n , Canada, 
Germany, France, e t c . , i n A f r i c a . So i n essence these A f r i c a n 
s t a t e s are of the opinion that the d i c e have been loaded against 
t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n r e s p e c t of the a p p l i c a t i o n of r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity to them i n Western i n d u s t r i a l i s e d countries. These 
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sentiments again have been expressed i n a form of p r o t e s t by the 
Asia n - A f r i c a n Legal Consultative Committee a g a i n s t the U.S. 
(1976) Sovereign Immunity Act i n November 1987. Thus A f r i c a n 
s t a t e s arguably motivated by a strong d e s i r e to p r o t e c t t h e i r 
i n t e r e s t s have joined other developing n a t i o n s to l i m i t 
proceedings against the person of the s t a t e eo nomine, i n order 
to destroy the u n i v e r s a l appeal of the do c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity. This undoubtedly has c r e a t e d a s i t u a t i o n where one 
could simply argue that, as of now, there i s no normative r u l e . 
I n that sense, the t h e o r e t i c a l paradigms or c o n f l i c t between 
s t a t e s w i l l c e r t a i n l y continue and t h i s can c l e a r l y be seen 
w i t h i n the l e g i t i m a t e context of the d i f f e r e n c e s t h a t e x i s t 
among s t a t e s i n respect of ideology, a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and 
p o l i t i c a l organization, economic management and the s t a t u s of 
s t a t e organs and s t a t e trading companies. 
Based on i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic r e l a t i o n s of s t a t e s and 
i t s l e g a l i m p l i c a t i o n s , what b e n e f i t s could A f r i c a n s t a t e s or 
developing countries p o s s i b l y derive from r e s t r i c t i v e immunity? 
The answer must be none, since these c o u n t r i e s have v e r y small 
p r i v a t e s e c t o r s and large p u b l i c s e c t o r s . Thus c o u n t r i e s with 
l a r g e p r i v a t e s e c t o r s are more l i k e l y to reap the b e n e f i t s of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity while those with l a r g e p u b l i c s e c t o r s or 
c e n t r a l l y c o n t r o l l e d economies would be faced with an avalanche 
of p r i v a t e s u i t s . The high p r o b a b i l i t y of these s a i d s u i t s i n 
the main has created a sense of i n s e c u r i t y and apprehension i n 
most A f r i c a n s t a t e s . For some i n the Western world, the 
doctr i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity wields a s p e c t r e of j u s t i c e , 
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but to others, i . e . , A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s and other developing 
co u n t r i e s , the d o c t r i n e gives an u n f e t t e r e d d i s c r e t i o n to 
n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t i e s to p r e s c r i b e and enforce laws which have 
dubious provenance of v a l i d i t y and weight i n r e s p e c t of general 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. I n short, the raison d'etre of r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity runs counter to the a s p i r a t i o n s and o b j e c t i v e s of 
developing c o u n t r i e s . And according to these A f r i c a n s t a t e s , i n 
so f a r as government i s regarded as an agent of the s t a t e , and 
thus l e g a l l y endowed with a u t h o r i t y to make laws and to promote 
j u s t i c e , i t should not by any measure be subjected to the same 
l i a b i l i t i e s and p e n a l t i e s of j u r i d i c a l persons or natur a l 
persons. And t h a t s i n c e s t a t e s s t i l l continued to be the b a s i c 
s u b j e c t s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law without any dispute, i t would be 
l e g a l l y untenable to impose a v e r t i c a l order on t h e i r l e g a l 
sovereignty, and thus s u b j e c t them f o r c i b l y to the j u r i s d i c t i o n 
of municipal c o u r t s without t h e i r consent. 
R e s t r i c t i v e immunity simply works hardship on Third World 
co u n t r i e s and t h i s has been put f o r t h expressis verbis before 
the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission and n a t i o n a l j u d i c i a l 
a u t h o r i t i e s . There i s the need th e r e f o r e to c r e a t e a compromise 
where the c o n f l i c t i n g c l a i m s of these developing s t a t e s can be 
balanced with t h a t of the p r i v a t e t r a d e r . C e r t a i n l y the 
a p p l i c a t i o n of the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i s not the answer, 1 6 5 i n 
view of the f a c t t h a t most developing c o u n t r i e s consider the 
1 6 5Brownlie, op. c i t . , p. 333. Sornaraja (1981) 31 ICLQ 
661-85; Hersch Lauterpacht, op. c i t . , BYIL (1951) 222-7; Molot 
and Jewett (1982) 20 Canadian Yrbk 96-104; Fitzmaurice (1933) 14 
BYIL 101-121; O'Connell, op. c i t . , p. 355. 
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doctrine of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity as a Trojan g i f t horse from the 
West. 
The Preceding Observations Suggest the Following Conclusions 
(1) The p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s i n A f r i c a i n r e s p e c t of 
sovereign immunity i s scanty. A c a r e f u l review however of 
diplomatic correspondence, general d e c l a r a t i o n s and p o s i t i o n s 
taken before i n t e r n a t i o n a l organisation by most A f r i c a n s t a t e s 
suggest t h e i r preference for absolute immunity and the c a l l t h a t 
disputes of t h i s nature be solved through a r b i t r a t i o n . 
(2) Many A f r i c a n countries have not had the chance to 
consider the i s s u e s r e l a t i n g to sovereign immunity i n t h e i r 
l o c a l c ourts. Hence the t r a d i t i o n a l notion of absolute immunity 
s t i l l appeals to these countries. 
(3) The f a c t t h a t most A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s have p r e m o b i l i s e d 
a u t h o r i t a r i a n governments with low sub-system autonomy and 
premobilised democratic governments or de f a c t o m i l i t a r y 
governments supports the notion that the l o c a l sovereign i s 
absolute and t h e r e f o r e highly l i k e l y to r e s i s t the r e s t r i c t i v e 
approach. Thus c o u n t r i e s with high sub-system autonomy such as 
B r i t a i n , the U.S.A. and other i n d u s t r i a l i s e d c o u n t r i e s , although 
may take some time to consider t h e i r p o s i t i o n s on sovereign 
immunity, as have been demonstrated so f a r , are l i k e l y to 
embrace the r e s t r i c t i v e approach. And t h i s i s supported by the 
f a c t that almost every leading i n d u s t r i a l i s e d country w i t h high 
sub-system autonomy has now embraced the r e s t r i c t i v e approach, 
because there i s a high l e v e l of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and 
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s e c u l a r i s a t i o n i n r e s p e c t to the p o l i t i c a l and economic systems 
of these c o u n t r i e s of the West. 
(4) Most A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s c o n t r o l a l l means of production 
and d i s t r i b u t i o n and given the new economic order coupled with 
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of S t a t e s , there i s 
bound to be a c o n f l i c t between the above al l u d e d ideas i n 
respect of s t a t e c o n t r a c t s and the notion of r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity. Hence, s i n c e f i n a n c e c a p i t a l i s very l i m i t e d i n 
Af r i c a n c o u n t r i e s , these s t a t e s have ventured i n t o commerce i n 
order to r e p l e n i s h t h e i r n a t i o n a l t r e a s u r y and therefore 
arguably p r e f e r the notion of s t a t e immunity i n order to avoid 
being sued i n f o r e i g n c o u r t s . 
(5) Commonwealth A f r i c a s t i l l follows the notion of 
sovereign immunity. I t would appear the d e c i s i o n handed down by 
the P r i v y Council i n the P h i l i p p i n e Admiral d i d not a f f e c t the 
jurisprudence of these c o u n t r i e s , s i n c e i t was not considered an 
authority but only p e r s u a s i v e i n i t s e n t i r e t y . 
(6) The preceding p o s i t i o n warrants a p r o p o s i t i o n that 
there i s a general p r a c t i c e of absolute immunity i n A f r i c a , 
except of l a t e such c o u n t r i e s as South A f r i c a , Togo, Lesotho and 
Madagascar have jumped unto the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity band wagon, 
with Egypt leading the way. And t h i s i s amply supported by the 
recent complaints mounted by the A s i a n - A f r i c a n C o n s u l t a t i v e 
Committee i n November 1987 a g a i n s t the r e s t r i c t i v e p r i n c i p l e i n 
respect of the 1976 U.S. Sovereign Immunity Act. 
(7) The d o c t r i n e of absolute immunity i s a product of 
municipal court d e c i s i o n s , p r i n c i p a l l y developed through the a i d 
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of comparative jurisprudence i n America and Europe. I t s 
e v o l u t i o n a r y process shows prima facie t h a t i t was s u f f i c i e n t l y 
grounded i n the p r a c t i c e of states to be accepted as a p r i n c i p l e 
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. l b b The o r i g i n a l version of the law of 
absolute immunity was f i r s t stated i n the Schooner Exchange v. 
McFaddon i n 1812, by Chief Justice Marshall. Arguably, 
t h e r e f o r e , A f r i c a n countries d i d not a f f e c t or c o n t r i b u t e t o the 
c r y s t a l l i z a t i o n of the modern development of the said law i n 
view of the f a c t t h a t these countries became independent i n the 
e a r l y f i f t i e s and e a r l y s i x t i e s and t h e r e a f t e r . These countries 
t h e r e f o r e accepted the c l a s s i c a l law of absolute immunity 
without question, as required by the p r i n c i p l e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law. But one question worth considering i s whether absolute 
immunity has been abandoned by A f r i c a n states and the 
r e s t r i c t i v e r u l e i n t u r n has been accepted i n i t s place? The 
answer c e r t a i n l y i s i n the negative. I t i s t h e r e f o r e submitted 
t h a t since some countries i n A f r i c a have r e s i s t e d the m o d a l i t i e s 
of the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity before foreign courts by pleading 
immunity as of r i g h t , then the only p l a u s i b l e assumption t o make 
i s t h a t these new countries i n A f r i c a would rather p r e f e r t h a t 
s t a t e immunity be preserved. And these claims normally c l o t h e d 
1 6 6See Sucha r i t k u l , op. c i t . , p. 355. The present w r i t e r i s 
not a t a l l advocating t h a t the r i g h t s of the p r i v a t e t r a d e r be 
relegated t o the background but only arguing against the 
a p p l i c a t i o n of the d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity because i t 
i s a d o c t r i n e " q u i t e i m p r a c t i c a l when tested by the a c t u a l i t i e s 
of l i f e . " Change comes through a spectre of enlightenment but 
not by f a c i l e theories wholly lacking of r e a l i t y . I t i s 
t h e r e f o r e submitted t h a t p r a c t i c a l i t y and w e l l grounded 
reasoning be allowed t o triumph over theory and u n c e r t a i n t y . 
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i n legal arguments before f o r e i g n courts i n support of s t a t e 
immunity are undoubtedly s t a t e p r a c t i c e . 
(8) Before the Second World War only four countries were 
independent i n A f r i c a , namely, E t h i o p i a , L i b e r i a , Egypt and 
South A f r i c a . And a l l these c o u n t r i e s except Egypt followed the 
p r i n c i p l e of absolute immunity u n t i l South A f r i c a broke ranks 
w i t h other A f r i c a n countries i n 1981. 
(9) I t i s submitted de lege ferenda t h a t the r u l e of s t a t e 
immunity would continue t o appeal t o the Th i r d World because of 
the new economic order and the g l o b a l h o r i z o n t a l expansionist 
order. These f a c t o r s i n p r a c t i c a l sense would i n no time create 
a c o n f l i c t i n g balance of claims geared towards the p r o t e c t i o n of 
the i n t e r e s t of the T h i r d World. 
(10) I t i s submitted t h a t since i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s 
based, or emanates from the c o l l e c t i v e w i l l of independent 
states, A f r i c a n states have the r i g h t t o r e s i s t any law which 
m i l i t a t e s against t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . And t h i s i s evidenced by the 
f a c t that some A f r i c a n states i n recent times have challenged 
the j u r i s d i c t i o n of n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t i e s as of r i g h t i n respect 
of absolute sovereign immunity, thus arguing t h a t they be 
accorded immunity. The un d e r l y i n g r a t i o n a l e of such actions i s 
to l i m i t the impact of the changing phase of modern c a p i t a l i s m 
on the a u t h o r i t y of the s t a t e . 
(11) The consistent expression of opinio non juris by 
Afri c a n states against r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i s l i k e l y t o 
obstruct the growth of the s a i d r u l e by destroying the 
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g e n e r a l i t y of p r a c t i c e r e q u i r e d to support i t s corpus and 
animus. 
(12) A t r u e general i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s said t o e x i s t i f 
t h e r e i s a consensus of opiniones individuales juris generalis 
o f s t a t e s w i t h i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. 
(13) So f a r desuetude has not occurred, so i n essence 
t h e r e i s a p e r s i s t e n t divergence of practice between adherents 
o f s t a t e immunity and r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. A normative r u l e 
t h e r e f o r e does not e x i s t . And t h i s gives A f r i c a n states a 
p e r f e c t r i g h t t o challenge the legitimacy of the d o c t r i n e of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity, i f the charge of i t being a Trojan g i f t 
horse from the West i s w e l l founded. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
A LOOK AT THE ILC REPORT ON JURISDICTIONAL 
IMMUNITIES OF FOREIGN STATES AND THEIR PROPERTY 
Int r o d u c t i o n 
The work of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission on the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n a l immunities of states and t h e i r property has been 
concluded, a f t e r over 13 years of t r y i n g t o create an equitable 
balance between the r i g h t of the p r i v a t e t r a d e r and t h a t of the 
r i g h t of the for e i g n s t a t e before n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t i e s or 
municipal courts. 1 I n f a c t , the task i n r e a l i t y was not an easy 
undertaking at a l l . Many thought the Commission was simply 
throwing i t s e f f o r t s unto the uncharted seas without any 
navigating force, and the p r e d i c t i o n was t h a t the underlying 
s p i r i t behind the whole e f f o r t would be drawn a t sea. Such a 
p r e d i c t i o n i n some respects has a l o g i c a l f o r c e t o i t , i n so f a r 
as there were a b a t t a l i o n of countries r a d i c a l l y opposed to the 
p r i n c i p l e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 2 Soviet Union, now Russia, 
r i g h t from the outset of the work o f the Commission voiced i t s 
opposition t o the idea of l i m i t i n g immunity. 3 This was 
supported by the People's Republic of China, A f r i c a n states and 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l Legal M a t e r i a l s (1991) pp. 1565-1574. 
2See The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission Report from 1980-
1988. 
3 I b i d . 
329 
some L a t i n American c o u n t r i e s . 4 For some time, one was 
convinced t h a t the i d e o l o g i c a l force of China and Russia would 
d e r a i l the attempt of c o d i f y i n g t h i s area of the law. However, 
the breakdown of the Soviet Union gave way to reforms i n Russia 
which over the years had softened the Russian p o s i t i o n on a 
number o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l law issues, and thus had given room f o r 
the ILC t o proceed w i t h i t s work without much delay and lengthy 
arguments i n respect of Russia's i n t e r e s t a r t i c u l a t i o n and the 
c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t aggregation l i k e l y t o emanate from the 
Warsaw Pact members. The purpose of t h i s study i s to explore 
those aspects of the Dra f t A r t i c l e s , l i k e l y t o create 
controversy and uncharted chaos. 
The Changing Composition of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission 
The ILC i s a law-creating agency which was established on 
21 November 1947, by v i r t u e of General Assembly Resolution 
174(11) . 5 I t s c r e a t i o n was made possible a f t e r the Second World 
War i n respect of the i n t e r e s t s expressed by governments t o 
promote a r a p i d growth and the progressive development of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, w i t h the u l t i m a t e aim of codi f y i n g the said 
law. 
I t s t a r t e d o f f w i t h l i m i t e d membership, but over the years 
there had been a steady expansion of the membership of the 
Commission. And t h i s i n f a c t was due to the gaining of 
" i b i d . 
^ S i n c l a i r , The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission 1987, p. 1. 
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independence by many countries a f t e r the Second World War. The 
term of o f f i c e i n regard t o i n d i v i d u a l members i s f i v e years. 
I n f a c t , i n 1981 the membership of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law 
Commission was enlarged t o t h i r t y - f o u r . These t h i r t y - f o u r 
members may be elected according t o the f o l l o w i n g method: 
" (a) Eight n a t i o n a l s from A f r i c a n s t a t e s 
(b) Seven n a t i o n a l s from A s i a n s t a t e s 
(c) Three n a t i o n a l s from E a s t e r n European s t a t e s 
(d) Six n a t i o n a l s from L a t i n American s t a t e s 
(e) Eight n a t i o n a l s from Western Europe or other s t a t e s 
(f) One n a t i o n a l from A f r i c a n s t a t e s or E a s t e r n European 
s t a t e s i n r e l a t i o n , with the s e a t being a l l o c a t e d to a n a t i o n a l 
of an A f r i c a n s t a t e i n the f i r s t e l e c t i o n h e l d a f t e r the 
adoption of the present r e s o l u t i o n . 
(g) One n a t i o n a l from Asian s t a t e s or L a t i n American 
s t a t e s i n r o t a t i o n , with the s e a t being a l l o c a t e d to a n a t i o n a l 
of an Asian s t a t e i n the f i r s t e l e c t i o n h e l d a f t e r the adoption 
of the present r e s o l u t i o n . " 6 
The pattern of e l e c t i o n and the composition of the ILC 
without doubt c l e a r l y strengthens Judge Higgins' p o s i t i o n when 
she argued sometime ago t h a t "Much of the T h i r d World from whom 
so much of the impetus f o r change today comes, has very 
conservative views about s t a t e immunity." 7 The learned judge's 
p o s i t i o n i s f u r t h e r supported by the views t h a t were expressed 
by the T h i r d World i n response t o the purported exceptions 
o f f e r e d i n respect of absolute immunity i n terms o f commercial 
a c t i v i t i e s of state, v i s - a - v i s the proposal t h a t both the nature 
and the purpose tests be considered or taken i n t o account when 
considering whether to grant immunity or n o t . 8 Coupled w i t h the 
6 I b i d . , p. 15. 
7See Higgins, op. c i t . , p. 265. 
8See ILC report, 1980-1988: The evidence of the influe n c e 
of the T h i r d World can be seen i n the f i n a l D r a f t A r t i c l e s 
reproduced i n the I L Materials (1991), pp. 1565-1574. 
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T h i r d World's o p p o s i t i o n to the idea of subjecting state 
property t o execution or attachment by municipal courts or l o c a l 
courts. The increase i n the number of nationals from the 
developing c o u n t r i e s on the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission has 
given these nations immense strength t o v e n t i l a t e t h e i r 
grievances i n respect of those laws which m i l i t a t e against t h e i r 
i n t e r e s t s , and t o shape the development of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
Some Pr e l i m i n a r y Observations 
The mandate given t o the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission i n 
1978 t o c o d i f y the law of sta t e immunity was declared functus 
officio some few years back and the d r a f t a r t i c l e s are being 
reviewed or considered as a t now by the S i x t h Legal Committee of 
the U.N. General Assembly w i t h a view towards i t s r a t i f i c a t i o n 
i n t o a t r e a t y . But a noteworthy question t o ask from the outset 
i s whether the d r a f t a r t i c l e s i n i t s present form would be 
acceptable t o a l l and sundry? Perhaps no, however, Lady Fox has 
observed t h a t "the departure of the Soviet Union from the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l scene has increased the chances f o r successful 
adoption of a t r e a t y t e x t . " 9 Whether there i s an element of 
t r u t h t o her p o s i t i o n i s yet t o be seen, f o r the Soviet Union 
was not the only country r a d i c a l l y opposed t o the r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity, thus arguing t h a t the d o c t r i n e of absolute immunity be 
maintained. I n f a c t , according t o the ILC repo r t s , almost a l l 
Th i r d World c o u n t r i e s have expressed the zeal to have the 
9 (1994) 43 ICLQ 193. 
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absolute immunity doctrine preserved. C e r t a i n l y the breakdown 
of the Soviet Union might be one f a c t o r , but i t cannot be 
designated as the only reason why the d r a f t a r t i c l e s on 
j u r i s d i c t i o n a l immunities of states and t h e i r p r o p e r t y be near 
adoption. 
The d r a f t a r t i c l e s cover f i v e major subjects. Part I 
covers p r e l i m i n a r y matters r e l a t i n g t o s t a t e immunity; Part I I 
explains the general p r i n c i p l e s behind absolute immunity; Part 
I I I covers instances i n which a f o r e i g n s t a t e cannot be immune 
before a municipal court; Part IV explores s t a t e immunity from 
measures of co n s t r a i n t i n regard t o proceedings before a 
municipal c o u r t ; Part V covers miscellaneous p r o v i s i o n s geared 
toward the f i l l i n g of the gaps i n the whole endeavour of 
c o d i f y i n g t h i s area of the law. 1 0 
The D r a f t A r t i c l e s , under general p r i n c i p l e s , i . e . , 
A r t i c l e 5 i n r e a l terms follows t o the l e t t e r , the d o c t r i n e of 
absolute immunity, and then by f o l l o w i n g the p r i n c i p l e of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i n Part I I I , the Commission c l e a r l y 
d e t r a c t s from the doctrine of absolute immunity. A r t i c l e s 10 t o 
17, t h e r e f o r e , f o l l o w the p r i n c i p l e s of l i m i t e d immunity thus 
concentrating on the d i s t i n c t i o n between acta jure imperii and 
acta jure gentionis.11 I t i s important t o stress t h a t c e r t a i n 
a c t i v i t i e s of the state are not immune and these are employment 
cont r a c t s , i . e . , A r t i c l e 11; a c t i v i t i e s or acts causing damage 
1 0 I L M a t e r i a l s , op. c i t . , note 1. 
n I b i d . , pp. 1568-1569. 
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t o property or i n j u r y t o persons f a l l under A r t i c l e 13; 
i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o p e r t y i s covered under A r t i c l e 14; and 
a r b i t r a t i o n proceedings f a l l under A r t i c l e 17. One d i s t i n c t i v e 
feature, however, of the Draft A r t i c l e s can be found under 
A r t i c l e 10, which covers commercial t r a n s a c t i o n , mutatis 
mutandis, while A r t i c l e 2(2) gives prominence t o both the nature 
t e s t and the purpose t e s t . 1 2 A r t i c l e 2(2) of the Dr a f t A r t i c l e s 
t herefore appears t o take a d i f f e r e n t route from the UK State 
Immunity Act of 1978, the U.S. 1976 FSIA and the 1972 European 
Convention on State Immunity, i n s o f a r as no room appears to have 
been given t o the purpose t e s t i n the parlance or domain of 
these Acts or the s a i d 1972 European Convention. 
S p e c i f i c Exceptions t o Immunity of States 
The Commercial Element of the Dr a f t A r t i c l e s and I t s Relation t o 
J u r i s d i c t i o n a l Competence 
In order t o d e t r a c t from the p r i n c i p l e of absolute 
immunity the ILC designated commercial transactions as the 
underlying f a c t o r i n determining whether t o take j u r i s d i c t i o n or 
not, coupled w i t h c e r t a i n important exceptions: A r t i c l e 10, f o r 
example, can be s t a t e d thus: 
"(1) I f a s t a t e engages i n a commercial t r a n s a c t i o n with 
a f o r e i g n n a t u r a l or j u r i d i c a l person, and by v i r t u e of the 
a p p l i c a b l e r u l e s of p r i v a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, d i f f e r e n c e s 
r e l a t i n g to the commercial t r a n s a c t i o n f a l l w i t h i n the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of a c o u r t of another s t a t e , the s t a t e cannot 
invoke immunity from the j u r i s d i c t i o n i n a proceeding a r i s i n g 
out of t h a t commercial t r a n s a c t i o n . 
1 2 I b i d . , p. 1565. 
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(2) Paragraph 1 does not apply: (a) i n the case of a 
commercial t r a n s a c t i o n between s t a t e s or (b) i f the p a r t i e s to 
the commercial t r a n s a c t i o n have e x p r e s s l y agreed otherwise. 
(3) The immunity from j u r i s d i c t i o n enjoyed by a s t a t e 
s h a l l not be a f f e c t e d with regard to a proceeding which r e l a t e s 
to a commercial t r a n s a c t i o n engaged i n by a s t a t e e n t e r p r i s e or 
other e n t i t y e s t a b l i s h e d by the s t a t e which has an independent 
l e g a l p e r s o n a l i t y and i s capable of (a) suing or being sued; and 
(b) a c q u i r i n g , owing or possessing and d i s p o s i n g of property, 
i n c l u d i n g property which the s t a t e has au t h o r i z e d i t to operate 
or manage. " 1 3 
The p o s i t i o n advanced by the ILC under t h i s s e ction o f the 
d r a f t a r t i c l e s i s not new, although one can discern some 
d r a f t i n g changes, f o r i t would appear i t s teachings f a l l i n the 
same domain as t h a t of the Immunity Act of 1978, the U.S. 
Sovereign Act of 1976 and the European Convention, 
r e s p e c t i v e l y , 1 4 and therefore open to some e a r l i e r c r i t i c i s m s 
(supra), already o f f e r e d by the present w r i t e r against these 
l e g i s l a t i v e p r o v i s i o n s placed i n t o these Acts. However, the ILC 
appears t o have made some improvements. 
The purpose of A r t i c l e 10 i s to l i m i t the a c t i v i t i e s o f 
states by l a y i n g bare the s p e c i f i c meaning of commercial 
trans a c t i o n s . Thus i f a state signs a contract w i t h a f o r e i g n 
n a t i o n a l or j u r i d i c a l person and by v i r t u e of the nature of the 
tr a n s a c t i o n qua the rules of c o n f l i c t of laws or p r i v a t e 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, the law of another s t a t e applies other than 
t h a t of the st a t e involved with the t r a n s a c t i o n , then such a 
stat e cannot plead t h a t i t be accorded immunity. A r t i c l e 10, 
1 3 I b i d . , pp. 1568-69. 
14See the U.S. Act 1976, The U.K. Act 1978, and the European 
Convention of 1972. 
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paragraph (3) covers some aspects of the controversy respecting 
p o l i t i c a l subdivisions of s t a t e s , but s p e c i f i c a l l y f o l l o w s an 
approach where the p o s i t i o n of these s t a t e organs i s considered 
p a r i passu on the same f o o t i n g as the sta t e i n respect of 
according or denying immunity. The approach of the Draft 
A r t i c l e s i n t h i s respect seems t o draw on the r u l e s of p r i v a t e 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i n as much as the appl i c a b l e law i s determined 
by reference t o the lex fori as the basic r u l e i n the 
ch a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of the a c t i v i t y of the s t a t e . This means t h a t 
a state p a r t y t o an agreement which i s commercial and not 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y connected w i t h the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the s t a t e but 
to some other j u r i s d i c t i o n may not q u a l i f y f o r immunity i f sued 
i n t h a t other c o u r t i n case of non-performance or breach. By 
fo l l o w i n g t h i s seemingly n e u t r a l approach the commissioners were 
t r y i n g t o avoid being trapped by the abstract t e s t of 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between acta jure imperii and acta jure 
gestionis. But again such an approach cannot be completely used 
to avoid the thorny problem o f determining whether a given s t a t e 
a c t i v i t y or t r a n s a c t i o n was concluded on a p r i v a t e law 
r e l a t i o n s h i p or not. This then b r i n g s t o mind the p l a i n f a c t 
t h a t some states a c t u a l l y c o n t r o l the means of production and 
d i s t r i b u t i o n w i t h i n t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s and thus have very small 
p r i v a t e sectors and t h e r e f o r e could not gain by the t h r u s t and 
force of A r t i c l e 10 of the ILC d r a f t a r t i c l e s . This also 
applies t o countries w i t h s t a t e t r a d i n g companies and c e n t r a l 
planning economies, e.g., T h i r d World countries. Thus i t can be 
argued t h a t the attempt by the commissioners t o s t a t e the 
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general r u l e of sta t e immunity and thereby l i s t i n g some 
important l i m i t a t i o n s t o i t , follow about the same reasoning 
behind the n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n already i n place i n the US, UK, 
Singapore, A u s t r a l i a , Canada, Pakistan and South A f r i c a , 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . The commissioners, however, followed on the whole 
a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t approach i n dealing w i t h the sovereign 
immunity controversy. The force of A r t i c l e 10 undoubtedly 
favours countries w i t h l a r g e p r i v a t e sectors, however, the 
p u b l i c / p r i v a t e law d i s t i n c t i o n s cannot be determined by a simple 
reference t o the very language of A r t i c l e 10, t h a t i s , i f the 
d r a f t a r t i c l e s are accepted as a t r e a t y t e x t . Furthermore, i n 
p r a c t i c e A r t i c l e 10 could give r i s e t o d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
since the jurisprudence of states more often than not seemed t o 
be influenced by d i f f e r e n t s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l considerations. Thus 
the Jex f o r i would have t o take i n t o account not only A r t i c l e 10 
but also c e r t a i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and s t a t u t o r y a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
laws which must be i n t e r p r e t e d against the background of whether 
a country fol l o w s a monist or d u a l i s t approach t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law. Furthermore, even i f the Draft A r t i c l e s are passed i n t o a 
t r e a t y , there i s the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t some countries would be 
infl u e n c e d by t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n s and economic p o l i c i e s t o 
r e j e c t those aspects of the Draft A r t i c l e s l i k e l y t o adversely 
a f f e c t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s by r e g i s t e r i n g t h e i r reservation t o i t . 
As regards s t a t e enterprises, i t i s submitted t h a t the 
d r a f t A r t i c l e 10 paragraph 3 i s purely f u n c t i o n a l and thus does 
not purport t o address the s p e c i f i c problems r e l a t i n g t o the 
determination of the independent l e g a l p e r s o n a l i t y of s t a t e 
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organs. This approach might have been followed i n so f a r as 
every country i n one way or the other appears t o have i t s own 
rules respecting i n c o r p o r a t i o n and r u l e s r e l a t i n g t o p u b l i c l y 
held corporations and c l o s e l y h e l d corporations qua t h e i r 
r e l a t i o n s to governmental f u n c t i o n s . These d i f f e r e n t r u l e s of 
incorporation, however, have created an e l u s i v e problem i n view 
of the f a c t t h a t such subsidiary organs perform d i f f e r e n t and 
concurrent functions s p e c i f i c a l l y geared towards the p u b l i c 
good, hence i t would be less h e l p f u l t o simply r e l y on a 
fun c t i o n a l approach as suggested by the commissioners i n 
determining whether these organs have performed a governmental 
function or not. I s i t l e g a l l y f e a s i b l e t h a t a domestic court 
must accept the conclusions of a f o r e i g n law? Or regard be had 
to some other law which i s germane t o the issues i n a given 
case? The m a j o r i t y of the c o u r t i n Baccus concluded t h a t 
foreign law was d e c i s i v e . 1 5 Parker J argued t h a t 
"Whether or not i t i s such a department i s c l e a r l y a matter of 
Spanish law. I see no ground f o r t h i n k i n g t h a t the mere 
c o n s t i t u t i o n of a body as a l e g a l p e r s o n a l i t y with the r i g h t to 
make c o n t r a c t s and to sue and be sued i s wholly i n c o n s i s t e n t 
with i t remaining and being a department of s t a t e . " 1 6 
15Baccus Sr L v. Se r v i c i o Nacional d e l Trigo (1957) 1QB 438; 
23 ILR p 160. The p o s i t i o n i n A r r i b a L i mited v. Petroleos 
Mexicanos (1992) ILR 103 p. 490 i s not t h a t d i f f e r e n t from 
Baccus because the p l a i n t i f f bears the onus of r e b u t t i n g the 
existence of an agency r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
1 6 I b i d . at p. 471, 472 and 473: Jenkins i n g i v i n g h i s 
blessings t o immunity i n the case admitted the inherent problems 
associated w i t h the p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n s of s t a t e s . 
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He concluded t h a t Spanish law be applied. I n Trendtex, 
Lord Denning appeared to f o l l o w t o some extent the same 
reasoning thus: 
" I would look to a l l the evidence to see whether the 
o r g a n i s a t i o n was under government c o n t r o l and e x e r c i s e 
government f u n c t i o n s . " 1 7 
Shaw LJ i n the same case, t h a t i s , Trendtex, also declared t h a t 
"the c o n s t i t u t i o n and powers of Nigerian corporation must be 
viewed i n the l i g h t of the domestic law of N i g e r i a . " 1 8 But on the 
whole the status of the Central Bank was misconstrued and t h i s 
i n the main simply casts doubt on the decision i n Trendtex. The 
e x i s t i n g case law by every measure i s inconsistent and thus does 
not give any c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n of usus on the l e g a l p o s i t i o n of 
s t a t e agencies. The Draft A r t i c l e s as already stated f o l l o w a 
f u n c t i o n a l approach as does the European Convention (Arts. 27 
and 28). Arguably, however, t h i s f u n c t i o n a l approach i s fraught 
w i t h some d i f f i c u l t i e s and u n c e r t a i n t i e s i n view of the f a c t 
t h a t s t a t e agencies are normally endowed w i t h p u b l i c f u n c t i o n t o 
help i n the process of nation b u i l d i n g and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n 
executing c e r t a i n important p u b l i c p o l i c i e s . This phenomenon i s 
pre v a l e n t i n developing countries or countries w i t h a small 
p r i v a t e sector. A r t i c l e 10 i s qu i t e essential i n a i d i n g the 
process by which a d i s t i n c t i o n i s made between governmental and 
commercial a c t i v i t i e s of states, but i t s l e g a l force as a 
"Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria (1977) 2 
WLR 356, 370, must be di s t i n g u i s h e d from Walter F u l l e r A i r c r a f t 
Sales Inc. v. Republic of Ph i l i p p i n e s (1992) ILR 103 p. 503. 
1 8 I b i d . at p. 385. 
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y a r d s t i c k i n the determination of j u r i s d i c t i o n a l competence i s 
hampered by the f a c t t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n between acts jure 
gestionis and acts jure imperii i s d i f f i c u l t of d e f i n i t i o n and 
a p p l i c a t i o n and therefore u n l i k e l y t o f i n d favour w i t h many 
developing states. 
A proper balance between the i n t e r e s t of the sovereign 
s t a t e and tha t of the p r i v a t e e n t i t y seemed, however, t o have 
been achieved under the D r a f t A r t i c l e s by the various exceptions 
adopted i n r e l a t i o n t o employment c o n t r a c t s 1 9 and questions of 
t o r t s i n v o l v i n g i n j u r y t o persons or damage t o p r o p e r t y . 2 0 The 
Dra f t A r t i c l e 10, i n some respects, took a much d i f f e r e n t t u r n 
i n respect of l i m i t a t i o n s on commercial t r a n s a c t i o n s as already 
shown, and therefore i f i t i s accepted as a t r e a t y t e x t , Section 
3(a) and (b) would have t o be c a r e f u l l y construed f o r there i s 
no easy method of determining the independent status of 
subsidiary organs of st a t e s . Mellenger v. New Brunswick 
Department Corporation case 2 1 and t h a t o f the Yousef Nada 
Establishment case are good examples. Perhaps courts could 
f o l l o w the e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l t e s t t o resolve these problems. 
1 9ILM, op. c i t . , p. 1569. 
2 0 I b i d . 
2 1 (1971) 1 WLR 603. But see the d e c i s i o n i n , I n Re Estate 
of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights L i t i g a t i o n H i l a s and Others v. 
Estate of Marcos U.S. Court o f Appeals, 9th C i r c u i t (16 June 
1994) ILR 103, p. 52 ILR 104, p. 119. 
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General P r i n c i p l e s of Sovereign Immunity under the Draft 
A r t i c l e s 
A r t i c l e Five i n Part Two of the Dra f t A r t i c l e s runs thus: 
"A s t a t e e njoys immunity, i n r e s p e c t of i t s e l f and i t s 
p r o p e r t y from the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the co u r t s of another s t a t e 
22 
s u b j e c t to the p r o v i s i o n s of the present a r t i c l e . " 
This p r o v i s i o n i s without doubt more of a compromise than 
i t might appear, since there was a d o c t r i n a l dispute between 
those c o u n t r i e s who p r e f e r absolute immunity and those i n favour 
of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. The commissioners thus followed an 
approach whereby s t a t e immunity i s sta t e d as a primary r u l e 
w i t h o u t negating the r i g h t s of the p r i v a t e trader to sue. This 
means t h a t A r t i c l e 5 does not i n r e a l terms f o l l o w the general 
immunity approach but i n c e r t a i n instances lends i t s e l f t o i t s 
general import and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I t would have been apposite 
i f the commissioners had l a i d much emphasis on connecting 
f a c t o r s , t h a t i s , between a given t r a n s a c t i o n or state a c t i v i t y 
and the f o r e i g n j u r i s d i c t i o n or forum where the natural or 
j u r i d i c a l person would have h i s or her r i g h t s redressed. Thus 
the i m p l i e d consent t o grant immunity would be b e t t e r r e a l i s e d 
i f the s a i d p r o v i s i o n i s conditioned on c e r t a i n s e t t l e d 
p r i n c i p l e s o f c o n f l i c t of laws, i . e . , connecting factors backed 
by the precepts of p u b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
I t i s important t o stress t h a t the question of immunity 
a r i s e s only i f a f o r e i g n state refuses t o submit t o the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of domestic courts and t h i s r i g h t t o r e s i s t the 
2 2ILM, op. c i t . , p. 1566; Dra f t A r t i c l e s : General 
P r i n c i p l e s , Part I I A r t i c l e 5. 
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j u r i s d i c t i o n of national a u t h o r i t i e s i s c l e a r l y d e r i v e d from the 
p o s i t i o n of the s t a t e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law coupled with the r u l e 
i n the Schooner Exchange, and the w r i t i n g s of d i s t i n g u i s h e d 
p u b l i c i s t s i n e a r l y 19th century. The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law 
Commission i n respect of the above i s s u e recommended t h a t for 
j u r i s d i c t i o n to be ex e r c i s e d by a n a t i o n a l j u d i c i a l a u t h o r i t y 
over a sovereign s t a t e , there i s the need t h a t consent be 
procured from the defendant s t a t e . T h i s recommendation, 
however, i s not new and over the years had produced d i f f i c u l t i e s 
i n l i t i g a t i o n . 
I t i s i n s t r u c t i v e to note a l s o t h a t the i n c l u s i o n of the 
purpose t e s t i n Draft A r t i c l e s 2 paragraph 2 a t the behest of 
the T h i r d World c e r t a i n l y has endowed defendant s t a t e s with 
powerful t o o l s to counter the e f f e c t of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 
This aspect of the d r a f t i s not on the same plane as t h a t of 
other a c t s passed i n other j u r i s d i c t i o n s . The E n g l i s h Act of 
1978, as w e l l as the US Act, f o r example, r e j e c t e d the purpose 
t e s t . 2 3 And t h i s r e s t r i c t i v e approach, as a matter of p r i n c i p l e , 
has a l s o been incorporated i n t o the n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n of 
other c o u n t r i e s or j u r i s d i c t i o n s . 2 4 The combined e f f e c t of 
A r t i c l e 2 paragraph 2, A r t i c l e 5 and A r t i c l e 6 has the tendency 
of e q u a l l y balancing the r i g h t s of the i n d i v i d u a l and t h a t of 
the s t a t e i n a meaningful way. Which means t h a t i n order to 
"Mann, The State Immunity Act, 1978, (1979) 50 BYIL 43. See 
Delaume, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Clunet 
(1978) 105 p. 187. 
2 4See g e n e r a l l y I n t e r n a t i o n a l Legal M a t e r i a l s . 
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implead a f o r e i g n s t a t e , domestic courts under the d r a f t 
a r t i c l e s would have to grapple with such f a c t o r s as the nature 
t e s t , purpose t e s t , consent and the s a i d enumerated exceptions. 
The c l a s h t h e r e f o r e between the category of the t e r r i t o r i a l 
aspect of the sovereign s t a t e and the p e r s o n a l i t y of the 
sovereign s t a t e simply then becomes severe and u n c e r t a i n . 
A r t i c l e 7, paragraph (1) a to c i n absolute terms touches 
on the w i l l of the p a r t i e s and i t s l e g a l r e l a t i o n s to the 
competence of domestic c o u r t s . To some extent t h i s part of the 
d r a f t a r t i c l e s seems to follow E n g l i s h p r a c t i c e . 2 5 A r t i c l e 7 
paragraph (2) reads as f o l l o w s : 
"Agreement by a s t a t e f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n of the law of 
another s t a t e s h a l l not be i n t e r p r e t e d as consent to the 
e x e r c i s e of j u r i s d i c t i o n by the c o u r t s of t h a t other s t a t e . " 2 6 
T h i s p a r t of the d r a f t a r t i c l e s thus c l a r i f i e s the thorny 
i s s u e r e s p e c t i n g a r b i t r a t i o n c l a u s e s and the deep-seated 
misconception t h a t once a s t a t e has entered i n t o an a r b i t r a t i o n 
agreement there i s a presumption t h a t i t has waived i t s r i g h t to 
immunity. The d r a f t a r t i c l e i n t h i s regard i s d i f f e r e n t from 
the European Convention where the p r i n c i p l e of forum prorogatus 
i s l i b e r a l l y construed. A defendant s t a t e s p e c i f i c a l l y under 
Part 2 paragraph 2 and A r t i c l e 5 has more t o o l s now to f i g h t the 
p r i v a t e s u i t s of l i t i g a t i n g p a r t i e s i n foreign courts. The 
d r a f t a r t i c l e s i n many r e s p e c t s , however, make i t d i f f i c u l t to 
2 5See g e n e r a l l y the Sovereign Immunity Act 1978. 
2 61 Legal M a t e r i a l s , op. c i t . , p. 1567; A r t i c l e 7(2) ILC 
Draft A. 
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determine what i s an exception and what i s a r u l e . 2 7 To some 
extent, one i s persuaded to argue that cases such as the Empire 
of I r a n , I Congreso del Partido and the New Brunswick 
Development Corporation would s t i l l remain r e l e v a n t i n view of 
the e f f e c t of d r a f t a r t i c l e s 3, 5, 6, 18 and 21. 
Execution Against a Foreign State 
A c a r e f u l study of the p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s i n r e s p e c t of 
enforcement measures against s t a t e property shows a c o n s i d e r a b l e 
degree of u n c e r t a i n t y . 2 8 Even those c o u n t r i e s which have f u l l y 
accepted or subscribed to the underlying p r i n c i p l e s of the 
r e s t r i c t i v e p r i n c i p l e have been wanting as to how to d e a l with 
the s p e c i f i c question of execution. Many c o u n t r i e s b e l i e v e t h a t 
enforcement measures be taken only a g a i n s t s t a t e property used 
i n commercial a c t i v i t i e s . 2 9 While there i s a l i n g e r i n g 
unanswered question i n respect to whether s t a t e property under 
the t h r e a t of being subjected to execution be d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d 
to the p r i v a t e a c t i o n brought against the defendant s t a t e or 
not. In f a c t , t h i s i s not an easy t a s k f o r judges. For the 
sake of j u s t i c e , the Draft A r t i c l e 18 i s i n order, i n view of 
the f a c t t h a t i t separated p r e s c r i p t i v e j u r i s d i c t i o n from 
2 7 I L M a t e r i a l s , op. c i t . , 1567, 1571, A r t i c l e s 2 ( 2 ) , 
A r t i c l e s 5, 16 and 22, r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
2 8See g e n e r a l l y (1979) Neth YBIL 3-289; O'Connell, op. c i t . ; 
S u c h a r i t k u l (1985) Yrbk I n t Law C I I Part 1; Johnson, 6, 
A u s t r a l i a n Year Book of I n t . Lawl pp. 2-3. 
2 9Crawford, Execution of Judgments and Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity (1981) 75 AJIL 820; S i n c l a i r (1980) 167 Hague R e c u e i l 
I I . 
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enforcement j u r i s d i c t i o n . I n other words, i t followed the 
perception t h a t sovereign immunity i s twofold, by separa t i n g the 
p u b l i c a c t i v i t y of the s t a t e acta jure imperii and that of 
a c t i v i t i e s r e s p e c t i n g the use of s t a t e property res publica 
publicis usibus destinata. The s a i d a r t i c l e provides as 
follows. 
"(1) No measure of c o n s t r a i n t , such as attachment, 
a r r e s t and exe c u t i o n a g a i n s t property of a s t a t e may be taken i n 
connection with a proceeding before a court of another s t a t e 
u n l e s s and except t o the e x t e n t t h a t . . . 
(c) the p r o p e r t y i s s p e c i f i c a l l y i n use or intended f o r 
use by the s t a t e f o r other than governmental non-commercial 
purposes and i s i n the t e r r i t o r y of the s t a t e of the forum and 
has a connection w i t h the c l a i m which i s the o b j e c t of the 
proceeding or with the agency or i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y a g a i n s t which 
the proceeding was d i r e c t e d . 
(2) Consent to the e x e r c i s e of j u r i s d i c t i o n under 
A r t i c l e 7 s h a l l not imply t o the taking of measures of 
c o n s t r a i n t under paragraph 1, f o r which separate consent s h a l l 
be n e c e s s a r y . " 3 0 
Although there a r e d i f f e r e n c e s between §1610 of the U.S. 
Act and Section 13 of the U.K. Act, i n r e a l i t y , however, a l l 
these p r o v i s i o n s under these d i f f e r e n t Acts simply run counter 
to paragraph 2 of A r t i c l e 18, which r e q u i r e s two s e t s of 
consents, thus one f o r j u r i s d i c t i o n a l purposes and the other for 
enforcement measures or ex e c u t i o n . Paragraph 2 of A r t i c l e 18 i s 
quite e f f e c t i v e and weighty and may prevent or make i t d i f f i c u l t 
for i n t e r l o c u t o r y r e l i e f to be procured. Such measures as 
in t e r i m and f i n a l r e l i e f would be hard to come by s i n c e a second 
consent i s needed before enforcement measures can be taken, thus 
even i f the property i n i s s u e happens to be involved i n 
3 0See ILM p. 1567; ILC D r a f t A r t i c l e s , A r t i c l e 18, Part IV 
1. 
345 
commercial a c t i v i t y . 3 1 The U.K. Act, §13(2) (a) and the U.S.Act 
§1610(d) a l l cover these p e r t i n e n t i s s u e s regarding enforcement 
measures, but i f the current d r a f t a r t i c l e s are adopted as a 
t r e a t y t e x t , i t would be cumbersome to take execution forcee 
a g a i n s t s t a t e property. 
True, when the d e c i s i o n s i n P h i l i p p i n e Admiral, Trendtex 
and I Congreso del Partido were handed down by E n g l i s h c o u r t s , 
many thought the hegemony of the concept of s t a t e immunity had 
been t o t a l l y broken, but before one could take some r e s p i t e f o r 
r e f l e c t i o n on the s u b j e c t , Alcorn Ltd. v. Republic of Colombia 
came up f o r l i t i g a t i o n . The i s s u e i n Alcorn was whether monies 
kept i n the defendant s t a t e ' s bank can be c h a r a c t e r i s e d as 
"property" used for commercial purposes w i t h i n the s p e c i f i c 
meaning of Section 13 of the E n g l i s h Act 1978. Lord Diplock 
r u l e d i n favour of the defendant s t a t e thus r e j e c t i n g the p l e a 
by Alcom Ltd. that enforcement measures be allowed a g a i n s t the 
Republic of Colombia. A s i m i l a r p o s i t i o n was taken i n the 
P h i l i p p i n e Embassy c a s e 3 2 by the German C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Court. 
Again i n the l i g h t of these a u t h o r i t i e s , coupled with the f o r c e 
and t h r u s t of A r t i c l e 2(2) of the Draft A r t i c l e s ; i t would 
appear the p o s i t i o n of the foreign s t a t e before a domestic c o u r t 
i s c onsiderably strengthened. Which means that under the 
present Draft A r t i c l e 18 i t i s the nature t e s t and the purpose 
3 1See Part IV of the ILC Draft A r t i c l e s ( 2 ) . 
3 2B Verf GE Vol. 46 p. 342 (1982), St Leg Ser B/20 p 297. 
But was a l s o extended i n Third Avenue A s s o c i a t e s and Another, 
1993 U.S. Court of Appeals 2nd C i r c u i t 767 (ILR 99 p. 193). 
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t e s t that would have to be a p p l i e d i n determining whether s t a t e 
property be subjected to exec u t i o n or not, and t h i s seemed 
somewhat to have been made c l e a r i n Lord Diplock's d e c i s i o n i n 
Alcom. Thus the d e n i a l of immunity does not mean that 
enforcement measures be taken. 
Actions i n Tort i n Respect to Personal I n j u r y or Damage to 
Property under the D r a f t A r t i c l e s 
A r t i c l e 12 of the d r a f t a r t i c l e s i s not new and appears to 
cover c e r t a i n i s s u e s r e l a t i n g to diplomatic and consular 
p r i v i l e g e s . 3 3 And i t s u n d e r l y i n g f o r c e follows some aspects of 
pr i v a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i n r e s p e c t to t o r t s . 3 4 A r t i c l e 12 reads 
as follows: 
"Unless otherwise agreed between the s t a t e s concerned, a 
s t a t e cannot invoke immunity from j u r i s d i c t i o n before a court of 
another s t a t e which i s o t h e r w i s e competent i n a proceeding which 
r e l a t e s to pecuniary compensation f o r death or i n j u r y to the 
person, or damage to or l o s s of t a n g i b l e property caused by an 
a c t or omission occurred i n whole or i n p a r t i n the t e r r i t o r y of 
that other s t a t e and i f the author of the a c t or omission was 
present i n t h a t t e r r i t o r y a t the time of the a c t or om i s s i o n . " 3 5 
A r t i c l e 12 i s q u i t e s i m i l a r to A r t i c l e 11 of the European 
Convention except t h a t the European Convention took i n t o 
consideration as to whether "the f a c t s which occasioned the 
i n j u r y or damage, occurred i n the t e r r i t o r y of the s t a t e of the 
forum." 3 6 Thus i n r e a l terms these two p r o v i s i o n s follow the same 
3 3See Brownlie, op. c i t . , pp. 355-361. 
3 4Dicey and Morris on C o n f l i c t of Laws (1993) pp. 1480-1550. 
3 5See I n t Legal M a t e r i a l s p. 1569. 
3 6European Convention (1972) A r t i c l e 11. 
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approach i n l i m i t i n g immunity to sovereign s t a t e s . The n a t i o n a l 
l e g i s l a t i o n passed i n other countries such as the US, UK, 
Singapore, Pakistan, South A f r i c a and Canada, however, l a i d much 
emphasis on the place where the harm occurred, i . e . , the lex 
loci delicti r a t h e r than the causative a c t or the s p e c i f i c 
reasons for the i n j u r y . And t h i s seems to be inf l u e n c e d by the 
f a c t t h a t the place of i n j u r y r u l e provides c e r t a i n t y and 
p r e d i c t a b i l i t y , notwithstanding i t s shortcomings i n re s p e c t to 
c e r t a i n unique c a s e s . 
A thorough examination of A r t i c l e 12 shows t h a t i t s 
purpose i s to enable the v i c t i m of a t r a f f i c accident to sue the 
sending s t a t e of the diplomat. The f a c t , however, s t i l l remains 
t h a t the diplomat i s accorded f u l l p r i v i l e g e s and immunities 
under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic R e l a t i o n s , 3 7 and 
t h e r e f o r e cannot be sued u n l e s s consent i s procured from the 
sending s t a t e . How, then, can the s u i t against the s t a t e be 
determined? The p r i n c i p l e s of v i c a r i o u s l i a b i l i t y could provide 
the answer, but then again i t must be borne i n mind, however, 
t h a t a foreign s t a t e would only be held l i a b l e i f there i s a 
c l e a r evidence to a t t e s t to the f a c t that the diplomat was 
a c t i n g w i t h i n the confines of h i s or her diplomatic d u t i e s or 
employment. Professor Brownlie says that 
" I n the case of o f f i c i a l a c t s the immunity i s permanent, s i n c e 
i t i s that of the sending s t a t e . In respect of p r i v a t e a c t s the 
immunity i s contingent and supplementary and i t ceases when the 
i n d i v i d u a l concerned l e a v e s h i s p o s t . " 3 8 
3 7 (1965) 500 UMTS 261; 596 UMTS 261. 
3 8See Brownlie, op. c i t . , p. 358. 
348 
This means that i n order to determine the l i a b i l i t y of the s t a t e 
one must d i s t i n g u i s h between o f f i c i a l a c t s and n o n - o f f i c i a l a c t s 
or p r i v a t e a c t s , taking i n t o account immunity which i s permanent 
and that which i s contingent and supplementary. Thus i n 
exploring these i s s u e s , i t i s important to have regard to the 
force of A r t i c l e 37(2), A r t i c l e 38(1) and A r t i c l e 32 of the 
Vienna Convention. This area of the law undoubtedly i n v o l v e s 
d i f f i c u l t i n t e r r e l a t e d i s s u e s which must be approached with 
care. 
In a recent case where Mr. Gueargui Markaradze, a diplomat 
of the Republic of Georgia, caused the death of Joviane W a l t r i c k 
i n a serious car a c c i d e n t , 3 9 a request was made to Georgia, a 
former Republic of the USSR, t h a t immunity be waived. Although 
such a request was acceded to by the o f f i c i a l s of the sending 
s t a t e , however, i t would appear the government of Georgia 
became apprehensive about the f a t e of Mr. Markaradze and 
therefore suggested th a t i f Mr. Markaradze i s convicted i n the 
United States he be allowed to s e r v e h i s p r i s o n sentence i n 
Georgia ( i . e . , i n the former S o v i e t R e p u b l i c ) ; and the reason 
being that Mr. Markaradze was drunk when the accident occurred 
and i f t r i e d i n the United S t a t e s he may be charged with a 
second-degree murder, which c a r r i e s a p r i s o n term between ten to 
twenty years. Although a sentence of t h i s nature would be too 
severe, Georgia did allow the s a i d diplomat to be prosecuted i n 
the United States, i . e . , where the a c c i d e n t occurred. Amid 
See U.S. News and World Report, Jan. 20, 1997, p. 14. 
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d i p l o m a t i c n e g o t i a t i o n s , Georgia f i n a l l y paid the expenses of 
Joviane W a l t r i c k ' s f u n e r a l . I t would appear the family had 
s i n c e then negotiated with the insurance company of Georgia f o r 
death b e n e f i t s to be paid. 
I n L e t e l i e r v. Republic of C h i l e , 4 0 the court was not 
persuaded t h a t C h i l e be granted immunity for claims a r i s i n g out 
of the a s s a s s i n a t i o n of a Chilean c i t i z e n who was revealed a t 
the t r i a l to be a g a i n s t the government of C h i l e . I t was a l s o 
h e l d i n Skeen v. Federated Republic of B r a z i l , 4 1 that B r a z i l 
cannot be v i c a r i o u s l y held r e s p o n s i b l e for the t o r t i o u s a c t 
caused by the grandson of the B r a z i l i a n ambassador to the United 
S t a t e s because such an a c t i o n f a l l s outside the confines of 
governmental a c t i v i t i e s . 
One other case worth considering i s John McElhinney v. 
Anthony I v o r John Williams and Her Majesty's Secretary of State 
f o r Northern I r e l a n d , 4 2 there a charge of a s s a u l t , t r e s p a s s to 
the person, negligence and breach of duty was sought a g a i n s t 
each of the defendants. The f a c t s can be r e l a t e d thus: the 
f i r s t respondent was a p r o f e s s i o n a l B r i t i s h s o l d i e r i n the Royal 
M i l i t a r y P o l i c e s t a t i o n e d i n Northern I r e l a n d . At about 11:30 
p.m. on the 4th day of March, 1991, while he was guarding a 
checkpoint a t Culmore Road County Londonderry, on the border 
between Northern I r e l a n d and the Republic of I r e l a n d , the 
4 0(1980) 488 F.Supp. 665; 671-3. 
4 1(1983) 566 F.Supp. 1414. 
4 2 (1995) ILR 104 p. 691. 
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p l a i n t i f f drove through the check poi n t and the f i r s t defendant 
was i n v o l u n t a r i l y c a r r i e d a c r o s s the border i n t o the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of the r e p u b l i c of I r e l a n d , and i n r e a c t i o n to the 
behaviour of the appellant, the f i r s t respondent attempted to 
f i r e a gun at the appellant. The a p p e l l a n t brought charges 
a g a i n s t the second respondent, the S e c r e t a r y of State for 
Northern I r e l a n d , on the ground t h a t being the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of 
Her Majesty's Government, he was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the s o l d i e r s ' 
t o r t i o u s action. The S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e prayed i n h i s pleadings 
t h a t the s e r v i c e on him be s e t a s i d e on the ground of sovereign 
immunity. The High Court r u l e d t h a t sovereign immunity applied. 
The appellant t h e r e a f t e r appealed to the Supreme Court of 
I r e l a n d , arguing inter alia, t h a t sovereign immunity di d not 
apply i n respect of claims c l e a r l y a r i s i n g from the t o r t i o u s 
conduct of the servant of a f o r e i g n s t a t e w i t h i n the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n , and that such a conduct c o n s t i t u t e d an exception 
to the r u l e of sovereign immunity. The a p p e l l a n t f u r t h e r 
claimed that recognition of sovereign immunity would i n f r i n g e 
h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t to b o d i l y i n t e g r i t y . The appeal was 
dismissed based on the force of sovereign immunity. I n reaching 
i t s conclusion Hamilton CJ reasoned thus: 
" I am s a t i s f i e d t h a t the proper q u e s t i o n i s as s t a t e d by-
Lord Porter, what i s the law of n a t i o n s by which c i v i l i z e d 
nations i n general are bound, not how i n d i v i d u a l n a t i o n s may 
t r e a t one another." 
He continued by saying t h a t : 
D i s t i n c t i o n must be drawn between the p r o v i s i o n s of 
l e g i s l a t i o n i n a number of s t a t e s and the p r o v i s i o n s of p u b l i c 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and the p r i n c i p l e s s e t f o r t h i n i n d i v i d u a l 
s t a t e l e g i s l a t i o n cannot be regarded as e s t a b l i s h i n g p r i n c i p l e s 
of p u b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
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The p r o v i s i o n s of s t a t u t e s cannot be used as evidence of 
what i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s : s t a t u t e s are evidence of domestic 
law i n the i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e s and not evidence of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law g e n e r a l l y . " 4 3 
The I r i s h court took i s s u e with the underlying p r i n c i p l e 
r e s p e c t i n g r e s t r i c t i v e immunity by arguing that the mere f a c t 
t h a t a t o r t i o u s a c t was committed i n the forum st a t e (lex loci 
delicti) i s not s u f f i c i e n t or j u s t i f i e d by any measure of 
general i n t e r n a t i o n a l law that immunity be denied or r e s t r i c t e d . 
Thus i f a s t a t e decides to enact laws r e s p e c t i n g the conduct of 
sovereign s t a t e s , t h a t law ( s t a t u t e s ) cannot be applied to 
sovereign s t a t e s u n l e s s there i s copious evidence to a t t e s t to 
the f a c t t h a t s t a t e s are w i l l i n g to accept the l i m i t s of the 
s a i d s t a t u t e . I n other words, the underlying consequence of the 
s t a t u t e would only be accepted by s t a t e s i f i t has attained the 
hallmark of custom, i . e . , s e t t l e d p r a c t i c e duly supported by 
opinio juris. But one fundamental question that must be 
addressed i s why should a s t a t e be granted immunity i f i t s 
a c t i o n or the t o r t i o u s conduct of i t s servant has caused damage 
to a — j u r i d i c a l or n a t u r a l person? The answer stems from the 
f a c t t h a t t o r t s or c o n t r a c t s cannot be the proper subjects of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i s p u t e s (public) s i n c e i n t e r n a t i o n a l law does not 
have r u l e s c o v e r i n g these s u b j e c t s . Perhaps municipal law 
a n a l o gies would be h e l p f u l , but here again one i s burdened as to 
whether a s o v e r e i g n s t a t e can be s u b j e c t e d to a v e r t i c a l law. 
The answer must be i n the negative because municipal law i s the 
4 3 (1995) ILR 104 p. 703. 
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c r e a t u r e of sovereignty and as such cannot adequately form the 
b a s i s of general i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, hence i t i s submitted that 
i t be c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d from the p r i n c i p l e s of general 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l to avoid the d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t faced the 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission. The B r i t i s h Act, 5(a) and (b) , 
the U.S. Act 1605(a) 5.3, the Canadian Act 6(a) and (b) and 
other i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e l e g i s l a t i o n r e s p e c t i n g t o r t i o u s conduct 
of foreign sovereign s t a t e s a l l l a c k evidence of usus and thus 
not r e f l e c t i v e of general i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and t h e r e f o r e 
sovereign s t a t e s have a p e r f e c t r i g h t to c h a l l e n g e r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity whenever i t i s applied to them. T h i s argument i s being 
put f o r t h because r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i s premised on 
questionable assumptions wholly d e r i v e d from municipal law 
values, and therefore runs counter to the s t a b l e i n t e r c o u r s e 
between sovereign s t a t e s . The a p p e l l a n t f a i l e d i n h i s quest to 
c l a i m damages because Hamilton C.J. was more concerned with the 
law of nations by which sovereign s t a t e s i n g e n e r a l are bound, 
but not i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e l e g i s l a t i o n r e s p e c t i n g r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity. 
The d r a f t a r t i c l e 12 appears to be n e u t r a l l y construed 
with much emphasis placed on the locus t e s t or connecting 
f a c t o r s and the aim one would presume was to e s t a b l i s h a 
normative c r i t e r i a in l i n k i n g the a c t i o n of the f o r e i g n s t a t e to 
the forum. This arguably i s a d e v i a t i o n from general 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law but one i s encouraged to argue that 
reasonableness would p r e v a i l i n the S i x t h Committee and t h a t the 
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delegates would d i f f e r c o n s t r u c t i v e l y on the i s s u e of t o r t 
c l a i m s . 
The four c a s e s a l l u d e d to above show that further 
d i f f i c u l t i e s surround the meaning of diplomatic p r i v i l e g e s v i s -
a - v i s Section 12 of the Draft A r t i c l e s qua t o r t i o u s acts and i t 
would have been most h e l p f u l i f the commissioners had given more 
a t t e n t i o n to i t s d r a f t i n g for i t l e a v e s some important and 
s e n s i t i v e i s s u e s unaddressed. Arguably, i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
a r b i t r a t i o n would be a b e t t e r approach i n r e s o l v i n g these 
i n t r a c t a b l e problems. 
The E f f e c t of D r a f t A r t i c l e 2 Paragraph 2 on the Application of 
the R e s t r i c t i v e P r i n c i p l e 
The p r i n c i p l e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity c e r t a i n l y lacks usus 
but i n r e a l i t y gained i t s strength or prowess from the nature 
t e s t . However, the i n c l u s i o n of the purpose t e s t into the 
present d r a f t a r t i c l e 2 w i l l undoubtedly throw the r e s t r i c t i v e 
d octrine i n t o a s t a t e of s t u p o r — w h i c h means that i t s e f f e c t 
w i l l be g r e a t l y reduced i n respect of p r o t e c t i n g the r i g h t s of 
the p r i v a t e t r a d e r . And l i t i g a t i o n before municipal courts 
i n v o l v i n g sovereign s t a t e s and p r i v a t e l i t i g a t i n g p a r t i e s w i l l 
c e r t a i n l y become complicated without any easy way out. This 
would u l t i m a t e l y c r e a t e an atmosphere of b i t t e r l i t i g a t i o n , 
s i n c e i t i s h i g h l y l i k e l y the purpose t e s t would serve as a 
f a c t o r i n c o n v e r t i n g 4 4 the commercial a c t s of the s t a t e into acta 
4 4See what L.A. F o r e s t J . s a i d i n United States v. The 
P u b l i c S e r v i c e A l l i a n c e of Canada (1993) 32, ILM 1 Canadian 
Supreme Court. 
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jure imperii thus paving way for the s t a t e to q u a l i f y for 
immunity. While conversely, i f the opposite or the competing 
concept of the nature t e s t i s applied, thus by e x c l u d i n g the 
purpose t e s t completely, these governmental a c t i v i t i e s of s t a t e s 
would i n turn be c h a r a c t e r i s e d as j u r e gestionis. R i g i d 
adherence, t h e r e f o r e , to both of these two concepts, i . e . , the 
nature t e s t and the purpose t e s t , could perhaps o f f e r an 
a t t r a c t i v e s o l u t i o n to the controversy at hand, i . e . , promoting 
j u s t i c e i n the market place. 
A mixed a p p l i c a t i o n of both the nature and purpose t e s t s 
may be cumbersome and t r i c k y but i n good conscience w i l l b r i n g 
about a f a i r balancing of r i g h t s between the sovereign s t a t e and 
the p r i v a t e t r a d e r . However, i t may c o n f l i c t with a l l the 
n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n i n operation which have ab initio r e j e c t e d 
the purpose t e s t (e.g., the U.S. Act, the U.K. Act, P a k i s t a n i 
Act, the Singapore Act, the Canadian Act, the A u s t r a l i a n Act, 
and the South A f r i c a n Act. This a p p l i e s a l s o to the 1972 
European Convention on s t a t e immunity. W i l l i t be appropriate 
to allow the purpose t e s t to compliment the nature t e s t ? Lord 
Wilberforce i n I Congreso argued th a t such an approach w i l l be 
h e l p f u l but f a r from d e c i s i v e . Or w i l l the " c o n t e x t u a l 
approach" followed by Lord Wilberforce be u s e f u l ? I n some 
respect s such an approach w i l l help throw l i g h t on the whole 
underlying i s s u e respecting s t a t e immunity v i s - a - v i s the nature 
and purpose t e s t s . But no one can guarantee i t s g e n e r a l f o r c e 
and e f f e c t i v e n e s s , f or while i t may be u s e f u l i n some c a s e s , i t 
may f a l l f a r short of being e f f e c t i v e i n other c a s e s . Take, f o r 
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example, the case of Sengupta v. Republic of I n d i a , 4 5 where as a 
r e s u l t of being d i s m i s s e d from h i s employment, the p l a i n t i f f 
sued for u n f a i r d i s m i s s a l . Although the case was dismissed for 
lack of j u r i s d i c t i o n , prima facie, the court was faced with 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t r y i n g to c h a r a c t e r i s e the main i s s u e according 
to p r i v a t e and p u b l i c law d i s t i n c t i o n s . Thus s i m i l a r problems 
were a l s o encountered i n the case of L i t t r e l l v. The United 
S t a t e s . 4 6 There the a u t h o r i t y i n I Congreso d e l Partido was used 
as a y a r d s t i c k i n c o n s t r u i n g the underlying p r i n c i p l e s followed 
i n the case. Hoffman L J r u l e d t h a t " I n my judgment, however, 
the standard of medical care which the U.S. a f f o r d s i t s own 
servicemen i s a matter w i t h i n i t s own sovereign a u t h o r i t y . In 
my judgment, t h e r e f o r e , the a c t of which Mr. L i t t r e l l complains 
was c l e a r l y on the jure imperii s i d e of the l i n e and the judge 
was r i g h t to d i s m i s s the a c t i o n . " 4 7 
An i s s u e of s i m i l a r kind a l s o came up i n the United States 
v. the P u b l i c S e r v i c e A l l i a n c e of Canada. 4 8 There, the court was 
faced with the d i f f i c u l t i e s of d e f i n i n g a commercial t r a n s a c t i o n 
within the domain of an employment con t r a c t , the court held that 
i n the s t r i c t e s t sense the c o n t r a c t of employment at a m i l i t a r y 
base was a sovereign a c t i v i t y although from a l l i n d i c a t i o n s the 
nature of the t r a n s a c t i o n was commercial i n outlook. 
4 5 (1983) ICR 221 (Employment Appeal T r i b u n a l ) . 
4 6 (19 9 4 ) 2 A l l ER 203 (Court of Appeal). 
4 7 I b i d . 
4 8 (19 9 3 ) 32 ILM 1 Canadian Supreme Court. 
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Undoubtedly, L.A. F o r e s t J took some lessons from the judgment 
of Lord Wilberforce i n the I Congreso. These cases support the 
view that the term commercial t r a n s a c t i o n and sovereign 
a u t h o r i t y ( i . e . , a c t a jure imperii) need some f u r t h e r 
c l a r i f i c a t i o n or e l u c i d a t i o n i n order to prevent confusion. On 
the whole i t i s doubtful as to whether l e g i s l a t i o n or an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l convention can be designated as the only panacea 
to promoting equity and j u s t i c e i n t r a n s n a t i o n a l b u s i n e s s 
t r a n s a c t i o n qua s t a t e r i g h t s . 
Judges therefore as a matter of f a i r n e s s must be given a 
degree of freedom to explore these i s s u e s without being l i m i t e d 
by n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n sentimentally or s e l e c t i v e l y couched to 
p r o t e c t the r i g h t s of the p r i v a t e trader. The United Kingdom, 
f o r example, does not need a l e g i s l a t i o n on s t a t e immunity, f o r 
i t s courts are capable of developing t h i s area of the law, i . e . , 
s t a t e immunity without any d i f f i c u l t i e s . Alcorn, and the 
A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. v. A u s t r a l i a 4 9 
d e c i s i o n s undoubtedly o f f e r a good i l l u s t r a t i o n of the 
considerable problems l e f t unanswered but at the same time a l s o 
provided a good road map for t h i s uncharted journey with r e s p e c t 
to r e s o l v i n g the sovereign immunity controversy. 
4 9 C i t e d from (1990) 39 ICLQ 950. 
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Some R e f l e c t i o n s on the I n f l u e n c e of the T h i r d World on the 
D e l i b e r a t i o n s of the I L C 
Dr. S u c h a r i t k u l i n one of h i s expositions on s t a t e 
immunity argued that 
" I t should be observed, on the other hand, that s e v e r a l 
governments expressed c e r t a i n p r e f e r e n c e f o r a more absolute 
r u l e of s t a t e immunity. The USSR and E a s t e r n European c o u n t r i e s 
as w e l l as some developing A s i a n , A f r i c a n and L a t i n American 
s t a t e s would l i k e to see the r u l e of s t a t e immunity upheld and 
maintained r a t h e r than eroded by l a r g e e x c e p t i o n s . T h e i r views 
cannot be i g n o r e d . " 5 0 
The observation a l l u d e d to above warrants a p r o p o s i t i o n , 
i f not a conclusion, t h a t t h e r e i s a general p r a c t i c e of s t a t e 
immunity or t h a t the m a j o r i t y of s t a t e s of the world r a t h e r 
p r e f e r that absolute s t a t e immunity be maintained. And s i n c e 
the Western i n d u s t r i a l i s e d c o u n t r i e s happened to be i n the 
minority, the views r e s p e c t i n g the narrowing of commercial 
exceptions won the day. T h i r d World c o u n t r i e s , therefore, i n a 
concerted e f f o r t to l i m i t proceedings i n s t i t u t e d a g a i n s t the 
person of the s t a t e eo nomine or a g a i n s t the s u b s i d i a r y organs 
of sovereign s t a t e s mounted a f o r c e f u l a t t a c k on the p r i n c i p l e 
of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity which has found favour with the West. 
The Venezuela argument t h a t T h i r d World co u n t r i e s are venturing 
i n t o the market p l a c e to s a t i s f y the needs of t h e i r c i t i z e n s 
because of l a c k of finance c a p i t a l and that l i m i t i n g immunity 
w i l l be p r e j u d i c i a l to these c o u n t r i e s i s a genuine concern t h a t 
cannot be dismissed, challenged or r e l e g a t e d to the background. 
I t would appear such an argument might have r e c e i v e d enormous 
5 0See Mohammed Bedjaoui (ed.) I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, 
Achievements and Prospects (1991) p. 333. 
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support from a ma j o r i t y of s t a t e s from the developing world, and 
t h i s ex hypothesi seemed re s p o n s i b l e for the in t r o d u c t i o n of the 
purpose t e s t i n t o the d r a f t a r t i c l e s , 5 1 thus s a t i s f y i n g the 
f o r c e f u l i n t e r e s t a r t i c u l a t i o n coming from the T h i r d World. 
C e r t a i n l y the a r t i c u l a t i o n of the Third World i n t e r e s t d i d 
c r y s t a l l i s e i n t o a f o r c e f u l u n i t y of aggregation th a t could not 
be defeated. I t may be r e c a l l e d that i t was due to the 
aggregation of T h i r d World i n t e r e s t s t h a t prompted the 
in c o r p o r a t i o n of A r t s . 61 and 62 among many other p r o v i s i o n s 
r e s p e c t i n g the "conservation and u t i l i z a t i o n of the l i v i n g 
r e s o u r c e s of the e x c l u s i v e zone" into the law of the sea 
convention of 1982. 
S i m i l a r pressure has been applied by the Th i r d World again 
i n t h e i r quest to a f f e c t changes i n the d r a f t a r t i c l e s , and so 
f a r these c o u n t r i e s have been s u c c e s s f u l . 
Mr. Balanda, a member of the Commission from Z a i r e , now 
Repub l i c of Congo, argued t h a t : 
"Major i n t e r e s t s were the cause of a d i s e q u i l i b r i u m t h a t 
was a l l too w e l l known and one f o r which a remedy was c o n s t a n t l y 
being sought. Contrary to what some people might b e l i e v e , i n 
most developing c o u n t r i e s the burden of development l a y l a r g e l y 
w i t h the s t a t e . Hence major a t t e n t i o n should be pa i d to the way 
i n which the a c t i v i t i e s of those s t a t e s were conducted, s i n c e i t 
was not always easy to d i s t i n g u i s h between a c t s jure gestionis 
and a c t s j u r e imperii. The i n t e r e s t s of the developing 
c o u n t r i e s t h e r e f o r e c a l l e d f o r the best p r o t e c t i o n p o s s i b l e . " 5 2 
5 1See I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission's Report 1980-1988 and 
the f o r c e f u l r o l e t h a t was played by the Third World. 
5 2See The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission's Report (1985) p. 
244. 
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Chief Akinjide, a member of the Commission from Niger i a , 
a l s o s a i d : 
"Far from attempting to m a i n t a i n an e q u i l i b r i u m between 
those competing i n t e r e s t s , the main t h r u s t of the two a r t i c l e s 
appeared to be to b r i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r a c t i c e as a whole i n t o 
l i n e with the U.S. and the U.K. Acts [he had a l r e a d y mentioned] . 
The meaning of A r t i c l e 19 was i n e f f e c t t h a t , u n l e s s otherwise 
agreed, a s t a t e d e a l i n g with a p r i v a t e or p u b l i c company i n 
another s t a t e would enjoy no immunity whatsoever. The r e s u l t i n g 
s i t u a t i o n would have v e r y s e r i o u s i m p l i c a t i o n s . His own 
experience of commercial l i t i g a t i o n i n v a r i o u s European 
countries l e d him to doubt t h a t any government of a developing 
country would sign, s t i l l l e s s r a t i f y , e i t h e r of the two 
a r t i c l e s now before the Commission." 
He further s a i d t h a t 
"The i s s u e s i n v o l v e d were so fundamental t h a t the 
a r t i c l e s would, i n h i s view, have to come back to the Commission 
for f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n . To accept them would be to s u b s c r i b e to 
the pr o p o s i t i o n that the r i c h should continue to be r i c h and the 
poor should continue to be poor." 5 3 
S i m i l a r sentiments were expressed by Mr. Ahmed of Sudan and Mr. 
Mahious of A l g e r i a , r e s p e c t i v e l y . 5 4 While the p o s i t i o n of Mr. 
Ushakov, the Soviet, now Russian, member of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Law Commission took a more r a d i c a l approach towards the 
preservation of the d o c t r i n e of s t a t e immunity thus: 
"The s t a t e engages i n economic a c t i v i t i e s not as does a 
p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l , but p r e c i s e l y as a s t a t e , sovereign, 
invested with p u b l i c power." 
He argued f u r t h e r t h a t : 
"The same i s apparent from the d i s c u s s i o n on the 
pe r t i n e n t s e c t i o n of the Commission's r e p o r t i n the S i x t h 
Committee of the General Assembly, which shows t h a t a l a r g e 
group of s t a t e s are opposed to the above mentioned concept." 5 5 
"See ILC Report (1985) p. 242 (1917th meeting) Vol. 1. 
5 4 I b i d . 
5 5 I L C Report (1983) p. 55 (Vol. I I P a r t 1 ) . 
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He again argued f o r c e f u l l y f u r t h e r i n support of the 
d o c t r i n e of s t a t e immunity and f i n a l l y concluded that: 
"The foregoing demonstrates t h a t c o d i f i c a t i o n based on 
concepts of l i m i t e d s o v e r e i g n t y would be c l e a r l y unsound and 
u n f r u i t f u l . 
The problem r e q u i r e s , at the v e r y l e a s t , f u r t h e r study i n 
g r e a t depth." 5 6 
The impetus for arguing t h a t Third World i n t e r e s t s be 
s p e c i a l l y considered i n the matter of A r t i c l e 2 paragraph (2) 
i n t o the d r a f t a r t i c l e s , coupled with the e f f e c t of A r t i c l e 5 
and the changes t h e r e i n made i n r e s p e c t of A r t i c l e 18 paragraph 
2 r e f l e c t s the impact the developing world had managed to 
e x e r c i s e i n the d r a f t i n g of the s a i d a r t i c l e s , r e s p e c t i v e l y . 5 7 
I t must be pointed out i n passing a l s o that the r o l e of R u s s i a 
i n t h i s endeavour cannot be underestimated in the l i g h t of the 
support i t had generated i n t r y i n g to have s t a t e immunity 
p r e s e r v e d as a r u l e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
The d r a f t a r t i c l e s embrace a considerable number of 
e xceptions to s t a t e immunity but the i n c l u s i o n of A r t i c l e 2 
paragraph 2 i n t o the d r a f t a r t i c l e s has l i m i t e d the scope of 
t h ese exceptions to such heights as to create an e q u i t a b l e 
balance. The e f f e c t of A r t i c l e 2 paragraph 2 would g r e a t l y 
i n f l u e n c e the course of l i t i g a t i o n and i t i s highly p o s s i b l e 
t h a t i t w i l l e c l i p s e the e f f e c t of A r t i c l e 10 which s p e c i f i c a l l y 
d e a l s with commercial t r a n s a c t i o n s under the d r a f t a r t i c l e s . 
The d i s t i n c t i o n t h e r e f o r e between acta jure imperii and acta 
5 6 I b i d . , p. 65, Vol. I I , Part 1. 
5 7See g e n e r a l l y The ILC's Report 1980-1988. 
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jure gentionis w i l l undoubtedly be p r e d i c a t e d on the b a t t l e of 
ideas which i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y w i l l not be an easy t a s k f or the 
modern judge. The d i f f i c u l t i e s encountered by municipal courts 
i n respect to p o l i t i c a l or diplomatic a c t i v i t i e s , however, would 
somewhat be made e a s i e r s i n c e the purpose t e s t has now been made 
re l e v a n t under the d r a f t a r t i c l e s . 5 8 These problems are 
i l l u s t r a t e d by the d e c i s i o n s i n P r e n t i c e Shaw and S c h e i s s v. 
Government of the Republic of B o l i v i a 5 9 where a c o n t r a c t f or the 
e r e c t i o n of an embassy was c h a r a c t e r i s e d as acta jure imperii, 
whereas i n the E n g l i s h case of Planmount Ltd., the Republic of 
Z a i r e ' s plea for immunity was r e j e c t e d on the grounds tha t the 
i s s u e regarding the r e p a i r s to the ambassador's residence was 
acta jure gestionis. The d e c i s i o n s i n Shaw S c h e i s s and 
Planmount Ltd. c l e a r l y support the argument t h a t was advanced 
agai n s t the a p p l i c a t i o n of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity by Judge 
Lauterpacht i n h i s w e l l c i t e d 1951 a r t i c l e , 6 0 i n which he pointed 
out t h a t courts of d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s and indeed co u r t s of the 
same country, have t r e a t e d s i m i l a r a c t i v i t i e s i n a d i f f e r e n t 
manner. 6 1 What then can be done to improve the present d r a f t 
a r t i c l e s ? On the whole, the d r a f t a r t i c l e s may be open to 
c r i t i c i s m from the standpoint of d r a f t i n g , i . e . , some of the 
a r t i c l e s are generally construed without e x p l o r i n g the 
5 8See A r t i c l e 2 Subsection or Paragraph 2 of the Draft 
A r t i c l e s (1991), a l s o i n I n t Legal M a t e r i a l s p. 1565. 
5 9 (1978) 3 SA 938 W. a t 9404. 
6 0See Lauterpacht, op. c i t . , pp. 222-223. 
6 1 I b i d . p. 222. 
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d i f f e r e n c e s t h a t e x i s t between the l e g a l and p o l i t i c a l systems 
on one hand, qua, the needs and the continuing change i n 
a c t i v i t i e s of the modern s t a t e . A good study i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n 
would show why c o u n t r i e s with premobilised a u t h o r i t a r i a n 
p o l i t i c a l systems and premobilised democratic p o l i t i c a l systems 6 2 
have ventured i n t o the market place and why countries with high 
subsystem autonomy such as B r i t a i n , Germany, U.S.A., Canada, 
France, e t c . , have not ventured i n t o the market place on a 
c o n s i d e r a b l e s c a l e as compared to the T h i r d World. Such studies 
would show t h a t t r a d i n g i s the l i f e blood of the Third World. 
Furthermore a study of t h i s nature would a l s o uncover i s s u e s 
r e l a t i n g to low subsystem autonomous co u n t r i e s such as Mexico, 
B r a z i l and the intermediate subsystem autonomous countries such 
as South A f r i c a . Indeed, such s t u d i e s must a l s o be c a r r i e d i n t o 
the domain of subsystem c o n t r o l or r a d i c a l t o t a l i t a r i a n systems 
i n such s t a t e s as the former USSR (now Russia) or China i n order 
to determine the economic needs of s t a t e s and why some of these 
s t a t e s venture i n t o commerce i n r e s p e c t of national economic 
management. The Venezuela r e p l y to the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law 
Commission's q u e s t i o n n a i r e s i s a good example of the s i t u a t i o n 
i n a p r e m o b i l i s e d a u t h o r i t a r i a n or democratic system, 6 3 e.g., 
Cuba, N i g e r i a , Libya, North Korea, e t c . , and a premobilised 
6 2See g e n e r a l l y the a n a l y s i s of p o l i t i c a l systems i n Almond 
and Powell, Comparative P o l i t i c s — A Developmental Approach 1966. 
6 3 I n t . L. Commission's Report (1988) p. 90. See a s i m i l a r 
p o s i t i o n advanced by USSR now R u s s i a , pp. 82-84; Thailand, pp. 
81-82, B r a z i l , p. 58 B u l g a r i a , pp. 59-60; and the p o s i t i o n of 
the former Republic of Czechoslovakia, pp. 63-64, r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
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democratic system, e.g., Zimbabwe, Zambia, Ghana, Lesotho, 
Jamaica, I n d i a , Kenya, e t c . 
Another drawback worth pointing out i n r e s p e c t of the 
d r a f t a r t i c l e s i s i n the areas of theory and r e s i d u a l r u l e s , 
i . e . , the d r a f t a r t i c l e s were based on a l e s s c o n v i n c i n g c i v i l 
law concept, for there i s no c r e d i b i l i t y i n the concept of the 
s t a t e a c t i n g as a p r i v a t e person. I n other words, a s t a t e does 
not become a p r i v a t e person because i t has ventured i n t o the 
market p l a c e . 6 4 For the s t a t e i n r e a l i t y always a c t s as a 
" p u b l i c person" for the betterment and the w e l f a r e of i t s 
c i t i z e n s . The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission's c e n t r a l purpose 
for r e l y i n g on the t h e o r e t i c a l underpinnings of the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between commercial a c t i v i t i e s and p u r e l y governmental 
a c t i v i t i e s , s i n g u l a r l y based on r e s t r i c t i v e p r i n c i p l e , must be 
r e l e g a t e d to the background for a more o b j e c t i v e t e s t . I t i s 
not the purpose of t h i s study to deal with the whole d r a f t 
a r t i c l e s but rather to explore those areas l i k e l y to b r i n g about 
d i f f i c u l t j u r i s d i c t i o n a l problems. 
Disagreement Over the Draft A r t i c l e s 
The S i x t h Committee and the Draft A r t i c l e s on J u r i s d i c t i o n a l 
Immunities of States and Their Property 
A f t e r Mr. Sucharitkul completed h i s terms of o f f i c e i n 
1988, Mr. Ogiso of Japan was appointed to continue where the 
f i r s t rapporteur l e f t o f f . The t a s k a l b e i t was not easy but as 
was expected, Mr. Ogiso gave a good account of h i m s e l f by coming 
6 4Lauterpacht, op. c i t . , p. 224; Hyde, op. c i t . 
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up with a p r e l i m i n a r y report which contained important proposals 
for minimizing the d i f f e r e n c e s t h a t e x i s t between member s t a t e s . 
With h i s able l e a d e r s h i p the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission 
adopted a s e t of 22 d r a f t a r t i c l e s on j u r i s d i c t i o n a l immunities 
of s t a t e s and t h e i r property which was submitted to the General 
Assembly i n 1991 with a recommendation that an I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Conference be convened to consider the t o p i c . And the General 
Assembly having r e a l i s e d the d e s i r a b i l i t y of a convention on 
s t a t e immunity decided to e s t a b l i s h an open-ended working group 
of the S i x t h Committee with a recommendation tha t i t be a l s o 
opened to p a r t i c i p a t i n g s t a t e members of the s p e c i a l i s e d 
agencies, to examine i s s u e s r e l a t i n g to the d r a f t a r t i c l e s and 
recent developments i n s t a t e p r a c t i c e , as w e l l as comments 
submitted by sovereign s t a t e s on the s u b j e c t . Although there i s 
s t i l l disagreement about c e r t a i n aspects of the d r a f t a r t i c l e s , 
member s t a t e s have expressed support i n the S i x t h Committee for 
the C o d i f i c a t i o n of the Law. I n 1991 members such as Mr. A l -
Bharna of Bahrain, P r i n c e A j i b o l a of Nig e r i a , Mr. Calero 
Rodrigues of B r a z i l , Mr. Guillaume of France, Mr. Al Khassuanah 
of Jordan, Mr. Guevoguian of the USSR (then), Mr. Al Quysi of 
Ir a q , Mr. McKenzie of T r i n i d a d and Tobago, S i r John Freeland of 
U.K., Mr. Abdel K h a l i k of Egypt, Mr. Mahiuw of Al g e r i a , Mr. 
Hayes of I r e l a n d , Mr. L a c e l e t a of Spain and Badr of Qatar, d i d 
voice out t h e i r o b j e c t i o n s to c e r t a i n aspects of the d r a f t 
a r t i c l e s but were without doubt g e n e r a l l y i n agreement on the 
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importance of sovereign immunity and the need f or g e t t i n g a 
t r e a t y t e x t i n p l a c e . 6 5 
Ever s i n c e the dr a f t a r t i c l e s were adopted i n 1991, 
informal c o n s u l t a t i o n s within the Si x t h Committee between 1992-
1994, gave s t a t e s the opportunity to r e f l e c t on the d i f f e r e n c e s 
of opinion th a t e x i s t among developed s t a t e s and developing 
s t a t e s . This then cleared the way for s t a t e s to f u r t h e r 
consider the s u b j e c t . The s p i r i t of cooperation thus brought 
about General Assembly Resolution 49/61 of 9 December 1994, 
which was followed by Resolution 52/151 of 15 December 1997. 
The General Assembly by "reaffirming t h a t the c o d i f i c a t i o n and 
progr e s s i v e development of i n t e r n a t i o n a l laws c o n t r i b u t e s to the 
implementation of the purpose and p r i n c i p l e s s e t f o r t h i n 
A r t i c l e 1 and 2 of the Charter of the U.N.,"66 and having 
considered the Secretary General's report, adopted R e s o l u t i o n 
48/413 by i n v i t i n g the ILC to present i t s p r e l i m i n a r y comments 
regarding the d r a f t a r t i c l e s by 31 August 1999. 
At the l a t t e r part of 1998, the S i x t h Committee took 
fu r t h e r steps to consider the proposal f o r an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
convention on j u r i s d i c t i o n a l immunity of s t a t e s and t h e i r 
property. But i t s e f f o r t s again met with d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the 
l i g h t of the great controversy regarding the d e f i n i t i o n of the 
term commercial t r a n s a c t i o n . In view of these d i f f i c u l t i e s , 
members of the S i x t h Committee suggested t h a t a working group be 
6 5 (19 8 6 ) 41 UN GAOR C6 (38th mtg) 62 UN DOC A/C 6.41/SR 38 
A/C 6.41/SR 37, A/C/41/SR28, A/C 6/41/SR 41. 
6 6 (1998) F i f t y - T h i r d Session, Agenda Item 148 A/53/629 p. 2. 
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e s t a b l i s h e d to consider the d r a f t a r t i c l e s during the F i f t y -
Fourth Assembly s e s s i o n . But before we consider the work of the 
s a i d group i t i s apposite to touch on some of the views that 
were expressed on the s u b j e c t i n the f a l l of 1998, so as to get 
some idea about c u r r e n t s t a t e p r a c t i c e . Mr. Duan Tielong of 
China, for example, s t a t e d t h a t 
" I n the f i r s t p l a c e , when determining the nature of a 
t r a n s a c t i o n i t was n e c e s s a r y to take i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n the 
purpose of the t r a n s a c t i o n , because t r a n s a c t i o n s of a s t a t e were 
often conducted not f o r p r o f i t but f o r the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t ; 
t r e a t i n g a l l i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a n s a c t i o n s of a s t a t e as commercial 
t r a n s a c t i o n without r e g a r d to t h e i r purpose could l e a d to an 
abuse of n a t i o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n t h a t would a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t 
r e l a t i o n s between s t a t e s . " 6 7 
Ms. Cueto M i l i a n of Cuba expressed the view that 
"her government had had r e c e n t d i r e c t experience of i t s 
property being s u b j e c t e d to a u n i l a t e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by some 
s t a t e s of the p r i n c i p l e s governing the j u r i s d i c t i o n a l immunities 
of s t a t e s and t h e i r p roperty. Any harmonization of r u l e s would 
have to r e c o n c i l e the p r i n c i p l e of par in parem imperium non 
habet and r e c e n t developments i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, with c u r r e n t 
p o l i c y of s t a t e s and the conceptual philosophy of the i s s u e . " 6 8 
Mr. L a v a l l a Valdes of Guatemala s a i d : 
" A f t e r endorsing the statement by the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of 
Panama on b e h a l f of the Rio Group, s a i d t h a t the j u r i s d i c t i o n a l 
immunities of s t a t e s and t h e i r p r o p e r t y e f f e c t i v e l y belong to 
the body of customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law cases where s t a t e s acted 
j u r e imperii. Outside such s p e c i f i c c a s e s , however, and d e s p i t e 
the importance of the i s s u e f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law p l a y e d a p a s s i v e r o l e ; no regime of what had 
been termed 'ordered freedoms' had been e s t a b l i s h e d . The reason 
for t h a t was t h a t , d e s p i t e the growth of i n t e r n a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y 
by s t a t e s and the development of i d e a s , no new customary r u l e s 
r e l a t i n g to j u r i s d i c t i o n a l immunities, nor a t r e a t y of u n i v e r s a l 
scope had come i n t o b e i n g . " 6 9 
Mr. Saguier C a b a l l e r a of Paraguay s a i d t h a t 
67A/C 6/52/SR 26 p. 5 (GA) S i x t h Committee 20th meeting. 
68A/C 6/53/SR 23 p. 4 (GA) 23rd meeting. 
69A/C 6/53/SR.23 p. 4 (GA) . 
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"Paraguay supported the b a s i c concept that s t a t e s enjoy immunity 
from the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the courts of other s t a t e s and the 
measures of c o n s t r a i n t which they might adopt. While there 
might be exceptions, they should be f u l l y j u s t i f i e d and i n 
conformity with the convention." 7 0 
Mr. Robert Rosenstock of the United S t a t e s s a i d 
"A growing number of delegates shaped t h a t view, he s a i d . 
He was aware t h a t other delegations had d i f f e r e n t views, hence 
the l a c k of consensus. The U.S. was not aware of any 
development which suggested a l i k e l i h o o d of agreement today. 
The p a u c i t y of comments from governments and the three comments 
r e c e i v e d by the S e c r e t a r i a t did not suggest any narrowing of 
d i f f e r e n c e s . Attempting to force the i s s u e would l e a d to the 
hardening of p o s i t i o n s . " 7 1 
Mr. Verweij of Netherlands s a i d that 
" d i f f e r e n c e s of substance s t i l l remain" and t h a t "there were 
three key i s s u e s : F i r s t l y , i t was necessary to c l a r i f y the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between acta jure imperii and a c t a jure gestionis: 
secondly, i t was ne c e s s a r y to determine which e n t i t i e s could, 
from the l e g a l standpoint, enjoy j u r i s d i c t i o n a l immunity and 
l a s t l y , i t was necessary to e s t a b l i s h the extent of immunity 
from e x e c u t i o n . " 7 2 
E v e r t Marechal of Belgium expressed the view t h a t 
"only non-standardized jurisprudence e x i s t e d on j u r i s d i c t i o n a l 
immunity. Most di s p u t e s i n Belgium involved d i p l o m a t i c m i s s i o n s 
which were not covered by the Vienna Convention's—he t h e r e f o r e 
supported the establishment of a working group to study the most 
important a s p e c t s of j u r i s d i c t i o n a l immunity." 7 3 
Delegates 7 4 from Japan, France, United Kingdom, Greece, 
Bangladesh, Czech Republic, Panama, I t a l y , A u s t r i a , Ukraine, 
70A/C.6/52/SR.26 p. 6 (GA). 
7 1 (1988) CA/L 30al, 
72A/C 6/52/SR.26 p. 
7 3 (1998) GA/L/3091: 
S i x t h Committee p. 4. 
5 (GA) . 
S i x t h Committee p. 4. 
74Mr. Nagaoka and Fukushima (Japan), Mr. Alabrune ( F r a n c e ) , 
Ms. Dickson (U.K.), Ms. Telahan (Greece), Mr. Morshed 
(Bangladesh), Mr. Smejkal (Czech Republic), J u d i t h Maria Cardoza 
(Panama), Mr. P o l i t i ( I t a l y ) , Ms. Suchanpa ( A u s t r i a ) , Mr. 
Kachurenko (Ukraine), Mr. Varso ( S l o v a k i a ) . 
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Panama and Slovakia, although were not agreed on the substantive 
i s s u e s r e l a t i n g to the d r a f t a r t i c l e s , d i d suggest th a t a 
working group be e s t a b l i s h e d to help rework or consider the 
outstanding i s s u e s r e s p e c t i n g s t a t e immunity. Thus on 7 May 
1999, the s a i d working group 7 5 was e s t a b l i s h e d to study f i v e main 
problems and these are (1) concept of s t a t e for purpose of 
immunity; (2) c r i t e r i a for determining commercial ch a r a c t e r of a 
contract or t r a n s a c t i o n ; (3) the concept of s t a t e e n t e r p r i s e or 
other e n t i t y i n r e l a t i o n to commercial t r a n s a c t i o n s ; (4) 
contracts of employment; and (5) measures of c o n s t r a i n t a g a i n s t 
s t a t e property. 
A r t i c l e 2 of the d r a f t a r t i c l e s , paragraph 1 ( b ) i i has been 
a subject of disagreement between f e d e r a l s t a t e s and non-federal 
s t a t e s , s p e c i f i c a l l y with r e s p e c t to the problem r e l a t i n g to the 
dual capacity of a province, " s t a t e s " or c o n s t i t u e n t u n i t s , to 
e x e r c i s e governmental power on b e h a l f of i t s e l f or for the 
7 5The working group i s made up of the following s c h o l a r s : 
Mr. A. Hafner, Chairman; Mr. C. Yamada, Rapporteur; Mr. H. Al 
Bahama, Mr. I . Brownlie, Mr. E. C a n d i o t i , Mr. J . Crawford, Mr. 
C. Dugard, Mr. G. Gaja, Mr. M. E l a r a b y , Mr. Q. He, Mr. M. Kamto, 
Mr. I . Lukashuk, Mr. T. Melescanu, Mr. P. Rao, Mr. B. Sepulveda, 
Mr. P. Tomica, and Mr. R. Rosenstock (ex o f f i c i o ) . The working 
group worked on the unresolved i s s u e r e l a t i n g to s t a t e immunity 
from 1 June 1999 to 5 J u l y 1999. I t i s proposed here to 
consider (1) concept of s t a t e f o r purposes of immunity; (2) 
c r i t e r i a for determining the commercial c h a r a c t e r of a c o n t r a c t 
or t r a n s a c t i o n s ; and (3) measure of c o n s t r a i n t against s t a t e 
property. Such other t o p i c s as the concept of s t a t e e n t e r p r i s e 
or other e n t i t y i n r e l a t i o n to commercial t r a n s a c t i o n s and 
contracts of employment have been considered infra. The 
suggestions, however, of the working group are i n order and 
therefore would l i k e l y f i n d favour with some co u n t r i e s ; see 
Document A/C.6/49/62 para. 88; see a l s o summary records of the 
meetings of the F o r t y - T h i r d S e s s i o n , 2218th meeting, Yearbook of 
the ILC Vol. pp. 68-72. 
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c e n t r a l government, pursuant to the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n 
of powers between the c e n t r a l government and the c o n s t i t u e n t 
u n i t s . The main controversy here i s whether component u n i t s of 
a f e d e r a l s t a t e be considered pari pasu to the f e d e r a l s t a t e i n 
enjoying f u l l immunity without any ad d i t i o n a l requirements, 
i . e . , when these u n i t s are a c t i n g within the confines of the 
powers granted to them and i n t h e i r name. The attempt by some 
s t a t e s to s h i f t the emphasis placed on the st a t u s of the s t a t e 
to i t s a c t i v i t i e s or functions i n granting immunity i s 
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h i s problem, s i n c e the granting of immunity i s 
wholly p r e d i c a t e d on the nature t e s t , i . e . , the commercial 
a c t i v i t y i n i s s u e . 7 6 However, Mr. Ogiso's commentary on the s a i d 
a r t i c l e , "that c o n s t i t u e n t u n i t s of some f e d e r a l systems, f o r 
h i s t o r i c a l or other reasons, enjoyed sovereign immunity without 
the a d d i t i o n a l requirement t h a t i t be performing sovereign 
a u t h o r i t y of the s t a t e , " 7 7 i s a w e l l reasoned answer to the 
problem. Many f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s i n f a c t are based upon 
c e n t r i p e t a l and c e n t r i f u g a l f o r c e s and therefore the r i g h t s , 
d u t i e s and o b l i g a t i o n s of these component u n i t s are w e l l defined 
and entrenched. Thus a c a r e f u l reference to the U.S. 
C o n s t i t u t i o n , i . e . , the Tenth Amendment78 and the Supremacy 
7 6 (1996) A Lim i t e d v. B. Bank and Bank of X, Court of Appeal 
U.K. 
7 7See (1991) V o l . I I Part I I p. 6, Yearbook of the I n t . Law 
Commission. 
7 8The 10th Amendment: "The powers not delegated to the 
United S t a t e s by the C o n s t i t u t i o n , nor prohibited by i t to the 
s t a t e s r e s p e c t i v e l y , or to the people." The process i s even 
made e a s i e r by the Supremacy Clause. 
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Clause shows how power i s shared between the s t a t e s and the 
f e d e r a l government. 
The proposal by Mr. C a r l o s Calero-Rodrigues which was 
based on A r t i c l e 28 of the 1972 European Convention was meant to 
pave way for a compromise to be reached. Germany and A u s t r i a 
supported the compromise proposal w h i l e Argentina argued th a t 
constituent u n i t s be replaced by "autonomous t e r r i t o r i a l 
governmental e n t i t i e s . " 7 9 Whether Argentina's suggestion would 
f i n d favour with other f e d e r a l c o u n t r i e s , or members of the 
S i x t h Committee, i s open to debate. Court d e c i s i o n s a t s t a t e 
l e v e l , however, have r e l i e d on such parameters as defined 
t e r r i t o r y , permanent population, and the formal o b l i g a t i o n s t h a t 
are normally a s s o c i a t e d with p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
community to determine what i s a s t a t e . That the above approach 
by municipal courts i s l o g i c a l l y t enable and th e r e f o r e l i k e l y to 
f i n d favour with some s t a t e s cannot be disputed. I t i s 
submitted that l e a v i n g the burden on the e n t i t y to prove whether 
i t f a l l s under the d e f i n i t i o n of a s t a t e or not as can be 
detected i n the d e c i s i o n of some c o u r t s 8 0 would be i n order i f 
reference i s made to the c o n s t i t u t i o n of the f e d e r a l s t a t e of a 
given component u n i t . The suggestion t h a t p a r a l l e l i s m be 
e s t a b l i s h e d between the "concept of s t a t e f o r purpose of 
immunity" and "the s t a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y d r a f t " f o r purposes of 
7 9Transaero I n c . v. La Fuerza Aerea B o l i v i a n a (1994) Court 
of Appeals, D i s t . of Columbia C i r c u i t (11-12 107 p. 308) . 
8 0Drexel Burnham Lambert Group I n c . v. Committee of 
Receivers for Galadari e t a l . . Refco: (1993) U.S. D i s t . Court 
Southern D i s t . of N.Y. (ILR 103 p. 532) . 
371 
d e f i n i n g the conduct of component u n i t s i n respect of e x e r c i s i n g 
government a u t h o r i t y i s not c l e a r c u t , and therefore was 
di s m i s s e d as unnecessary. The suggestion by the working group 
to the General Assembly that paragraph 1 ( b ) i i of A r t i c l e 2 of 
the d r a f t a r t i c l e s could be delet e d and the element, 
" c o n s t i t u e n t u n i t s of a f e d e r a l s t a t e " would j o i n " p o l i t i c a l 
s u b d i v i s i o n s of the s t a t e " i n present paragraph 1 ( b ) i i i , w i l l 
c e r t a i n l y be h e l p f u l , but again i n a b i t t e r dispute reference to 
a given f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n coupled with i t s l e g i s l a t i v e 
h i s t o r y and s t a t u t e s would be most appropriate and adequately 
p l a u s i b l e i n determining the l e g a l p o s i t i o n of component u n i t s , 
f o r the purpose of granting immunity. Federal c o n s t i t u t i o n s may 
d i f f e r i n r e s p e c t of the a l l o c a t i o n of powers to the component 
u n i t s and i t s agencies, but the l e g a l p o s i t i o n of these 
component u n i t s do not d i f f e r markedly from country to country 
as to c r e a t e any d i f f i c u l t i e s i n f i n d i n g an acceptable s o l u t i o n 
to the problem. 8 1 The s a i d problem i s not too severe as many 
would t h i n k i t to be, for the i n d i v i d u a l f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s 
c u r r e n t l y i n p l a c e could serve as a valuable source m a t e r i a l i n 
r e s o l v i n g the problem. 
8 1The s t a t e i n c l u d e s both the government and the governed 
and i t i s concerned i n most cases with those s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l 
and economic r e l a t i o n s h i p s that could be expressed through the 
government of the day: a f e d e r a l s t a t e i s made up of the 
c e n t r a l government tha t represents the whole and represents the 
whole i n e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s and such i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s c l e a r l y 
c o n s i d e r e d to be of common i n t e r e s t : J . Bryce, Studies i n 
H i s t o r y and Jurisprudence, Vol. 1 Essay I I I Oxford (1901); 
L a n s k i , op. c i t . See, e.g., A r t i c l e 118 of the Con s t i t u t i o n of 
A u s t r a l i a , A r t i c l e 121 of the C o n s t i t u t i o n of Canada. 
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The 1991 ILC d r a f t a r t i c l e s approached the s t a t e immunity 
problem by r e l y i n g on the view th a t s t a t e s be denied immunity i f 
they venture i n t o the market place, i . e . , immunity would not be 
granted to a s t a t e i f i t undertakes a commercial a c t i v i t y which 
has nothing to do with jure imperii. To many, t h i s appears 
appropriate, but how i s the commercial t r a n s a c t i o n for the 
purpose of determining j u r i s d i c t i o n to be defined? And t h i s has 
been a source of disagreement over the y e a r s . 8 2 
Current s t a t e p r a c t i c e shows t h a t some Western s t a t e s are 
i n s i s t i n g that only the nature of the a c t i v i t y be taken i n t o 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n when determining whether a s t a t e a c t i v i t y i s 
commercial or not. 8 3 While others argued t h a t sovereign s t a t e s 
should not be allowed to canvass t h e i r i n t e r e s t s before a 
n a t i o n a l authority, s t i l l some s t a t e s , on the other hand, argued 
tha t the nature t e s t alone does not always a i d the judge i n 
determining whether an a c t i v i t y i s commercial or not. 8 4 And 
t h e r e f o r e the purpose t e s t must a l s o be c o n s i d e r e d . Thus i n 
order to avoid further r a d i c a l i n t e r e s t a r t i c u l a t i o n or 
controversy, the two approaches were i n t e g r a t e d . T h i s , however, 
met with r e s i s t a n c e i n the S i x t h Committee. 8 5 
8 2See the work of ILC (1978-1991) . And the i s s u e s that were 
debated i n the S i x t h Committee: R e s o l u t i o n s 46/55, 49/61 and 
52/51, r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
"Document A/CN 14/410 and Add. 1-5 Yearbook of the ILC 
1988, Vol. I I , Part 1, pp. 51 et seq. 
8 4 I b i d . 
8 5See the work of the S i x t h Committee and the completion of 
the 2nd Reading: Forty-Third Session YBILC 1991 V o l . I I Part 2. 
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A c a r e f u l review of comments submitted by governments 
shows tha t B r a z i l supported absolute immunity. Yugoslavia, on 
the other hand, expressed a p o s i t i v e view of the d r a f t a r t i c l e s . 
While such c o u n t r i e s as Canada, Mexico, Qatar, Spain, United 
Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, and Ic e l a n d strongly 
objected to the i n c l u s i o n of the purpose t e s t 8 6 i n the 
determination of the commercial a c t i v i t i e s of s t a t e s . 
Mr. Ogiso, i n order to promote a common understanding i n 
the S i x t h Committee, s t a t e d i n h i s p r e l i m i n a r y report thus: 
"With r e g a r d to paragraph 2, i n the l i g h t of the f a c t that many 
c o u n t r i e s support the nature c r i t e r i o n i n determining whether a 
c o n t r a c t i s commercial or not and c r i t i c i z e the purpose 
c r i t e r i o n , which i n t h e i r view i s l e s s o b j e c t i v e and more one-
sided, the S p e c i a l Rapporteur has no o b j e c t i o n to d e l e t i n g the 
purpose c r i t e r i o n . At the same time, i t should be r e c a l l e d that 
s e v e r a l governments, both i n t h e i r w r i t t e n comments and i n t h e i r 
o r a l o b s e r v a t i o n s i n the S i x t h Committee, have supported the 
i n c l u s i o n of the purpose c r i t e r i o n . " 8 1 
Since the development of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law or the making 
of law i n the i n t e r s t a t e system i s based upon the c o n f l i c t i n g 
claims of s t a t e s , i t would have been d e f e a t i s t i f Mr. Ogiso had 
r e j e c t e d the purpose t e s t as was suggested by some leading 
s t a t e s . The i n c l u s i o n of the purpose t e s t , f or example, did 
produce v e r y i n s i g h t f u l comments. Mr. Ogiso, for example, 
suggested t h a t the reason f o r taking i n t o account the purpose 
t e s t arose from the need to provide for cases r e l a t i n g to 
n a t u r a l d i s a s t e r s , 8 8 e.g., famine. Although the reason he 
8 6 (1988) Yearbook of the ILD, Vol. I I , P art 1 p. 51. 
8 7See Document A/CN/4/415 YBILC, 88 Vol I I Part 1 p. 102. 
88A/CN/4/L 443 p. 6 [44th S e s s i o n ] . 
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o f f e r e d was a good one, he did not go as f a r as to c o n s i d e r the 
p r e s s i n g needs of the developing world, t h a t i n these c o u n t r i e s , 
the s t a t e i s forced to perform d i v e r s e and v a r i e d a c t i v i t i e s i n 
order to promote the welfare of i t s c i t i z e n s 8 9 because of l a c k of 
finance c a p i t a l , and therefore d e l e t i n g the purpose t e s t would 
load the dice against developing c o u n t r i e s , f o r these c o u n t r i e s 
would be l e f t a t the mercy of n a t i o n a l j u d i c i a l a u t h o r i t i e s . 
Thus i n order to avoid being harassed by p r i v a t e s u i t s , many 
developing s t a t e s are expressing strong views i n support of the 
purpose t e s t i n the S i x t h Committee. 
In 1991, the ILC managed somehow to complete i t s second 
reading which was t h e r e a f t e r sent to the S i x t h Committee, but i n 
s p i t e of i t s compromising approach, the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
commercial and non-commercial a c t i v i t i e s of s t a t e s continued to 
pose d i f f i c u l t problems and t h i s i s amply r e f l e c t e d i n the 
comments that were submitted by s t a t e s . 9 0 
The p o s i t i o n of governments s i n c e 1992 i n r e s p e c t of s t a t e 
immunity f a l l s i n t o two categories. B r a z i l and France, e.g., 
c l e a r l y supported the i n c l u s i o n of the purpose t e s t , w h i l e other 
countries such as A u s t r a l i a , A u s t r i a , United Kingdom, United 
State s , Germany, I t a l y , Netherlands, Belgium and B u l g a r i a 
8 9 (1988) 41 UN GAOR C.6 (37th mtg.) 73 UN DOC. 
A/C.6/41/SR.37; Prince A j i b o l a of N i g e r i a s a i d : " J u r i s d i c t i o n a l 
immunities of s t a t e s and t h e i r property could not be 
underestimated i n the l i g h t of i n c r e a s i n g economic development 
and interdependence and varying s t a t e p r a c t i c e among 
i n d u s t r i a l i z e d , s o c i a l i s t and developing c o u n t r i e s such as 
N i g e r i a which engaged i n s t a t e t r a d i n g as a means of economic 
s u r v i v a l . " 
9 0 R e s o l u t i o n 46/55, 49/61, 52/52, r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
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i n s i s t e d that the nature t e s t be designated as the sole t e s t . 
The only newcomer i n the l a t t e r group i s B u l g a r i a , for i t 
appears to take a p o s i t i o n quite d i f f e r e n t from i t s e a r l i e r 
p o s i t i o n of 1988 thus: 
"The p r i n c i p l e of j u r i s d i c t i o n a l immunity of s t a t e s i s 
u n i v e r s a l l y r e c o g n i s e d i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law as being a l o g i c a l 
consequence of the p r i n c i p l e s of sovereignty and sovereign 
e q u a l i t y of s t a t e s , which provide f o r the non-submission of one 
s t a t e to the a u t h o r i t y of another (par in parem imperium non 
habet) .91 
B u l g a r i a ' s 1988 p o s i t i o n thus runs counter to i t s current 
p o s i t i o n but i t i s hard to t e l l as to whether i t has completely 
abandoned i t s support f o r the non-submission of one s t a t e to the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of another. Perhaps B u l g a r i a i s modulating i t s 
p o s i t i o n i n order to j o i n the European Union. 
Disagreements r e s p e c t i n g the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
commercial and non-commercial a c t i v i t i e s of s t a t e s continued 
between delegates i n the informal c o n s u l t a t i o n s t h a t were held 
i n 1994, pursuant to the d e c i s i o n of the General Assembly, 
48/413; but i n order to b r i n g about a common understanding the 
chairman suggested the f o l l o w i n g : 
"A g r e a t e r measure of c e r t a i n t y could be achieved by 
g i v i n g s t a t e s the opti o n of i n d i c a t i n g the p o t e n t i a l relevance 
of the purpose c r i t e r i o n under t h e i r n a t i o n a l law and p r a c t i c e 
e i t h e r by means of a g e n e r a l d e c l a r a t i o n i n r e l a t i o n to the 
convention or a s p e c i f i c n o t i f i c a t i o n to the other p a r t y by 
whatever means i n r e l a t i o n to a p a r t i c u l a r c o n t r a c t or 
t r a n s a c t i o n , or a combination t h e r e o f . T h i s would c l a r i f y the 
s i t u a t i o n not o n l y f o r a p r i v a t e p a r t y who i s so informed when 
e n t e r i n g i n t o a c o n t r a c t or t r a n s a c t i o n with a s t a t e but a l s o 
f o r a court which i s c a l l e d upon to apply the p r o v i s i o n s of the 
convention." 9 2 
9 1 (1988) Vol I I , YB IL C 40th Session; B u l g a r i a from the 
beginning d i d support the concept of sovereign immunity. 
9 2 P a r a . 6; Informal C o n s u l t a t i o n s held pursuant to General 
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Given the above compromise suggestion, a r t i c l e 2 paragraph 
2 was duly approved, although some s t a t e s s t i l l b e l i e v e t h a t i t s 
continued i n c l u s i o n i n the d e f i n i t i o n of commercial t r a n s a c t i o n s 
would introduce an element of c i r c u l a r i t y i n t o i t s a p p l i c a t i o n 
to concrete cases. One important f a c t that has been overlooked 
however, by these s t a t e s i s that i t i s d i f f i c u l t i n some ca s e s 
to separate the nature t e s t from the purpose t e s t , and f u r t h e r 
more, i t i s not that easy to determine the nexus between a 
commercial a c t i v i t y and the cause of a c t i o n . Which means t h a t 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the commercial a c t i v i t y of s t a t e s and 
the cause of a c t i o n must not be merely presumed but must have 
both c a u s a l and l e g a l connections. Thus the nature t e s t alone 
i s i n s u f f i c i e n t i n the determination of j u d i c i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n . 9 3 
Courts i n some j u r i s d i c t i o n s have e i t h e r followed the c o n t e x t u a l 
approach or simply r e s o r t to an approach where the l o c a t i o n of 
the a c t i v i t y i s considered as the appropriate t e s t . 9 4 
The current working group which was e s t a b l i s h e d by General 
Assembly Resolution 53/98 concluded that reference to A r t i c l e 2 
only to "commercial contr a c t s or t r a n s a c t i o n s without f u r t h e r 
e x p l i c a t i o n " must be accepted as the p r e f e r r e d approach to 
r e s o l v i n g the controversy a f t e r having considered other 
Assembly d e c i s i o n 48/43, A/C.6/49/L2 p. 3: Courts i n Zimbabwe 
and i n Malaysia have followed the nature t e s t , while the Supreme 
Court of P h i l i p p i n e s took int o consideration the i n t e n t i o n of 
the purchase of land by r e j e c t i n g arguments i n r e s p e c t of the 
commercial c h a r a c t e r of the agreement. 
"See (1999) General Assembly A/CN AL.576, F i f t y - F i r s t 
Session, pp. 21-54. 
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a l t e r n a t i v e s as w e l l . Whether the suggestions of the s a i d group 
would be acceptable to s t a t e s i s f a r from c e r t a i n , i n view of 
press r e l e a s e , GA/L/3091 which evidenced the continuing 
disagreement among s t a t e s . Goa Feng of China, for example, 
stated that "The time had not yet come for the convening of a 
diplomatic conference to conclude a convention." 9 5 One can a l s o 
detect s i m i l a r sentiments expressed by Mr. Robert Rosenstock of 
the United S t a t e s . The problem, unfortunately, t h e r e f o r e 
remains unresolved. 
I s s u e s i n r e s p e c t of measures of c o n s t r a i n t against s t a t e 
property over the years have been h o t l y contested before 
nati o n a l j u d i c i a l a u t h o r i t i e s and i n the S i x t h Committee. 9 6 
P r i o r to the adoption of the d r a f t a r t i c l e s i n 1991, the 
comments of governments f a l l i n t o two d i f f e r e n t groups. While 
one group argued e f f e c t i v e l y on the importance of the p r i n c i p l e 
of sovereign immunity from measures of execution, 9 7 other s t a t e s 
such as U.K., F e d e r a l Republic of Germany (then), Belgium, 
A u s t r a l i a , Canada, Qatar, S w i t z e r l a n d , Sweden, Norway, Finland, 
I c e l a n d and Denmark 9 8 argued t h a t t h e r e be proper c l a r i f i c a t i o n 
9 5 (1998) GA/L/3091 pp. 3 of 5. 
9 6See Paras. 67-80, Report of the Working Group, 
A/C.6/48/L.4, pp. 13-15. 
9 7These c o u n t r i e s were USSR (then), B y e l o r u s s i a , GDR (then). 
9 8 P r e l i m i n a r y r e port on j u r i s d i c t i o n a l immunities of s t a t e s 
and t h e i r property A/CN.4/415 YB I L C 1988 Vol I I part 1 p. 117 
[paras. 211-213]. The working group, however, suggested t h a t : 
"As regards prejudgment . . . these should be p o s s i b l y only i n 
the following c a s e s : (a) measures on which the s t a t e has 
expressly consented e i t h e r ad hoc or i n advance; (b) measures on 
property designated to s a t i s f y the claim; (c) measures a v a i l a b l e 
under i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y accepted p r o v i s i o n . " 
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as regards the scope of A r t i c l e 18 so as to avoid unnecessary 
l i m i t a t i o n s on s t a t e property that could l e g i t i m a t e l y be 
s u b j e c t e d to execution. The comments of government, however, 
d i d not a f f e c t the fundamental s t r u c t u r e of the proposed 
a r t i c l e s . The d i s c u s s i o n s i n the working group which were 
e s t a b l i s h e d pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 46/55 were 
q u i t e encouraging and c o n s t r u c t i v e but no compromise was reached 
i n regard to any of the p r o p o s a l s . " Further d i s c u s s i o n s were 
h e l d again as a r e s u l t of General Assembly d e c i s i o n 48/413, but 
i n view of the s e n s i t i v e nature of the s u b j e c t the S i x t h 
Committee could not formulate a compromise. Delegates were 
simply d i v i d e d as to whether the denial of immunity means t h a t 
enforcement measures should be taken against s t a t e p r o p e r t y . 1 0 0 
"See The Report of the Working Group, A/C.6/48 L.4 pp. 13-
15. The Chairman's proposal reads as follows: "No measures of 
c o n s t r a i n t s h a l l be taken a g a i n s t the property of a s t a t e before 
t h a t s t a t e i s given adequate opportunity to comply with the 
judgment." 
1 0 0See Document A/C.6/49 L 2 para. 11: The U.K. Act 1978, 
and other municipal courts have refused to support measures of 
c o n s t r a i n t a g a i n s t sovereign s t a t e s : e.g., T h i r d Avenue 
A s s o c i a t i o n and Another v. Permanent Mission of the Rep. of 
Z a i r e to the United Nations (1993) U.S. Court of Appeals 2nd 
C e r t , ILR 99, p. 195; Foxworth, ILR 99, p. 138. I n the I t a l i a n 
case of Condor and F i l v e r n v. Minister of J u s t i c e (ILR 101 p. 
394), however, the court r u l e d that "the foreign p o l i c y i n t e r e s t 
of the executive i n p r e s e r v i n g good r e l a t i o n s with other s t a t e s 
no longer j u s t i f i e d a r u l e of absolute immunity from attachment 
and execution where the property was not destined s p e c i f i c a l l y 
f o r the f u l f i l l m e n t of sovereign functions; i f the e x e c u t i v e 
wished to avoid p o s s i b l e embarrassment i t remained p o s s i b l e f o r 
i t to intervene i n the proceedings to o f f e r to pay o f f a 
c r e d i t o r seeking enforcement against the property of a f o r e i g n 
s t a t e or guarantee payment of a debt i n r e t u r n f o r the 
c r e d i t o r ' s withdrawal of a request for attachment a g a i n s t such 
property." This c e r t a i n l y i s an i n t e r e s t i n g suggestion. 
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And t h i s one would suggest could be balanced a g a i n s t the 
i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t s of sovereign s t a t e s to minimise the 
i n t e r f e r e n c e with s t a t e property which might be subjected to the 
coercive measures of the forum s t a t e i n order to s a t i s f y a 
p r i v a t e claim. Many s t a t e s have f o r c e f u l l y debunked the 
suggestion t h a t measures of c o n s t r a i n t be i n s t i t u t e d a g a i n s t 
st a t e property i n view of the consequences of the United Nations 
Charter, the United Nations-United S t a t e s Headquarters Agreement 
and the force of the Vienna Convention, and t h e i r views on t h i s 
matter cannot be ignored i f consensus i s to be reached. Thus 
even i f measures of c o n s t r a i n t a g a i n s t s t a t e property are 
allowed, d i f f i c u l t i e s would s t i l l remain as to which s t a t e 
property i s to be l e v i e d upon. S t a t e s are again deeply d i v i d e d 
on t h i s i s s u e because of the f a c t t h a t the only property t h a t 
may be a v a i l a b l e to the forum c o u r t would be monies and other 
a s s e t s , be i t movable or immovable, i n the forum s t a t e , which 
might have been d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y used i n promoting 
diplomatic a c t i v i t y . 
I n view of the complexity of the above i s s u e , the chairman 
of the working group suggested t h a t : 
" I t may be p o s s i b l e to l e s s e n the need for measures of 
c o n s t r a i n t by p l a c i n g g r e a t e r emphasis on v o l u n t a r y compliance 
by a s t a t e with a v a l i d judgment. T h i s may be achieved by 
providing the s t a t e with complete d i s c r e t i o n to determine the 
property to be used to s a t i s f y the judgment as w e l l as a 
reasonable p e r i o d f o r making the n e c e s s a r y arrangements. 
Second, i t may be u s e f u l to e n v i s a g e i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i s p u t e 
settlement procedures to r e s o l v e q u e s t i o n s r e l a t i n g to the 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n or a p p l i c a t i o n of the Convention which may 
obviate the need to s a t i s f y a judgment owning to i t s 
i n v a l i d i t y . " 1 0 1 
^See Document A/C. 6/49/L2 p a r a s . 12 and 13: The c r u c i a l 
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Although the above suggestion i s l o g i c a l l y grounded, there 
i s s t i l l one problem that must be addressed, and that i s , 
t e c h n i c a l l y no court would e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n over a s t a t e i f 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of enforcing the judgment i s li n k e d with the 
d i s c r e t i o n of the defendant s t a t e , as to when s t a t e property 
would be made ready for the s a t i s f a c t i o n of the judgment and 
which s p e c i f i c s t a t e property would be given up for the 
s a t i s f a c t i o n of the p r i v a t e c laim. Unless there i s a t r e a t y i n 
p l a c e , such suggestions would indeed be d i f f i c u l t to put i n t o 
e f f e c t given the complex nature of the i n t e r s t a t e system. 
Furthermore, the reasonable time of three months t h a t was 
suggested may be f l o u t e d and the r e f o r e the forum s t a t e would 
arguably be forced to attach the s t a t e property i n i s s u e or the 
s t a t e property l o c a t e d i n the s i t u s of the s u i t , which appears 
not to be used f or government purposes. The d i f f i c u l t y here i s 
t h a t the working group i n the S i x t h Committee f a i l e d to come up 
wit h answers as to how s t a t e property within the forum s t a t e i s 
to be c h a r a c t e r i s e d . And does the l o c a l court have the 
a u t h o r i t y to i n q u i r e i n t o the a s s e t s of a sovereign s t a t e ? The 
answer c e r t a i n l y i s no. Any attempt to do that w i l l be a 
i s s u e before the S i x t h Committee appears to be the nature of the 
s t a t e property before the forum court, and whether i n c l e a r 
terms i t i s s p e c i f i c a l l y d e s t i ned for p o l i t i c a l f unctions. I t 
i s not always easy to come up with c l e a r answers to these 
i s s u e s . S t a t e p r a c t i c e , t h e r e f o r e , i s fragmented. Thus while 
some s t a t e s are w i l l i n g to grant immunity, others are not 
convinced t h a t there i s s t i l l i n exist e n c e a r u l e of customary 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law which precludes enforcement measures a g a i n s t 
s t a t e property. But one important f a c t that has been ignored i s 
t h a t t h e r e i s no r u l e of customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l which supports 
enforcement measure against the property of a sovereign s t a t e . 
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complete deviation from the p o s i t i v e normative r u l e s of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. S t a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , e.g., diplomats, 
ambassadors, are not required by i n t e r n a t i o n a l law to answer 
such questions for i t amounts to unnecessary i n t r u s i v e s c r u t i n y 
i n t o the a s s e t s of sovereign s t a t e s . The suggestion, however, 
i n respect of envisaging an i n t e r n a t i o n a l dispute settlement 
procedures would be welcomed by a great m a j o r i t y of s t a t e s , but 
again there i s the need to develop s p e c i f i c e q u i t a b l e r u l e s to 
streamline the process. 
The suggestions by the working group c h a i r e d by Mr. G. 
Hafner were not th a t d i f f e r e n t from the suggestions which were 
offe r e d by the chairman of the i n f o r m a l c o n s u l t a t i o n s held 
pursuant to General Assembly Decision 48/413. The suggestions 
of the Geneva group may, however, be s t a t e d as f o l l o w s : 
" A l t e r n a t i v e 1. ( i ) Recognition of judgment by s t a t e 
and granting the s t a t e a 2-3 months grace p e r i o d to comply with 
i t as w e l l as freedom to determine p r o p e r t y f o r execution; ( i i ) 
I f no compliance occurs during the g r a c e p e r i o d , property of 
s t a t e [ s u b j e c t to A r t i c l e 19] could be s u b j e c t to e x e c u t i o n . 
A l t e r n a t i v e 2. ( i ) Recognition of judgment by s t a t e and 
granting the s t a t e a 2-3 months grace p e r i o d to comply with i t 
as w e l l as freedom to determine property f o r e x e c u t i o n ; ( i i ) I f 
no compliance occurs during the grace p e r i o d , the c l a i m i s 
brought i n t o the f i e l d of i n t e r s t a t e d i s p u t e settlement; t h i s 
would imply the i n i t i a t i o n of d i s p u t e - s e t t l e m e n t procedure i n 
connection with the s p e c i f i c i s s u e of e x e c u t i o n of the c l a i m . " 1 0 2 
A l t e r n a t i v e 3 simply suggested t h a t the matter be l e f t to 
s t a t e p r a c t i c e s i n c e i t i n v o l v e s d e l i c a t e and complex i s s u e s . 
A l t e r n a t i v e 1 l a c k s focus and t h e r e i s the p o s s i b i l i t y 
t h a t the forum s t a t e could take the law i n t o i t s own hands by 
1 0 2General Assembly; F i f t y - F i r s t S e s s i o n (1999) J u l y : 
A/CN.4/L.576 pp. 54-55. 
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v i o l a t i n g the r i g h t s of sovereign s t a t e s . Furthermore, there i s 
every i n d i c a t i o n t h a t the defendant s t a t e could f r u s t r a t e the 
forum s t a t e by t r a n s f e r r i n g t h e i r a s s e t s somewhere out of reach 
of the forum court. A l t e r n a t i v e 2 has promise, but would have 
to be c a r e f u l l y s t u d i e d i n the l i g h t of the d e l i c a t e nature of 
the i s s u e s . I t i s suggested by the present w r i t e r that a l l 
these problems could be solved i f the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community i s 
w i l l i n g to s u b s c r i b e to the idea of e s t a b l i s h i n g a s p e c i a l 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l court or t r i b u n a l to handle p r i v a t e s u i t s against 
f o r e i g n sovereign s t a t e s . Or a dispute settlement procedure 
based upon the r u l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r b i t r a t i o n could be put 
i n p l a c e to deal with these d e l i c a t e i s s u e s . The s a i d 
suggestions are being put f o r t h because an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
convention per se cannot be accepted as the only means by which 
a l l the i n t r a c t a b l e problems normally ass o c i a t e d with 
j u r i s d i c t i o n a l immunities of s t a t e s and t h e i r property could be 
r e s o l v e d . Thus, even i f a convention of the s a i d subject i s 
concluded, i t i s doubtful as to whether a l l the grey areas of 
the s u b j e c t would be covered, hence i t would be most appropriate 
i f sovereign s t a t e s are encouraged to p l a c e emphasis on the r o l e 
of b i l a t e r a l t r e a t i e s i n order to provide a d d i t i o n a l s t a b l e 
b a s i s f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l business t r a n s a c t i o n . 
The U n c e r t a i n t y of State P r a c t i c e 
One i s persuaded to argue tha t p r i o r to 1900 the immunity 
of a s t a t e from the j u d i c i a l process of another sovereign s t a t e 
i r r e s p e c t i v e of the nature of the t r a n s a c t i o n i n question was 
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absolute and t h i s was derived from the innate supremacy of the 
l o c a l sovereign. Over the years, however, t h e r e i s c e r t a i n l y a 
quest to l i m i t the concept of s t a t e immunity. Many b e l i e v e the 
move towards the t o t a l acceptance of the d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity i s almost complete, but a c a r e f u l review of s t a t e 
p r a c t i c e shows that i s not the c a s e . 1 0 3 For i n s p i t e of the 
demand by many leading countries t h a t immunity be l i m i t e d i n the 
market place, at l e a s t before 1990 and perhaps to date, 
c o u n t r i e s such as Russia, Indonesia, Tanzania, Venezuela, 
T r i n i d a d and Tobago, Uganda, S y r i a , Sudan, Thailand, Portugal, 
Japan, Kuwait, China, Poland, Hungary, Ecuador, B r a z i l , Libya, 
E t h i o p i a and the r e s t of the T h i r d World (or developing nations) 
have turned deaf ears to the c a l l or have i n short become 
r e s e r v e d . 1 0 4 The German Democratic Republic (GDR), although i n 
1990 embraced the concept of absolute immunity, has s i n c e then 
been united with West Germany and t h e r e f o r e a u t o m a t i c a l l y l o s t 
i t s independent voice i n these matters, i n view of the f a c t that 
West Germany acceded to the European Convention of State 
Immunity and the Br u s s e l s Convention of 1926 on the immunity of 
state-owned ships coupled with i t s 1934 Prot o c o l t h e r e t o . 1 0 5 
1 0 3The ILC Report, op. c i t ; (1998) S i x t h Committee, 
GA/L/3091; (1998) General Assembly, F i f t y - S e c o n d Session, 
A/C.6/52/SR.26; (1999) A/CN/4L.576. 
1 0 4 I b i d . 
1 0 5 E a s t Germany, before 1992, was an independent s o c i a l i s t 
s t a t e which followed the p r i n c i p l e s of absolute immunity. But 
as a r e s u l t of s t a t e succession, such a p r a c t i c e had been 
abandoned i n view of the f a c t t h a t i t was absorbed by West 
Germany, a country although ambivalent i n i t s p r a c t i c e , had i n 
recent past embraced the mo d a l i t i e s of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 
See The ILC report on J u r i s d i c t i o n a l Immunities of S t a t e s and 
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The p o s i t i o n i n 1990 i n respect of Czechoslovakia was a 
c l e a r acceptance of the concept of s t a t e immunity, but ever 
s i n c e i t s breakup, the p o s i t i o n of the r e p u b l i c s of Czech and 
Slovak have become u n c l e a r . 1 0 6 Countries such as Mexico, 
Ic e l a n d , Madagascar, Togo, Barbados, F i n l a n d , Norway, Qatar, 
C h i l e , Suriname, Yugoslavia, Lesotho follow the doctrine of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 1 0 7 The p o s i t i o n i n r e s p e c t of Tunisia, a 
former French Colony, Burma, P h i l i p p i n e s and Cape Verde seemed 
not c l e a r , but appear o s c i l l a t i n g towards the preservation of 
the concept of absolute immunity of s t a t e s . I n fact, the 
p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s the world over i s simply f a r from consistent 
and i t would appear t h a t R u s s i a as w e l l as A s i a , A f r i c a , and a 
majo r i t y of L a t i n American s t a t e s would p r e f e r t h a t the ru l e of 
s t a t e immunity be maintained r a t h e r than discounted. 1 0 8 I t would 
ther e f o r e be premature and c e r t a i n l y c a r e l e s s to simply s t a t e 
the c u r r e n t p o s i t i o n of customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i n respect 
T h e i r P r o p e r t i e s . See S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . See also the 
res e a r c h papers prepared by the A u s t r a l i a n Law Reform Commission 
1983, under the d i r e c t i o n of Professor Crawford; and that of 
GAOR 46th S e s s i o n , Supp. 10 (A/46/10) p. 9. 
1 0 6The breakup of Czechoslovakia means we now have two 
independent c o u n t r i e s with two independent l e g a l systems. I t i s 
not c l e a r these two c o u n t r i e s have embraced the r e s t r i c t i v e 
d o c trine, but i n the pas t the evidence supports the fact that 
Czechoslovakia d i d support absolute immunity. Without doubt 
almost a l l members of the Warsaw Pact d i d support the modalities 
of s t a t e immunity. But see (1998) GA/L 13091 Committee work 
programme; (1998) GA, Fifty- S e c o n d Session, A/C6/52/SR.26. 
1 0 7See ILCR, op. c i t . , 183, 184, 186, r e s p e c t i v e l y . See 
a l s o (1999) GA, F i f t y - F i r s t Session A/CN.416 576. 
1 0 8See P a r t V of the ILCR. See a l s o R. Higgins, Problems 
and Process, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law and How We Use I t (1994) p. 81; 
GAOR 46th S e s s . , 10 (1/46/10) p. 9. 
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of s t a t e immunity since there i s ample evidence of the p a u c i t y 
of s t a t e s i n embracing the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 1 I t i s 
submitted t h a t t h i s s t a t e of a f f a i r s i n regard to i n c o n s i s t e n t 
s t a t e p r a c t i c e might have prompted Lord Denning to conclude 
o b i t e r thus. 
"Some have adopted a r u l e of absolute immunity, which i f 
c a r r i e d to i t s l o g i c a l extreme, i s i n danger of becoming an 
instrument of i n j u s t i c e . Others have adopted a r u l e of immunity 
fo r p u b l i c a c t s but not for p r i v a t e a c t s which has t u r n e d out to 
be a most e l u s i v e t e s t . A l l admit exce p t i o n s . There i s no 
uniform p r a c t i c e . There i s no uniform r u l e . So t h e r e i s no 
help t h e r e . Search now among the d e c i s i o n s of the E n g l i s h 
courts and you w i l l not f i n d them c o n s i s t e n t . " 1 1 0 
Professor Brownlie's p o s i t i o n on t h i s s u b j e c t seemed not 
d i f f e r e n t from Lord Denning's obiter, when he argued as f o l l o w s : 
" I t i s f a r from easy to s t a t e the c u r r e n t l e g a l p o s i t i o n 
i n terms of customary or general i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. Recent 
w r i t e r s emphasize that there i s a t r e n d i n the p r a c t i c e of 
s t a t e s towards the r e s t r i c t i v e d o c t r i n e of immunity but a v o i d 
f i r m and p r e c i s e p r e s c r i p t i o n s as to the p r e s e n t s t a t e of the 
law. Moreover, the p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s i s f a r from c o n s i s t e n t 
and, as the comments of governments r e l a t i n g to the d r a f t 
a r t i c l e s produced by the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission i n d i c a t e , 
there i s a p e r s i s t e n t divergence between adherents of the 
p r i n c i p l e of absolute immunity and t h a t of r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity. 1 , 1 1 1 
I s there a cu r r e n t law? The answer i s i n the negative s i n c e 
customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s formed when s e t t l e d p r a c t i c e i s 
aided by opinio juris. I t i s c l e a r , however, t h a t many 
coun t r i e s are modulating t h e i r p o s i t i o n s and t h e r e f o r e we are 
l e f t with a divided opinion i n r e s p e c t of the law of s t a t e 
1 0 9Ushakov, op. c i t . , Vol. I I , p. 55; Brownlie, op. c i t . , 
at pp. 329-336. 
1 1 0Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad (1957) 3 A l l ER 461. 
1 1 : LBrownlie, op. c i t . , at pp. 329-330. 
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immunity. I n any event, the p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s i n the d i r e c t i o n 
of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i s not uniform and municipal courts of 
l a t e have exacerbated the problem by g i v i n g c o n f l i c t i n g 
judgments. I t i s expedient, however, tha t the concept of 
sovereign immunity be maintained and thoroughly st u d i e d rather 
than have i t r e l e g a t e d to the background. The r u l e of s t a t e 
immunity as formulated by the ILC i n i t s 38th s e s s i o n , however, 
i s s u b j e c t to a c a r e f u l q u a l i f i c a t i o n as regards i t s a p p l i c a t i o n 
wherever p o s s i b l e . I t i s indeed important to conclude that what 
may perhaps be accepted by some co u n t r i e s as the o b j e c t i v e 
evidence for so improbable a c l a i m i n support of the doctrine of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity must be thoroughly examined i n i t s e n t i r e t y 
as space may permit f o r i t w i l l c e r t a i n l y be l e s s h e l p f u l to 
accept i t s a u t h o r i t y based only on i t s popular appeal. I t now 
remains to be seen how venerable i s the doctrine of r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity, but f o r the sake of o b j e c t i v i t y one i s persuaded to 
argue t h a t r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i s an incomplete doctrine and 
hence does not command s u f f i c i e n t support from the majority of 
s t a t e s i n the world to be considered a r u l e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law, i . e . , the law of nations by which c i v i l i s e d nations i n 
general are bound. I t i s simply e l u s i v e but h e a v i l y supported 
by i n d u s t r i a l i s e d c o u n t r i e s 1 1 2 where finance c a p i t a l i s w e l l 
e s t a b l i s h e d u n l i k e i n developing c o u n t r i e s where there i s 
paucity of c a p i t a l . 1 1 3 I n r e a l i t y , the quest to l i m i t s t a t e 
1 1 2See g e n e r a l l y the ILC Report 1982-1986; UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/410, 1-5, 40th S e s s i o n , 2 YB INT'L. COMM'N Part 1 (1988). 
1 1 3See Kwame Nkrumah, Neo Colonialism, The L a s t Stage of 
Imperialism (1965). T h i s book shows the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p i t a l 
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immunity i s fraught with d i f f i c u l t i e s and u n c e r t a i n t i e s f o r i t 
would appear that even countries with the i n c l i n a t i o n of 
accepting, or c o u n t r i e s which have accepted the d o c t r i n e of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity have d i f f e r e d as to how the v a r i o u s d r a f t 
a r t i c l e s of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission be a p p l i e d . 1 1 4 
N i k o l a i Ushakov, a Russian scholar, i n h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n to the 
debate on sovereign immunity argued as follows: 
"A number of the S p e c i a l Rapporteur's c o n c l u s i o n s do not 
seem to us to be well-founded. More p a r t i c u l a r l y , t h i s a p p l i e s 
to the S p e c i a l Rapporteur's view concerning an emerging g e n e r a l 
trend i n favour of the concept of " l i m i t e d " or " f u n c t i o n a l " 
s t a t e immunity. 
T h i s concept or theory runs counter to the b a s i c 
p r i n c i p l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and i t i s r e j e c t e d by many 
s t a t e s , a f a c t to which we have repeatedly drawn the a t t e n t i o n 
of members of the Commission i n our statements. Consequently i t 
cannot, i n our view, form the b a s i s f or the c o d i f i c a t i o n of 
r u l e s on the immunities of s t a t e s and t h e i r p r o p e r t y . " 1 1 5 
Again, Ushakov c l e a r l y delves into an un c e r t a i n a s p e c t of 
the doctrine of r e l a t i v e or r e s t r i c t i v e immunity, by e x p l a i n i n g 
t h a t i t runs counter to the p r i n c i p l e s of p u b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law, and t h a t the concept does not command support from v e r y 
many co u n t r i e s of the world except western i n d u s t r i a l i s e d 
c o u n t r i e s . 1 1 6 Dr. Ushakov, i n t r y i n g to support h i s p o s i t i o n , 
argued f u r t h e r that, 
amongst nations and how i t i s normally manipulated to the 
advantage of Western countries; Measures for the Economic 
Development of Under-developed countries: United Nations Dept. 
of Economic A f f a i r s (May 1951). 
1 1 4See ILC Report, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986. See 
a l s o (1999) GA F i f t y - F i r s t Session, A/CN.4/L.576. 
1 1 5Ushakov, op. c i t . , at p. 53. 
1 1 6 I b i d . a t pp. 54-55. 
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"Many s t a t e s , p o s s i b l y a m a j o r i t y , do not s u b s c r i b e to or 
r e j e c t , the concept of f u n c t i o n a l immunity. Hence i t i s c l e a r l y 
mistaken to speak of any g e n e r a l t r e n d emerging i n favour of 
that concept. 
Thus, of the 29 s t a t e s which, i n accordance with the 
Commission's request, s e n t information and documentation i n 
r e p l y to the q u e s t i o n n a i r e , 14 grant f u l l immunity and four have 
no l e g i s l a t i o n or p r a c t i c e i n t h i s a r e a . " 1 1 7 
I f t h i s be the case, then one w i l l c e r t a i n l y be hard put 
to argue f o r the replacement of absolute immunity (wider 
p r i n c i p l e ) by a r e l a t i v e or r e s t r i c t i v e immunity which i s l e s s 
grounded on the whole i n the p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s . 1 1 8 I t i s 
s u f f i c i e n t l y obvious from the reading of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law 
Commission's report t h a t a g r e a t m a j o r i t y of c o u n t r i e s of the 
world oppose the d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 1 1 9 In r e a l 
terms, however, i t would appear t h a t courts i n recent times have 
followed the d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i n Continental 
European c o u n t r i e s , B r i t a i n , Canada, South A f r i c a , A u s t r a l i a and 
the United S t a t e s , to mention the main ones. 1 2 0 But i t i s 
equally c l e a r from the foregoing a n a l y s i s t h a t the d o c t r i n e of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i s a s s o c i a t e d with l e g a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n s and 
therefore could r i g h t l y be designated as a c r e a t u r e of 
sovereignty wholly l a c k i n g of usus. I t s u t i l i t y arguably was 
simply consecrated i n the Western world without any support from 
the Third World. 1 2 1 And s i n c e t h e r e are about 190 nations as of 
1 1 7 I b i d . a t p. 55, 
1 1 8 I b i d . 
u 9 I b i d . 
1 2 0 I b i d . 
1 2 1See Brownlie, op. c i t . 
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now i n the world, i t would be f a r from conclusive to make an a 
p r i o r i or sweeping g e n e r a l i s a t i o n on the current s t a t e of the 
law as regards the d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity without 
having regard to the o v e r a l l p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s i n the world. 
C e r t a i n l y the r e s t r i c t i v e doctrine stands or f a l l s on i t s 
i n t r i n s i c merit but not on the popular appeal of some few 
c o u n t r i e s . 1 2 2 Indeed, having offered these arguments, i t i s 
apposite a l s o to say that the shortcomings of s t a t e immunity 
have become apparent, and the s o l i d r i n g that was once b u i l t 
around t h i s almighty d o c t r i n e of immunity i s prima facie now 
broken i n the major i n d u s t r i a l i s e d countries of the West, i n 
view of recent l e g i s l a t i o n i n these countries. However, i t 
remains to be seen how v i a b l e the doctrine of r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity would be i n a quest by municipal courts to r e s o l v e 
p r i v a t e claims a g a i n s t foreign sovereign s t a t e s i n domestic 
c o u r t s , for the r e s t r i c t i v e or r e l a t i v e approach has i n one way 
or the other made l i t i g a t i o n i n t h i s area of the law more 
complex. 
For an i n t e r n a t i o n a l convention on s t a t e immunity to be 
acceptable to a l l and sundry the following p r i n c i p l e s must be 
considered. These p r i n c i p l e s may be stated as f o l l o w s . 
(1) F i r s t and foremost, the standard of general 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law must be the f o c a l point of the convention. 
1 2 2See ILC Report (1978-1990); see a l s o (1999) GA, F i f t y -
F i r s t Session A/CN.4/L.576; (1998) Press Release ( S i x t h 
Committee) 9A/L/3091. 
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And t h i s must be c a r e f u l l y supplemented by connecting f a c t o r s , 
e.g., the r o l e of the lex fori must be c l e a r l y explained. 
(2) The d i s t i n c t i o n between acta jure imperii and ac t a 
j u r e gestionis must be e l i m i n a t e d or n e u t r a l i s e d by g i v i n g equal 
prominence to the nature and purpose t e s t s . Although such an 
approach w i l l not be d e c i s i v e , a t l e a s t i t w i l l open a floodgate 
of i n s i g h t s and ideas i n e x p l o r i n g the s t a t e immunity 
controversy, thus helping to promote an e q u i t a b l e balancing of 
r i g h t s . 
(3) The a c t i v i t i e s and i n t e r e s t s of s t a t e s do d i f f e r and 
therefore must be c h a r a c t e r i s e d a ccording to the l e g a l , economic 
and p o l i t i c a l systems 1 2 3 of c o u n t r i e s of the world, e.g.: 
See Almond and Powell, op. c i t . 
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(a) Democratic systems 
1. B r i t a i n , for instance, has a high 
subsystem autonomy. 
2. While Mexico has a low subsystem autonomy. 
(b) A u t h o r i t a r i a n systems 
1. USSR had subsystem control and s u b j e c t 
p a r t i c i p a n t c u l t u r e . This i s changing and 
R u s s i a as a t now might have a quasi 
conservative subsystem c o n t r o l , and China 
s t i l l follows a subsystem c o n t r o l . And 
t h i s i n c l u d e s North Korea. 
(c) Premobilised modern systems 
1. Newly independent s t a t e s , with l i m i t e d 
s e c u l a r i s a t i o n and low middle c l a s s 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n . 
2. Premobilised a u t h o r i t a r i a n systems, e.g., 
Ni g e r i a , Burma, Libya, e t c . 
3. Premobilised democratic systems, e.g., 
Zimbabwe, Egypt, India, Pakistan and Ghana 
s i n c e 1992. 
T h i s option may involve an extensive study which 
u l t i m a t e l y would r e v e a l to members of the Commission as to how 
s t a t e s behave and the attendant needs to which t h e i r i n t e r e s t s 
a r e d i r e c t e d . The d i s t i n c t i o n a lluded to above undoubtedly 
d e s t r o y s the concept of " a s s i m i l a t i o n " once suggested by 
P r o f e s s o r Lauterpacht. For as can be seen, each s t a t e i s unique 
i n i t s sphere of a u t h o r i t y with minimal s i m i l a r i t i e s . 
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(4) The l e g a l p o s i t i o n of governmental i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s 
of s t a t e s can be c h a r a c t e r i s e d according to the system suggested 
i n option 3. 
(5) I t could be p o s s i b l e to i n c o r p o r a t e the approach 
followed by Lord Wilberforce, i . e . , the c o n t e x t u a l a n a l y s i s i n 
the I Congreso de Lapido case i n t o the d r a f t a r t i c l e s , i . e . , by 
making reference to the c e n t r a l i s s u e , 1 2 4 upon which the s u i t i s 
based, i . e . , the nature of the t r a n s a c t i o n and the nature of the 
breach. 
(6) An a l t e r n a t i v e model r u l e should have been 
e s t a b l i s h e d , thus encouraging i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r b i t r a t i o n . 
(7) F a i l i n g a l l these, then the only v i a b l e approach l e f t 
i s to propose that a s p e c i a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o u r t or t r i b u n a l 
be e s t a b l i s h e d to handle p r i v a t e s u i t s a g a i n s t f o r e i g n sovereign 
s t a t e s . 
These recommendations are being made i n view of the f a c t 
t h a t so many countries of the world have not as yet had the 
chance to consider the sovereign immunity question before t h e i r 
l o c a l courts and evidence of s t a t e p r a c t i c e seemed to be scanty 
and quite obscure i n the T h i r d World, s i n c e the crusade f or 
change s t a r t e d i n the West. 1 2 5 
1 2 4See the judgment of Lord W i l b e r f o r c e i n the case of I 
Congreso del Par t i c o (1981) 3 WLR 328 (House of Lords) where he 
made an e x c e l l e n t e f f o r t to apply the c o n t e x t u a l theory. 
1 2 5E.g., I t a l i a n p r a c t i c e , Belgium p r a c t i c e , French 
p r a c t i c e , German p r a c t i c e , American p r a c t i c e , to mention a few. 
General Assembly, F i f t y - F i r s t Session, A/CN.4/L.576; Research 
Papers prepared by the A u s t r a l i a n Law Reform Commission (1983), 
under the d i r e c t i o n of Professor Crawford. 
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I n s p i t e of the above observations, i t i s submitted tha t 
the ILC d r a f t a r t i c l e s d i d b r i n g to the fore some new ideas and 
these are 
(1) The i n c l u s i o n of the purpose t e s t i n A r t i c l e 2 
paragraph 2. 
(2) The r e j e c t i o n of the s t r u c t u r i s t approach e n t i r e l y . 
(3) The d i s t i n c t i o n between p r e s c r i p t i v e and enforcement 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of the s t a t e , i . e . , A r t i c l e 18. Thus 
there i s a requirement for two sets of consents, 
i . e . , one for j u r i s d i c t i o n and the other i n respect 
of enforcement measures. 
(4) The commissioners somewhat deemphasised the a b s t r a c t 
t e s t of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between a c t s jure imperii and 
acts jure gestionis. 
I n sum, the r i f t between developed countries and developing 
c o u n t r i e s s t i l l remains. But the d r a f t a r t i c l e s and the work i n 
the S i x t h Committee c e r t a i n l y represent a great contribution to 
the understanding of t h i s e l u s i v e s u b j e c t . 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
SOVEREIGN STATES BEFORE FOREIGN COURTS: 
AN OBSERVATION ON CERTAIN UNSETTLED OR 
LINGERING STATE IMMUNITY PROBLEMS 
Intr o d u c t i o n 
In the l o g i c a l and o b j e c t i v e Freudian p s y c h o a n a l y t i c 
realms of the subconscious and unconscious mind, no one worries 
or r e s i g n s himself to death for an a l r e a d y dying concern, and 
f a i t h i s more powerful than doubt and d e s p a i r . But over the 
years the doctrine of sovereign immunity has been a t t a c k e d by 
leading s c h o l a r s 1 and i t would appear t h a t a l l l e a d i n g t e x t 
w r i t e r s who have s p e c i f i c a l l y s t u d i e d the s u b j e c t , although d i d 
not speak with one voice, are agreed t h a t immunity be 
r e s t r i c t e d . And i n t e r e s t i n g l y enough, one l e a d i n g s c h o l a r , 2 on 
record even went as f a r as to proclaim from the "mountaintop" 
t h a t sovereign immunity be abandoned for the sake of j u s t i c e and 
h i s p e r suasive t h e s i s seemed to have perhaps i n f l u e n c e d the 
1Lauterpacht H., The Problems of J u r i s d i c t i o n a l Immunities 
of Foreign States (1951) 28 BYIL, 220; Weiss, T r a i t e de d r o i t 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l p r i v e , LV pp 94; A l l e n , The P o s i t i o n of Foreign 
s t a t e s before n a t i o n a l courts (1933); Watkins, The S t a t e as a 
Party L i t i g a n t (1927); Hyde, op. c i t . , I n t Law Vol I I ; Friedman, 
The Growth of State Control (1938) BYIL XIX; Mann, The S t a t e 
Immunity Act, 1978 (1979) BYIL 50, p. 43; Loewenfield, The 
Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 44th Report of the ILA 1950 pp. 
204-217 and 45th Report 1952 at p. 215: See a l s o Lord Denning*s 
p o s i t i o n on the subject i n Rahimtoula V. Nizam of Hyderabad 
(1957) 3 WLR 884; and Trendtex and I Congreso d e l P a r t i d o ; 
Cater, Sovereign Immunity: S u b s t a n t i a t i o n of Claim (1955) 3 
ICLQ Vol IV part 3 p. 469; S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , 1959 work -
S t a t e Immunities and Trading A c t i v i t i e s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law. 
2See Lauterpacht, op. c i t . , pp. 220-224. 
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learned Thai j u r i s t Dr. S u c h a r i t k u l to a l s o c a l l for a complete 
abandonment of absolute immunity of s t a t e s i n h i s w e l l c i t e d 
1959 work. 3 So f a r , however, i t would appear sovereign immunity 
i s holding steady and t h e r e f o r e arguably here to stay, for i t 
would take more than j u r i s t i c w r i t i n g s to destroy the corpus and 
animus of sovereign immunity. Hence i t would be expedient to 
put on a l a n t e r n f o r t h i s uncharted journey r a t h e r than curse 
the darkness. And i t w i l l c e r t a i n l y be d e f e a t i s t to pray i n our 
pleading f o r deus ex machina, i n view of the f a c t that i n these 
modern times, such unexpected hidden or s p i r i t u a l powers have i n 
r e a l i t y ceased to be forthcoming when c a l l e d to save a d i f f i c u l t 
s i t u a t i o n . 
A l l t h a t i s being put across i s that a f t e r 186 years, the 
d o c t r i n e of sovereign immunity has become more entrenched i n the 
pleadings of s t a t e s before foreign c o u r t s 4 and although some 
co u n t r i e s have passed l e g i s l a t i o n i n order to block i t s appeal, 
arguably such u n i l a t e r a l l e g i s l a t i v e p r o v i s i o n s or executive 
r e g u l a t i o n s have been l e s s h e l p f u l and thus not r e f l e c t i v e of 
customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. To some extent such actions have 
r a t h e r exacerbated the a l r e a d y thorny problem by g i v i n g 
c o n f l i c t i n g s i g n a l s . 
3See S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , pp. 355-359. 
4 L i t t r e l v. United S t a t e s of America (No 2) (1994) 2 A l l ER 
203 Court of Appeal; Van Der Hurst v. United S t a t e s 94 ILR 374, 
The Netherlands Supreme Court; John McElhinney v. Anthony Ivor 
John Williams and Her Majesty's S e c r e t a r y of State for Northern 
I r e l a n d , Supreme Court d e c i s i o n 15th Dec 1995 per Hamilton CJ. 
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So f a r , one would be hard put to conclude t h a t t h e r e i s a 
normative r u l e i n t h i s area of the law i n so f a r as s t a t e 
p r a c t i c e i s u n s e t t l e d and there are c e r t a i n unresolved problems 
s t i l l a s s o c i a t e d with the s u b j e c t . 5 As f a r back as 1978, the 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission was given the mandate to embark on 
the c o d i f i c a t i o n of the law of sovereign immunity, and i t would 
appear some progress had been made, notwithstanding the 
con s e r v a t i v e p o s i t i o n of a great number of c o u n t r i e s t h a t s t a t e 
immunity be maintained. 6 Thus i f c o d i f i c a t i o n i s to be 
s u c c e s s f u l as an a t t r a c t i v e proposition, then c e r t a i n l y the 
continuing or unresolved problems c u r r e n t l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the 
e f f o r t to l i m i t s t a t e immunity must be c a r e f u l l y e x p l o r e d with 
the view to r e s o l v i n g them adequately by having regard to s t a t e 
p r a c t i c e and the fundamental p r i n c i p l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law 
p a r t i c u l a r l y enshrined i n the c h a r t e r of the UN.7 I t i s the 
5R. Higgins, Certain Unresolved Aspects of the Law of S t a t e 
Immunity (1982) 29 NILR 265; S u c h a r i t k u l , Immunities of Foreign 
S t a t e s before National A u t h o r i t i e s : R e c u e i l des Cours (1976 1) ; 
C. Schreuer, S t a t e Immunity: some Recent Developments (1988) . 
6See g e n e r a l l y The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission's Report, 
1981-1988 f o r d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of the p o s i t i o n of the T h i r d 
World and R u s s i a (formerly USSR) , Part V: R e p l i e s to 
Questionnaires Sent to Sovereign S t a t e s , pp. 557-645 Togo a t p. 
607; Venezuela a t p. 638; S y r i a a t p. 605; Sudan a t p. 605; and 
USSR a t p. 617. 
7The Asylum Case I C J Reports (1950) p. 266; North Sea 
Continental S h e l f Cases I C J Reports 1969 p. 3; V i l l i g e r , 
Customary I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law and T r e a t i s e (1985); Wolfke, Custom 
i n Present I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (2nd ed 1993); Kunz (1953) 47 A J I L 
662; Thirlway, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Customary Law and C o d i f i c a t i o n ; 
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purpose of t h i s study to attend to some of these thorny 
problems. 
The Problems of T e r r i t o r i a l Nexus or Connection 
State j u r i s d i c t i o n may be defined as the power to 
p r e s c r i b e r u l e s and to enforce these r u l e s . Under the 
t r a d i t i o n a l r u l e s , j u r i s d i c t i o n i s comprised of three important 
i s s u e s ; (1) whether a given court has the power to hear the 
case; (2) whether the court w i l l e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n or 
d e c l i n e j u r i s d i c t i o n , or i f need be, s t a y the proceedings; and 
(3) whether there are any l i m i t a t i o n s on the e x e r c i s e of 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . 8 The t h i r d i s s u e i s r e l e v a n t to the sovereign 
immunity controversy because i t d e a l s s p e c i f i c a l l y with a 
s i t u a t i o n where a court may have to grapple with c e r t a i n 
underlying l i m i t a t i o n s r e s p e c t i n g competency. The e f f e c t of 
these l i m i t a t i o n s u s u a l l y becomes apparent when a sovereign 
s t a t e i s impleaded before a f o r e i g n c o u r t 9 or i f the l i m i t a t i o n 
Akehurst (1974-75) 47 BYIL 1 D'Amato, The Concept of Custom i n 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1971) . 
8 C h e s h i r e and North's P r i v a t e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (12th ed 
1992) pp. 179-219, 223. 
9Juan Ysmach Co. I n c . v. Indonesian Government (1954) 3 WLR 
351; Trendtex Trading Corp. v. C e n t r a l Bank of N i g e r i a (1977) 
IQB 529; claims a g a i n s t the Empire of I r a n (1963) BV e r f GE 16: 
45 ILR 57; I Congreso d e l P a r t i d o (1981) 3 WLR 328 per Lord 
Wilberforce; The Pesaro (1926) 271 US 30; Republic of Mexico v. 
Huffman (1945) 324 US 30; S t a t e of Netherlands v. Federal 
Reserve Bank (1953) 99 Fed Supp 655; National American 
Corporation v. F e d e r a l Rep of N i g e r i a (1978) 448 S.Supp 622; 
A l f r e d D u n h i l l of London v. Republic of Cuba (1976) 125 US 682. 
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r e l a t e s to a s p e c i f i c subject matter, e.g., a case i n v o l v i n g a 
foreign element gua commercial t r a n s a c t i o n or a f o r e i g n 
l e g i s l a t i v e or executive action gua p r i v a t e r i g h t s . 
The law r e s p e c t i n g l i m i t a t i o n s upon the e x e r c i s e of 
j u r i s d i c t i o n over sovereign s t a t e s may be derived from the r u l e s 
of p u b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and the maxim par in parem non habet 
jurisdictionem, which means no s t a t e would be subjected to the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of another s t a t e without i t s consent. The most 
commonly quoted statement of the law of sovereign immunity can 
be found i n the Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon. T h i s was 
extended i n E n g l i s h law by B r e t t L J i n Parlement Beige i n the 
following words: 
" I t has been f r e q u e n t l y s t a t e d that an independent sovereign 
cannot be p e r s o n a l l y sued, although he has c a r r i e d on a p r i v a t e 
t r a d i n g adventure. I t has been he l d that an ambassador cannot 
be p e r s o n a l l y sued, although he has traded; and i n both c a s e s 
because such a s u i t would be i n c o n s i s t e n t with the independence 
and e q u a l i t y of the s t a t e which he r e p r e s e n t s . " 1 0 
C l a s s i c a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l law therefore discounted the dual 
p e r s o n a l i t y of the s t a t e and i t s ambassador. The law of 
sovereign immunity thus e x i s t e d u n t i l quite r e c e n t l y when i t s 
a u t h o r i t y was c a l l e d i n t o question i n some leading Western 
n a t i o n s . 1 1 Thus i n an attempt to l i m i t the absolute immunity of 
s t a t e s , the d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity was developed and 
had s i n c e then become a s t a t u t e law i n USA, UK, Singapore, 
Pakistan, South A f r i c a , Canada and A u s t r a l i a . 
1 0 (1880) 5 PD 197. 
n T r e n d t e x Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of N i g e r i a (1977) 
IQB 529; Claims a g a i n s t the Empire of I r a n (1963) BV e r f GE 16; 
National American Corporation v. Federal Republic of N i g e r i a 
(1978) 448 F.Supp 622; The P h i l i p p i n e Admiral (1977) AC 373. 
399 
Ever s i n c e r e s t r i c t i v e immunity gained some currency, 
i s s u e s regarding j u r i s d i c t i o n have become confusing and 
d i f f i c u l t because of the simple f a c t t h a t emphasis has been 
s h i f t e d from the s t a t u s of the s t a t e to i t s a c t i v i t i e s . The 
problem has now become deep-seated i n view of the f a c t t h a t 
municipal courts, having r e s i g n e d to the acceptance of the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between a c t a jure imperii and a c t a j u r e gestionis, 
side-stepped or overlooked the d i f f e r e n c e between immunity and 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . J u r i s d i c t i o n as a matter of law encompasses 
actions inter partes or a c t i o n i n personam, geared towards the 
r e s o l u t i o n of disputes between l i t i g a t i n g p a r t i e s while immunity 
can a p p r o p r i a t e l y be r e f e r r e d to as an a f f i r m a t i v e defence. 
Thus one must come f i r s t before the other but not the two 
concepts at the same time. One s t r i k i n g feature of a c t i o n s in 
personam i s th a t i t i s undoubtedly procedural i n every r e s p e c t , 
and therefore any person l i v i n g w i t h i n the j u r i s d i c t i o n of a 
st a t e could become amenable to i t provided a proper w r i t i s 
served on the defendant. 1 2 Thus i n the absence of a c l e a r l y 
defined method of s e r v i n g s o vereign s t a t e s , s u i t s a g a i n s t 
sovereign s t a t e s became a source of acrimony and p r o t e s t , 
because of the l e g a l requirement t h a t the person being served 
(that i s , the defendant) must be p r e s e n t i n the j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
This requirement i s not n e c e s s a r y as regards actions in rem, 
i . e . , jus in re aliena, s i n c e i t i n v o l v e s an acquired r i g h t of 
1 2Cheshire and North, op. c i t . , pp. 183-184; McDonald v. 
Mabee (1917) 243 US 90, a t 91. 
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ownership by one over the res of another. 1 3 A good example may 
take the form of a l i e n and therefore could be regarded as a 
p r i v i l e g e c laim. The l e g a l d i f f e r e n c e between action in 
personam and actions in rem i n En g l i s h law was not s e r i o u s l y 
considered or regarded as important during the epoch where 
immunity was completely absolute, but became e s s e n t i a l during 
the p e r i o d when the courts had to grapple with the i s s u e of 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between acta jure imperii and act a jure 
gestionis.14 And the r a t i o n a l e behind the d i s t i n c t i o n , one would 
suppose, was to prevent a constant c o n f l i c t between the 
p r i n c i p l e of par in parem non habet jurisdicionem and that of 
the p r i n c i p l e princeps in alterius territorio privatus, qua 
suits eo nomine. T h i s c o n f l i c t can al s o be seen i n the context 
of p r i v a t e law and property law r e l a t i o n s , 1 5 which over the years 
had given b i r t h to prodigious c o n f l i c t i n g j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s on 
the s u b j e c t . 
A thorough examination of pu b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l law w i l l 
show t h a t i t has l i t t l e to o f f e r as regards problems with c i v i l 
s u i t s , 1 6 which means that contemporary problems r e s p e c t i n g c i v i l 
j u r i s d i c t i o n , s p e c i f i c a l l y a s s o c i a t e d with a foreign element, 
1 3See Cheshire and North, op. c i t . , pp. 214-215. 
1 4See Higgins, Recent Developments i n the Law of Sovereign 
Immunity i n the United Kingdom (1977) 71 AJIL; and Schreur, Some 
Recent Developments i n the Law of State Immunity 2 Comparative 
Law YB (1978) 215. 
1 5 T a n i v. Russian Trade Delegations i n I t a l y (1948) Annual 
Digest 15 pp. 141-144. 
1 6Jennings, 32, M o r d i s i l T i d s c r i f t For I n t . , Reg. (1962); 
Mann, Stud i e s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1973) pp. 1-140. 
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can be resolved by reference to the p r i n c i p l e of p r i v a t e 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. I n other words, p r i v a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l law or 
c o n f l i c t of laws o f f e r s a b e t t e r guidance to the understanding 
of c i v i l j u r i s d i c t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i n so f a r as the 
relevant l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p would have to be c l a s s i f i e d by the 
lex fori coupled with some re f e r e n c e to the precepts of p u b l i c 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. This means t h a t when deal i n g with the 
question of sovereign immunity, one i s bound to be faced with 
d i f f i c u l t i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s s u e s i n e x t r i c a b l y i n t e r t w i n e d with 
public and p r i v a t e law p r e c e p t s . 1 7 I t i s t h e r e f o r e important to 
note that the study of p r i v a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s e s s e n t i a l to 
the understanding of the sovereign immunity controversy and a l s o 
to the study of p u b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. And t h i s i s so 
because these two branches of law--one p r i v a t e and the other 
p u b l i c — g r e w out of the same p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h i n k i n g but do, 
however, follow d i f f e r e n t teachings and l e a r n i n g , but s t i l l i n 
one way or the other could be a p p l i e d i n c e r t a i n circumstances 
to resolve general problems of j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
The word j u r i s d i c t i o n must be e c l e c t i c a l l y used because i t 
has a t e c h n i c a l connotation and t h e r e f o r e could simply be 
interpreted to mean d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s i n many cou n t r i e s and thus 
can be misleading i n many r e s p e c t s . But i n general, j u r i s d i c t i o n 
r e f e r s to the powers e x e r c i s e d on the b a s i s of law by a 
sovereign s t a t e over i t s t e r r i t o r y , c i t i z e n s and events. 1 8 I n 
1 7Lowenfeld, A.F., R e c u e i l descours (1979) 11 pp. 321-330. 
1 8Michael Akehurst, J u r i s d i c t i o n i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1972-
73) XLV BYIL 145-259; Mann, The Doctrine of J u r i s d i c t i o n i n 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, R e c u e i l des Cours I I I (1964-1); Ehrenzweig 
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Compania Naviera Vascongado v. Steamship ' C r i s t i n a , ' Lord 
Macmillan o f f e r e d the following d e f i n i t i o n of j u r i s d i c t i o n : 
" I t i s an e s s e n t i a l a t t r i b u t e of the sovereignty of t h i s 
realm, as of a l l sovereign independent s t a t e s , that i t should 
p o s s e s s j u r i s d i c t i o n over a l l persons and things w i t h i n i t s 
t e r r i t o r i a l l i m i t s and a l l causes, c i v i l and c r i m i n a l , a r i s i n g 
w i t h i n these l i m i t s . " 1 9 
Although the above d e f i n i t i o n i s i n order, i t i s doubtful 
as to whether such a d e f i n i t i o n could generally be a p p l i e d 
without d i f f i c u l t i e s . C e r t a i n l y , problems may be encountered 
s i n c e j u r i s d i c t i o n appears to have v a r i e d connotations. How, 
then, can j u r i s d i c t i o n be determined? C o n f l i c t s c h o l a r s are 
agreed t h a t the lex fori must be the s t a r t i n g point, for i t i s 
only through the lex fori t h a t connecting f a c t o r s can be 
determined. 2 0 I n France the connecting f a c t o r i s r e f e r r e d to as 
pointe de rabtacheement, while i n Germany i t i s known as 
aknupfungspunkt.21 Thus f o r the lex causae to be e f f e c t i v e l y 
a p p l i e d there must be a connecting f a c t o r and that i s why some 
s c h o l a r s have concluded t h a t the b a s i c r u l e of the c o n f l i c t of 
laws i s the lex fori.22 I n the Empire of Ir a n case, the court 
seemed to explore the i s s u e r a i s e d above as follows: 
(1956) Y a l e Law Journal; Dicey and Morris, C o n f l i c t of Law 
(1992); Cheshire and North, op. c i t . 
1 9 (1938) AC 485 House of Lords. 
2 0 M o r r i s , C o n f l i c t of Law (1993) pp. 7-11. 
2 1 I b i d . , p. 7 (footnote note 32). 
2 2Ehrenzweig, The Lex F o r i — B a s i c Rule i n the C o n f l i c t of 
Laws (1960) 58 Mich L Rev 637; A Proper Law i n a Proper Forum. 
A Restatement of the Lex F o r i Approach (1965) 18 Okla L Rev 340; 
B. C u r r i e , S e l e c t e d Essays i n the C o n f l i c t of Laws (1963). 
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" I t i s s t i l l today g e n e r a l l y r e c o g n i s e d t h a t f o r e i g n 
s t a t e s are not s u b j e c t to the municipal j u r i s d i c t i o n a t l e a s t as 
regards t h e i r sovereign a c t i v i t i e s . T h i s p r i n c i p l e of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law would be devoid of content, and c o u l d not l a y 
c l a i m to the nature of a l e g a l p r i n c i p l e , i f the q u e s t i o n as to 
what acts were to be regarded as a c t s jure imperii were to be 
determined s o l e l y by the formal c r i t e r i o n whether the r e l e v a n t 
l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p i s to be c l a s s i f i e d by the lex fori as p u b l i c 
or as p r i v a t e law. Were one to proceed i n t h i s way, i t would i n 
p r a c t i c e depend on the opinion of the s t a t e whose c o u r t s are 
d e a l i n g with the matter, whether i t d e s i r e s t o g r a n t immunity; 
one would come to d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t s i n d i f f e r e n t s t a t e s , and 
moreover, f a i l to take account of the grounds t h a t have l e d to 
the d i s t i n c t i o n between a c t s j u r e imperii and j u r e gestionis.1,23 
In the l i g h t of the n e u t r a l p o s i t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law 
on these i s s u e s , some courts have, however, of l a t e openly 
r e s o r t e d to the a p p l i c a t i o n of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity qua the lex 
fori to determine forum arrest or forum patrimonii. The 
n e u t r a l i t y of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law or the f a c t t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law has no c r i t e r i a for the d i s t i n c t i o n between acta jure 
imperii and acta jure gestionis i n t h i s r e g a r d has a l s o given 
r i s e to d i v e r s i t y i n s t a t e p r a c t i c e and c o n f l i c t i n g j u d i c i a l 
d e c i s i o n s i n respect of j u r i s d i c t i o n a l competence. The problem 
can be resolved i f the lex fori c l a s s i f i e s s t a t e a c t i v i t i e s by 
having regard to usus and the l e g a l p o s i t i o n of s t a t e s i n 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
In the case of Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad, Lord 
Denning explained the law r e s p e c t i n g t e r r i t o r i a l connection 
thus: 
"Applying t h i s p r i n c i p l e , i t seems to me t h a t a t the p r e s e n t 
time sovereign immunity should not depend on whether a f o r e i g n 
government i s impleaded, d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y , but r a t h e r on 
the nature of the d i s p u t e . Not on whether ' c o n f l i c t i n g r i g h t s 
have to be decided, ' but on the nature of the c o n f l i c t . . . . 
"Claims against the Empire of I r a n (1963) BV e r f 16, 45 ILR 
p. 59. 
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But i f the d i s p u t e concerns, for i n s t a n c e , the commercial 
t r a n s a c t i o n s of a f o r e i g n government (whether c a r r i e d on by i t s 
own departments or agencies or by s e t t i n g up separate l e g a l 
e n t i t i e s ) , and i t a r i s e s p r o p e r l y w i t h i n the t e r r i t o r i a l 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of our c o u r t s , there i s no ground for granting 
immunity. " 2 A 
Lord Denning c a r r i e d h i s views a stage f a r t h e r i n Thai Europe 
Ltd. by arguing t h a t j u r i s d i c t i o n be e x e r c i s e d i f there i s 
evidence to a t t e s t to the f a c t t h a t the commercial t r a n s a c t i o n 
i n d ispute has "a most c l o s e connection with England such that 
by the presence of the p a r t i e s or the nature of the dispute i t 
i s more r e c o g n i z a b l e here than elsewhere." 2 5 Lord Denning seems 
to be f o l l o w i n g one of the t r a d i t i o n a l r u l e s of j u r i s d i c t i o n , 
that i s the primary t e s t of whether the court w i l l d e c l i n e 
j u r i s d i c t i o n or s t a y the proceeding. But would such an approach 
be a c c e p t a b l e to a m a j o r i t y of s t a t e s ? C e r t a i n l y no, because 
the s t a t e i s a s p e c i a l s u b j e c t of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, hence i t 
w i l l be d i f f i c u l t to l i k e n i t s a c t s to j u r i d i c a l persons as a 
prelude to determining j u r i s d i c t i o n . The p r a c t i c e where foreign 
s t a t e s were s u b j e c t e d to the law of the forum was derived from 
municipal law a n a l o g i e s , and therefore arguably a deviation from 
general i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i n c e one sovereign a c t s as a defecto 
arbitre i n a d i s p u t e between an equal and a p r i v a t e t r a d e r . 
E.g., commercial a c t i v i t i e s as defined i n the FSIA undoubtedly 
have a v a r y i n g connotation and therefore must be supplemented by 
s p e c i f i c r u l e s r e s p e c t i n g connecting f a c t o r s to avoid d i f f i c u l t 
j u r i s d i c t i o n a l problems. No a c t i v i t y can be considered invacuo 
2 4 (1958) AC 379 p. 422. 
2 5 (1975) IWLR a t p. 1492. 
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f o r every a c t i v i t y ; whether i t be commercial or non-commercial 
must have some purpose or reasons behind i t . Thus f o r a s t a t e 
a c t i v i t y to be meaningful i t must have a purpose extraneous to 
the commercial act i n order to i n f l u e n c e i t s r e s u l t . The 
attempt therefore to determine j u r i s d i c t i o n a l nexus through 
commercial a c t i v i t y or minimum contact wholly based upon the 
nature t e s t encounters t h e o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l problems. The 
t h e o r e t i c a l aspect of the problem stems from the f a c t t h a t the 
s t a t e to a greater extent has an a b s t r a c t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c and 
t h e r e f o r e must be separated from i t s concrete m a n i f e s t a t i o n s . 
While on the other hand, the p r a c t i c a l aspect of the problem 
hinges on how best to d e l i m i t the a c t i v i t i e s of the modern 
s t a t e , and t h i s , one would argue, i s the bane of l i n k i n g the 
conduct of the s t a t e to a foreign court, i . e . , the forum s t a t e . 
The d i f f i c u l t y i n separating these two c o n s t i t u t e elements of 
the s t a t e gave currency to sovereign immunity. And s i n c e the 
law i s the creature of the sovereign, one encounters 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n subjecting an equal to a v e r t i c a l order, i . e . , 
the procedural and remedial law of the forum (the lex fori) . 
The myth of j u s t i c e or f a i r n e s s to the p l a i n t i f f does not 
therefore e c l i p s e the needs of the i n t e r - s t a t e system. The 
concept of j u r i s d i c t i o n a l connection f a l l s or stands on the 
i n t r i n s i c value placed on s p e c i f i c r u l e s l i n k i n g the a c t i v i t i e s 
of the s t a t e with the forum. But again t h i s approach i s fraught 
with u n c e r t a i n t y because of the consequence of s t a t e 
sovereignty, and the f a c t t h a t i t cannot be p r a c t i c a l l y 
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subjected to t r a n s i t o r y conditions as regards commercial 
a c t i v i t i e s or the v a r i e d modern functions of the s t a t e . 2 6 
The U.K. a c t d i d not t a l k of a s p e c i f i c requirement 
r e s p e c t i n g t e r r i t o r i a l connection but Section 3 ( l ) b touches on 
"whether a commercial t r a n s a c t i o n or not f a l l s to be performed 
wholly or p a r t l y i n the United Kingdom." The l i n k here i s 
somewhat p r e d i c a t e d on the lex loci solutionis, which i s thereby 
contrasted w i t h the o b j e c t i v e nature of the a c t i v i t y rather than 
the s u b j e c t i v e purpose of the a c t i v i t y . The s a i d provision, 
however, i s broadly c a s t and t h e r e f o r e not p a r t i c u l a r l y h e l p f u l . 
J u r i s d i c t i o n r e f e r s to the concrete manifestation and the 
patent e x p r e s s i o n of sovereignty and i t i s i n many respects 
t e r r i t o r i a l . Thus u n t i l such time that the p r i n c i p l e s of 
p r i v a t e and p u b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l law are applied concurrently to 
contain the problem of t e r r i t o r i a l connection, the p r i n c i p l e of 
par in parent non habet jurisdictionem and the p r i n c i p l e of 
princeps in alterius territorio privatus w i l l continue to 
c o n f l i c t , thus somewhat g i v i n g v a l i d i t y to the j u d i c i a l 
pronouncements i n such c a s e s as the claims a g a i n s t the Empire of 
I r a n , I Congreso d e l P a r t i d o and the Kuwait Airways Corporation 
v. I r a q Airways Company and Another. 2 7 
2 6 Z e r n i c e K. V. Brown and Root I n c . and others (1993) 92 I L 
Reports p. 442; Nelson v. Saudi Arabia (1992) 88 I L Reports p. 
189. 
2 7 (1995) 1 WLR 1147 House of Lords. 
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The Continuing Problems Associated with the Nature and Purpose 
Tests 
I t i s apposite to s t a t e expressis verbis a t t h i s j u n c t u r e 
that the I t a l i a n theory of dual p e r s o n a l i t y of s t a t e s 2 8 i s ex 
facie erroneous. The s t a t e cannot be simply d i v i d e d i n t o 
'potere politico' and 'persona civile' without f i r s t t a k i n g i n t o 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n the a b s t r a c t nature of the s t a t e . Perhaps the 
government of a given s t a t e could be d i v i d e d i n t o p o t e r e 
politico and persona civile but not the s t a t e , because j u r i d i c a l 
philosophy t e l l s us that the s t a t e i s "both an a b s t r a c t 
conception and concrete manifestation." 2 9 The a b s t r a c t nature of 
the s t a t e i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y grounded and thus may be regarded 
as having an e t h i c a l and natura l p e r s o n a l i t y q u i t e d i f f e r e n t 
from the concrete s t a t e which could a p t l y be denoted as the 
government. The concrete s t a t e as already s t a t e d elsewhere i s 
the agent of the a b s t r a c t s t a t e and t h e r e f o r e may change from 
time to time depending, of course, upon the w i l l of the people. 
The a b s t r a c t s t a t e i s inanimate, u l t r a - e x c l u s i v e and a 
determinate superior, hence i t cannot be regarded as having a 
'potere politico and persona civile' because i t s domain i s ex 
hypothesi p o l i t i c a l , i . e . , the p r o v i s i o n of the p u b l i c good on 
2 8 M o r e l l e t v. Governio Denese (1882); G u t t i e r e s v. E l m i l i k 
1886-1-913; F i l t , 920, 922; Su c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , pp. 233-242. 
2 9See B. Bhattacharyya, F i r s t Coure i n P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e 
(1949) p. 10, but see al s o , George Sabine and Thomas Thorson, A 
History of P o l i t i c a l Theory (1973); A. Appadorae, The Substance 
of P o l i t i c s (1968); L a s k i , A Grammar of P o l i t i c s (1967); 
Dunning, W.A., A History of P o l i t i c a l Theories, Ancient and 
Medieval (New York) 1902; Holland, T.E., The Elements of 
Jurisprudence 12th ed. Oxford 1916. 
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behalf of the r u l e d . Any attempt therefore to d i v i d e the s t a t e 
into a p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y and a 'corpo morale' i s fundamentally 
flawed. I t i s only the concrete s t a t e which could perhaps be 
amenable to s u i t i n the l i g h t of the f a c t that i t i s made up of 
the e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the people. The r e l a t i o n s h i p 
therefore between the people and the a b s t r a c t s t a t e i s 
permanent, absolute, e x c l u s i v e and sacred than many would think 
i t to be. The a b s t r a c t s t a t e cannot commit a t o r t or v i o l a t e a 
contract or get i n t o t r a d i n g a c t i v i t i e s because i n r e a l i t y i t 
does not have a 'persona civile' as was suggested by I t a l i a n 
j u r i s p r u d e n c e . 3 0 The concrete s t a t e d e r i v e s i t s sovereign 
p e r s o n a l i t y from the a b s t r a c t s t a t e j u s t as p o l i t i c a l 
s u b d i v i s i o n s d e r i v e immunity from the concrete s t a t e . Thus any 
actio n which i s taken by the concrete s t a t e i s done on behalf of 
the a b s t r a c t s t a t e and t h e r e f o r e represents the p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n 
and a s p i r a t i o n s of the people. A s t a t e therefore never acts as 
a p r i v a t e person. 3 1 The a c t of a s t a t e s i g n i n g a co n t r a c t i s 
p o l i t i c a l because i t i s done on behalf of the a b s t r a c t s t a t e , 
i . e . , the rul e d , and t h i s a l s o a p p l i e s to the a c t of v i o l a t i n g 
i t . There i s t h e r e f o r e no c o n c l u s i v e evidence t h a t a s t a t e has 
a corpo morale, hence such a theory was simply presumed without 
any foundation. That the I t a l i a n theory was based upon a 
3 0 F i t z m a u r i c e (1933) 14 BYIL 101 at 121; Lauterpacht, op. 
c i t . , note 1. 
3 1B. Bhattacharyya, op. c i t . ; Dunning, W.A., A History of 
P o l i t i c a l Theories from Luther to Montesquieu (NY) 1905; Bryce 
J . , Studies i n H i s t o r y and Jurisprudence (NY) 1901; Lauterpacht 
(1951) 28 BYIL; F i t z m a u r i c e (1933) 14 BYIL. 
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misconception has s i n c e been proven by the d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t 
judges would have to face i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between p r i v a t e and 
p u b l i c law and a l s o between commercial and non-commercial 
a c t i v i t i e s of the s t a t e . The I t a l i a n theory i n s h o r t 
consecrated the anomaly tha t whenever a s t a t e descends i n t o the 
realm of buying goods or signing a contract i t has behaved as a 
p r i v a t e person and t h e r e f o r e could be sued. I s the problem t h a t 
simple? I think not, for there i s more involved i n r e s p e c t of 
the s a i d i s s u e than miss the eye. 
In B e r i z z i Brothers v. The Steamship Pesaro, the U.S. 
Supreme Court s t a t e d the d i f f i c u l t i e s that may be a s s o c i a t e d 
with r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i n the following words: 
"an i n t e r n a t i o n a l usage which regards the maintenance and 
advancement of the economic welfare of a people i n time of peace 
as any l e s s a p u b l i c purpose than the maintenance or t r a i n i n g of 
a naval f o r c e . " ' 2 
The import of the s a i d dictum shows c l e a r l y the d i f f i c u l t i e s 
t h a t one may have to face i n t r y i n g to develop a uniform t e s t 
t h a t could be applied i n c h a r a c t e r i s i n g governmental and non-
governmental a c t i v i t i e s of s t a t e s . Professor Brownlie i n h i s 
e x p o s i t i o n on the problem c a r e f u l l y pointed out t h a t an adequate 
a n a l y s i s of the i s s u e "requires value judgments which r e s t on 
p o l i t i c a l assumptions as to the proper sphere of s t a t e a c t i v i t y 
and of p r i o r i t i e s of s t a t e p o l i c i e s . 3 3 While Lord Denning i n I 
Congreso argued that "sovereign immunity depends on the nature 
of the a c t i o n ; not on the purpose or i n t e n t or motive, use 
3 2 (1926) 27 U.S. 562. 
3 3See Brownlie, op. c i t . , p. 331. 
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whichever word you l i k e , with which i t i s done." 3 4 As has 
already been shown, the d o c t r i n e of r e l a t i v e immunity was f i r s t 
developed by c i v i l law c o u n t r i e s , namely, Belgium and I t a l y , and 
i n order to promote the v a l i d i t y of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity, the 
purpose t e s t was dismissed by c o n t i n e n t a l s c h o l a r s because i t 
appears to be s u b t l e and l e s s r u l e - s p e c i f i c . The r e l i a n c e on 
the nature t e s t was i n f l u e n c e d by the w r i t i n g s of De Paepe and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y t h a t of Judge Weiss. 3 5 And i t would appear i n many 
respects that these s c h o l a r s were i n t u r n a l s o i n f l u e n c e d by the 
theory of the dual p e r s o n a l i t y of s t a t e s . But one important 
weakness i n respect of the a p p l i c a t i o n of the r e s t r i c t i v e 
approach i s t h a t i t s v a l i d i t y depends wholly on the nature t e s t 
and that without the advantage of the nature t e s t the concept of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity would simply become a 'paper t i g e r ' without 
any teeth whatsoever. As i t may be r e c a l l e d , before the Second 
World War most common law c o u n t r i e s d i d not consider the concept 
of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity as a v i a b l e option u n t i l the famous Tate 
l e t t e r was w r i t t e n i n 1952. T h i s was followed by the 197 6 U.S. 
Act which di d confirm the nature t e s t i n § 1603(d) as f o l l o w s : 
"The commercial c h a r a c t e r of an a c t i v i t y s h a l l be 
determined by r e f e r e n c e to the nature of the course of conduct 
or p a r t i c u l a r t r a n s a c t i o n , r a t h e r than by r e f e r e n c e to i t s 
purpose." 
A c a r e f u l reading of t h i s p o r t i o n of the Act shows t h a t 
the i n c l u s i o n of the nature t e s t was misconceived without f i r s t 
3 4 (1981) 1 A l l ER p. 1102. 
3 5Academie de Dr o i t I n t e r n a t i o n a l , R e c u e i l des Cours (1922) 
Vol. 1 pp. 545-6. 
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t a k i n g pains to study the shaky continental jurisprudence from 
which i t was borrowed. Furthermore, the d r a f t e r s f a i l e d to 
i n q u i r e i n t o the l e g a l b a s i s of applying the nature t e s t , and 
whether i t can be applied i n a l l cases without defeating the 
course of j u s t i c e . The d r a f t e r s a l s o f a i l e d to determine 
whether the nature t e s t can adequately be applied to p o l i t i c a l 
d e c i s i o n s of n a t i o n - s t a t e s i n respect of t h e i r dealings with 
p r i v a t e t r a d e r s . The p r i v a t e and public law d i s t i n c t i o n s were 
a l s o overlooked, for i t would have been most rewarding, as was 
suggested by Professor Higgins, i f common law c o u n t r i e s had 
taken steps to f a m i l i a r i s e 3 6 themselves with t h i s all-embracing 
c i v i l law concept, which as a matter of p r i n c i p l e has now become 
the cornerstone i n the a p p l i c a t i o n of the concept of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 3 7 The d i s t i n c t i o n i n question i s p a t e n t l y 
d e f e c t i v e because i t t o t a l l y ignores the f a c t that one of the 
p a r t i e s to the agreement i s a recognised person i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law and t h a t whatever d e c i s i o n i s taken by a s t a t e i s always 
i n f l u e n c e d by p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Secondly, most L a t i n 
American s t a t e s and A s i a n - A f r i c a n s t a t e s are poor and t h e r e f o r e 
any economic d e c i s i o n which i s taken i s geared towards the 
betterment of the whole s o c i e t y . And t h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y so 
because i n these developing c o u n t r i e s the sole provider of goods 
and s e r v i c e s i s the s t a t e , hence the s t a t e i n t h i s regard 
ventures or i s forced to perform v a r i e d economic a c t i v i t i e s i n 
3 6Higgins, Unresolved Problems, op. c i t . 
3 7Trendtex Trading Corp. v. C e n t r a l Bank of Nigeria (1977) 2 
WLR; I Congreso des Partido (1981) 3 WLR 328. 
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order to keep the economy going. T h i s i n v o l v e s s t a t e planning, 
hence the proposed d i s t i n c t i o n by l e a d i n g Western s t a t e s , where 
the purpose t e s t i s r e j e c t e d or ignored simply s a c r i f i c e s 
j u s t i c e for a f a i l e d theory. The s i g n i n g of a c o n t r a c t by a 
s t a t e for the supply of goods may appear commercial but the 
decision i n signing the c o n t r a c t i s without doubt p u b l i c l y based 
and whatever d e c i s i o n i s taken t h e r e a f t e r r e s p e c t i n g the 
performance or breach of the c o n t r a c t i s more often than not 
p o l i t i c a l and nothing e l s e . T h i s does not mean, however, tha t 
the r i g h t of the p r i v a t e t r a d e r be s a c r i f i c e d for the betterment 
of the people or for the p u b l i c good. 3 8 Quite apart from these 
drawbacks i t i s hard to t e l l as to whether there i s any 
consensus i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law as to how to determine the 
general scope of s t a t e a c t i v i t i e s . I f t h i s be the case, how 
w i l l a court be able to d e l i m i t the scope of the a c t i v i t i e s of a 
given s t a t e i n order to determine whether the a c t i v i t i e s i n 
i s s u e are governmental or non-governmental? At best the whole 
e x e r c i s e i s l e f t i n the hands of the lex fori to c h a r a c t e r i s e 
the i s s u e s as i t sees f i t . And i t i s p o s s i b l e the judge may be 
tempted to only follow the cum sensu i n the West to simply 
r e s o r t to conjecture. There i s the l i k e l i h o o d a l s o t h a t the 
r e s u l t s could e a s i l y be manipulated to prevent the defendant 
s t a t e from seeking j u s t i c e i n a given case i n as much as the lex 
fori rather than the lex causae i n p r a c t i c e would have to be 
applied as an important t o o l i n d e f i n i n g the i s s u e s and thus 
3 8See Higgins, Problems and P r o c e s s — I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law and 
How We Use I t (1994) p. 85. 
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l i n k i n g the a c t i v i t y of the defendant s t a t e to the forum. I t i s 
suggested t h a t emphasis be r a t h e r l a i d on the breach or 
i n f r a c t i o n so as to o f f e r the judge the opportunity to put h i s 
l e g a l reasoning to work, i n order to avoid a s i t u a t i o n where 
cases w i t h s i m i l a r f a c t s and i s s u e s are decided d i f f e r e n t l y . 
Given these d i f f i c u l t i e s , would i t be proper for the lex fori to 
follow only l o c a l data i n applying the doctrine of r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity without having regard to the standard of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law? The answer must be no, i f p e r s i s t e n t divergence i n s t a t e 
p r a c t i c e i s to be avoided. A f t e r a l l , the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
commercial and non-commercial a c t i v i t i e s of s t a t e s at best could 
only have a presumptive currency s i n c e every d e c i s i o n of the 
s t a t e i s arguably i n f l u e n c e d by p o l i t i c s and the economic 
w e l f a r e of the r u l e d . And quite apart from t h i s , the b o r d e r l i n e 
between the nature and purpose t e s t i s fraught with 
u n c e r t a i n t i e s . Even courts i n the same country have on many 
occ a s i o n s reached d i f f e r e n t conclusions on s i m i l a r i s s u e s 
r e s p e c t i n g the d i s t i n c t i o n between acta jure imperii and a c t a 
j u r e gestionis. In France, for example, a c o u r t 3 9 ruled that the 
procurement of goods to be sold l a t e r to nationals cannot be 
accorded immunity because the a c t was not sovereign-based. 
While another French court, faced with s i m i l a r f a c t s and i s s u e s , 
t h e r e a f t e r r u l e d t h a t immunity be granted on the ground tha t the 
a c t f a l l s w i t h i n the confines of jure imperii. Courts i n 
3 9The S t a t e of Romania v. P a s c a l e t , AD, 2 (1923-24) No. 68 
must be c a r e f u l l y c ontrasted with Lakhowsky v. Swiss F e d e r a l 
Government, AD, 1 (1919-1922) No. 85. 
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d i f f e r e n t countries have a l s o reached d i f f e r e n t conclusions on 
s i m i l a r f a c t s , e.g., U.S. c o u r t s , 4 0 I t a l i a n c o u r t s , 4 1 U.K. 
c o u r t s 4 2 and Canadian c o u r t s . 4 3 
The Court of Appeal i n England, f o r example, in Kuwait 
Airways Corporation v. I r a q i Airways Company and another r u l e d 
that I r a q be accorded immunity but on a f u r t h e r appeal the House 
of Lords i n a 3-2 ruled that immunity be denied. T h i s tendency 
a l s o became apparent i n Trendtex and Alcorn. What i s being put 
acro s s here i s that the theory of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i s so 
uncl e a r and open-ended that i t has often c r e a t e d a s i t u a t i o n 
where courts of the same country have d i f f e r e d markedly on the 
i s s u e i n according or denying immunity to defendant s t a t e s . And 
t h i s i s made more d i f f i c u l t because of the f a c t t h a t i n most 
developing nations the p u b l i c s e c t o r i s i n h e r e n t l y l a r g e , hence 
the a p p l i c a t i o n of the d i s t i n c t i o n between acta jure imperii and 
acta jure gestionis s o l e l y based on the nature t e s t becomes 
onerous and uncertain and thus i n the end works hardship on 
developing s t a t e s . 
While i t i s p e r f e c t l y c l e a r t h a t the U.S. has embraced the 
nature t e s t and thus r e j e c t e d the purpose t e s t , 4 4 i n the U.K., 
4 0Kingdom of Romania v. Guaranty T r u s t Co. of New York 2nd 
250 Fed 341, 343. 
4 1Governor Rumeno v. T r u t t a , G i urisprudenza I t a l i a n a (1926) 
(1) p. 774. 
4 2Planmount Ltd. v. Republic of Z a i r e (1981) 1. A l l ER 1110. 
4 3Govt. of the Democratic Rep. of the Congo v. Venne, ILR 64 
(1983) 24-46. 
4 4See FISA (1976), g e n e r a l l y . 
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however, i t would appear the d r a f t e r s were s i l e n t on the purpose 
t e s t although i t was i n f a c t r e j e c t e d i n an e a r l i e r d r a f t . 4 5 No 
one, however, can t e l l with much candour or exactitude as to 
whether the purpose t e s t had t o t a l l y been r e j e c t e d i n the 
p r a c t i c e of E n g l i s h c o u r t s . Current trends, however, i n the 
p r a c t i c e of c o u n t r i e s of the West i n f a c t show a c l e a r r e j e c t i o n 
of the purpose t e s t . 4 6 A good i l l u s t r a t i o n of the d i f f i c u l t i e s 
and u n c e r t a i n t i e s a s s o c i a t e d with the p r i v a t e and public law 
d i s t i n c t i o n s can be detected i n the judgment of Lord Wilberforce 
i n I Congreso d e l Partido, where he s a i d : 
" E v e r y t h i n g done by the Republic of Cuba i n r e l a t i o n to Playa 
Larga [one of the two v e s s e l s involved] could have been done and 
so f a r as evidence goes, was done, as owners of the ship. . . . 
I t a c t e d , as any owner of the s h i p would a c t , through the 
managing o p e r a t o r s . I t invoked no governmental a u t h o r i t y . 4 7 
In t h i s r e s p e c t , can i t be s a i d t h a t the a p p l i c a t i o n of 
the p r i v a t e and p u b l i c law d i s t i n c t i o n was proper i n view of the 
f a c t t h a t the i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t were given by the Cuban 
government could be q u a l i f i e d as an Act of State coupled with 
i t s i d e o l o g i c a l and p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s , and therefore 
amounted to mixed governmental a c t s which i n p r a c t i c a l terms 
d e f i e s easy s o l u t i o n and therefore could not e a s i l y be resolved 
4 5 H i g g i n s , op. c i t . , p. 268. 
4 6Yousef Nada v. C e n t r a l Bank of N i g e r i a , Dec. 2, 1975, 
P r o v i n c i a l Court of F r a n k f u r t ; National American Corp. v. Fed. 
Republic of N i g e r i a (1978) 448 F.Supp. 622; I Congreso del 
Partido (1981) 3 WLR 328. A l l the n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n 
c u r r e n t l y i n p l a c e a l s o r e j e c t e d the purpose t e s t . 
4 7 I Congreso d e l Partido (per Lord Wilberforce) House of 
Lords (1983) AC 244, p. 268. Here i t would appear the learned 
judge was t r y i n g to argue the p r i v a t e / p u b l i c law d i s t i n c t i o n . 
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simply through the proposed d i s t i n c t i o n ? The t r u t h of the 
matter i s tha t although comparative case law on s t a t e immunity 
i s growing i n the West toward the r e c o g n i t i o n of r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity, the reasons advanced i n i t s support appear weak or 
t o t a l l y misconceived for municipal court judges and p u b l i c i s t s 
seemed to have erected an imaginary t a r g e t to debunk as a means 
of j u s t i f y i n g the d i s t i n c t i o n between acts jure gestionis and 
acts jure imperii, coupled with the t h e o r e t i c a l and e l u s i v e 
p r i v a t e and p u b l i c law d i s t i n c t i o n s w e l l entrenched i n the 
p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s on the continent of Europe. 
One important development i n recent times i s t h a t the 
purpose t e s t has been introduced i n t o the present d r a f t a r t i c l e s 
of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission, which are c u r r e n t l y being 
considered by the 6th Legal Committee of the U.N., with the 
ulti m a t e goal of being accepted as a t r e a t y t e x t . The reason 
f o r the i n c l u s i o n of the purpose t e s t seemed to be based on 
T h i r d World i n t e r e s t a r t i c u l a t i o n r e s p e c t i n g the v a r i e d 
a c t i v i t i e s t h a t would have to be performed by governments i n 
A f r i c a , A s i a and L a t i n America i n order to promote economic 
development. But i t would appear t h i s development towards the 
a p p l i c a t i o n of the purpose t e s t i s not an i s o l a t e d phenomenon. 
Thus although c i v i l law countries such as Belgium and I t a l y must 
be c r e d i t e d f or the introduction of the r e s t r i c t e d immunity i n t o 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, however, i n recent times c o u n t r i e s such as 
France and I t a l y which have accepted the nature t e s t and 
r e j e c t e d the purpose t e s t because i t i s more v i a b l e and r u l e 
s p e c i f i c , have a l l at l e a s t taken a walk backwards to r e c o n s i d e r 
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the merits of the purpose t e s t i n c e r t a i n unique c a s e s . France, 
for example, took the l e a d i n Guggenheim v. State of Vietnam 4 8 i n 
which the Court of C a s s a t i o n r u l e d t h a t immunity be granted on 
the strength of the purpose t e s t because the s a l e of c i g a r e t t e s 
to the defendant s t a t e , which was used by i t s defence forces, 
f a l l s i n t o the domain of a c t a jure imperii. A s i m i l a r r u l e was 
again followed i n E n t e r p r i s e Pengon v. Government des E t a t s -
U n i i s 4 9 i n which the same court r u l e d t h a t immunity be accorded 
to the defendant on the a u t h o r i t y of the purpose t e s t . However, 
i n Spanish S t a t e v. S o c i e t e Anonyne del Hotel George V, 5 0 which 
involved s i m i l a r i s s u e s , the court r e j e c t e d the purpose t e s t 
argument, thus t h i s time embracing the nature t e s t as the 
appropriate t e s t i n the s a i d case. France, t h e r e f o r e , as can be 
gathered from the above d e c i s i o n s , seemed open to the 
a p p l i c a t i o n of the purpose t e s t where i t i s c l e a r such a t e s t 
w i l l be the b e s t way of promoting j u s t i c e . 
I t a l i a n c o u r t s i n r e c e n t times have a l s o followed the 
French example where as a matter of p r i n c i p l e , though perhaps 
for d i f f e r e n t j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l reasons, have considered the 
purpose t e s t , 5 1 i n some unique cases i n deciding whether to grant 
4 8 (1961) 44 ILR 74. 
4 9 (1973) 45 ILR 82. 
5 0 (1973) 65 ILR 61. I n 1991 French courts r e i t e r a t e d t h e i r 
p o s i t i o n i n S o c i e t e Euroequipement v. Centre European de l a 
C a i s s e de S t a b i l i s a t i o n e t de Soutien des productions a g r i c o l e s 
de l a Cote d ' l v o i r e , T r i b u n a l of Instance, Pans France: Feb. 
1991, by A. Mahiou i n 118 JD1 408 (1991); S i e u r Mouracade v. 
Yamen i n 119 JD1 398 (1992). 
5 1 A s s o c i a t i o n of I t a l i a n Knights of the Order of Malta v. 
P i c c o l i (1974) 65 I L R 308. 
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immunity or not. I t would be argued, however, t h a t t h i s t r e n d 
of applying the purpose t e s t as a prelude to determining as to 
whether to grant immunity or not, has not found favour with 
other European c o u n t r i e s . 3 2 I t i s submitted th a t no one would 
enter i n t o a contract, be i t a n a t u r a l person or a s t a t e , 
without f i r s t t h i n k i n g of the o b j e c t i v e s and purposes of the 
agreement and what i n concrete terms can be achieved out of the 
s a i d agreement. The purpose of an agreement, as a matter of 
l o g i c , may be s i n g l e d out as the reason why i n d i v i d u a l s and 
s t a t e s enter i n t o agreements duly pre d i c a t e d on consessus ad 
idem. But here the most important question to c o n s i d e r i s 
whether the scope of s t a t e a c t i v i t i e s can reasonably be narrowed 
down and properly categorised for the nature t e s t a n a l y s i s . 
This t a s k i s not easy and the court i n the Empire of I r a n case 
had some d i f f i c u l t i e s i n determining whether r e p a i r s to an 
embassy b u i l d i n g be c h a r a c t e r i s e d as f a l l i n g w i t h i n the domain 
of p r i v a t e law. Again i n Yousef Nada Establishment v. C e n t r a l 
Bank of N i g e r i a , 5 3 the court reasoned along the same l i n e t h a t 
the opening of a l e t t e r of c r e d i t by the C e n t r a l Bank was not a 
p u b l i c a c t but a p r i v e law a c t i v i t y but f a i l e d to o f f e r an 
adequate a n a l y s i s respecting the l e g a l s t a t u s of the C e n t r a l 
Bank. I n f a c t , the d e c i s i o n was based on c o n j e c t u r e because the 
"Empire of I r a n Case (1963) 45 ILR 57, 80; Arab Republic of 
Egypt v. C i n e t e l e v i s i o n I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e g i s t e r e d T r u s t (1979) 65 
ILR 425 431; A Limited v. B Bank and Bank of X, 31 J u l y 1996, 
Court of Appeal U.K. (1992) C o n s t i t u t i o n a l FCourt, Candor v. 
F i l v e r n v. M i n i s t e r of J u s t i c e (ILR 101 p. 394. 
5 3Dec. 2 (1975), P r o v i n c i a l Court of F r a n k f u r t . 
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status of the C e n t r a l could not be determined but simply 
presumed or der i v e d from l o c a l data, not the l e a s t r e f l e c t i v e of 
stat e p r a c t i c e or customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. In I Congreso de 
Partido, the Law Lords made the attempt to follow the p r i v a t e 
law and p u b l i c law d i s t i n c t i o n i n order to determine the i s s u e s 
t h e r e i n presented, but had d i f f i c u l t i e s and th e r e f o r e d i f f e r e d 
c o n s t r u c t i v e l y on i s s u e s r e s p e c t i n g the Marble I s l a n d s . The Law 
Lords had d i f f i c u l t i e s i n d e a l i n g with the Marble I s l a n d s 
because as may be r e c a l l e d , Cuba and the cargo owners did not 
have any c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p as to warrant the p u b l i c and 
pr i v a t e d i s t i n c t i o n . I n e x p l a i n i n g the i s s u e s surrounding the 
Marble I s l a n d s , Lord W i l b e r f o r c e argued thus: 
"The R e p u b l i c of Cuba never entered i n t o these 
operations. The c a p t a i n d i d not purport to a c t on i t s b e h a l f . 
I t s a c t i o n s were confirmed t o d i r e c t i n g t r a n s f e r of the sugar to 
North Vietnam, and to the enactment of Law No. 1256 (which f r o z e 
and block C h i l e a n a s s e t s . A l l of t h i s was done i n a 
governmental c a p a c i t y : any a t t a c k upon i t s a c t i o n s must c a l l i n 
question i t s a c t s as a s o v e r e i g n s t a t e . . . . I cannot agree 
t h a t there was ever any p u r e l y commercial o b l i g a t i o n upon the 
Republic of Cuba or any b i n d i n g commercial o b l i g a t i o n . " 5 4 
In Congreso, provided a good example where the a c t of s t a t e 
doctrine overlaps with the d o c t r i n e of s t a t e immunity thus 
giving r i s e to mixed a c t i v i t i e s of s t a t e s which i n r e a l i t y are 
not e a s i l y amenable to the commercial and non-commercial 
d i s t i n c t i o n of s t a t e a c t i v i t i e s . I t i s important to note that 
general i n t e r n a t i o n a l law does not support any d i s t i n c t i o n 
between immune and non-immune t r a n s a c t i o n s , thus the whole idea 
i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y based and h i g h l y a r b i t r a r y without any 
5 4 I Congrego d e l P a r t i d o (1983) AC per Lord Wilberforce, pp. 
271-72. 
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foundation. That i s why f o r some time now courts have found i t 
d i f f i c u l t to grapple with the issue of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between 
acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis. 
The most important question to ask. at t h i s stage of the 
study i s , when does a s t a t e stop a c t i n g as a p u b l i c person and 
thus r e s i g n s i t s e l f unto the market place c l e a r l y c lothed with 
the s t a t u s of a p r i v a t e trade? In other words, has the s t a t e 
acted as a p r i v a t e person because i t has embarked on the 
management of an industry, or entered into an agreement to buy 
goods, or have i t s embassy repaired? The C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Court 
of the German Federal Republic i n the Empire of I r a n case r u l e d 
t h a t : 
"This court has t h e r e f o r e examined the argument t h a t the 
con c l u s i o n of the c o n t r a c t for r e p a i r i s to be regarded as a 
non-sovereign f u n c t i o n of the foreign s t a t e , and has accepted 
t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n as c o r r e c t . I t i s obvious t h a t the c o n c l u s i o n 
of a c o n t r a c t of t h i s kind does not f a l l w i t h i n the e s s e n t i a l 
sphere of s t a t e immunity. I t does not depend on whether the 
co n c l u s i o n of the c o n t r a c t was necessary f o r the r e g u l a r 
t r a n s a c t i o n of the embassy's a f f a i r s and t h e r e f o r e stood i n a 
re c o g n i s a b l e r e l a t i o n s h i p with the sovereign f u n c t i o n s of the 
sending s t a t e . " 5 5 
The German court i n i t s reasoning c l e a r l y followed a t e s t 
where emphasis was l a i d on whether the a c t i n i s s u e could be 
performed by an i n d i v i d u a l or such an act only f a l l s w i t h i n the 
domain of p u b l i c a u t h o r i t y . This t e s t appears to have been 
followed elsewhere, 5 6 and i n I Congreso del Partido, but Lord 
5 5 (1963) B Verf GE 16, 45 ILR 57. 
5 6Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of N i g e r i a (1977) 
IQB 529; Hispanio America Mercantil SA v. C e n t r a l Bank of 
N i g e r i a (1979) 2 LLR 277; Consorzio Agrario d i T r i p o l i t a n i a v. 
Federazione I t a l i a n o Consorzi Agrari G u i s t i z i a C i v i l e (1967) 1. 
972-975; D i t t a Companione v. D i l t a P e t i Nitrogenmuvek (1972) n. 
3368 1 s t Sess. 
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Wilberforce i n h i s judgment d i d not t o t a l l y r e j e c t the u t i l i t y 
of the purpose t e s t as was e a r l i e r on i n d i c a t e d i n the claim 
against the Empire of I r a n case. The aim of the p r i v a t e and 
public law d i s t i n c t i o n i s to help i d e n t i f y which act i s 
governmental or non-governmental. I s the s a i d approach 
s a t i s f a c t o r y ? The answer i s i n the negative. Perhaps i t could 
be applied with success i n simple cases where the d i s t i n c t i o n i s 
straightforward, while i n a more complicated case the t e s t would 
simply f a l l apart thus s a c r i f i c i n g the need f o r j u s t i c e . S t ates 
perform v a r i e d and i n t e r r e l a t e d a c t i v i t i e s and t h e r e f o r e t h e i r 
a c t i v i t i e s cannot simply be d e r i v e d from an incongruous set of 
events, one commercial and the other governmental. I n other 
words, i t i s hard to simply compartmentalise the a c t i v i t i e s of 
s t a t e s as a prelude to determining whether to grant immunity or 
not. The weakness i n c h a r a c t e r i s i n g the a c t i v i t i e s of s t a t e s 
became apparent i n the Uganda Co. (Holdings) Ltd. v. the 
Government of Uganda, 5 7 when the d o c t r i n e of a c t of s t a t e 
overlapped with the d o c t r i n e of r e l a t i v e immunity. Donaldson J 
i n h i s judgment o f f e r e d the f o l l o w i n g e x p l a n a t i o n : 
"Even i f the d e c i s i o n i n the Trendtex case had a p p l i e d , 
the a p p l i c a t i o n would s t i l l have been determined i n favour of 
the defendants s i n c e the l i t i g a t i o n would have i n v o l v e d the 
court i n e x p r e s s i n g an o p i n i o n on the meaning and e f f e c t of the 
Uganda l e g i s l a t i o n i n a s u i t to which the government of t h a t 
s t a t e was a p a r t y and i t c o u l d not be h e l d t h a t the r e s t r i c t i v e 
doctrine of sovereign immunity extended t h i s f a r . " 5 8 
"(1979) 1 Lloyds Rept 481. 
5 8 I b i d . a t pp. 487-488. 
422 
Donaldson, i t would appear, simply did not f i n d p e r s u a s i v e the 
p a s s i n g of judgment on Ugandan l e g i s l a t i o n . A somewhat s i m i l a r 
problem was a l s o encountered i n Czarnikow Ltd. v. Rolimpex, 5 9 
where a P o l i s h government p o l i c y adversely a f f e c t e d a c o n t r a c t 
purportedly signed with a foreign p r i v a t e e n t i t y . These 
problems show that the underlying fundamental b u i l d i n g block on 
which the concept of corpal civile was premised appeared to be 
flawed ab initio because a s t a t e i n r e a l i t y does not operate 
l i k e a n a t u r a l person. Judge Lauterpacht i n h i s s t u d i e s , 
although took i s s u e with the doctrine of absolute immunity 
argued t h a t : 
"The s t a t e n e v e r t h e l e s s a c t s as a p u b l i c person f o r the 
g e n e r a l purpose of the community as a whole. This a p p l i e s not 
only to the s t a t e s with a S o c i a l i s t economy where t r a d i n g or 
management of i n d u s t r y have become a p u b l i c function of the 
s t a t e , f o r the s t a t e always a c t s as a p u b l i c person. I t cannot 
a c t o t h e r w i s e . " 6 0 
Judge Fitzmaurice a l s o says "The t r u t h i s that a sovereign s t a t e 
does not cease to be a sovereign s t a t e because i t performs a c t s 
which a p r i v a t e c i t i z e n might perform. 6 1 O'Connell a l s o argues 
t h a t 
"Although t h e r e i s a marked tendency towards r e j e c t i n g 
the absolute r u l e as one of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, there i s s t i l l 
cogency i n the argument t h a t i t i s impossible to d i s t i n g u i s h 
between sovereign and non-sovereign a c t i v i t y , and t h a t the 
attempt to do so l e a d s i n t o a j u n g l e of l e g a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n s . " 6 2 
5 9 (1979) AC 351 House of Lords per Lord Wilberforce. 
6 0Lauterpacht, op. c i t . , p. 137. 
6 1 F i t z m a u r i c e , op. c i t . , p. 121. 
6 2See O'Connel, op c i t . , p. 846: Even today, one would be 
hard put to take i s s u e with Professor O'Connell's argument. 
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Fawcett i n h i s study of the l e g a l a s p e c t s of s t a t e t r a d i n g came 
to the same conclusions t h a t 
"The various d i s t i n c t i o n s made between acts jure imperii (actes 
de puissance publique) and a c t s jure gestionis (actes 
degestion), sovereign a c t s and non-sovereign a c t s , and the 
p u b l i c and the p r i v a t e c a p a c i t y of the s t a t e , a r e not adequate 
f o r c l a s s i f y i n g s t a t e t r a d i n g c o n t r a c t s , f o r the l i n e s of 
demarcation between the p o l i t i c a l and economic a c t i v i t i e s of 
s t a t e have become b l u r r e d and i t i s i n t h i s b orderland t h a t 
s t a t e trading f l o u r i s h e s . " 6 3 
The arguments po s i t e d by these s c h o l a r s have e q u a l l y been shared 
by Professor Fairman, 6 4 and Pro f e s s o r Hyde. 6 5 The p o s i t i o n of 
these d i s t i n g u i s h e d s c h o l a r s , however, run counter to the 
p o s i t i o n advocated by Lord Denning i n Trendtex and a l s o i n I 
Congreso at the Court of Appeal l e v e l thus: 
"When a sovereign chooses to go i n t o the markets of the 
w o r l d — j u s t l i k e an o r d i n a r y p r i v a t e s h i p owner f o r commercial 
purposes—then he c l o t h e s h i m s e l f i n the d r e s s of an o r d i n a r y 
ship's captain. He i s l i a b l e to be sued on h i s c o n t r a c t or f o r 
h i s wrongs i n the court of any country which has j u r i s d i c t i o n i n 
the cause. He cannot renounce the j u r i s d i c t i o n by a p l e a of 
66 
sovereign immunity. 
6 3See Fawcett, op. c i t . , p. 35. Pr o f e s s o r Fawcett's 
arguments are weighty and very convincing. 
6 4 (19 2 8) AJIL 22, pp. 569-74. 
65Hyde, op. c i t . 
6 6 (1980) 1 LLR 39. 
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Weller, L J , the other member of the two-man court 
r e s p e c t i n g the Cuban case, however, r u l e d otherwise by according 
immunity to Cuba. Although Lord Denning's approach i s w e l l 
taken, he f a i l e d to look beyond the nature of the contract as 
was done by Lord Wilberforce i n I Congreso at the House of 
Lords, and the d i f f i c u l t i e s normally a s s o c i a t e d with u n i l a t e r a l 
p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s taken w i t h i n the t e r r i t o r y of a sovereign 
s t a t e which i n turn has a f f e c t e d the con t r a c t u a l o b l i g a t i o n of 
the s t a t e . The heart of the argument i s that the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
of commercial a c t i v i t i e s of s t a t e s based on the lex fori 
p a t e n t l y conditioned only on the d i s t i n c t i o n between acta jure 
imperii and acta jure gestionis i s i l l - c o n c e i v e d and misleading 
and t h e r e f o r e does not purport to promote equity and s t a b i l i t y 
as proponents of the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity have advanced or made 
us to b e l i e v e . I n other words, the curren t approach followed by 
some c o u r t s i s not r e f l e c t i v e of customary law and ther e f o r e 
could l e a d to i n j u s t i c e . A f t e r a l l , sovereign s t a t e s do not 
venture i n t o the market with the ultimate aim of b l a t a n t l y 
v i o l a t i n g the terms of a given commercial agreement. 
The concern of most T h i r d World countries i s tha t the 
approach used i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g commercial a c t i v i t i e s from non-
commercial a c t i v i t i e s of s t a t e s simply exceeds the acceptable 
requirement of j u r i s d i c t i o n a l competence and therefore may leave 
the defendant s t a t e a t the mercy of domestic courts. This 
reason, as al r e a d y s t a t e d elsewhere, prompted the Asian-African 
Legal C o n s u l t a t i v e Committee to vehemently a i r t h e i r grievances 
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a g a i n s t the United States and i t s courts f o r exceeding the 
acceptable bounds of j u r i s d i c t i o n a l competence. 6 7 
Experience so f a r has proved the above s c h o l a r s r i g h t , 
thus i f the whole i s s u e r e s p e c t i n g r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i s 
approached with regard to the r e a l i t i e s of l i f e , one would be 
s u r p r i s e d to f i n d out that s t a t e a c t i v i t y i s conditioned on 
ideology and the l e v e l of p o l i t i c a l and economic development i n 
a given country, hence the suggested s i n g l e t e s t i n r e s o l v i n g 
the problem i s woefully inadequate. Thus the throwing of 
support behind the doctrine of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity with a l l i t s 
drawbacks or demerits i s not j u s t i f i e d and t h e r e f o r e l i k e l y to 
c r e a t e disrepute or acrimony among s t a t e s and t h i s has been 
c l e a r l y shown i n recent cases which were l i t i g a t e d before 
E n g l i s h courts, i . e . , Alcorn v. the Republic of Colombia; I 
Congreso del Partido; Trendtex Corp. v. the C e n t r a l Bank of 
N i g e r i a ; L i t t r e l l v. United S t a t e s of America (No. 2) . Given 
the bent of thinking of both Lord Denning and Lord Wilberforce 
on the doctrine of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity, i t i s i n s t r u c t i v e to 
note t h a t these judges have a l l expressed some doubts about the 
cogency of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. Simply put, the a p p l i c a t i o n of 
the doctrine of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity r e q u i r e s the highest 
standards from the j u d i c i a r y . Anything s h o r t of t h a t could 
simply d i s t u r b the balance of j u s t i c e and thus c r e a t e hardship 
and i n j u s t i c e wholly detrimental to the defendant s t a t e . 
6 7See Doc No. AALCC 1M/87/1 Nov. 1987 f o r d e t a i l s r e s p e c t i n g 
the p r o t e s t . 
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Problems of Mixed A c t i v i t i e s of S t a t e s I n v o l v i n g P r i v a t e Traders 
I s i t expedient, or indeed f a i r i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, for 
municipal c o u r t s to u n i l a t e r a l l y impose a v e r t i c a l r u l e of law 
upon sovereign s t a t e s ? Some would p o s s i b l y answer i n the 
negative and thus may advise that municipal c o u r t s ' decisions be 
based on customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and c e r t a i n s e n s i t i v e 
p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s i n v o l v i n g the s t a t e could b e t t e r be resolved 
through d i p l o m a t i c c h a n n e l s . 6 8 I f t h i s approach be l o g i c a l l y 
grounded, then c e r t a i n s e n s i t i v e a c t i v i t i e s of s t a t e s must be 
c a r e f u l l y c h a r a c t e r i s e d and s i n g l e d out for diplomatic 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Goff J ' s argument i n I Congreso del Partido i n 
t h i s d i r e c t i o n can t h e r e f o r e be r i g h t l y described as weighty. 6 9 
But as i t may be r e c a l l e d , h i s cautionary note came i n a l i t t l e 
l a t e . 
Thus the main i s s u e before the House of Lords i n I 
Congreso d e l P a r t i d o was whether Cuba could c l a i m immunity for a 
purported breach of c o n t r a c t adversely a f f e c t e d by i t s executive 
order or p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n — a c t a jure imperii, even though the 
i n i t i a l c o n t r a c t i n question f a l l s i n t o the domain of acta jure 
gestionis. The case can s h o r t l y be r e l a t e d thus. In 1973 a 
Cuban s t a t e e n t e r p r i s e entered i n t o an agreement to s e l l sugar 
to a p r i v a t e company i n C h i l e . The s a l e c o n t r a c t d i r e c t e d that 
the sugar be d e l i v e r e d to the Chilean company between the months 
of January and October 1973, r e s p e c t i v e l y , and payment was to be 
6 a I Congreso, per Goff J (1978) 1 A l l ER p. 1192. 
6 9 I b i d . , p. 1192. 
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made i n U.S. d o l l a r s under a l e t t e r of c r e d i t . Both p a r t i e s 
agreed per the terms of the contract that E n g l i s h law must apply 
i n case of dispute. While the Marble I s l a n d s and the Playa 
Larga were i n the process of d e l i v e r i n g the sugar i n i s s u e , a 
right-wing group of s o l d i e r s took over power i n C h i l e , thus 
toppling the government of President Allende. At t h a t time 
Playa Larga was about to discharge i t s cargo a t V a l p a r a i s o , 
while Marble I s l a n d was i n the middle of the high s e a s . The 
government of Cuba abrogated the c o n t r a c t by ord e r i n g t h a t the 
sugar be d e l i v e r e d elsewhere. Playa Larga thus brought i t s 
cargo back to Cuba while the Marble I s l a n d s was ordered to 
d e l i v e r i t s cargo to North Vietnam. The s t o r y d i d not end here; 
the p l a i n t i f f s who were the r i g h t f u l owners of the sugar i n 
question i n s t i t u t e d a s u i t against I Congreso, a s h i p owned by 
Cuba, then docked i n England f or conversion and detinue. 
A c a r e f u l a n a l y s i s of I Congreso shows i t has a l o t i n 
common with Trendtex, De Sanches v. Banco C e n t r a l de Nicaragua 7 0 
and Banque C e n t r a l de l a Republique de Turquie v. Weston 
Compagnie de Finance e t d'Investissement S.A.,71 f o r a l l these 
cases involved mixed s t a t e a c t i v i t i e s s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l a t e d to 
p r i v a t e t r a d e r s . In I Congreso, Cuba was s u c c e s s f u l a t the 
t r i a l l e v e l , however, Lord Denning and Waller L . J . were 
deadlocked on the is s u e of whether to grant immunity to Cuba or 
not. This was not an easy case, but on appeal the House of 
7 0(1985) 770 F.2d 1385. 
7 1 (1978) BGE 1104 l a 367 ILR 65 (1984) p. 417. 
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Lords found f o r the p l a i n t i f f s , the owners of the sugar. Can i t 
be s a i d that Cuba b l a t a n t l y repudiated the co n t r a c t ? Or was the 
p l a i n r e p u d i a t i o n of the c o n t r a c t influenced by p o l i t i c a l 
ideology? C e r t a i n l y one may not be wrong i n t h i n k i n g i n those 
terms, s i n c e the coup d' e t a t was a l l e g e d l y supported by CIA 
agents i n which Allende was k i l l e d . The House of Lords avoided 
c e r t a i n c r u c i a l i s s u e s i n the case and thus l o s t the chance of 
c l e a r i n g the unbeaten path i n r e s o l v i n g t h i s d i f f i c u l t problem 
r e s p e c t i n g mixed a c t i v i t i e s of s t a t e s . Perhaps the most 
important question t h a t the Law Lords should have considered was 
which a c t i v i t y of Cuba i n regard to the contract should be given 
more weight i n r e s p e c t of according immunity. I s i t the breach 
or the nature of the t r a n s a c t i o n which must be considered? Or 
should one ask whether the a c t i v i t y i n i s s u e was p o l i t i c a l l y 
i n s p i r e d ? And whether a s t a t e having entered i n t o a commercial 
t r a n s a c t i o n can be immune by a subsequent p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n 
which might have been prompted by an unexpected event which cuts 
deep i n t o the i n i t i a l t r a n s a c t i o n ? 
I t i s submitted t h a t the a c t i v i t i e s of s t a t e s are numerous 
and while some may be d i r e c t l y governed by i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, 
others arguably f a l l o u t s i d e the confines of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law 
and t h e r e f o r e , i n order to be i n a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n to resol v e 
the problems t h a t were a s s o c i a t e d with I Congreso d e l Partido, a 
concerted e f f o r t should have been made to c a r e f u l l y d e l i m i t the 
scope of the power of the s t a t e e n t e r p r i s e qua the p o l i t i c a l 
d e c i s i o n t h a t was taken by Cuba. For i t i s hard to come up with 
reasons why Cuba would e n t e r i n t o a commercial t r a n s a c t i o n with 
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the u l t i m a t e aim of breaking i t with impunity j u s t to punish the 
p r i v a t e t r a d e r . Thus there must be a hidden motive behind the 
order requesting t h a t the sugar be d e l i v e r e d elsewhere and t h i s 
motive prima facie was p o l i t i c a l l y based, for Cuba, being a 
s o c i a l i s t country, was not ready to work with a p r i v a t e e n t i t y 
operating under a right-wing m i l i t a r y government of C h i l e . 
A f t e r a l l , any f l a g r a n t d i s r e s p e c t of i t s o b l i g a t i o n s would 
destroy i t s c r e d i b i l i t y . Thus i f there had not been a coup 
d'etat i n C h i l e the sugar would have been d e l i v e r e d without any 
problems inasmuch as Allende's government was a l s o s o c i a l i s t . 
These underlying f a c t s might have prompted Goff J . to r u l e t h a t 
"The c l a i m s would be more a p p r o p r i a t e l y d e a l t w i t h 
through di p l o m a t i c channels than through the c o u r t s of another 
country. Such an a c t i s an actus jure imperii; i t i s not j u s t 
t h at the purpose or motive of the a c t i s to s e r v e the purposes 
of the s t a t e , but that the a c t i s of i t s own c h a r a c t e r a 
governmental a c t , as opposed to an a c t which any p r i v a t e c i t i z e n 
can perform. " 7 2 
Furthermore, i t should be borne i n mind t h a t Cuba would not do 
anything out of the blue j u s t to f l o u t the s a i d commercial 
agreement, f o r such a decision w i l l c e r t a i n l y have a n e g a t i v e 
repercussion on i t s trade r e l a t i o n s with p r i v a t e t r a d e r s and 
p o s s i b l y other s t a t e s . And i t i s p o s s i b l e a d e c i s i o n of t h a t 
nature would i n v i t e condemnation and p r o t e s t from many s t a t e s . 
Thus Cuba, mindful of the p a i n f u l U.S. embargo i n p l a c e , 7 3 would 
7 2 (1978) 1 A l l ER p. 1192. 
7 3The U.S. during the cold war period put i n p l a c e an 
embargo ag a i n s t Cuba i n order to bring down the s o c i a l i s t 
government of F i d e l Castro. I t must be a l s o s t a t e d t h a t Cuba i s 
a c i v i l law country but refuses to have anything to do w i t h 
C a p i t a l i s m s i n c e 1958. I t s p o s i t i o n r e s p e c t i n g the events which 
occurred i n C h i l e i s understandable given i t s S o c i a l i s t 
p o l i c i e s . 
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not go to the extent of d e s t r o y i n g i t s a b i l i t y and reputation i n 
obtaining c r e d i t from f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s i n other Western 
nations. Thus, i n the l i g h t of the Cold War, i t would appear 
the p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n i n question was taken i n the n a t i o n a l 
i n t e r e s t of Cuba and nothing e l s e . For during the course of the 
coup d'etat the C h i l e a n m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s i n s t i t u t e d a 
diplomatic, consular and commercial blockade, thus c a r e l e s s l y 
i n t e r r u p t i n g the maritime t r a n s p o r t l i n k between C h i l e and Cuba 
and for t h a t matter, the world, i n order to f i r m l y consolidate 
t h e i r newly won power. I f these arguments be w e l l founded, then 
w i l l i t be proper to question why Cuba behaved the way i t did? 
I t i s submitted t h a t although Lord Wilberforce was not t o t a l l y 
impressed by the currency of the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity, i t would 
appear some aspects of the s a i d p r i n c i p l e found i t s way i n t o the 
judgment he handed down i n I Congreso. True, the contextual 
approach appears a l l - e m b r a c i n g and appealing, but seemed to f a l l 
f a r short of providing the r i g h t answers to the problems r a i s e d 
i n t h i s complicated case. 
F i r s t , the i n i t i a l agreement f o r the s a l e of the sugar of 
which payment was to be made i n U.S. d o l l a r s under a l e t t e r of 
c r e d i t was prima facie a commercial endeavour. But the d e c i s i o n 
of the Cuban government to abrogate the s a l e c o n t r a c t by an 
executive order because the Allende government was toppled was 
purely a p o l i t i c a l a c t , which ex hypothesi cannot be disputed. 
But the quest to c h a r a c t e r i s e these a c t i v i t i e s according to the 
p r i n c i p l e s of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity, i . e . , acta jure imperii and 
acta jure gestionis, i s defeated by the f a c t that these 
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a c t i v i t i e s were i n e x t r i c a b l y intertwined without one or the 
other arguably having an independent d i r e c t e f f e c t on the 
i n i t i a l t r a n s a c t i o n . I n t h i s case, are we t a l k i n g about the 
breach or the nature of the i n i t i a l t r a n s a c t i o n which, i f 
c a r e f u l l y analysed, c r e a t e s an unseemingly hidden consequence i n 
r e s p e c t of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity, meaning "that once a t r a d e r , 
always a t r a d e r . " Can i t therefore be argued th a t once a s t a t e 
has entered i n t o a commercial arena, i t cannot get i t s e l f out of 
i t by genuinely claiming immunity? And i f so, which s t a t e 
a c t i v i t y can be designated as more important? I s i t the i n i t i a l 
a c t i v i t y which must be c h a r a c t e r i s e d or the subsequent p o l i t i c a l 
d e c i s i o n i n res p e c t to the breach? Lord Wilberforce, as i t may 
be r e c a l l e d , d i d not go as f a r as to consider some of the i s s u e s 
h e r e i n presented, but at the same time provided an argument, i f 
c a r e f u l l y read, d e t r a c t s from Lord Denning's p o s i t i o n i n the 
Trendtex, thus exposing the f a l l a c y i n the arguments made i n 
r e j e c t i n g N i g e r i a ' s plea f o r immunity i n that case. 
" I f one s t a t e chooses to l a y down by enactment c e r t a i n 
l i m i t s , t h a t i s by i t s e l f no evidence that those l i m i t s are 
g e n e r a l l y accepted by s t a t e s . And p a r t i c u l a r l y enacted l i m i t s 
may be (or presumed to be) not i n c o n s i s t e n t with general 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w — t h e l a t t e r being i n a s t a t e of u n c e r t a i n t y — 
without a f f o r d i n g evidence what t h a t law i s . I s h a l l make no 
f u r t h e r r e f e r e n c e to t h i s E n g l i s h s t a t u t e , nor for s i m i l a r 
reasons to the analogous United States s t a t u t e passed i n 1976." 7 4 
The argument advanced i n the above passage i s not at a l l 
d i s s i m i l a r to the argument made by Stephenson L J i n Trendtex. 7 5 
Thus although Stephenson L J ' s argument appears seemingly i n some 
7 4 (1981) 3 WLR 328, 334. 
7 5 (19 7 7 ) 2 WLR 356; Court of Appeal per Stephenson L J . 
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respects to have been overlooked, i t undoubtedly i n r e a l i t y 
throws l i g h t on the p l a c e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i n 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, which he a n a l y s e d as l e s s grounded i n the 
p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s and t h e r e f o r e l a c k s opinio juris, and that 
the doctrine be a p p l i e d only i f t h e r e i s evidence to a t t e s t to 
the f a c t that i t s currency i s not doubtful i n the p r a c t i c e of 
s t a t e s . 
Lord Wilberforce i n f a c t s t a r t e d on a good footing, thus 
following the contextual approach. I t would appear, however, 
that he f i n a l l y r e j e c t e d Cuba's p l e a t h a t i t be granted immunity 
i n respect of the Playa Larga, by reasoning t h a t the d e c i s i o n by 
Cuba to order Playa Larga not to d e l i v e r the remainder of the 
cargo although could apparently be construed as p o l i t i c a l and 
non-commercial, the s a i d a c t i o n d i d not q u a l i f y as a c t a jure 
imperii because i n r e a l i t y the Republic of Cuba had acted as the 
owner of the ship, r a t h e r than an independent s t a t e making a 
sovereign d e c i s i o n . Such an argument, however, i s f a r from 
c l e a r . The learned judge thus followed the nature t e s t i n s t e a d 
of the purpose t e s t i n a r r i v i n g a t t h i s d e c i s i o n . I f he had 
followed the purpose t e s t , the r e s u l t c e r t a i n l y would have been 
d i f f e r e n t as f a r as the Playa Larga was concerned. 
Lord Wilberforce and Lord Edmund-Davies, however, took a 
more conservative approach i n r e s p e c t of the Marble I s l a n d s , 
because the cargo owners never entered i n t o any commercial 
agreement with Cuba. 
"The c l a i m a g a i n s t the R e p u b l i c of Cuba i n r e s p e c t of the 
Marble I s l a n d s was not a c l a i m i n c o n t r a c t , s i n c e the Republic 
was not a p a r t y to any of the c o n t r a c t s i n question as i t had 
only acquired ownership of the v e s s e l a f t e r the b i l l s of 
lading had been n e g o t i a t e d to the C h i l e a n p u r c h a s e r s . 
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U n l i k e the case of the Playa Larga, the Republic had not entered 
i n t o any commercial t r a n s a c t i o n a t a l l . I t s involvement was 
confirmed to o r d e r i n g Mambisa, not to d e l i v e r the cargo, and 
then d i s p o s i n g of the cargo i n North Vietnam, both of which a c t s 
were of a governmental c h a r a c t e r . " 7 6 
The other three law l o r d s , on the other hand, however, were not 
persuaded by the s p e c i f i c i s s u e s respecting the Marble I s l a n d s 
and Cuba's p l e a for immunity. But at l e a s t i t would have been 
appropriate i f the law l o r d s had considered the c h a r a c t e r of the 
c o n t r a c t i n i t s primary and absolute terms v i s - a - v i s Cuba's 
a c t i v i t i e s which i n essence cannot be s i n g u l a r l y construed as 
r e p r e s e n t i n g a commercial a c t i v i t y , a t l e a s t i n the case of the 
Marble I s l a n d s and secondly, because the d e c i s i o n by Cuba not to 
d e l i v e r the Congo was an a c t of s t a t e which takes us unto 
another u n s e t t l e d area of the law. 
The judgment of the law l o r d s seemed open to c r i t i c i s m on 
many f r o n t s inasmuch as t h e i r withholding or granting of 
immunity was p r e d i c a t e d on the modalities of r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity and on how the Cuban government went about p o l i t i c a l l y 
i n abrogating the i n i t i a l c o n t r a c t s for the c a r r i a g e and the 
s a l e of the sugar, thus f i r s t s t a r t i n g off on the concept of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity and then moving the argument i n t o the 
c o n t e x t u a l domain. Furthermore, one may a l s o argue t h a t the 
approach was flawed i n some r e s p e c t s because i n r e a l i t y not a l l 
s t a t e a c t i v i t i e s can be conditioned on a hybrid nature of 
e v e n t s — o n e commercial and the other governmental. 
/ 6 I I n Congreso per Lord Wilberforce and Edmund-Davies, 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Legal Rep. (1983) p. 308. 
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In Trendtex, for example, there was s u f f i c i e n t evidence to 
support Nigeria's a c t i o n , t h a t i t was because of an i n t e r n a l 
c r i s i s which prompted the f e d e r a l government to i n s t i t u t e the 
import con t r o l s . Thus i f t h i s evidence be w e l l founded and 
c r e d i b l e , then was i t f a i r when immunity was denied to Nig e r i a ? 
Or were the j u s t i f i e d expectations of the p r i v a t e t r a d e r much 
greater than the welfare of the c i t i z e n s of N i g e r i a ? The answer 
l o g i c a l l y must be i n the negative s i n c e t h e r e was a genuine 
c r i s i s of shortage of e s s e n t i a l commodities i n N i g e r i a because 
the ports were congested with a multitude of s h i p s unloading 
larg e q u a n t i t i e s of cement which s e v e r e l y l i m i t e d the 
importation of other e s s e n t i a l commodities i n t o the country. 
A s i m i l a r argument could a l s o be advanced on behalf of 
Cuba, since the right-wing m i l i t a r y r u l e r s of C h i l e d i d c l o s e 
the ports and severed diplomatic r e l a t i o n s with Cuba because of 
the l a t e President Allende's f r a t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p with 
President Castro. And i t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e t h a t i f the sugar 
were d e l i v e r e d i t could have been l o o t e d by s o l d i e r s or other 
right-wing coup supporters. 
I t i s not that easy to deal w i t h mixed a c t i v i t i e s of 
s t a t e s as regards commercial t r a n s a c t i o n s with the p r i v a t e 
t r a d e r . And the a p p l i c a t i o n of the d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity to these problems simply confuses and exacerbates the 
already thorny sovereign immunity controversy. The Law Lords, 
as can c l e a r l y be seen, were trapped i n proving too much by 
t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s to follow the m a n i f e s t l y d e f i c i e n t doctrine of 
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r e s t r i c t i v e immunity which has so f a r gained ground i n the 
p r a c t i c e of Western c o u n t r i e s . 7 7 
A somewhat s i m i l a r case i n v o l v i n g mixed a c t i v i t i e s was 
decided by an American court i n which immunity was granted i n 
view of the f a c t t h a t a p r i v a t e r i g h t was v i o l a t e d . Thus i n De 
Sanchez v. Banco C e n t r a l de Nicaragua, 7 8 Mrs. Josefine Neyarro de 
Sanchez, a payee of a cheque i s s u e d by General Somozo's 
government, i . e . , i t s C e n t r a l Bank, brought an action against 
the new government t h a t toppled Somozo's government for having 
placed a stop-payment order on the s a i d cheque. The Nicaraguan 
C e n t r a l Bank thus sought to challenge the s u i t , pleading that i t 
be granted summary judgment. Morey L Sear J granted the C e n t r a l 
Bank the motion i t prayed f o r . On appeal Goldberg J ruled t h a t 
the bank's i s s u a n c e of a cheque to i t s n a t i o n a l was acta jure 
imperii and not acta jure gestionis and t h a t FSIA [28 US CH 1605 
(a) (2)] d i d not apply. I t was f u r t h e r s t a t e d that Mrs. Sanchez, 
being a Nicaraguan n a t i o n a l , negated the e f f e c t of the FSIA 
exception. The payee's conversion c l a i m was a l s o mutatis 
mutandis d i s m i s s e d . 
I t i s not c l e a r as to whether p u b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l law 
p r i n c i p l e s do govern disputes between the s t a t e and i t s own 
n a t i o n a l s regarding the i s s u e s a l l u d e d to above, unless, of 
course, t h e r e i s evidence of r e c k l e s s disregard for human 
r i g h t s . Thus i f an i n j u r y i s caused by a s t a t e to i t s own 
7 7 L a u t e r p a c h t , op. c i t . ; S i n c l a i r , The Law of Sovereign 
Immunity—Recent Developments (1980) Hague R e c u e i l . 
7 8(1985) 770 F.2d 1385. 
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n a t i o n a l beyond i t s own borders, e.g., i f the i n j u r y occurred i n 
another s t a t e , the s t a t e i n which the i n j u r y o c c urred c e r t a i n l y 
w i l l have an i n t e r e s t i f there i s a prima facie evidence that 
the s a i d i n j u r y a f f e c t e d i t s i n t e r e s t or t e r r i t o r i a l 
sovereignty. In t h i s respect, the lex loci delicti would be 
more important than the n a t i o n a l i t y of the i n j u r e d person. So 
i n essence the f a c t that Mrs. Sanchez claimed t h a t her i n j u r y 
occurred i n the United States seemed not to h e l p her case s i n c e 
the d e c i s i o n to stop payment on her cheque was taken i n 
Nicaragua i n order to prevent a c r i t i c a l shortage of foreign 
exchange during a period of p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y i n the 
country. The p o s i t i o n of the court would have been d i f f e r e n t i f 
Nicaragua had attempted to take Mrs. Sanchez's r e a l property i n 
the United States, which as a matter of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law simply 
amounts to blatant i n t e r f e r e n c e with the a u t h o r i t y of the United 
S t a t e s . 7 9 This, however, i s not the case, f o r the d e c i s i o n to 
put a stop on the payment of the cheque i n q u e s t i o n i s c l e a r l y a 
d i s c r e t i o n a r y power which f a l l s w i t h i n the domain of the 
sovereign authority of Nicaragua. Thus Banco C e n t r a l had the 
a u t h o r i t y as a s u b s i d i a r y organ of the s t a t e to take d e c i s i o n s 
i n p r e s e r v i n g Nicaragua's foreign exchange r e s e r v e s by stopping 
payment on the cheque, i n the l i g h t of the acute shortage of 
foreign currency i n the country. C e r t a i n l y the problems of 
mixed a c t i v i t i e s of s t a t e s i n r e s p e c t of s t a t e immunity i s f a r 
from s e t t l e d and the only way of g i v i n g s t a t e s some l a t i t u d e of 
7 9Akehurst, op. c i t . ; Mann, op. c i t . (on the question of 
j u r i s d i c t i o n ) . 
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freedom to adequately deal with emergency s i t u a t i o n s without 
being open to s u i t i s to allow what some may r e f e r to as 
" d i s c r e t i o n a r y f u n c t i o n exemption" to sovereign s t a t e s . 8 0 Thus 
the d e c i s i o n by Nicaragua to stop payment on Mrs. Sanchez's 
cheque could simply be c h a r a c t e r i s e d as a n a t i o n a l p o l i c y which 
i s immune from s u i t because i t was made at the highest l e v e l of 
government i n order to avoid economic chaos i n Nicaragua. Thus, 
i t appears t h a t the court was r i g h t i n r u l i n g i n favour of the 
r e p u b l i c of Nicaragua. Mrs. Sanchez should have therefore 
r e l i e d on l o c a l remedy. 
Can the same argument, i . e . , the " d i s c r e t i o n a r y function 
exception," be made i n Trendtex, Yousef Nada, and perhaps i n 
Behring I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n c . v. Imperial because of i n t e r n a l 
c r i s i s ( i . e . , emergency s i t u a t i o n s ) ? Or can a sovereign s t a t e 
simply plead f r u s t r a t i o n , or force majeure to avoid l i a b i l i t y ? 
I n f a c t , the c o u r t s have not been c l e a r on these matters and 
u n t i l such time t h a t these i s s u e s are c l e a r l y d e a l t with, the 
sovereign immunity controversy w i l l remain, thus making i t 
d i f f i c u l t f o r the goal of c o d i f i c a t i o n to be achieved. 
The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission's d r a f t a r t i c l e s on 
j u r i s d i c t i o n a l immunities of s t a t e s and t h e i r property c u r r e n t l y 
being c o n s i d e r e d by the 6th l e g a l committee simply did not 
consider these i s s u e s , i . e . , i n regard to mixed a c t i v i t i e s of 
8 0 A s s o c i a t i o n de Reclamantes v. United Mexican States (1983) 
DDC 561, F.Supp. 1190, 1198; Frolova v. USSR (N.D. I 11 1983), 
559 F.Supp. 358, 363. 
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s t a t e s . The s a i d argument can a l s o be made a g a i n s t a l l the 
n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n c u r r e n t l y i n p l a c e . 8 1 
The Continuing Problems of A r b i t r a t i o n 
A r b i t r a t i o n may be designated as one of the b e s t options 
i n r e s o l v i n g the controversy regarding p r i v a t e s u i t s a g a i n s t 
foreign s t a t e s before domestic courts. But before t h i s method 
would be acceptable to l i t i g a t i n g p a r t i e s , c e r t a i n e s s e n t i a l 
p r i n c i p l e s r e s p e c t i n g a r b i t r a t i o n must be c l e a r l y l a i d down i n 
order to promote a modicum of f a i r n e s s and s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i c e 
i n a given case. I t i s , however, appropriate to c o n s i d e r 
c e r t a i n p r e l i m i n a r y i s s u e s before considering these p r i n c i p l e s . 
The attempt at c o d i f i c a t i o n has so f a r produced i n some 
sense a considerable degree of u n c e r t a i n t y as regards 
a r b i t r a t i o n proceedings. And i n c i d e n t a l l y , s t a t e p r a c t i c e i s 
f a r from s e t t l e d . 8 2 I t i s i n s t r u c t i v e , however, to note tha t 
a r b i t r a t i o n i s not a new phenomenon nor a new approach i n 
s e t t l i n g d i s p u t e s . 8 3 But i t would seem that i n s p i t e of i t s long 
h i s t o r y , many a r b i t r a t o r s and judges s t i l l have an u n c e r t a i n 
grasp of the s a i d subject. 
The r o l e of domestic courts i n the enforcement of f o r e i g n 
a r b i t r a l awards may d i f f e r from case to case, depending, of 
8 1See for example the U.S. Act 1976, the U.K. Act 1978, and 
the Canadian Act 1982. 
8 2Schreuer, State Immunity--Some Recent Developments (1995) 
pp. 63-91. 
8 3Morris, op. c i t . , p. 132; I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law i n a Changing 
World (UN Pub 1963) p. 83. 
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course, however, on the exact terms incorporated into the 
a r b i t r a l c l a u s e . I n some cases a n a t i o n a l law would be 
c o n t r o l l i n g and t h e r e f o r e the l o c a l court as a matter of law 
must n e u t r a l l y a i d the process i f , for example, the a r b i t r a t i o n 
f a l l s c l e a r l y under the framework or the auspices of an agreed-
upon regime, e.g., the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Chamber of Commerce i n 
P a r i s , ICSID and perhaps the American A r b i t r a t i o n A s s o c i a t i o n . 8 4 
The most d i f f i c u l t aspect of a r b i t r a t i o n i s the problem of 
enforcement, indeed, the enforcement of a r b i t r a l awards poses 
more d i f f i c u l t i e s than the enforcement of f o r e i g n judgments 8 5 
because c e r t a i n i n t e r r e l a t e d p r i n c i p l e s do come i n t o play and 
these are: the v a l i d i t y of the agreement to a r b i t r a t e , the law 
t h a t must govern the proceedings r e l a t i n g to the a r b i t r a t i o n , 
the v a l i d i t y of the award and the f a c t o r s to consider to 
determine the f i n a l i t y of the award. 8 6 These p r i n c i p l e s , 
however, cannot be a p p l i e d without taking i n t o consideration 
c e r t a i n e s s e n t i a l r u l e s r e l a t i n g to the concept of j u r i s d i c t i o n 
i n p r i v a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l law which must a l s o be a p p l i e d to a i d 
the process. 
8 4See Schreuer, op. c i t . 
8 5Morris, op. c i t . , pp. 131-143; Richard B. L i l l i c h and 
Charles N. Brower ( e d s . ) , I n t e r n a t i o n a l A r b i t r a t i o n i n the 21st 
Century towards J u d i c i a l i z a t i o n and Uniformity 1994. Mann, 
State Contracts and I n t e r n a t i o n a l A r b i t r a t i o n (1967) X L I I BYIL 
1; C a r l s t o n , The P rocess of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A r b i t r a t i o n (1946); 
Steyn, A r b i t r a t i o n Law Reform—Towards a New A r b i t r a t i o n Act 
(1991) 6 I n t L Arb, Report 27; L a l i v e , The F i r s t "World Bank" 
A r b i t r a t i o n (Holiday Inns v. Morocco) Some Legal Problems (1980) 
51 BYIL 123. 
8 6Morris, op. c i t . ; L i l l i c h and Brower, op. c i t . , pp. 3-49. 
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The j u r i s d i c t i o n , for example, of an a r b i t r a t o r i s 
determined by the lex voluntatis or the agreement of the p a r t i e s 
to a r b i t r a t e . 8 7 This may take two d i s t i n c t i v e forms because the 
p a r t i e s can e i t h e r agree that t h e i r present or future d i s p u t e s 
be r e f e r r e d to a r b i t r a t i o n . Thus a contract may be formulated 
i n which an a r b i t r a t i o n clause i s i n s e r t e d to c a t e r f o r any 
d isputes that may a r i s e . In such a case, a r b i t r a t i o n w i l l be 
the ultimate end r e s u l t i n the r e s o l u t i o n of any d i f f e r e n c e s 
which may a r i s e between the p a r t i e s . 
An important question worth considering i s whether the 
mere agreement by a s t a t e to a r b i t r a t e with a p r i v a t e t r a d e r 
simply amounts to waiver of immunity i n which case a domestic 
court could e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n over the matter on the m e r i t s . 
Many courts i n f a c t d i f f e r on t h i s i s s u e , 8 8 perhaps because there 
i s no usus on the whole subject matter. So i n essence the f a c t 
t h a t a foreign s t a t e has i n p r i n c i p l e agreed to a r b i t r a t i o n does 
not mean that immunity i s automatically waived or abandoned 
which could thus give the p l a i n t i f f the power to sue before the 
l o c a l court without f i r s t considering the terms of the i n i t i a l 
c o n t r a c t to a r b i t r a t e . 8 9 Thus any r e j e c t i o n of the a r b i t r a t i o n 
agreement amounts to a v i o l a t i o n of the lex voluntatis and t h i s 
g i v e s the defendant s t a t e a v i a b l e defence e s p e c i a l l y when the 
8 7Morris, op. c i t . , 131-139. 
8 8Schreuer, op. c i t . , pp. 70-71; G. S u l l i v a n (1983) 18 Texas 
I L J , C; Simpson and Fox, I n t e r n a t i o n a l A r b i t r a t i o n (1959) pp. 
40-55. 
8 9Schreuer, op. c i t . , p. 70. 
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agreement to a r b i t r a t e i s v a l i d and the p a r t i e s have made a good 
e f f o r t on the meeting of the minds to choose the law t h a t w i l l 
govern the a r b i t r a t i o n proceedings. P a r t i e s t h e r e f o r e to 
a r b i t r a t i o n have the r i g h t to choose the law t h a t governs the 
agreement and the law t h a t governs the a r b i t r a t i o n proceedings, 9 0 
which means that i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t the law which i s s e l e c t e d 
to govern the a r b i t r a t i o n proceedings may be d i f f e r e n t from the 
law which governs the agreement to a r b i t r a t e . Thus i f p a r t i e s 
from country A agree to a r b i t r a t e i n country B, the law of 
country A would i n a t e c h n i c a l sense govern i s s u e s r e l a t i n g to 
the v a l i d i t y , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , and the e f f e c t of the a r b i t r a t i o n 
clause and i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t i e s the a r b i t r a t o r ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n , 9 1 
but the s upervisory j u r i s d i c t i o n f a l l s under the domain of 
country B. S i m i l a r l y , on the other hand, i f a sovereign s t a t e 
and a p r i v a t e e n t i t y f a i l to agree on the law r e s p e c t i n g the 
proceedings, then the l o c u s or the country i n which the 
a r b i t r a t i o n i s to take p l a c e a u t o m a t i c a l l y a p p l i e s i n the 
absence of any o b j e c t i o n s t h e r e t o . I n t h i s respect the law of 
the country with the most s i g n i f i c a n t or c l o s e connection would 
be designated as c o n t r o l l i n g , thus r e k i n d l i n g the thorny 
sovereign immunity controversy. 
A c a r e f u l study of n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n c u r r e n t l y i n place 
shows, however, t h a t the s u b j e c t of a r b i t r a t i o n seemed to be 
9 0Morris, op. c i t . , pp. 131-139. 
9 1 I b i d . 
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c a s u a l l y t r e a t e d . Under the U.K. Act of 1978, for example, 
a r b i t r a t i o n i s covered under Section 9, thus: 
" (1) Where a s t a t e has agreed i n w r i t i n g to submit a 
d i s p u t e which has a r i s e n , or may a r i s e , to a r b i t r a t i o n , the 
s t a t e i s not immune as r e s p e c t s proceedings i n the courts of the 
United Kingdom which r e l a t e to the a r b i t r a t i o n . 
(2) T h i s s e c t i o n has e f f e c t subject to any c o n t r a r y 
p r o v i s i o n i n the a r b i t r a t i o n agreement and does not apply to any 
a r b i t r a t i o n agreement between s t a t e s . " 9 2 
The South A f r i c a n Act Sec. 10, the Pakistan Ordinance Sec. 10 
and the Singapore Act Sec. 10 a l l follow i n p r i n c i p l e the 
m o d a l i t i e s of the U.K. Act of 1978. These a c t s are t h e r e f o r e 
almost the same, 9 3 with minor l i n g u i s t i c d i f f e r e n c e s . The 
A u s t r a l i a n Act Sec. 17 covers more ground i n r e s p e c t of 
s u p e r v i s o r y j u r i s d i c t i o n of a l o c a l court. S u r p r i s i n g l y , the 
United S t a t e s 1976 Act does not s p e c i f i c a l l y r e f e r to 
a r b i t r a t i o n but r a t h e r r e f e r s to the question of waiver of 
immunity, e i t h e r e x p l i c i t l y or by i m p l i c a t i o n . Section 1605, 
f o r example, can be s t a t e d thus: 
"(a) A f o r e i g n s t a t e s h a l l not be immune from the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of c o u r t s of the United States or of the s t a t e s i n 
any case: 
(1) i n which the f o r e i g n s t a t e has waived i t s immunity 
e i t h e r e x p l i c i t l y or by i m p l i c a t i o n , notwithstanding any 
withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign s t a t e may purport to 
e f f e c t i n accordance with the terms of the waiver." 
The Canadian Act, i n c i d e n t a l l y , does not contain any r e f e r e n c e 
to a r b i t r a t i o n . 9 4 Thus the general formulation of a r b i t r a t i o n 
9 ZSee The 1978 UK Act § (9) . 
9 3A c a r e f u l review of a l l these national l e g i s l a t i o n shows 
t h a t they do not d i f f e r a t a l l on t h i s very i s s u e . A good 
comparison would be h e l p f u l (e.g., the U.K. Act 1978 and t h a t of 
S e c t i o n 10 of the South A f r i c a n A c t ) . 
9 4See g e n e r a l l y the Canadian Act 1982. 
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provisions i n n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n without considering i n d e t a i l 
c e r t a i n s a l i e n t i s s u e s regarding the process of a r b i t r a t i o n has 
led to d i f f i c u l t i e s i n l i t i g a t i o n . 9 5 I n Ipitoode I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
SA v. Federal Republic of N i g e r i a , the court followed the 
command of the FSIA, § 1605(a) ( 2 ) , by r u l i n g that an agreement 
to a r b i t r a t e amounts to waiver of immunity. The same argument 
was made i n Maritime I n t e r n a t i o n a l Nominees Establishment v. The 
Republic of Guinea, but t h i s time, the argument was c a r r i e d a 
stage further i n r e s p e c t of the f a c t t h a t because the ICSID has 
i t s headquarters i n Washington, t h e r e was an intended nexus duly 
contemplated by the p a r t i e s t h a t U.S. c o u r t s must e x e r c i s e 
j u r i s d i c t i o n over the dispute without f i r s t taking steps to 
consider whether the p a r t i e s a r e agreed t h a t the same law must 
govern the a r b i t r a t i o n proceedings and the agreement to 
a r b i t r a t e , s ince one of the p a r t i e s to the a r b i t r a t i o n i s a 
p r i v a t e e n t i t y domiciled i n the U.S. and the other party, a 
sovereign s t a t e having absolute a u t h o r i t y w i t h i n i t s spheres of 
operation. Thus, i n t h i s case although the law r e s p e c t i n g the 
agreement to a r b i t r a t e might be c l e a r , arguably, however, i t 
would appear there was no agreement as regards which law must 
apply to the a r b i t r a t i o n proceedings. The reasoning followed by 
the court i n t h i s r espect t h e r e f o r e can be deprecated as f a u l t y 
and unbalanced. 
In Verlinden BV v. C e n t r a l Bank of N i g e r i a , 9 6 Texas Trading 
and M i l l i n g Corp., and the Chicago Bridge and I r o n Company 
9 5See L i l l i c h and Brower, op. c i t . , pp. 61-115; 223-275. 
9 6 (1980) SDNY 488 F.Supp. 1284. 
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c a s e s , however, i t would appear U.S. judges seemed to be 
showing some c l e a r grasp and a p p r e c i a t i o n of the d i f f i c u l t i e s 
a s s o c i a t e d with a r b i t r a t i o n and t h e r e f o r e ready to rethink t h e i r 
p o s i t i o n s r e s p e c t i n g the i n f e r r i n g of waiver of immunity from 
the agreement to a r b i t r a t e and thus moving to embrace the 
E n g l i s h p r a c t i c e i n t h i s area of the law, e.g., the U.K. Act of 
1978. The change of p o s i t i o n by American courts i s c l e a r l y 
evidenced i n P r a c t i c a l Concepts I n c . v. The Republic of B o l i v i a , 
where the court r u l e d t h a t : 
"The e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h i s a r b i t r a t i o n clause does not 
depend upon t h i s c o u r t ' s assumption of j u r i s d i c t i o n over a s u i t 
on the m e r i t s . On the contrary, an i n i t i a l determination of the 
p a r t i e s ' r i g h t s by the court would be d e s t r u c t i v e of t h e i r 
i n t e n t i o n s to have the dispute r e s o l v e d by n e u t r a l a r b i t r a t o r s . 
B o l i v i a cannot t h e r e f o r e be s a i d to have i m p l i c i t l y waived i t s 
immunity from t h i s s u i t . " 9 8 
The foregoing d i s c u s s i o n i s a c l e a r manifestation of the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s u s u a l l y a s s o c i a t e d with a r b i t r a t i o n , which as a 
matter of urgency must always be recommended to resolve c e r t a i n 
s e n s i t i v e s t a t e immunity i s s u e s , f o r i t i s one of the v i a b l e 
means of containing the problems r e l a t i n g to the sovereign 
immunity controversy. Thus i n order to get these d i f f i c u l t i e s 
contained, the following methods are herein suggested: 
(1) That i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r b i t r a t i o n should be conducted such 
t h a t i t i s not impeded by l o c a l a r b i t r a t i o n laws because 
Texas Trading and M i l l i n g Corp. v. Fed. Rep. of N i g e r i a , 
2d C i r (1981) 647 F.2d. 300; Chicago Bridge and Iron Company v. 
The I s l a m i c Republic of I r a n , I Leg M (1980) 19. 
9 8 (1985) DDC F.Supp. 613, 863. 
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of the p r i n c i p l e s of e q u a l i t y of s t a t e s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law; 
(2) That to promote j u s t i c e the i n f e r e n c e of waiver from the 
existence of an a r b i t r a t i o n c l a u s e must be discarded; 
(3) That enforcement measures i n a i d of a r b i t r a l awards must 
be c a r e f u l l y studied thus g i v i n g deference to s t a t e 
property, e.g., see Alcorn and the P h i l i p p i n e s Embassy 
case; 
(4) That a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n must be made as to which law 
governs the agreement to a r b i t r a t e and which governs the 
a r b i t r a t i o n proceedings i n view of the p o s i t i o n of the 
sovereign s t a t e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law; 
(5) That a d i s t i n c t i o n must a l s o be made between the main 
contract and the s p e c i f i c i s s u e s t h a t must be r e f e r r e d to 
a r b i t r a t i o n , i n order to avoid d i f f i c u l t j u r i s d i c t i o n 
problems beyond what i s r e q u i r e d i n a given a r b i t r a t i o n 
process; 
(6) That a foreign a r b i t r a l award, f o r example, can be 
enforced i f the agreement to a r b i t r a t e i s unquestionably 
v a l i d by the proper law of the c o n t r a c t , while the 
f i n a l i t y and the v a l i d i t y of the award must be determined 
by the law which the p a r t i e s have agreed, consensus ad 
idem, to govern the a r b i t r a t i o n p r o c e e d i n g s . " But here 
there i s one ser i o u s problem and t h a t i s , c o u n t r i e s are 
not agreed that enforcement measures be taken a g a i n s t 
them. 
"Morris, op. c i t . , p. 137. 
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Any misguided attempt by municipal courts to sidestep the 
above mentioned suggestions would simply lead to d i f f i c u l t i e s 
and u n c e r t a i n t i e s i n t r a n s n a t i o n a l l i t i g a t i o n s p e c i f i c a l l y 
a s s o c i a t e d with a r b i t r a t i o n . F a i l i n g a l l these, then i t i s 
suggested t h a t a r b i t r a t i o n be d e l o c a l i s e d so as to pave way for 
the a p p l i c a t i o n of the general p r i n c i p l e s of lex mercatoria. 
Although these suggestions may not s o l v e a l l the attendant 
problems r e l a t i n g to a r b i t r a t i o n , at l e a s t i t would help the 
judge to see h i s way c l e a r l y i n the r e s o l u t i o n of c e r t a i n 
problems s p e c i f i c a l l y a s s o c i a t e d with a r b i t r a t i o n . 
The S t a t u s of C e n t r a l Banks and State Immunity, C e r t a i n 
U n s e t t l e d Problems 
The e x t e n t to which a C e n t r a l Bank of a sovereign s t a t e 
can c l a i m immunity i s u n s e t t l e d . 1 0 0 The e x i s t i n g case law i s not 
a t a l l c l e a r c u t and v a l i a n t attempts at c o d i f i c a t i o n have 
exacerbated the problem by s h i f t i n g the emphasis from the 
s t r u c t u r a l i s t approach to r e s o l v i n g the problem to the 
f u n c t i o n a l i s t approach. The i n c r e a s i n g r e l i a n c e on the a c t i v i t y 
of the bank and i t s s t a t u s t h e r e f o r e may arguably be designated 
as the bane of the problem. I t i s a l s o important to s t r e s s that 
s u b s i d i a r y organs of s t a t e s such as C e n t r a l Banks more often 
than not perform v a r i e d i n t e r r e l a t e d functions, encompassing 
1 0 0 S c h r e u e r , op. c i t . , pp. 137-167; Brownlie, op. c i t . , pp. 
341-342; S u c h a r i t k u l , Second Report, Yrbk ILC (1980); O'Connell, 
op. c i t . , pp. 877-8; and case law r e s p e c t i n g t h i s s u b j e c t i s 
fraught w i t h u n c e r t a i n t i e s ; Montefiore v. Belgian Congo, ILR 44, 
72; Mellenger v. New Brunswick Development Corporation (1971) 1 
WLR 603 CA. 
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both commercial and p o l i t i c a l f u n c t i o n s . Thus i n view of these 
problems, i t i s not that easy to determine the p r e c i s e f u n c t i o n s 
of C e n t r a l Banks. William B l a i r i n h i s attempt to study the 
l e g a l s t a t u s of Central Banks i n E n g l i s h law s t a t e d t h e i r 
functions as follows: 
"The term ' c e n t r a l bank' i s d e s c r i p t i v e of a bank's 
f u n c t i o n s , rather than i t s l e g a l s t a t u s . These f u n c t i o n s 
i n c l u d e note i s s u e , monetary p o l i c y the e f f i c i e n t o p e r a t i o n of 
the n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l system i n c l u d i n g payment systems, banking 
r e g u l a t i o n and supervision, the p r o v i s i o n of banking s e r v i c e s 
f o r the government, the management of gold and f o r e i g n exchange 
r e s e r v e s , debt management, exchange c o n t r o l s and development and 
promotional task. Not a l l c e n t r a l banks conduct a l l of these 
f u n c t i o n s . And sometimes the f u n c t i o n s change." 1 0 1 
Although the functions which are suggested above are 
i m p r e s s i v e l y exhaustive, and thus may be h e l p f u l i n developing 
the f u n c t i o n a l i s t approach to solve the problem, however, the 
l e g a l s t a t u s of c e n t r a l banks can a p p r o p r i a t e l y only be 
determined by having regard to the n a t i o n a l l a w 1 0 2 of a given 
country, i . e . , the law by which i t was c r e a t e d . And t h i s over 
the years may be responsible f o r the u n c e r t a i n grasp of the 
underlying p r i n c i p l e s behind the l e g a l s t a t u s of c e n t r a l banks. 
And the problem further becomes quite e l u s i v e i n so f a r as the 
functions and l e g a l status of these banks d i f f e r from country to 
country. I n Baccus SRL v. S e r v i c i o Nacional d e l T r i g o , 1 0 3 the 
101W B l a i r , The Legal Status of C e n t r a l Bank Investment 
under E n g l i s h Law (1998) Cambridge Law J . 374, p. 375. 
1 0 2Schreuer, op. c i t . , pp. 121-124; W. B l a i r , op. c i t . , pp. 
385-386; Baccus SRL v. S e r v i c i o Nacional d e l Trigo (2957) 1 Q 
438; Trendtex v. Central Bank of N i g e r i a (1977) Q 529, ILR 64 
1983 p. 111. 
1 0 3 (1954) 1QB 4388. 
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court accepted the a f f i d a v i t of the Spanish ambassador and a 
Spanish l e g a l e x p e r t i n determining as to whether the defendants 
were i n Spanish law a department of s t a t e . Parker L J i n h i s 
r u l i n g suggested c l e a r l y that Spanish law be applied in the 
determination of the s t a t u s of the S e r v i c i o Nacional del Trigo. 
Thus Jenkins, having a l s o been convinced by the evidence t h e r e i n 
presented, r u l e d t h a t immunity be accorded to the defendants 
although the c o n t r a c t contained an a r b i t r a t i o n clause 
designating E n g l i s h law as the a p p l i c a b l e law i n case of 
dispute. Does t h i s mean that n a t i o n a l law be applied over the 
w i l l of the p a r t i e s because of the s t a t u s of the p o l i t i c a l 
s u b d i v i s i o n ? I t h i n k not, unless there i s evidence to a t t e s t to 
the f a c t t h a t the c o n t r a c t was f r a u d u l e n t l y concluded and thus 
a g a i n s t p u b l i c p o l i c y or circumstances r e s p e c t i n g the status of 
the l i t i g a t i n g p a r t i e s have changed considerably. The e f f e c t of 
the judgment i n Baccus seemed quite s t r i k i n g , but one must 
understand t h a t a t t h a t time E n g l i s h p r a c t i c e was wholly 
pr e d i c a t e d on a b s o l u t e sovereignty, where immunity was granted 
i r r e s p e c t i v e of the a c t i v i t y i n i s s u e . 1 0 4 Ever s i n c e that time, 
however, the p o s i t i o n of E n g l i s h courts has gradually changed 
considerably. 
I n Trendtex, the Court of Appeal having been overwhelmed 
by a multitude of evidence presented i n respect to the status of 
1 0 4 S i n c l a i r , The Law of Sovereign Immunity—Recent 
Developments (1980) Hague R e c u e i l 119; S u c h a r i t k u l , State 
Immunities and Trading A c t i v i t i e s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1959) 
pp. 162-182; Annuaire Year Book ( I n s t i t u t e de D r o i t I n t . ) Cairo 
1987; Annuaire Yearbook (Basle, 1991). 
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the C e n t r a l Bank, decided to consider Nigerian Law i n p a r t and 
the functions of the Central Bank i n i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p with the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, i . e . , the government, i n order to 
accord immunity. Lord Denning i n exploring the i s s u e s regarding 
the s t a t u s of the Central Bank r e l i e d on the f o l l o w i n g 
reasoning. 
" I Confess t h a t I can think of no s a t i s f a c t o r y t e s t except t h a t 
of looking t o the functions and c o n t r o l of the o r g a n i s a t i o n . I 
do not t h i n k t h a t i t should depend on the f o r e i g n law alone. I 
would look to a l l the evidence to see whether the o r g a n i s a t i o n 
was under government control and e x e r c i s e d governmental 
f u n c t i o n s . " 1 0 5 
The same approach was followed i n an e a r l i e r case of 
Mellenger v. New Brunswick Development Corp., 1 0 6 where immunity 
was granted on the strength of the argument p o s i t e d t h e r e i n , 
that the corporation i n i s s u e was an arm or a l t e r ego of the 
government of a sovereign s t a t e and t h e r e f o r e duly e n t i t l e d to 
immunity. Such a r e s u l t was not, however, reached i n Trendtex. 
Lord Denning i n h i s f i n a l a n a l y s i s r u l e d t h a t " I n my opinion the 
plea of sovereign immunity does not a v a i l the C e n t r a l Bank of 
Ni g e r i a . I would allow the appeal a c c o r d i n g l y . " 1 0 7 The C e n t r a l 
Bank inter alia was denied immunity because i t was not an a l t e r 
ego or organ of the government of N i g e r i a . I s the f u n c t i o n a l i s t 
and s t r u c t u r a l i s t determination of the p o s i t i o n of the C e n t r a l 
Bank c o n c l u s i v e ? A c a r e f u l examination of the l e g a l s t a t u s of 
the C e n t r a l Bank does not warrant such a c o n c l u s i o n . I t would 
1 0 5Trendtex v. Central Bank of N i g e r i a (1977) Q 560. 
1 0 6 (1971) IWLR 604 CA. 
1 0 7 P e r Lord Denning (1977) Q 560. 
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appear Lord Denning and h i s colleagues misconstrued the i n t e r n a l 
laws of N i g e r i a because the Federal Government of N i g e r i a did 
have o v e r a l l c o n t r o l over the s a i d bank and thus appointed i t s 
o f f i c e r s and p a i d t h e i r s a l a r i e s . The o f f i c e r s of the Central 
Bank were more or l e s s c i v i l s e r v a n t s . What these judges f a i l e d 
to appreciate was t h a t the C e n t r a l Bank of N i g e r i a performed 
v a r i e d functions and t h e r e f o r e seemingly appeared independent 
but i n r e a l i t y d e r i v e d i t s powers from the f e d e r a l government, 
which means i t was not a t a l l independent. C e n t r a l Banks i n 
developing c o u n t r i e s perform very important functions on behalf 
of the s t a t e and t h e r e f o r e do not operate independently of 
governmental c o n t r o l . I n other words, these banks normally 
perform p u b l i c f u n c t i o n s and t h e r e f o r e must always be 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d from commercial banks. 
Before the enactment of the State Immunity Act of 1978, 
E n g l i s h courts were r e s i g n e d to following the s t r u c t u r a l i s t 
approach, where a l l t h a t mattered was the s t a t u s of the 
p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n or s t a t e agency, with i t s attendant 
c o m p l e x i t i e s . 1 0 8 The S t a t e Immunity Act of 1978, however, 
follows the s t r u c t u r a l i s t and f u n c t i o n a l i s t methods i n granting 
immunity to c e n t r a l banks. A r t i c l e 14 proceeds undoubtedly from 
a s t r u c t u r a l i s t standpoint but e q u a l l y a l s o g i v e s prominence to 
the a c t i v i t y of the s u b s i d i a r y organ or the f u n c t i o n a l i s t 
approach. This i s not d i f f e r e n t from A r t i c l e 27 of the European 
Convention. Again the E n g l i s h l e g i s l a t i v e approach 
1 0 8See S i n c l a i r , op. c i t . ; see a l s o S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t , 
pp. 113-120. 
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i n c o r p o r a t i n g both the s t r u c t u r a l i s t and f u n c t i o n a l i s t 
approaches i s almost i d e n t i c a l to Sections 1(2) and 15 of the 
South A f r i c a n Act, Section 16(1) and (2) of the Singapore Act 
and that of Section 15 of the P a k i s t a n i Ordinance. In s p i t e of 
the s h i f t i n emphasis as regards the above mentioned s t a t u t o r y 
p r o v i s i o n s , i t would appear the problem s t i l l remains i n so f a r 
as the judge i s c a l l e d upon to deal with the usual thorny i s s u e 
of sovereign a u t h o r i t y gua the underlying u n s e t t l e d problems of 
the l e g a l s t a t u s of p o l i t i c a l s ubdivisions and s t a t e agencies. 
The ILC Draft A r t i c l e s on the other hand follow the 
f u n c t i o n a l i s t approach to the l e t t e r and nothing e l s e . 1 0 9 The 
U.S. l e g i s l a t i o n follows about the same approach as those of the 
U.K. Act, South A f r i c a n Act, Singapore Act and the P a k i s t a n 
Ordinance. The only d i s t i n g u i s h i n g feature of the FSIA i s t h a t 
i t grants immunity to e n t i t i e s with an independent l e g a l s t a t u s . 
I t s approach, t h e r e f o r e , i n granting immunity to p o l i t i c a l 
s u b d i v i s i o n and s t a t e agencies i s l i b e r a l l y or moderately 
construed. 
With respect to c e n t r a l banks, the U.K. Act appears more 
l i b e r a l l y construed i n every respect than th a t of the U.S. Act. 
A r t i c l e 14(4) reads as follows: 
"Property of a s t a t e ' s c e n t r a l bank or other monetary 
a u t h o r i t y s h a l l not be regarded for the purposes of Subsection 
(4) of S e c t i o n 13 above as i n use or intended f o r use f o r 
commercial purposes; and where any such bank or a u t h o r i t y i s a 
separate e n t i t y Subsection (1) to (3) of t h a t S e c t i o n s h a l l 
1 0 9See ILC Draft A r t i c l e s 3(a) I , I I , I I I , IV and A r t i c l e 7. 
See a l s o recent cases on t h i s matter: Walter F u l l e r A i r c r a f t 
S a l e s I n c . v. Republic of the P h i l i p p i n e s (1992) ILR 103 p. 503; 
A r r i b a Limited v. Petroleous Mexicanos (1992) ILR 103 p. 490. 
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apply to i t as i f r e f e r e n c e s to a s t a t e were r e f e r e n c e s to the 
bank or a u t h o r i t y . " 
A r t i c l e 14(4) i s imperative because i t f u l l y p r o t e c t s the 
property of c e n t r a l banks from enforcement measures and a l s o 
affords these banks s i m i l a r procedural p r i v i l e g e s normally 
extended to sovereign s t a t e s under A r t i c l e 13 of the 1978 U.K. 
Act. In the Trendtex case, the Court of Appeal granted the 
p l a i n t i f f s a mareva injunction ordering t h a t a s s e t s of the 
Central Bank be h e l d w i t h i n the j u r i s d i c t i o n u n t i l the outcome 
of the l i t i g a t i o n . T h i s w i l l not be p o s s i b l e any more i n view 
of the e f f e c t of A r t i c l e 14 (4) . Thus i n the main, even i f the 
property of a c e n t r a l bank i s used f o r commercial purposes, i t 
cannot be subjected to e x e c u t i o n . The U.S. Sovereign Immunity 
Act 1976, § 1161 a l s o f o l l o w s the same p r i n c i p l e as the other 
national l e g i s l a t i o n i n p l a c e , thus c r e a t i n g confusion and 
doubtful modus operandi. The whole process t h e r e f o r e becomes 
complex since i t would not be easy to apply the s t r u c t u r a l i s t 
t e s t and the f u n c t i o n a l i s t t e s t a t the same time without 
reducing the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the process. And the reason being 
that the s t r u c t u r a l i s t t e s t undoubtedly w i l l s t i l l r e q u i r e an 
examination of the concept of sovereign a u t h o r i t y , i . e . , 
superanus, which may leave us i n the middle of the ocean without 
any c l e a r c u t d e s t i n a t i o n i n the l i g h t of the d i f f i c u l t i e s 
a s s o c i a t e d with the determination of the l e g a l s t a t u s of c e n t r a l 
banks which wields a m u l t i f a c e t e d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i n the l e g a l 
parlance or j u r i s p r u d e n c e of s t a t e s . 
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The e f f e c t of A r t i c l e 14(4) became somewhat apparent i n 
Camdex v. Bank of Zambia, 1 1 0 there a written deposit agreement 
was concluded between the C e n t r a l Bank of Kuwait and the C e n t r a l 
Bank of Zambia i n 1982, where the Central Bank of Kuwait agreed 
to deposit a sum of 15 m d i n a r s at an agreed r a t e of i n t e r e s t 
i n t o the Bank of Zambia. The s a i d agreement was duly renewed i n 
subsequent years without any problems. The two p a r t i e s a l s o 
entered i n t o two other agreements which dealt s p e c i f i c a l l y with 
the bank of Zambia's i n t e r e s t l i a b i l i t y . L a t e r the defendant 
p a i d a sum of KD 616,098 i n 1990 but somehow f a i l e d to honour 
the 1988 agreements. In 1995 when i t became c l e a r t h a t the 
defendant would not be able to pay the debt due without a t h r e a t 
of s u i t or l i t i g a t i o n , the C e n t r a l Bank of Kuwait assigned the 
debt to Camdex, a Bahamian company, at a discount of 11 per cent 
of the value of the t o t a l debt. This was duly communicated i n a 
w r i t t e n n o t i c e to the defendant. I t must be made c l e a r t h a t the 
Bank of Zambia had i n an e a r l i e r agreement a l s o given an express 
waiver of sovereign immunity, with the understanding t h a t the 
agreement i n i s s u e was s u b j e c t to E n g l i s h law i n case of 
d i s p u t e . The p l a i n t i f f having acquired a l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t to 
the assignment, made an a p p l i c a t i o n under R.S.C. ord. 14 f o r 
summary judgment. This was challenged by the defendant on the 
ground t h a t the order had been brought pursuant to a champertous 
" d e a l i n g . " The court r u l e d against the defendant s t a t e by 
arguing th a t "an assignment of a bona fide debt i n accordance 
(1996) 3 WLR 759. 
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with the provisions of S e c t i o n 136 of the Law of Property Act, 
1925, was v a l i d and no question of maintenance or champerty 
arose even i f the n e c e s s i t y f o r l i t i g a t i o n to recover the 
assignment debt was contemplated." 1 1 1 
Having obtained a summary judgment i n the amount of $80 
m i l l i o n , Camdex then sought to enforce the debt against the 
a s s e t s of the C e n t r a l Bank of Zambia i n England. This became 
pos s i b l e because at t h a t very moment the Bank of Zambia had 
entered into another c o n t r a c t with an E n g l i s h company to p r i n t a 
large quantity of i t s currency, the Kwacha, for use i n Zambia i n 
replacement of the e x i s t i n g lower denomination notes. And the 
reason for the new notes was to counter the severe e f f e c t of the 
devaluation of the Kwacha. Camdex i n a quest to force the Bank 
of Zambia to pay the s a i d debt r e f u s e d to allow the notes to be 
sent to Zambia as planned. The p l a i n t i f f , as a matter of law, 
was e x e r c i s i n g i t s r i g h t s under the mareva i n j u n c t i o n granted to 
him as a judgment c r e d i t o r , but when the case was brought before 
the court of appeals, the i n j u n c t i o n was a c c o r d i n g l y discharged 
i n the following formulated words: 
"Of course one agrees w i t h the judge, without 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n , t h a t a judgment debt should, i n the o r d i n a r y way 
and i n any o r d i n a r y s i t u a t i o n , be p a i d . I t i s , however, 
relevant that the defendant i s a body to whom the ordinary 
procedures of bankruptcy and winding up a r e not a v a i l a b l e . The 
s i t u a t i o n i s one i n which, on the evidence, severe n a t i o n a l 
hardship to the people of Zambia would f o l l o w i f the s t a t e 
defaulted i n i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n s . " 1 1 2 
m I b i d . at p. 760. 
112Camdex I n t e r n a t i o n a l v. Bank of Zambia (No. 2) 1 A l l ER 
728, 722 per S i r Bingham M.R. 
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S i r Bingham continued: 
" I t must be a l e g i t i m a t e concern of the defendant to t r y and 
ensure t h a t the repayments due to the World Bank and the 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund are not the subject of d e f a u l t . 
T h i s seems to me a s e t t i n g so u n l i k e t h a t in which the ordinary 
Mareva j u r i s d i c t i o n f a i l s to be e x e r c i s e d , that the learned 
judge d i d f a l l i n t o e r r o r i n f a i l i n g to recognise t h i s new 
dimension of the problem with which he was confronted. 
With regard to ZCCM I agree with P h i l i p s L J and would 
wish to a s s o c i a t e myself with what he i s to say about t h a t . 
I would for my p a r t , grant leave to appeal and would 
a l l o w the appeal d i r e c t i n g that t h e r e be a v a r i a t i o n of the 
e x i s t i n g Mareva i n j u n c t i o n so as to exclude from i t s scope the 
bank notes c u r r e n t l y h e l d by De La Rue p i c . " 1 1 3 
The judgment of the court seemed to acknowledge the f a c t 
t h a t although debts g e n e r a l l y are to be paid, there are c e r t a i n 
i n s t a n c e s i n which i t would be reasonable to allow some 
exceptions, and that i s when a c e n t r a l bank of a sovereign s t a t e 
i s i nvolved, and there i s a c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n that the 
p l a i n t i f f ' s demand would work hardship on the defendant as was 
prima facie revealed i n the Camdex case. The judge, as can 
c l e a r l y be gathered from h i s judgment, allowed h i s head to take 
c o n t r o l over h i s heart by balancing s p e c i f i c a l l y the p l i g h t of 
the people of Zambia as a g a i n s t the r i g h t s of Camdex i n r e s p e c t 
of not a l l o w i n g enforcement measures against the C e n t r a l Bank of 
Zambia. And the r a t i o n a l e behind the s a i d approach can be 
p r e d i c a t e d on the f a c t t h a t "a c e n t r a l bank does have important 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of i t s country and the people who l i v e there 
and i n appropriate circumstances t h i s f a c t can a f f e c t the l e g a l 
r e s u l t . " 1 1 4 The judgment makes good sense i n that, even i f the 
1 1 3 I b i d . 
1 1 4 B l a i r , op. c i t . , p. 389. 
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Zambian bank notes were to be kept i n the j u r i s d i c t i o n as a 
r e s u l t of the Mareva i n j u n c t i o n , i t would be of no value to the 
p l a i n t i f f i n view of the f a c t t h a t the notes would not f e t c h 
much on the open market. A f t e r a l l , the Kwacha was s p e c i f i c a l l y 
p r i n t e d for use i n Zambia but not to be traded on the open 
market. C e r t a i n l y , common sense would r e v o l t i f the i n j u n c t i o n 
was allowed, since the probable e f f e c t would more than l i k e l y 
destroy the economy of Zambia thus making i t d i f f i c u l t f o r the 
country to operate e f f i c i e n t l y . 
The court simply did not consider the much d i s c r e d i t e d 
d i s t i n c t i o n between acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis 
but r a t h e r allowed sound p r a c t i c a l reasoning to triumph over 
a b s t r a c t r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n which over the yea r s had l e d us 
nowhere. I t i s submitted t h a t given the problems a s s o c i a t e d 
with the ap p l i c a t i o n of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity, the court s t i l l 
would be faced with a mammoth t a s k i f i t had followed an 
approach where the st a t u s of the sovereign i s considered v i s - a -
v i s res publica publicis usibus destinata i.e., the property 
used i n carr y i n g out the a c t i v i t i e s , f o r such methods have 
simply compounded the problem r a t h e r than s o l v e i t . 
The f i n a l e or the impressive climax of t h i s controversy 
occurred i n January 1997, where the Court of Appeal was faced 
with the issue of whether moneys h e l d i n hard currency by the 
C e n t r a l Bank of Zambia i n r e s p e c t of copper r e c e i p t s could 
p o s s i b l y be attached. The Court of Appeal again a f t e r a c a r e f u l 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the i s s u e r u l e d i n favour of the C e n t r a l Bank 
by arguing that " I n the present case, the bank's duty to use 
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r e c e i p t s of f o r e i g n exchange for p u b l i c purposes would defeat 
any c l a i m to a t t a c h such funds." 1 1 5 The court again seemed to 
follow an approach where the purported force of immunity i s 
v a r i e d qua the s u b j e c t matter. Thus where there i s a prima 
facie incompetence ratione materiae, then immunity would have to 
be accorded. And the court, having determined that the money 
hel d by the bank would be used f o r the betterment of the people 
of Zambia or f o r governmental d u t i e s , d e c l i n e d to allow Camdex 
to a t t a c h the money. This again shows t h a t c e n t r a l banks occupy 
a s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n and the s e n s i t i v e and d e l i c a t e nature of 
t h e i r r o l e s must not be ignored when i s s u e s respecting saisie 
conservatoire and saisie execution, come before a court f or 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n . I t i s i n s t r u c t i v e a t t h i s juncture to s t a t e more 
c l e a r l y t h a t the d e n i a l of immunity from j u r i s d i c t i o n does not 
a u t o m a t i c a l l y mean t h a t immunity from execution i s also denied. 
So f a r s t a t e p r a c t i c e i s u n s e t t l e d r e s p e c t i n g t h i s i s s u e , but 
the judgments i n Alcorn and the P h i l i p p i n e s Embassy case show 
th a t c o u r t s a r e not ready to sanction t h a t the property of 
sovereign s t a t e s be subjected to f o r c i b l e measures. There i s 
wisdom o b v i o u s l y i n such an approach s i n c e i t would prevent 
acrimony among n a t i o n - s t a t e s . 
The a p p l i c a t i o n of the s t r u c t u r a l i s t and f u n c t i o n a l i s t 
p r i n c i p l e s of s t a t e immunity to the va r i o u s subsidiary organs of 
s t a t e s or s t a t e e n t i t i e s breeds confusion and obstructs any 
1 1 5 C i t e d from B l a i r , op. c i t . , p. 389. This must be 
compared to the d e c i s i o n i n Walter F u l l e r A i r c r a f t Sales I n c . 
(1992) ILR 103 p. 503. 
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attempts at developing a c o n s i s t e n t and a c c e p t a b l e p r i n c i p l e . 
The European Convention A r t i c l e 27 and the ILA D r a f t Convention 
of 1982, A r t i c l e 1, a l l adopt a t e s t of d i s t i n c t l e g a l 
p e r s o n a l i t y coupled with a c l e a r r e l i a n c e on the a c t i v i t y of the 
e n t i t y i n the performance of i t s p u b l i c f u n c t i o n s , to determine 
whether to grant immunity or not. T h i s i s a f a m i l i a r r e c i p e of 
f a c i l e p r i n c i p l e s which do not i n r e a l terms mean what they 
appear to convey. And i t i s hard to simply r e l y on l o g i c s i n c e 
i t l a c k s force to p r e s c r i b e the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of terms or i n 
the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r s . Indeed, any r e l i a n c e on the 
s t a t u s and a c t i v i t y of these s u b s i d i a r y organs, both r e a l and 
p u t a t i v e , would be s u s c e p t i b l e to d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s and 
t h e r e f o r e l e a d to a penumbra of doubt i n the a p p l i c a t i o n of the 
d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. I t i s important to s t r e s s at 
t h i s point of our d i s c u s s i o n t h a t the a p p l i c a b l e law i n the 
determination of the l e g a l s t a t u s of s t a t e e n t i t i e s i s the law 
of t h e i r c r e a t i o n or the law by which they were i n s t i t u t e d . 
Hence i t i s suggested that n a t i o n a l law be a p p l i e d by t a k i n g 
a l s o i n t o consideration the precepts of general i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law. 
D i f f i c u l t problems of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and c o n s t r u c t i o n 
would s t i l l remain or a r i s e i f the lex fori r e l i e s s p e c i f i c a l l y 
or wholly on l o c a l data or forum data which perhaps r e q u i r e s 
f u r t h e r refinement of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity as regards the s t a t u s 
and functions of c e n t r a l banks or p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n s . 
Arguably, such problems would overburden t h i s a r e a of the law 
which i s already b r i s t l i n g with d i f f i c u l t i e s and u n c e r t a i n t i e s . 
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I n an obiter dictum, the German C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Court i n the 
claims ag a i n s t the Empire of I r a n case explored the above stated 
problem as f o l l o w s : (ILR 45, p. 57) 
"The q u a l i f i c a t i o n of s t a t e a c t i v i t y as sovereign or non-
sovereign must i n p r i n c i p l e be made by n a t i o n a l (municipal) law, 
s i n c e i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, a t l e a s t u s u a l l y , contains no c r i t e r i a 
f o r t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n . . . . I t i s not unusual f o r r u l e s of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law to r e f e r to n a t i o n a l law. A c q u i s i t i o n and 
l o s s of n a t i o n a l i t y a r e , however, determined i n p r i n c i p l e by 
n a t i o n a l law. 
F i n a l l y , i t cannot be of d e c i s i v e importance that 
r e f e r e n c e to n a t i o n a l law t h e o r e t i c a l l y g i v e s the n a t i o n a l 
l e g i s l a t u r e the p o s s i b i l i t y of i n f l u e n c i n g the scope of the r u l e 
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law through a corresponding formulation of the 
n a t i o n a l law. . . . An improper form of the law by the n a t i o n a l 
l e g i s l a t u r e c o u l d be opposed by the recognized i n t e r n a t i o n a l law 
p r i n c i p l e of good f a i t h . 
I t must be admitted t h a t the a p p l i c a t i o n of general 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s made more d i f f i c u l t , and the d e s i r e d 
u n i f o r m i t y of law i s hindered, i f the nature of s t a t e a c t i v i t y 
determines the d i s t i n c t i o n between sovereign and non-sovereign 
a c t s and n a t i o n a l law determines t h e i r q u a l i f i c a t i o n s " (ILR 45, 
p. 5 7). 
Thus, u n t i l such time t h a t s c h o l a r s and municipal courts are 
ready to r e c o n s i d e r the d e f i n i t i o n of the s t a t e i n terms of i t s 
v a r i e d modern f u n c t i o n s , and to balance the e f f e c t of the lex 
fori and the lex causae, t h i s area of the law would continue to 
be u n s e t t l e d and fragmented. Perhaps a d e f i n i t i o n encompassing 
the changing scope and fun c t i o n s of the modern s t a t e as was 
attempted under the OAS D r a f t Convention, A r t i c l e 2, and that of 
ILC Draft A r t i c l e s , A r t i c l e 3, would be h e l p f u l provided the 
d e f i n i t i o n does not have a v a r i e d connotation or points to 
d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s . 
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Some Problems R e l a t i n g to the Act of State Doctrine 
National Courts and Foreign Acts of States 
The p o s i t i o n of countries on the do c t r i n e of a c t of s t a t e 
d i f f e r s markedly and therefore i t i s d i f f i c u l t to give a water-
t i g h t d e f i n i t i o n of what the act of s t a t e d o c t r i n e means. 
I n c i d e n t a l l y , a l l the national l e g i s l a t i o n c u r r e n t l y i n p l a c e 
avoided the s u b j e c t and the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission's d r a f t 
a r t i c l e s never touched on the underlying p r i n c i p l e s r e s p e c t i n g 
the s u b j e c t and i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p with the doctr i n e of sov e r e i g n 
immunity. So f a r the e x i s t i n g case law i s not c l e a r c u t 1 1 6 and 
s t a t e p r a c t i c e appears l e s s c o n s i s t e n t . Thus u n t i l such time 
that a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between these two areas of the law are 
c a r e f u l l y explored and brought to the fore f o r c r i t i c a l 
a n a l y s i s , judges would continue to be faced with a mammoth t a s k 
i n dealing with the i n t r a c t a b l e problems of a c t of s t a t e . 
The d o c t r i n e of act of s t a t e i s somewhat r e l a t e d to the 
p r i n c i p l e of sovereign immunity. 1 1 7 In England i t would appear 
that the scope of the act of s t a t e doctrine was d e l i m i t e d as a 
prelude to s e t t i n g f o r t h the En g l i s h Crown's adoption of p r i v a t e 
c i t i z e n ' s a c t i n foreign countries a g a i n s t c i v i l s u i t s , thus i n 
the main p r o t e c t i n g the subject of the Crown r e t r o a c t i v e l y from 
1 1 6 F o r a c l e a r exposition of the s u b j e c t see Singer, The Act 
of State Doctrine of the United Kingdom: An A n a l y s i s w i t h 
Comparison to the United States P r a c t i c e (1981) 75 A J I L , 283. 
See a l s o Dr. Mann, The Sacros a n c t i t y of the Foreign Act of S t a t e 
(1943) 59 LQ Rev 42. Wade, Act of State i n E n g l i s h Law: I t s 
Re l a t i o n s with I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1934) 15 BYIL 98, 104. 
1 1 7T. Buergenthan and H. Maier, P u b l i c I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law 
(1989) p. 233 [The Nutshell S e r i e s ] . 
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being sued abroad. 1 1 8 I n A.M. Luther v. James Sagor and Co., 1 1 9 
Scrutton L J r e j e c t e d the p l a i n t i f f ' s c l a im against R u s s i a for 
n a t i o n a l i s i n g h i s woodwork m i l l s which was wholly incorporated 
under i m p e r i a l Russian laws i n the following words: 
"But i t appears a s e r i o u s breach of i n t e r n a t i o n a l comity 
i f a s t a t e i s r e c o g n i z e d as a sovereign independent s t a t e , to 
p o s t u l a t e t h a t l e g i s l a t i o n i s ' contrary to e s s e n t i a l p r i n c i p l e s 
of j u s t i c e and m o r a l i t y . ' Such an a l l e g a t i o n might w e l l with a 
s u s c e p t i b l e f o r e i g n government become a casus belli; and should 
i n my view be the a c t i o n of the sovereign through h i s m i n i s t e r s , 
and not of the judges i n r e f e r e n c e to a s t a t e which t h e i r 
sovereign has r e c o g n i s e d . " 1 2 0 
Scrutton L J ' s judgment may be considered as a pre-Sabbatino 
c l a s s i c B r i t i s h statement of the law i n respect of the doctrine 
of act of s t a t e . 
The r e a l meaning of the d o c t r i n e of a c t of s t a t e i n 
American j u r i s p r u d e n c e i s the p r e c l u s i o n of domestic courts from 
i n q u i r i n g i n t o the v a l i d i t y of p u b l i c a c t s or d e c i s i o n s taken by 
sovereign s t a t e s w i t h i n t h e i r own borders. 1 2 1 The c l a s s i c 
d e f i n i t i o n of the law was c l e a r l y s t a t e d i n U n d e r h i l l v. 
Hernandez 1 2 2 by F u l l CJ, thus: 
"Every s o v e r e i g n s t a t e i s bound to r e s p e c t the 
independence of e v e r y o t h e r s o v e r e i g n s t a t e , and the c o u r t s of 
one country w i l l not s i t i n judgment on the a c t s of the 
government of another done w i t h i n i t s own t e r r i t o r y . Redress of 
g r i e v a n c e s by reason of such a c t s must be obtained through the 
1 1 8Johnson v. Peddlar (1921) 2 AC 262 [House of L o r d s ] / 
Luther v. Sagor (1921) 3 ICB 532 CA. 
1 1 9 (1921) 3 KB 532 CA. 
1 2 0 I b i d . 
1 2 1R. Wallace, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (Student Introduction) 1986 
p. 48-50. 
122 (1897) 168 US 250, 
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means opened to be a v a i l e d of by sovereign powers as between 
the m s e l v e s . " 1 2 3 
The reasoning behind the decision i n A.M. Luther and 
U n d e r h i l l are about the same and therefore presupposes a c l e a r 
r e s t r a i n t on courts from passing judgment or i n q u i r i n g i n t o the 
v a l i d i t y of a c t i o n s taken by sovereign s t a t e s w i t h i n t h e i r 
t e r r i t o r i a l boundaries. S t r i c t adherence to t h i s notion was 
followed i n Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 1 2 4 i n which the 
court gave e f f e c t to a Cuban decree, although i t prima facie 
v i o l a t e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. Ever since t h a t time, however, the 
p o s i t i o n of the Supreme Court has changed. 1 2 5 I t i s important to 
s t r e s s t h a t the a c t of s t a t e doctrine and the d o c t r i n e of 
sovereign immunity have s i m i l a r underpinnings, however, they 
d i f f e r on one or two important points and these have been 
c l e a r l y s t a t e d i n Braka v. Bancomer, that "While the e f f e c t of 
sovereign immunity i s to s h i e l d the person of the f o r e i g n 
sovereign, and by extension, h i s agents, from j u r i s d i c t i o n , the 
a c t of s t a t e doctrine s h i e l d s the foreign sovereign's i n t e r n a l 
laws from i n t r u s i v e s c r u t i n y . " 1 2 6 One other d i s t i n g u i s h i n g 
f e a t u r e of the act of s t a t e doctrine, as already s t a t e d 
elsewhere, i s th a t i t i s a v a i l a b l e to n a t u r a l persons, whereas 
such a defence i s not a v a i l a b l e under the doctrine of s t a t e 
1 2 3 I b i d . , 250. 
1 2 4 (19 6 4 ) 3 7 6 U.S. 398, 428. 
1 2 5Banco Nacional de Cuba v. F i r s t National C i t y Bank, 270 F 
Supp. 1004, (1967) 
1 2 6 (1984) SDNY, 1465, 1470, 589 F.Supp. SA. 
463 
immunity (which i s e x c l u s i v e l y developed to p r o t e c t the person 
of the sovereign and i t s p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n or s t a t e 
e n t i t i e s ) . 
The doctrine of act of s t a t e , i f c a r e f u l l y examined, w i l l 
show that i t overlaps with both p r i v a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and 
public i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and E n g l i s h courts on some occasions 
have simply applied the p r i n c i p l e s of p r i v a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l law 
as an a l t e r n a t i v e approach to the a c t of s t a t e d o c t r i n e . C i v i l 
law countries such as Germany, France, I t a l y , Spain and other 
countries on the Continent with s i m i l a r c i v i l law t r a d i t i o n have 
for d i f f e r e n t j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l reasons a l s o followed the 
p r i n c i p l e s of p r i v a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i n determining i s s u e s 
respecting e x p r o p r i a t i o n and s t a t e debts, thus s p e c i f i c a l l y 
r e l y i n g on the lex fori to c h a r a c t e r i s e the r i g h t s of the 
l i t i g a t i n g p a r t i e s . There i s t h e r e f o r e the problem of confusing 
the precepts of p r i v a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l law with the a c t of s t a t e 
doctrine. American cou r t s have a l s o i n the past given 
c o n f l i c t i n g s i g n a l s by regarding the a c t of s t a t e doctrine more 
of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law wholly p r e d i c a t e d on the p r i n c i p l e of 
separation of powers. 1 2 7 American c o u r t s , however, have now 
changed t h e i r p o s i t i o n by c o n s i d e r i n g the s a i d s u b j e c t w i t h i n 
the purview of p u b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. C e r t a i n l y opinions 
d i f f e r from country to country as to whether the a c t of s t a t e 
doctrine be considered a r u l e of p u b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l law or 
not. So f a r the c u r r e n t E n g l i s h approach i s qu i t e d i f f e r e n t 
1 2 7Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino (1964) 376 US 398, 
84, S Ct 923, I I L Ed 2d 804. 
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from t h a t of the United S t a t e s . 1 2 8 The d i f f e r e n c e of opinion as 
regards the s u b j e c t may be due to the f a c t that the a c t of s t a t e 
d o c t r i n e covers four c o n t r o v e r s i a l s i t u a t i o n s and these are (1) 
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n or e x p r o p r i a t i o n , 1 / 9 (2) the s i t u s of debts and 
p u b l i c l o a n s , 1 3 0 (3) a commercial act exception, i . e . , when 
sovereign immunity overlaps with the a c t of s t a t e d o c t r i n e 1 3 1 and 
(4) non-expropriation context, i . e . , conspiracy and s l a n d e r 
a c t i o n s . 1 3 2 The s u b j e c t undoubtedly has a v a r i e d connotation and 
t h e r e f o r e must be approached with care. Thus for some i t i s 
p u r e l y a p r i v a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l law problem w h i l s t others simply 
argue t h a t i t f a l l s w i t h i n the domain of p u b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law. 
The Overlap of Act of State and the Doctrine of Sovereign 
Immunity 
The overlap of the a c t of s t a t e doctrine and the d o c t r i n e 
of sovereign immunity has always created problems of mixed 
1 2 8See Akehurst, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, Sixth Ed (1991) p. 47 
but see the 7th e d i t e d by Peter Malanczuk (1997) pp. 118-121. 
1 2 9Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino (1964) Supreme Court 
of the U.S. 376 US 398, 84 S Ct 923 I I L Ed 2 804. 
1 3 0 G a r c i a v. Chase Manhattan Bank NA, U.S. Court of Appeals 
2nd C i r c u i t (1984) 735 F.2d 645; A l l i e d Bank I n t . v. Banco 
C r e d i t o A g r i c o l a de Cartago, U.S. Court of Appeals 2nd C i r c u i t 
1985, 757 F.2d 516. 
1 3 1 A l f r e d D u n h i l l of London I n c . v. Republic of Cuba (1976) 
125 US 682; Czarnikow Ltd. v. Rolimpex (1979) AC 351, ILR 64 
(1983) . 
1 3 2 K i r k p a t r i c k & Co. I n c . v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Supreme Court of the United S t a t e s . 1990, 493 US 
400, 110 S Ct, 701 L Ed 2s 816. 
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a c t i v i t i e s of s t a t e s . 1 3 3 Thus can immunity be granted for a 
breach of contract, i f the reason f o r the abrogation of the 
contract i s prompted by an unexpected event or c r i s i s w i t h i n the 
t e r r i t o r i a l boundaries of the defendant s t a t e ? This i s not an 
easy question, and i t would appear the House of Lords had 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n dealing with the I Congreso de Partido case. 
The I Congreso case i s a good example where the mere d i s t i n c t i o n 
between acta jure imperii and acta jure gentionis proved 
woefully inadequate i n deciding the i s s u e s which came up f o r 
contention. The court i n order to a v o i d being completely 
trapped into following the a b s t r a c t underpinnings of r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity reasoned that when faced with the problems of sovereign 
immunity courts must not only r e s i g n t h e i r i n q u i r y to the nature 
of the contract, but a t t e n t i o n be a l s o p a i d to the nature of the 
breach, which means that a s t a t e could s t i l l succeed i n pleading 
f o r immunity i f the a c t i v i t y i n breach of the agreement i s a 
governmental a c t . Courts are a l s o c a l l e d upon to consider 
whether i n the course of the performance of the c o n t r a c t the 
s t a t e has performed a sovereign a c t i n which case immunity could 
be accorded. Are these recommendations i n r e a l i t y adequate to 
solve a l l the i n t r a c t a b l e problems which had to be considered i n 
the I Congreso case? The answer must be i n the negative i n so 
f a r as Cuba did not enter i n t o any c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p with 
1 3 3Trendtex v. C e n t r a l Bank of N i g e r i a (1977) Q 529, 
Czarnikow Ltd. v. Rolimpex (1979) AC 351; I Congreso d e l Partido 
(1983) 1 AC 244; De Sanchez v. Banco C e n t r a l de Nicaragua (1985) 
5th C i r c u i t 770 F.2d 1385; The Uganda Co. v. The Government of 
Uganda (1979) 1 Lloyds Rep 481. 
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the cargo owners i n respect of the Marble Islands and the 
d e c i s i o n not to d e l i v e r the cargo was prompted by p o l i t i c a l 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n because of the right-wing coup which took place i n 
C h i l e a t t h a t time. The d e c i s i o n by Cuba not to d e l i v e r the 
cargo t h e r e f o r e was an a c t of s t a t e which for some obvious 
reasons destroyed the sugar c o n t r a c t . I t i s submitted that the 
government of Cuba's i n s t r u c t i o n s i n t h i s respect cannot be 
disobeyed and anyone who dares to disobey i t w i l l c e r t a i n l y be 
v i s i t e d by punishment. In sum, the Cuban action was acta jure 
Imperii and i t would have been apposite as was suggested by Goff 
J , a t f i r s t i n s t a n c e i f the controversy were r e f e r r e d to 
a r b i t r a t i o n f o r the s a i d Cuban a c t i o n could be c h a r a c t e r i s e d as 
a " t a k i n g , " and therefore was not per se v i o l a t i v e of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. The House of Lords, i t would appear, r e l i e d 
on the c l a i m s a g a i n s t the Empire I r a n case and other important 
ca s e s without taking i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n the p r a c t i c a l 
a c t u a l i t i e s of l i f e and thus l o s t the opportunity of bringing to 
the fore a l l the complicated i s s u e s which were as s o c i a t e d with 
the I Congreso case. 
I n C. Czarnikow Ltd. v. Rolimpex, 1 3 4 a P o l i s h s t a t e t r a d i n g 
o r g a n i s a t i o n adequately adjudged of having an independent l e g a l 
p e r s o n a l i t y and thus f r e e of governmental control entered i n t o a 
c o n t r a c t f o r the s a l e of 200,000 metric tons of sugar with an 
E n g l i s h company. The c o n t r a c t terms incorporated r u l e 18(a), "of 
which the force majeure c l a u s e provided that i f d e l i v e r y was 
1 3 4 (19 7 9) AC 351. 
467 
prevented i n t e r a l i a , by 'government i n t e r v e n t i o n . . . beyond 
the s e l l e r ' s c o n t r o l ' the c o n t r a c t would be v o i d without 
penalty." Rule 21 made the s e l l e r r e s p o n s i b l e i n r e s p e c t of 
obtaining the necessary export l i c e n c e and t h a t f a i l u r e to 
procure such l i c e n c e s should not be construed as a defence under 
the force majeure doctrine. Due to f l o o d and heavy r a i n i n 
1974, the expected y i e l d of sugar h a r v e s t f e l l below expectation 
and t h e r e f o r e the government intervened by i s s u i n g a decree 
banning a l l exports from the country i n order to prevent s e r i o u s 
shortages of sugar i n Poland. Rolimpex thereupon i n r e l i a n c e on 
the force majeure clause i n the c o n t r a c t e x p r e s s l y communicated 
to Czarnikow Ltd. that as a r e s u l t of governmental i n t e r v e n t i o n 
beyond i t s control, i t cannot f u l f i l the c o n t r a c t u a l o b l i g a t i o n 
of s e l l i n g the 200,000 metric tons of sugar p r e v i o u s l y agreed 
upon. Czarnikow was not persuaded by the argument p o s i t e d by 
Rolimpex and therefore argued t h a t Rolimpex by every measure was 
very c l o s e to the P o l i s h government and t h a t i t was simply 
untenable for i t to hide behind the a c t i v i t y of the P o l i s h s t a t e 
in order to avoid l i a b i l i t y . The d i s p u t e was r e f e r r e d to 
a r b i t r a t i o n i n London, but a f t e r a c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the 
i s s u e s , the a r b i t r a t o r s unanimously found f o r Rolimpex on the 
strength of A r t i c l e 18(a) which provided force majeure as a 
defence. On an appeal Lord Denning reasoned as f o l l o w s : 
" t h a t no 'governmental i n t e r v e n t i o n ' i s beyond the s e l l e r ' s 
c o n t r o l : because the s e l l e r , being the government, can always 
e x e r c i s e c ontrol over i t s own i n t e r v e n t i o n . I t can i n t e r v e n e or 
not, as i t p l e a s e s . T h i s i s a t e l l i n g argument when the 
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government i t s e l f i s a party: a t any r a t e when i t intervenes so 
as to escape i t s own o b l i g a t i o n s under the c o n t r a c t . I t cannot 
r e l y on a s e l f - i n d u c e d ' i n t e r v e n t i o n ' any more than i t could 
r e l y on a s e l f - i n d u c e d f r u s t r a t i o n . " 1 3 5 
He continued by r u l i n g i n favour of Rolimpex thus: 
" I would say the same a l s o , as a matter of E n g l i s h law, by which 
these c o n t r a c t s a r e governed. 
I am of opinion, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t Rolimpex can r e l y on the 
ban on e x p o r t s as 'government i n t e r v e n t i o n ' beyond s e l l e r ' s 
c o n t r o l . " 1 3 6 
Rolimpex again won the case on the strength of i t s 
argument t h a t i t had an independent l e g a l p e r s o n a l i t y t o t a l l y 
f r e e from government c o n t r o l . Thus anything short of that could 
defeat i t s quest t h a t i t be r e l i e v e d of l i a b i l i t y . 
On a f u r t h e r appeal before the House of Lords, Lord 
Wilberforce as was expected r u l e d i n favour of Rolimpex because 
of the s a i d decree banning export of sugar from Poland. 
"The independence of Rolimpex from government i s i n my 
opinion amply demonstrated by the f a c t s s e t out a t length i n the 
award. Together with a l l four l e a r n e d judges who have 
c o n s i d e r e d t h i s p o i n t , I f i n d the c o n c l u s i o n c l e a r , and I 
t h e r e f o r e h o l d t h a t the s e l l e r makes good the contention that 
t h e r e was governmental i n t e r v e n t i o n w i t h i n r u l e 18. " 1 3 7 
What i s d i s c e r n i b l e i n the Court of Appeals' judgment and 
t h a t of the House of Lords' judgment i s that Rolimpex was 
without doubt an e n t i t y c l e a r l y independent of P o l i s h 
governmental c o n t r o l and therefore could not p o s s i b l y be held 
1 3 5 (1978) 1 Q 194. 
1 3 6 I b i d . a t p. 195. 
1 3 7 (19 7 9) AC 364. 
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responsible f o r a self-induced i n t e r v e n t i o n s i n c e i t was not 
part of the P o l i s h s t a t e . And i t would simply be untenable to 
argue that Rolimpex might have conspired with the P o l i s h s t a t e 
to i n s t i t u t e the export c o n t r o l . A f t e r a l l , what would Rolimpex 
gain by g e t t i n g involved i n such a c o l l u s i o n ? S i n c e i t became 
c l e a r from the outset that i t entered i n t o the s a l e c o n t r a c t i n 
order to make p r o f i t which i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t i e s would help 
promote i t s f i n a n c i a l standing. C e r t a i n l y any f i n d i n g s of 
conspiracy between Rolimpex and the P o l i s h s t a t e w i l l completely 
destroy i t s chances of winning the case. But the dilemma here 
i s that even i f there were a conspiracy i t would be very 
d i f f i c u l t to prove i n view of the s e n s i t i v e nature of such an 
offence and the s t a t e involved would do whatever i t takes to 
avoid being placed i n f a l s e l i g h t by covering up. 
Lord Denning i n the Court of Appeal o f f e r e d an e x c e l l e n t 
a n a l y s i s of the law by l a y i n g bare the e s s e n t i a l d i s t i n c t i o n 
between governmental a c t i v i t y and what c o n s t i t u t e s p u b l i c good 
i n the eyes of the law and those which may be prompted by the 
u l t e r i o r motive of the s t a t e , but i n the end, the l e a r n e d judge 
s h i f t e d h i s emphasis by having regard to the underlying 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between Rolimpex and the P o l i s h s t a t e , thus 
d i v e r t i n g a t t e n t i o n from the general method by which to i d e n t i f y 
the s u b j e c t matter i n regard to the determination of the 
competence of municipal courts. Perhaps i t would have been 
expedient i f Rolimpex was d i s t i n g u i s h e d from Cubazucar v. 
I a n a , 1 3 8 s i n c e the f a c t s of these cases do not d i f f e r i n any 
1 3 8 (19 8 3) ILR 64. 
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measure. Such an approach, one would suppose, would i n e f f e c t 
b ring to the fore c e r t a i n s a l i e n t i s s u e s that could help shed 
l i g h t on i n s t a n c e s where the a c t of s t a t e doctrine i n t e r a c t s or 
overlaps with the d o c t r i n e of s t a t e immunity. The heart of the 
matter i s t h a t any time the a c t of s t a t e doctrine i n t e r s e c t s 
with s t a t e immunity the problems of mixed a c t i v i t i e s of s t a t e s 
are c r e a t e d where p o l i t i c a l and commercial a c t i v i t i e s become 
i n e x t r i c a b l y i n t e r t w i n e d , arguably g i v i n g r i s e to d i f f i c u l t i e s 
r e s p e c t i n g the d e l i m i t a t i o n of the scope of s t a t e a c t i v i t i e s . 
The a p p l i c a t i o n of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity to mixed 
a c t i v i t i e s of s t a t e s has created a l o t of d i f f i c u l t i e s for 
judges, i n as much as the a c t i v i t i e s i n i s s u e were taken within 
the borders of the defendant s t a t e . 1 3 9 How i s the scope of such 
a c t i v i t i e s to be d e l i m i t e d so as to a f f o r d municipal courts the 
opportunity to c l a s s i f y such a c t i v i t i e s ? W i l l the municipal 
court be persuaded to f o l l o w the two-part conditions of having 
regard to immunity ratione personae as w e l l as immunity ratione 
materiae, or be trapped by other r e l e v a n t p o l i t i c a l reasons to 
only consider the u n d e r l y i n g force of immunity ratione materiae? 
Any misplaced attempt to consider one or the other f a c t o r 
independently would c r e a t e confusion i n respect of i d e n t i f y i n g 
the nature of the t r a n s a c t i o n to the person of the sovereign 
s t a t e i f , for example, the a c t i v i t y i n question may have been 
1 3 9Uganda Co. (Holdings) Ltd. v. The Government of Uganda 
(1979) 1 Lloyds Law Reports 481 at 488; IAM v. OPEC (1981) 649 
F.2d at 1359; S p o c i l v. Crowe (1974) 480 F.2d 614; I Congreso 
(1983) 1 AC 244; De Sanchez v. Banco C e n t r a l de Nicaragua (1985) 
5th C i r c u i t 770 F.2d 1384. 
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performed by a p o l i t i c a l subdivision or a c e n t r a l bank of the 
sovereign s a t e . 1 4 0 Or where there i s a c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n i n the 
sequence of events that a p r i v a t e person or an e n t i t y w i t h an 
independent l e g a l p e r s o n a l i t y with a de j u r e a u t h o r i t y might 
have been involved and therefore could be impleaded. The 
problem becomes more complicated s i n c e the i s s u e more o f t e n than 
not would have to be considered qua an executive decree or a 
l e g i s l a t i v e a c t i o n which might have adversely a f f e c t e d a given 
commercial agreement. In t h i s case can a defendant s t a t e or 
s t a t e e n t i t y argue the act of s t a t e d o c t r i n e to avoid being 
l i a b l e ? I n many cases o f f i c i a l s of f o r e i g n s t a t e s have argued 
tha t as a r e s u l t of i n t e r n a l c r i s i s or the d i s c r e t i o n a l f u n c t i o n 
exception, municipal courts cannot review executive p o l i c y 
d e c i s i o n s of s t a t e s . Can a foreign s t a t e t h e r e f o r e be impleaded 
f o r a planned p o l i c y d e c i s i o n which has v i o l a t e d the terms of a 
co n t r a c t signed with a p r i v a t e e n t i t y ? What i f such pubic 
p o l i c i e s have adversely a f f e c t e d a c o n t r a c t which has duly been 
concluded by a s t a t e agency with an independent l e g a l 
p e r s o n a l i t y , e.g., the Rolimpex case or the Ugandan Co. 
(Holdings) Ltd. case? The answer may be no. 1 4 1 What about an 
o p e r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n taken by a c e n t r a l bank or a s u b s i d i a r y 
organ of the s t a t e ? To answer a question of t h i s nature, one 
1 4 0 (19 6 0 ) 7 Netherlands I n t . Law Reports 399. However, on 
appeal a d i f f e r e n t d e c i s i o n was handed down. Med. J u r i s p r u d e n c e 
1959 o. 164. 
1 4 1Recent d e c i s i o n s seemed to be g r a v i t a t i n g i n a c c o r d i n g 
complete immunity. Rolimpex, Uganda Holding and De Sanchez 
cases are good examples. 
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must f i r s t determine as to whether there was any room for p u b l i c 
p o l i c y a n a l y s i s or judgment a t the executive l e v e l . 1 4 2 Thus i f 
there was room, then the d e c i s i o n can wholly be c h a r a c t e r i s e d as 
d i s c r e t i o n a r y and t h e r e f o r e duly occasioned by the need to 
promote p u b l i c good, 1 4 3 i n which case the doctrine of a c t of 
s t a t e or sovereign immunity can be o f f e r e d as a defence or the 
defendant s t a t e could p l e a d t h a t the domestic court has no 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . Where the a c t of s t a t e d o c t r i n e overlaps with the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity such as i n Rolimpex, i t i s 
appropriate or l e g a l l y f e a s i b l e to f i r s t consider the sovereign 
immunity i s s u e s i n the case before t a c k l i n g the a c t of s t a t e 
problems. And the r a t i o n a l e behind such a suggestion i s that 
sovereign immunity i s not merely an a f f i r m a t i v e defence but 
j u r i s d i c t i o n a l i n some r e s p e c t s as w e l l . Thus the i s s u e 
respecting j u r i s d i c t i o n must f i r s t be considered before regard 
be had to the a c t of s t a t e d o c t r i n e which precludes or s h i e l d s 
the i n t e r n a l laws or e x e c u t i v e p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s of a foreign 
s t a t e from i n t r u s i v e judgment or s c r u t i n y . Such an approach 
would allow the judge to determine whether the a c t i v i t y of the 
s t a t e was o p e r a t i o n a l or a d i s c r e t i o n a r y (planning) d e c i s i o n , 
and t h i s would remove an important hurdle of making the i s s u e s 
c l e a r e r thus paving the way f o r the judge to ask the r i g h t 
1 4 2 A s s o c i a t i o n de Reclamantes v. United Mexican States 
(1983) DDC 561 F.Supp. 1190, 1198; D a l e h i t e v. United States 
(1953) 97 LED 1427; De Sanchez v. Banco C e n t r a l de Nicaragua 
(1985) 5th C i r . 770 F.2d 1385. 
1 4 3DeSanchez v. Banco C e n t r a l de Nicaragua (1985) 770 F.2d 
1385. 
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questions. In Rolimpex, a P o l i s h s t a t e t r a d i n g o r g a n i s a t i o n 
which was adjudged independent of the Po l i s h s t a t e was sued f o r 
f a i l i n g to honour i t s con t r a c t u a l o b l i g a t i o n because of an 
unexpected u n i l a t e r a l d e c i s i o n taken by the P o l i s h s t a t e a t a 
higher executive l e v e l on November 5, 1974. The r e s o l u t i o n of 
the Council of M i n i s t e r s to ban sugar export d i d not v i o l a t e 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law because the decree was passed i n order to 
prevent shortage of sugar i n Poland since there was a s h o r t f a l l 
of the projected amount required to s a t i s f y l o c a l demand. The 
r e s o l u t i o n of the Council of Ministers was taken pursuant to the 
c r i t i c a l executive function of a l l o c a t i n g l i m i t e d r e s ources, 
i . e . , the sugar i n question. The Poli s h decree t h e r e f o r e made 
export of sugar i l l e g a l and thus destroyed the c o n t r a c t u a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between Czarnikow and Rolimpex. I n these 
circumstances any attempt by Rolimpex to export sugar would 
simply amount to the v i o l a t i o n of the November 5, 1971, decree 
and i t would be l o g i c a l l y untenable to sue or deny j u s t i c e to 
Rolimpex f or having been adversely a f f e c t e d by the P o l i s h 
decree, i . e . , when there i s evidence to a t t e s t to the decree 
being put i n place for the pu b l i c good. At t h i s point Rolimpex 
could argue the a c t of s t a t e doctrine s i n c e the decree was 
l a w f u l but made the export of sugar i l l e g a l . Thus i n the 
absence of the decree, Rolimpex would have honoured i t s 
c o n t r a c t u a l o b l i g a t i o n s . Both the Court of Appeal and the House 
of Lords r e l i e d on the r e l a t i o n s h i p between Rolimpex and the 
P o l i s h s t a t e to di s m i s s Czarnikow's claim and t h e i r r a t i o n a l e 
f o r doing so seems to be predicated on the ground t h a t Rolimpex 
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being an independent Polxsh s t a t e o r g a n i s a t i o n , s u f f i c i e n t l y 
free from governmental c o n t r o l , could r e l y on the ban, i . e . , 
force majeure, as a p r o t e c t i v e s h i e l d to avoid being l i a b l e . 
Lord Denning i n h i s judgment touched on the governmental 
intervention thus: 
" I cannot t h i n k they should be made l i a b l e i n t h a t 
s i t u a t i o n — w h e n there was a b s o l u t e l y nothing they could do. 
They had done e v e r y t h i n g t h a t the c o n t r a c t r e q u i r e d them to do. 
I t was only the b a n — t h a t i s , the governmental i n t e r v e n t i o n — 
which prevented the shipment. I t was a c l e a r case of f o r c e 
majeure. They were excused from l i a b i l i t y f or i t by r u l e 
18(a) ," 1 4 4 
Lord Wilberforce a l s o followed about the same argument. 1 4 5 
But the question worth asking i s what becomes of the case i f 
Rolimpex were a department of the P o l i s h s t a t e ? The r e s u l t 
could have been the same s i n c e Rolimpex could hide behind the 
act of s t a t e d o c t r i n e to a v o i d l i a b i l i t y . Or the P o l i s h 
Government could invoke the d i s c r e t i o n a r y function exemption as 
a defence i n as much as the d e c i s i o n to pass the decree was 
taken at the highest l e v e l of government, with the u l t i m a t e aim 
of a r r e s t i n g the shortage of sugar i n Poland. T h i s means t h a t 
Rolimpex could e i t h e r put f o r t h the a c t of s t a t e or the 
sovereign immunity defence i f t h e r e i s evidence to prove th a t i t 
i s a s u b s i d i a r y organ of the P o l i s h s t a t e . I t cannot, however, 
argue that i t be accorded immunity i f i t i s not a s t a t e e n t i t y 
i n view of the f a c t t h a t sovereign immunity i s not a v a i l a b l e to 
a p r i v a t e party. 
1 4 4 (1978) QBB 197. 
1 4 5 (1979) AC 364. 
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A c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the preceding argument would 
show t h a t i t would be d i f f i c u l t i f not confusing to c a r r y the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis 
i n t o the domain of an act of s t a t e , thus applying the concept of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity to defeat the attempt by defendant s t a t e s 
to plead the a c t of s t a t e d o c t r i n e as a prote c t i v e s h i e l d . And 
i t i s e q u a l l y confusing i f a p r i v a t e party argues the a c t of 
s t a t e d o c t r i n e because an executive order or decree has a f f e c t e d 
or prevented i t s a b i l i t y to perform. In National American 
Corporation v. Federal Republic of N i g e r i a , 1 4 6 the Republic of 
N i g e r i a and the C e n t r a l Bank were j o i n t l y sued for a f a i l e d 
cement c o n t r a c t . N i g e r i a i n turn f i e r c e l y challenged the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of the f e d e r a l court by of f e r i n g sovereign immunity 
and the a c t of s t a t e defence on the merits. Can i t be s a i d t h a t 
the court was r i g h t i n d i s m i s s i n g Nigeria's defence? A c a r e f u l 
examination of the i s s u e s shows c l e a r l y that the court e r r e d on 
c e r t a i n important i s s u e s , i . e . , the decision taken i n N i g e r i a to 
avoid congestion a t the Lagos Harbour and the f a c t t h a t the 
cou r t concentrated on the nature of the tr a n s a c t i o n i n s t e a d of 
the breach. National American Corporation and Trendtex to some 
extent were wrongly decided, f or i t i s not easy to come up with 
an adequate reason why immunity be denied to N i g e r i a f o r 
in t r o d u c i n g a system of import c o n t r o l to ease the congestion a t 
the Lagos harbour. I t would have been expedient i f the 
ex e c u t i v e order was c h a r a c t e r i s e d as representing the 
1 4 6 (19 7 8 ) 4 4 8 F.Supp. 622. 
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implementation of N i g e r i a ' s domestic economic p o l i c y and 
t h e r e f o r e q u a l i f i e s as a d i s c r e t i o n a r y f u n c t i o n exception 
because i t was not operation but r a t h e r taken for the p u b l i c 
good. To deny immunity to such h i g h - l e v e l p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s w i l l 
c e r t a i n l y be doing i n j u s t i c e to the people of N i g e r i a and simply 
undermining the t h r u s t and purpose of the r u l e of s t a t e immunity 
and " d i s c r e t i o n a r y function exemption." I t could have been 
appropriate i f the controversy were r e f e r r e d to a r b i t r a t i o n . 
I t i s i n s t r u c t i v e to s t r e s s t h a t although sovereign 
immunity and the a c t of s t a t e d o c t r i n e are somewhat 
i n t e r r e l a t e d , they c e r t a i n l y operate on d i f f e r e n t planes wholly 
influenced by d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l and l e g a l f a c t o r s which cannot 
be ignored or swept under the carpet f o r i t would appear the act 
of s t a t e doctrine i s more s l a n t e d towards p r i v a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law than public i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. The suggestion i n A l f r e d 
D u n h i l l of London I n c . v. Republic of Cuba 1 4 7 t h a t the a b s t r a c t 
d i s t i n c t i o n between commercial and non-commercial a c t i v i t i e s of 
s t a t e s be c a r r i e d i n t o the domain of a c t of s t a t e with the 
underlying r a t i o n a l e t h a t the a c t of s t a t e d o c t r i n e l i k e the 
sovereign immunity should not f r e e the f o r e i g n sovereign i f 
t h e r e i s evidence i t has acted i n a commercial cap a c i t y , thus 
j u s t i f y i n g the commercial exception argument, i s fundamentally 
flawed since such d i s t i n c t i o n s have v a r i e d connotations and 
fraught with d i f f i c u l t i e s . I t i s suggested by the present 
w r i t e r that such attempts to e n g r a f t the concept of sovereign 
1 4 7 (19 7 6) 125 U 682. I n t h i s case Cuba s p e c i f i c a l l y o f f e r e d 
i n her defence the act of s t a t e d o c t r i n e . 
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immunity on the doctrine of a c t of s t a t e are i l l conceived and 
t h e r e f o r e must be discouraged. I t would rather be meaningful 
and rewarding i f the r e l a t i o n s h i p between these two concepts i s 
p e r i o d i c a l l y reviewed and analysed as a prelude to r e s o l v i n g 
some of the i n t r a c t a b l e problems a s s o c i a t e d with the d o c t r i n e s 
of a c t of s t a t e and sovereign immunity. 
F i n a l Remarks 
I n order to promote the uniformity of s t a t e p r a c t i c e and 
thereby a i d the process of c o d i f i c a t i o n , the above i s s u e s must 
be thoroughly explored and c a r e f u l l y analysed, taking i n t o 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n the views of every s t a t e on the subject. Although 
such an approach or a s p i r a t i o n i s of a t a l l order, at l e a s t i t 
would c r e a t e a common ground for other e l u s i v e i s s u e s i n respect 
of s t a t e immunity, such as the ownership, possession and 
c o n t r o l , 1 4 8 execution of s t a t e p r o p e r t y , 1 4 9 the act of s t a t e 
d o c t r i n e , and such other i s s u e s r e l a t i n g to r u l e s and 
e x c e p t i o n s , 1 5 0 to be adequately studied, for c o d i f i c a t i o n i s 
f r u s t r a t i n g and time consuming and therefore must be approached 
e c l e c t i c a l l y so as to avoid the d i f f i c u l t i e s normally a s s o c i a t e d 
1 4 8 H a i l e S e l a s s i e v. Cable and Wireless Ltd. (1938) 1 Ch 545 
No. 1; Juan Ysmael (1955) AC 72. 
1 4 9Arab Republic of Egypt v. C i n e t e l e v i s i o n I n t . (1983) ILR 
65 430; Alcom Ltd. v. Republic of Colombia (1984) AC 580; 
Hispano Americana Mercantil SA v. C e n t r a l Bank of Nigeria (1979) 
2 L l o r d s Rep 277; P h i l i p p i n e Embassy Case (1977) B Verf GE 46, 
342, 399. 
1 5 0 S e e R. Higgins, C e r t a i n Unresolved Aspects of the Law of 
S t a t e Immunity, op. c i t . , pp. 270-77. 
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with the p r i n c i p l e pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt—meaning 
a t r e a t y cannot confer o b l i g a t i o n s or b e n e f i t s on a s t a t e which 
has r e f u s e d to be a party to i t . The above observations are 
being made because the curren t law i s u n s e t t l e d and the 
a p p l i c a t i o n of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity simply l a c k s p r a c t i c a l 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s . 
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CHAPTER NINE 
THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
Int r o d u c t i o n 
I t i s f a r from c l e a r as to the curren t s t a t e of the law i n 
respect of customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. This may be p a r t l y due 
to the f a c t t h a t some w r i t e r s who have w r i t t e n on the subject 
were r a t h e r too eager to "take the helm while t o s s i n g overboard 
the compasses, s e x t a n t s , and other n a v i g a t i o n a l aids which 
c e n t u r i e s of e f f o r t have devised," 1 without f i r s t developing a 
s u i t a b l e method f o r r e s o l v i n g the problem. While others simply 
overloaded the d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity with a multitude 
of c o n f l i c t i n g t h e o r i e s to such heights as to completely 
transmute the s a i d s u b j e c t into a 'dismal swamp' of competing 
dogma and f a i l e d t h e o r i e s f a r removed from the r e a l i t i e s of 
l i f e . 
The t h e o r e t i c a l s o l u t i o n s devised by Belgian and I t a l i a n 
courts to c u r t a i l the immunity of s t a t e s i n the past were 
imperfect, and wholly conditioned on ad hoc b a s i s . And although 
t h i s hidden f l a w might w e l l have been detected somewhere along 
the l i n e , 2 no e f f o r t s were expended i n removing t h i s inherent 
d i f f i c u l t y , which to the present w r i t e r has caused so many 
d i f f i c u l t i e s , thus t a k i n g the development of the whole subject 
'•See A l f r e d H i l l (1960) 27 U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Law 
Review, p. 485. 
2 L a u t e r p a c h t , op. c i t . (the 1951 a r t i c l e i n the B r i t i s h 
yearbook). 
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as a hostage. C e r t a i n l y , no condition i s permanent, t h i n g s do 
change and i t i s expedient that a concerted e f f o r t be made to 
resolv e new problems with new s o l u t i o n s , thus d i s c o u n t i n g the 
use of obsolete incomplete t h e o r i e s i n the r e s o l u t i o n of 
i n t r a c t a b l e problems of today. There ought t h e r e f o r e to be 
emphasis properly placed on areas of c o n f l i c t i n g d o c t r i n e , the 
changing scope of s t a t e immunity, and evidence of s t a t e p r a c t i c e 
r e s p e c t i n g customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law r a t h e r than the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between commercial and non-commercial a c t i v i t i e s of 
s t a t e s . 
Some Thoughts on the Current State of the Law 
The maxim rex gratia dei, although p a t e n t l y obsolete, gave 
a l b e i t a f o r c e f u l j u s t i f i c a t i o n to the concept of sovereign 
immunity and t h i s somewhat prepared the way f o r sovereign 
immunity to f l o u r i s h i n t o a m e t a - j u r i d i c a l philosophy, i . e . , 
"the King can do no wrong."3 Each of these concepts, however, 
has an independent existence and the r e f o r e must not be confused 
i n respect to the present-day development of the concept of 
sovereignty. .Rex gratia dei was arguably an i n t e r n a l phenomenon 
which gave power to the King to i n t e r p r e t God's law. I n short, 
sovereign immunity i s the modern v e r s i o n of rex gratia dei. 
As a l r e a d y stated elsewhere, the d o c t r i n e of absolute 
immunity "obtained a foothold" i n t o American law i n 1812, 
through a p r i v a t e claim duly p r e f e r r e d a g a i n s t Napoleon before 
3Leon Hurwitz, The State as a Defendant--Governmental 
A c c o u n t a b i l i t y and the Redress of I n d i v i d u a l Grievances (1981), 
pp. 8-24. 
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American c o u r t s . 4 E v e r s i n c e that day the p o s i t i o n of the 
sovereign s t a t e was e l e v a t e d unto a higher plane where i t cannot 
be sued without i t s consent before municipal c o u r t s . Thus 
before the beginning of t h i s century sovereign immunity was 
absolute where immunity was granted i r r e s p e c t i v e of the 
a c t i v i t i e s of the s t a t e i n i s s u e . A f t e r the F i r s t World War 
onwards, however, the currency of absolute immunity has been 
reduced and thrown i n t o question. T h i s i n the main seemed to 
have prompted some common law c o u n t r i e s to r e s o r t to l e g i s l a t i o n 
i n order to c u r t a i l the immunity of s t a t e s before domestic 
courts. Although the d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i s the 
b r a i n c h i l d of c i v i l law c o u n t r i e s , i t i s s u r p r i s i n g to note 
that none of these c o u n t r i e s to date has embarked on introducing 
the d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i n t o i t s s t a t u t e book. A 
c a r e f u l review of European p r a c t i c e simply shows t h a t almost 
every Western European s t a t e now follows the r e s t r i c t i v e r u l e to 
some e x t e n t . 5 Recent trends a l s o show t h a t r e s t r i c t i v e immunity 
or r e l a t i v e immunity i s r e f l e c t e d i n the s t a t u t e books of the 
United S t a t e s , the United Kingdom, A u s t r a l i a , Canada, Pakistan, 
Singapore, and South A f r i c a . 6 There are c e r t a i n l y s i m i l a r i t i e s 
between the v a r i o u s n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n where primacy i s given 
to the nature t e s t i n every case w h i l s t the purpose t e s t i s 
4Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon (1812) 7 Cranch 
116. 
5 S i n c l a i r , The Law of Sovereign Immunity—Recent 
Developments, RC 167 1980 I I . 
6Brownlie, op. c i t . , pp. 323-345. 
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t o t a l l y r e j e c t e d . This arguably i s unfortunate because the 
r e j e c t i o n of the purpose t e s t i n r e a l i t y deprives the judge from 
asking the r i g h t questions l i k e l y to uncover the main i s s u e s and 
answers i n a given sovereign immunity controversy. E a r l i e r 
d o c t r i n a l developments i n Belgium and I t a l y 7 m i s t a k e n l y 
r e l e g a t e d to the background the purpose t e s t thus b l o c k i n g one 
aspect of the development of sovereign immunity, because the 
suggestion that the nature t e s t be accepted as the only 
c r i t e r i o n i n c l a s s i f y i n g commercial and non-commercial 
a c t i v i t i e s i s ex hypothesi flawed s i n c e any s e r i o u s 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the purpose t e s t qua s t a t e a c t i v i t i e s seemed to 
provide a more p o s i t i v e means of removing the attendant web of 
confusion i n e x p l a i n i n g the nature of a given t r a n s a c t i o n . For 
no one enters i n t o an agreement without f i r s t s e r i o u s l y 
considering the ob j e c t and purpose of the a c t or f a c t of 
agreeing. 
A Perspective Sketch of the Changing Scope of Sovereign Immunity 
A f t e r the Second World War the concept of ab s o l u t e 
immunity came under attack from many f r o n t s . While C o n t i n e n t a l 
European s t a t e s l e d the move i n promoting the c r y s t a l l i s a t i o n of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity, the common law cou n t r i e s i n the West took 
a more conservative view about the c a l l f o r change u n t i l the 
Tate l e t t e r was w r i t t e n and made known to the world. 8 
7 I b i d . at 327. 
8 (1952) 984 Dept. State B u l l . 26. This l e t t e r i n f a c t 
i n f l u e n c e d many c o u n t r i e s to also modulate t h e i r p o s i t i o n s , 
e.g., common law c o u n t r i e s . 
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The curre n t p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s seemed to be g r a v i t a t i n g 
towards a r u l e whereby f o r e i g n s t a t e s are allowed to enjoy some 
degree of s t a t e immunity as regards c e r t a i n a c t i v i t i e s a c t a jure 
imperii while s t a t e a c t i v i t i e s prima facie commercial i n outlook 
are denied immunity. Thus f o r a l o c a l court to take 
j u r i s d i c t i o n over a f o r e i g n s t a t e a d i s t i n c t i o n must be made 
between what i s a commercial a c t i v i t y and what a c t i v i t i e s f a l l 
within the confines of acta jure imperii. Although the s a i d 
approach leaves much to be d e s i r e d , a t l e a s t for now, most 
Western co u n t r i e s have r e s i g n e d to following i t , coupled with 
the c l a r i o n c a l l t h a t the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity be accepted, 
without f i r s t t a k i n g pains to c o n s i d e r i t s m e r i t s . So f a r the 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity has been embraced by courts i n more than 
twenty c o u n t r i e s . 9 And i t would appear some other s t a t e s are 
also w i l l i n g to follow the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i n p r i n c i p l e . 1 0 
Although the number of c o u n t r i e s moving towards t h i s p r i n c i p l e 
seemed not t h a t c l e a r , a t l e a s t some eleven more co u n t r i e s 
appear to support the s a i d d o c t r i n e . 1 1 The current l e g a l 
p o s i t i o n of some s t a t e s as regards r e s t r i c t i v e immunity can be 
stated thus: 
(1) Any a c t i v i t y of a s t a t e t h a t could be c h a r a c t e r i s e d as 
acta jure gestionis would not be accorded immunity. 
9Brownlie, op. c i t . , 326-328. 
1 0 I b i d . a t 328. 
n I b i d . 
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(2) A c o n t r a c t of employment signed between a sending s t a t e 
and a n a t u r a l person to be performed i n the t e r r i t o r y of 
the r e c e i v i n g s t a t e may not be accorded immunity. That 
i s , i f the work i n question i s wholly or p a r t l y to be 
performed w i t h i n the r e c e i v i n g s t a t e . 
(3) Any i n t e r e s t c l e a r l y d i s c e r n i b l e i n the possession or the 
use of immovable property by a foreign s t a t e , e.g., i n the 
United Kingdom would not a t t r a c t immunity (UK Act 1978 
Section 6(1) (a)) . 
(4) Any a c t or omission respecting death or personal i n j u r y 
caused by the o f f i c i a l s of a sending s t a t e i n the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of a r e c e i v i n g s t a t e s h a l l be denied 
immunity. 
(5) Any o b l i g a t i o n a r i s i n g out of an agreement r e s p e c t i n g 
i n t e r e s t i n or possession and use of property i n the 
r e c e i v i n g s t a t e would not be accorded immunity (UK 
l e g i s l a t i o n S e c t i o n 6 ( 1 ) ( b ) , see Intpro P r o p e r t i e s UK L t d 
v. Sauvel (1983) QB 1016). 
(6) An infringement by a foreign s t a t e i n the forum s t a t e of 
any patent, trademark and copyright laws would not a t t r a c t 
immunity i n the forum s t a t e . 
(7) An important exception to s t a t e immunity can be found i n 
Section 3 of the 1978 UK Act: Section three, for example, 
reads as f o l l o w s : 
"A s t a t e i s not immune as respects proceedings 
r e l a t i n g to (a) a commercial t r a n s a c t i o n entered 
i n t o by the s t a t e or (b) an o b l i g a t i o n of the s t a t e 
which by v i r t u e of a contract (whether a commercial 
t r a n s a c t i o n or not) f a l l s to be performed wholly or 
p a r t l y i n the United Kingdom." 
A state cannot claim immunity i f i t enters i n t o an 
agreement i n the formation of a company w i t h a n a t u r a l 
person or l e g a l e n t i t y having i t s seat a t the forum s t a t e . 
Thus Section (3) of the 1978 UK Act, f o r example, defines 
commercial t r a n s a c t i o n as f o l l o w s : 
" (a) Any c o n t r a c t f o r the supply of goods and 
s e r v i c e s . 
(b) Any loan or other t r a n s a c t i o n f o r the p r o v i s i o n of 
finance and any guarantee or indemnity i n r e s p e c t of any 
such t r a n s a c t i o n or of any other f i n a n c i a l o b l i g a t i o n ; 
and 
(c) Any other t r a n s a c t i o n or a c t i v i t y (whether of a 
commercial, i n d u s t r i a l , f i n a n c i a l , p r o f e s s i o n a l or other 
s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r i n t o which a s t a t e e n t e r s or i n which 
i t engages otherwise than i n the e x e r c i s e of sovereign 
a u t h o r i t y . " 
The 1972 European Convention also confirms the 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity and the p r i n c i p a l p r o v i s i o n of 
i n t e r e s t runs as f o l l o w s ( i . e . , A r t i c l e 6 ) : 
"(1) A c o n t r a c t i n g s t a t e cannot c l a i m immunity 
from the j u r i s d i c t i o n of a c o u r t of another 
c o n t r a c t i n g s t a t e i f i t p a r t i c i p a t e s w i t h one or 
more p r i v a t e persons i n a company, a s s o c i a t i o n or 
other l e g a l e n t i t y having i t s s e a t , r e g i s t e r e d 
o f f i c e or p r i n c i p a l p l a c e of b u s i n e s s on the 
t e r r i t o r y of the s t a t e of the forum, and the 
proceedings concern the r e l a t i o n s h i p , i n matters 
a r i s i n g out of the p a r t i c i p a t i o n between the s t a t e 
on the one hand and the e n t i t y or any other 
p a r t i c i p a n t on the other hand. 
(2) Paragraph 1 s h a l l not apply i f i t i s otherwise 
agreed i n w r i t i n g . " 
Section 28 USC 1330 of the FSIA, f o r example, 
c l e a r l y confers j u r i s d i c t i o n on f e d e r a l courts 
respecting matters concerning s u i t s against f o r e i g n 
sovereign s t a t e s . Section 1604 covers instances 
where immunity could be claimed by sovereign states, 
while exceptions t o immunity are set out under 
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sections 1605-1607, 1605 and 1605 wit h some f l e x i b l e 
reference t o j u r i s d i c t i o n a l issues qua the p o s i t i o n 
of f o r e i g n states, e.g., the due process clause. 
Section 1605 (a)2 under the FSIA, f o r example, 
defines commercial a c t i v i t y thus: 
"A commercial a c t i v i t y means e i t h e r a r e g u l a r 
course of commercial conduct or a p a r t i c u l a r 
commercial t r a n s a c t i o n or a c t . The commercial 
c h a r a c t e r of an a c t i v i t y s h a l l be determined by 
r e f e r e n c e to the nature of the course of conduct or 
p a r t i c u l a r t r a n s a c t i o n or a c t , ra t h e r than by 
r e f e r e n c e to i t s purpose." 
The United States l e g i s l a t i o n i s not d i s s i m i l a r 
t o the UK State Immunity Act, i n respect of Section 
5, which provides t h a t "(a) death or personal i n j u r y ; 
or (b) damage t o or a loss of tangible property 
caused by an act or omission i n the United Kingdom" 
may not be accorded immunity. Section 13 of the 
A u s t r a l i a n Foreign States Immunities Act (1985); 
Section 6 of the Canadian State Immunity Act (1982); 
Section 7 of the Singapore State Immunity Act (1979); 
and Section 6 of the South A f r i c a n Foreign State 
Immunity Act (1981) a l l f o l l o w about the same 
p r i n c i p l e s l a i d down both i n the American l e g i s l a t i o n 
and the United Kingdom l e g i s l a t i o n , r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
The c u r r e n t s t a t e of the law, however, i s not s e t t l e d i n 
the areas of waiver of immunity and the execution forcee 
as regards the property of a sovereign s t a t e . I t i s 
submitted t h a t under general i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, a 
p r o v i s i o n made i n a contract based on the meeting of the 
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minds (consensus ad idem), w i t h a p r i v a t e e n t i t y 
specifying t h a t the co n t r a c t be governed by a p a r t i c u l a r 
law cannot be construed as a waiver o f immunity (§ 2(2) 
the UK Act 1978). The current law t h e r e f o r e supports a 
method whereby a waiver i s f o r m e r l y procured through 
competent organs of a s t a t e . Thus immunity from execution 
forcee and saisie conservatoire, must be d i s t i n g u i s h e d i n 
clear terms as regards the person of the s t a t e and the 
adjudicatory procedures respecting s t a t e p r o p e r t y i n order 
t o avoid confusion. But i t would appear t h i s web of 
confusion s t i l l remains thus c r e a t i n g a f l o o d of 
c o n f l i c t i n g state p r a c t i c e . 1 2 True, s t a t e p r a c t i c e since 
the 19th century up t o the F i r s t World War seemed t o be 
f a i r l y uniform but ever since the d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity found i t s way onto the i n t e r n a t i o n a l plane, some 
countries have refused t o grant immunity from enforcement 
measures, while others e n t e r t a i n the view of according 
absolute immunity, thus s t i l l w i l l i n g t o f o l l o w the o l d 
order. A c a r e f u l review of a l l the n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n 
c u r r e n t l y i n place shows t h a t the 1976 immunity acts of 
the US, i . e . , Section 1610(a), the UK Act of 1978 Section 
13(4), the Canadian Act Section 11(1), only accord 
immunity i n respect of s t a t e p r o p e r t y being used f o r 
public purposes. South A f r i c a , Singapore and Pakistan 
Acts, undoubtedly also f o l l o w a s i m i l a r approach alluded 
12See The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commissions Reports, 1978-1988. 
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t o above by according immunity only i n respect of stat e 
a c t i v i t i e s where the use of s t a t e property f a l l s w i t h i n 
the confines of acta jure imperii. A country such as 
former USSR, i . e . Russia, before 1990 granted absolute 
immunity i n the spheres of enforcement measures. And i t 
i s q u i t e c l e a r China, B r a z i l , Chile and Syria also f o l l o w 
the absolute sovereign immunity r u l e . Before the 1992 
c i v i l war or when a c t i v e antagonism took place i n 
S o c i a l i s t Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, there was 
evidence t o support the f a c t t h a t S o c i a l i s t Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia also supported the grant of 
absolute immunity from enforcement measures. But ever 
since the war, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's p o s i t i o n 
has become obscure. 
(10) The question r e l a t i n g t o the grant of immunity t o 
sub d i v i s i o n s of states i s not c l e a r c u t and over the years 
has proved t o be q u i t e e l u s i v e . I n other words, there i s 
no uniform s t a t e p r a c t i c e respecting immunity ratione 
personae of p o l i t i c a l subdivisions, m u n i c i p a l i t i e s , 
regions or c o n s t i t u e n t states of a federal government. 
Under the UK Act of 1978, A r t i c l e 14, § 2, 
"A sepa r a t e e n t i t y i s immune from the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the 
c o u r t s of the United S t a t e s i f , and only i f (a) the 
proceedings r e l a t e to anything done by i t i n the e x e r c i s e 
of s o v e r e i g n a u t h o r i t y and (b) the circumstances are such 
t h a t a s t a t e (or, i n the case of proceedings to which 
S e c t i o n 10 above a p p l i e s , a s t a t e which i s not a party to 
the B r u s s e l s Convention) would have been so immune." 
"(3 ) I f a separate e n t i t y (not being a s t a t e ' s c e n t r a l 
bank or other monetary a u t h o r i t y submits to the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n i n r e s p e c t of proceedings i n the case of 
which i t i s e n t i t l e d to immunity by v i r t u e of Section 
(2) above s u b s e c t i o n (1) to 4 of S e c t i o n 13 above s h a l l 
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apply to i t i n r e s p e c t of those proceedings as i f 
references to a s t a t e were r e f e r e n c e s to t h a t e n t i t y . " 
Although the above 1978 UK Act Section (14) appears 
to o f f e r some help, there i s s t i l l some d i f f i c u l t y i n 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between what i s a s t a t e e n t i t y and what i s 
not. The problem i s even exacerbated because subsidiary 
organs of states perform d i f f e r e n t a c t i v i t i e s , which i n 
r e a l i t y d i f f e r from country t o country, thus i t i s q u i t e 
d i f f i c u l t to formulate a general formula geared towards 
the r e s o l u t i o n of problems r e l a t i n g t o s t a t e e n t i t i e s as 
regards the granting of immunity. The European Convention 
A r t . 27 denies immunity t o any e n t i t y w i t h an independent 
p e r s o n a l i t y from the s t a t e , which i n the main can sue and 
be sued. The question t o grapple w i t h , however, i s 
whether the dual t e s t s p e c i f i e d under A r t . 27 of the 
European Convention i s adequate. Perhaps i t could open 
the way f o r some p e r t i n e n t questions t o be asked. 
However, a f t e r t h i s p o i n t , the whole subject matter seemed 
to be thrown unto the uncharted seas w i t h o u t any c l e a r c u t 
d e s t i n a t i o n . I n other words, the purported exception 
seems to be drawn at sea. 
(11) Recent state p r a c t i c e seems t o support an approach whereby 
a d i s t i n c t i o n i s c a r e f u l l y made between the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between the state and the subsidiary organs ( s t a t e agent) 
i n order to grant immunity. Thus where the l e g a l e n t i t y 
i n issue i s independent of the s t a t e and thus could sue 
and be sued, then such an e n t i t y may not c l a i m immunity. 
But i n r e a l i t y , how can evidence regarding the status of 
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these s u b s i d i a r y organs be adequately procured? Is the 
evidence given by the f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r of a given state 
enough? And how can the v e r a c i t y of the said evidence be 
v e r i f i e d ? I n view of the a u t h o r i t y of Rolimpex, i t i s 
suggested t h a t l e g a l e n t i t i e s w i t h i n a s t a t e be l o g i c a l l y 
t r e a t e d i n the same manner as the s t a t e or government, or 
the concept of agency law i n respect of general p r i n c i p l e s 
of law duly accepted by nations of the world could be 
app l i e d t o contain the problem. The current t e s t appears 
t o be pr e d i c a t e d on e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l of the government 
over the s u b s i d i a r y organ. 
(12) As a matter o f p o i n t of law, the ILC d r a f t a r t i c l e s are 
not b i n d i n g a t the moment but i n every respect follows the 
p r i n c i p l e whereby sovereign acts jure imperii are mutatis 
mutandis immune, while sovereign a c t i v i t i e s jure gestionis 
are denied immunity. A r t i c l e 2(2) of the Draft A r t i c l e s 
i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important because i t gives prominence t o 
the purpose t e s t as f o l l o w s : 
" I n determining whether a c o n t r a c t or t r a n s a c t i o n i s a 
'commercial t r a n s a c t i o n ' under paragraph 1 ( C ) , reference 
should be made p r i m a r i l y to the nature of the c o n t r a c t or 
t r a n s a c t i o n , but i t s purpose should a l s o be taken i n t o 
account i f , i n the p r a c t i c e of the s t a t e which i s a party 
to i t , t h a t purpose i s r e l e v a n t to determining the non-
commercial c h a r a c t e r of the c o n t r a c t or t r a n s a c t i o n . " 
A r t i c l e 7(2) i s also important because i t resolves one of 
the c o n t r o v e r s i a l issues regarding the exercise of 
j u r i s d i c t i o n gua lex voluntatis. I t reads as follows: 
"Agreement by a s t a t e f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n of the law of 
another s t a t e s h a l l not be i n t e r p r e t e d as consent to the 
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exercise of j u r i s d i c t i o n by the courts of t h a t other 
s t a t e . " 
I t i s c l e a r t h a t the current law of sovereign immunity i s 
changing but i t i s hard t o t e l l e xactly where the change i s 
t a k i n g us. Thus although some countries are modulating t h e i r 
p o s i t i o n s on the said subject matter, however, s t a t e p r a c t i c e 
seemed not uniform. 1 3 For example, the meaning of commercial 
t r a n s a c t i o n and sovereign a u t h o r i t y undoubtedly opens a 
Pandora's box of d i f f i c u l t i e s and u n c e r t a i n t i e s , hence there i s 
the need f o r more c l a r i f i c a t i o n and e l u c i d a t i o n of these terms. 
The d i s t i n c t i o n between jure imperii and j u r e gestionis, 
although predicated on questionable assumptions, i s g a i n i n g 
grounds and i t i s now qui t e clear states could f o l l o w 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity without i n c u r r i n g l i a b i l i t y under s t a t e 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n general i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. I n other words, 
states would not incur any l e g a l claims whatsoever by r e s o r t i n g 
t o the a p p l i c a t i o n of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 
True, r e s t r i c t i v e immunity or r e l a t i v e immunity i s 
gradu a l l y becoming w e l l grounded i n the p r a c t i c e o f s t a t e s i n 
Western i n d u s t r i a l countries. And the question t h a t must be 
t r u l y grappled w i t h i s whether the said r u l e has c r y s t a l l i s e d 
i n t o customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. As already s t a t e d elsewhere, 
customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s formed when usus i s aided by 
opinio juris sive necessitatis, so i n essence the r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity d o c t r i n e lacks usus and th e r e f o r e has not as yet 
1 3 I b i d . , 43rd sess., Suppl No. 10 (A/43/10 pp. 258-9, paras 
398-503, etc. 
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a t t a i n e d the status o f opinio generalis juris generalis. This 
i s so because a new i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s formed or created 
provided there i s no weighty s t a t e p r a c t i c e i n existence t h a t 
c o n f l i c t s w i t h i t . 1 4 Perhaps one could argue t h a t r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity without doubt i s an emerging r u l e which i n the fu t u r e 
may be accepted by some s t a t e s , but as of now, the best t h a t can 
be said about r e s t r i c t i v e immunity or r e l a t i v e immunity i s t h a t 
i t has perhaps c r y s t a l l i s e d i n t o a regio n a l custom because i n 
r e a l i t y i t appears t o l a c k u n i f o r m i t y and consistency of general 
p r a c t i c e . 1 5 Absolute immunity t h e r e f o r e survived w i t h some 
exceptions, less grounded i n the p r a c t i c e of states and t h i s has 
so f a r created d i f f i c u l t i e s i n l i t i g a t i o n . 
A Look at Current State P r a c t i c e 
One p e r t i n e n t p r o v i s i o n of A r t i c l e 38 of the Statute of 
the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Court o f J u s t i c e , which the court must f o l l o w 
or apply, reads thus: " I n t e r n a t i o n a l custom, as evidence of a 
general p r a c t i c e accepted as law." 1 6 
Professor B r i e r l y i n e x p l a i n i n g what i s p r a c t i c e 
postulated t h a t "What i s sought f o r i s a general r e c o g n i t i o n 
among states of a c e r t a i n p r a c t i c e as o b l i g a t o r y " 1 7 ; and Judge 
Read, i n the F i s h e r i e s case, argued t h a t "Customary 
1 4 V i l l i n g e r , op. c i t . , pp. 1-65; M. Akehurst, op. c i t . , p. 
53. 
1 5Brownlie, op. c i t . , p. 330; Schreuer, State Immunity—Some 
Recent Development (1988) . 
16See A r t i c l e 3 8 ( l ) b o f the Statute of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Court. 
1 7 B r i e r l y , op. c i t . , p. 61. 
493 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s the generalization of the p r a c t i c e of 
s t a t e s . " 1 8 
The explanation o f f e r e d by these scholars undoubtedly 
proves t h a t there i s a r e l a t i o n s h i p between custom and p r a c t i c e . 
Thus p r a c t i c e must ex hypothesi be constant and u n i f o r m l y 
grounded i n order t o a i d the formation of custom and t h i s has 
been c l e a r l y explained and supported i n the Asylum Case. 1 9 Thus 
arguably where states vigorously give t h e i r support t o an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l r u l e , no d i f f i c u l t i e s would be encountered i n 
proving the general acceptance of the said r u l e . But i n c e r t a i n 
cases one i s bound t o encounter d i f f i c u l t i e s and t h a t i s i f 
there i s no c l e a r c u t evidence respecting a p a r t i c u l a r r u l e , i n 
which case i t would be expedient to i n f e r consent from a s t a t e ' s 
conduct, i t s f a i l u r e t o react or protest and i t s acquiescence i n 
a given r u l e . I t i s important to stress t h a t both custom and 
p r a c t i c e do i n the main compliment each other and t h i s i s w e l l 
expressed i n A r t i c l e 38(1) (b) of the Statute of the 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Court of Justice. 
Today, no one can say w i t h much candour or e x a c t i t u d e as 
t o whether there i s usus respecting the do c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity. Although the Tate l e t t e r touched on the changing 
scope of s t a t e immunity, however, the evidence t h e r e i n submitted 
seemed q u i t e l i m i t e d as to prompt a momentous change from 
absolute immunity t o r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 2 0 I n recent times 
18See ICJ Reports (1951), 191. 
19See ICJ Reports (1950) . 
2 0For a c a r e f u l analysis, see The Tate L e t t e r of 1952 which 
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municipal courts have handed down c o n f l i c t i n g decisions i n 
respect of e x e r c i s i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n over sovereign states i n 
America, U.K., Germany, France, I t a l y , Canada, A u s t r a l i a , 
Austria, Holland and South A f r i c a . The courts i n these 
countries, i t would appear, f o l l o w the d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity at one time and absolute immunity a t other times, while 
scholars t o some extent have been cautious and perhaps h e s i t a n t 
to emphatically s t a t e the c u r r e n t t r e n d of st a t e p r a c t i c e i n 
respect of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. A c a r e f u l review of the law, 
however, shows t h a t the p r a c t i c e of states i s q u i t e scanty and 
c o n f l i c t i n g . And comments or r e p l i e s of governments t o the 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission's questionnaires c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e 
t h a t the divergence between the r e s t r i c t i v e school and the 
absolute school i s f a r from over. 2 1 Dr. Schreuer i n h i s book, 
f o r example, concluded t h a t "from a general perspective i t can 
be said t h a t the d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity has been 
strengthened t o a p o i n t where p r a c t i c a l l y a l l countries from 
which any substantive m a t e r i a l i s a v a i l a b l e have embraced i t . " 2 2 
Dr. Schreuer appears t o have exaggerated the current t r e n d of 
events, f o r h i s conclusion does not f u l l y r e f l e c t the 
proceedings and reports of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission, 2 3 
i s quoted i n t h i s study i n Chapter Four. 
21See generally the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission Report on 
State Immunity 1978-1988; 1988-1990. 
2 2Schreuer, op. c i t . , p. 168. 
2 3Schreuer, op. c i t . , p. 168. 
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the c u r r e n t s t a t e p r a c t i c e and perhaps the behaviour of states 
regarding the subject. 
Judge Jennings and S i r Watts also argued t h a t "Most states 
have now abandoned or are i n the process of abandoning the r u l e 
of absolute immunity." 2 4 Again such a statement seems o v e r l y 
o p t i m i s t i c and arguably not i n l i n e w i t h state p r a c t i c e and t h a t 
of Prof. Brownlie's p o s i t i o n , when he argued t h a t there i s a 
p e r s i s t e n t divergence between the adherence of the d o c t r i n e of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity and t h a t of absolute immunity. 2 5 Unless 
Professor Jennings and h i s co-editor were r e f e r r i n g t o the 
p r a c t i c e of states i n the i n d u s t r i a l i s e d world, which forms less 
than o n e - t h i r d of the t o t a l number of countries i n the world. 
Quite apart from t h i s , although the pra c t i c e of states i n 
respect of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity seemed to f i n d favour w i t h some 
Western s t a t e s , i n r e a l terms, however, one i s h e s i t a n t t o 
conclude t h a t the said d o c t r i n e has become w e l l grounded i n the 
p r a c t i c e of the m a j o r i t y of states as to prompt any accurate 
p o s t u l a t i o n of i t s general acceptance on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l plane 
or i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. For example, the group of 
77, as a matter of f a c t , i n recent years have mounted opp o s i t i o n 
against the attempt by some states t o increase the purported 
exceptions t o the r u l e of s t a t e immunity. 
2 40ppenheim, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (EDs) by Judge Jennings and 
Mr. Watts (1992) p. 357. 
2 5See Brownlie, op. c i t . , p. 330. 
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Some Evidence of State Practice 
European State Practice 
(1) These e i g h t countries have r a t i f i e d the European 
Convention (1972). 
Countries i n Europe R e s t r i c t i v e Immunity 
Austria 
Belgium 
Cyprus » 
Germany 
Luxembourg 
The Netherlands 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom » 
Portugal has signed the t r e a t y but has not as yet r a t i f i e d 
the Convention. The a d d i t i o n a l p r o t o c o l had been r a t i f i e d by 
Austr i a , Belgium, Cyprus, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and 
Switzerland. Germany signed the p r o t o c o l , but has not as yet 
r a t i f i e d i t . Portugal also f a l l s i n t o t h i s group. 
The Dutch, I t a l i a n s , the French and the Swiss have 
developed a r i c h store of jurisprudence on r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 
Only few states on the Continent have so f a r r a t i f i e d the 
Convention. 
SOURCE: See Oppenheim's I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, 9th Ed., Vol. 1, 
page 343, p a r t i c u l a r l y the f o o t n o t e s . 
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(2) Countries w i t h a National L e g i s l a t i o n i n Respect o f 
R e s t r i c t i v e Immunity 
Countries Legislation and Dates 
U.S.A. Passed i n 1976 
U.K. Passed i n 1978 
Singapore Passed i n 1979 
Pakistan Passed i n 1981 
South A f r i c a Passed i n 1981 
Canada Passed i n 1982 
A u s t r a l i a Passed i n 1985 
These countries have incorporated i n t o n a t i o n a l 
l e g i s l a t i o n the r e s t r i c t i v e d o c t r i n e , thus introducing some 
important exceptions t o the absolute immunity r u l e . 
One important p r i n c i p l e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s t h a t the 
essence of customary law i s opinio generalis juris generalis of 
sovereign s t a t e s . 
The above p o s i t i o n i s supported by A r t i c l e 3 8 ( l ) b of the 
Statu t e of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Court of Justice. 
The various n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n i n place could be 
designated as representing the opinio individualis juris 
generalis of each of the states l i s t e d above, but i n r e a l i t y do 
not represent general i n t e r n a t i o n a l law or customary 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
The various l e g i s l a t i v e p r o v i s i o n s enacted i n the USA, UK, 
Singapore, Pakistan, South A f r i c a , Canada and A u s t r a l i a simply 
show how i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s understood i n these countries and 
th e r e f o r e such provisions cannot be imposed on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
community a t lar g e , because i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s h o r i z o n t a l i n 
s t r u c t u r e . 
SOURCE: See the various l e g i s l a t i v e provisions i n I n t Leg 
Ma t e r i a l s 8 ILM 21 (1982), ILM 25 (1986), ILM 23 (1984). 
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(3) These Countries also Follow the R e s t r i c t i v e Doctrine 
Sovereign Countries 
Following R e s t r i c t i v e Immunity 
Barbados Argentina 
Chile L i b e r i a * 
Finland Romania 
Iceland Peru 
Mexico Denmark 
Norway Estonia 
Madagascar A u s t r i a 
Qatar Belgium 
Surinam Canada 
Togo France 
Yugoslavia (former) Holland 
Egypt Spain 
South A f r i c a 
*Seemed to fo l l o w the American approach before the C i v i l 
War. But i t s p o s i t i o n i s obscure as of now. 
Some of the above l i s t e d c o untries are e i t h e r i m i t a t i n g 
the leading i n d u s t r i a l i s e d countries or may have been influenced 
by the opinio individualis juris generalis of Belgium, I t a l y , UK 
and the USA as regards the d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 
Opinio juris generalis may be created eo instanti as regards the 
reduction of nuclear weapons between super powers but not i n 
respect of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity, e.g., i n matters respecting the 
s u r v i v a l of the universe and c e r t a i n d e l i c a t e and s e n s i t i v e 
issues. I n other words, droit spontane i s formed only w i t h the 
ai d of opinio juris, without the t r a d i t i o n a l requirement of 
sta t e p r a c t i c e . Some scholars, however, have taken issue w i t h 
the above stated process. 
The present w r i t e r i s indebted t o Judge Ago and Professor 
Bin Chen f o r t h e i r learned w r i t i n g s on i n s t a n t customary law or 
droit spontane. 
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(4) These Countries S t i l l Follow Absolute Immunity 
Sovereign Countries 
Following Absolute Immunity 
B r a z i l Thailand Ghana 
Bul g a r i a * T r i n i d a d and Tobago Sierra Leone 
China Russia Gambia* 
Czechoslovakia 
(former) 
Venezuela Cameroon* 
Ecuador Burma* Iran 
Hungary P h i l i p p i n e s * I r a q 
Japan Tunisia* Mozambique 
Poland Libya Portugal 
N i g e r i a Sudan Tanzania 
Syria Zambia Indonesia 
Spain* Ukraine 
*The p o s i t i o n of the above countries seemed obscure but 
would r a t h e r p r e f e r absolute immunity. 2 6 Russia seemed to be 
moving towards a market economy but i t s p o s i t i o n on sovereign 
immunity appears more i n c l i n e d t o accepting the modalities of 
s t a t e immunity, i . e . , the o l d order. 
*Ukraine q u i t e r e c e n t l y has argued f o r c e f u l l y that i t be 
granted immunity before English courts, and i t appears some of 
the former Soviet republics would rather p r e f e r t h a t the o l d 
order be maintained. 
*Bulgaria r e c e n t l y opposed the purpose t e s t although i n 
the past i t d i d support st a t e immunity. 
26See I n t . Law Commission's Report 1978-1988. 
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(5) State Practice i n A f r i c a I s Li m i t e d 
Countries Favouring R e s t r i c t i v e Immunity i n A f r i c a 
North A f r i c a Egypt 
Southern p a r t of A f r i c a South A f r i c a * 
An A f r i c a n Island Madagascar 
Southern Part of A f r i c a Lesotho 
West A f r i c a Togo 
*Has na t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n on sovereign immunity. And i t 
i s the only country i n A f r i c a so f a r to jump on the l e g i s l a t i v e 
bandwagon. 
*The r e s t of Af r i c a n countries would r a t h e r p r e f e r t h a t 
absolute immunity be maintained. A good example i s herewith 
provided below, e.g., the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission's 
proceedings r e l a t i n g t o the d r a f t a r t i c l e s i s a good evidence t o 
a t t e s t t o the f a c t t h a t Third World c o u n t r i e s and the great 
m a j o r i t y of A f r i c a n countries have through i n t e r e s t a r t i c u l a t i o n 
challenged the lega l basis of the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. (1980-
1988) ILC Report. 
*This i s even more so because A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s s t i l l 
b elieve i n EXTERNAL and INTERNAL NATIONALISM. 
*Very few Af r i c a n states have had the chance t o consider 
the issues r e l a t i n g t o r e s t r i c t i v e immunity l o c a l l y . 
*Hence state p r a c t i c e may be determined from claims made 
before f o r e i g n courts and declarations made before the OAU and 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l bodies. 
* I was able t o compile t h i s data by exchanging l e t t e r s 
w i t h 350 students I met at the Hague Academy o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Law i n the summer of 1997. 
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(6) French-Speaking Countries i n A f r i c a 
Countries 
State 
Immunity 
Re s t r i c t i v e 
Immunity 
Position 
Obscure 
A l g e r i a X 
Benin X 
Burkina Faso X 
Cameroon X 
Senegal X 
Madagascar X 
Mali X 
Mauritania X 
Morocco X 
Niger X 
Central A f r i c a n Republic X 
D j i b o u t i X 
Togo X 
Gabon X 
Guinea X 
I v o r y Coast X 
Chad X 
Camoros X 
Congo X 
Tunisia X 
*These c o u n t r i e s have a promobilised a u t h o r i t a r i a n or 
democratic p o l i t i c a l systems and t h e i r d e c l a r a t i o n s before the 
OAU i n d i c a t e a w e l l grounded support i n the d i r e c t i o n of 
absolute sovereign immunity f o r there i s no evidence of practice 
i n these co u n t r i e s r e s p e c t i n g r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 
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(7) English-Speaking Countries of A f r i c a 
Countries 
State Immunity Res t r i c t i v e 
Immunity Position 
Obscure 
Ghana X 
Nigeria X 
Sierra Leone X 
Botswana X 
Egypt X 
Malawi X 
Kenya X 
Gambia X 
Lesotho X 
Sudan X 
Swaziland X 
South A f r i c a X 
Has a 
l e g i s l a t i o n i n 
place. 
But f o l l o w e d 
absolute 
immunity u n t i l 
1981. 
Uganda X 
Tanzania X 
Zambia X 
Z imbabwe X 
Mauricius X 
Seychelles X 
*These countries have a premobilised a u t h o r i t a r i a n or 
democratic p o l i t i c a l systems and theref o r e s t e a d f a s t l y b e l i e v e 
i n i n t e r n a l and ex t e r n a l nationalism. 
*This means t h a t the above l i s t e d c o u n t r i e s would not 
submit t o the j u r i s d i c t i o n of f o r e i g n courts w i t h o u t a f i g h t , 
i . e . , arguing as of r i g h t t h a t they be accorded immunity. 
•Zimbabwe—Its Supreme Court f u l l y supported the nature 
t e s t i n 1983. 
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(8) Other Countries i n A f r i c a 
Country 
State Immunity Res t r i c t i v e 
Immunity Position 
Obscure 
Spanish Sahara X 
Spanish Guinea X 
Angola X 
Cape Verde X 
Guinea Bissaau X 
Mozambique X 
Republic of 
Congo 
X 
Rwanda X 
Burundi X 
Somalia Followed s t a t e immunity before the C i v i l War. 
There i s , however, no government i n Somalia at 
the moment. 
Libya X 
*There i s no evidence of the p r a c t i c e of r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity i n the co u n t r i e s l i s t e d above. But the f a c t t h a t these 
countries have promobilised a u t h o r i t a r i a n or democratic systems 
shows a c l e a r preference f o r absolute immunity. 
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(9) L a t i n American Countries 
Country State 
Immunity 
Restrictive 
Immunity Position 
Obscure 
Ecuador X 
B r a z i l X 
Mexico X 
English Guyana X 
French Guyana X 
Guatemala X 
E l Salvador X 
Costa Rica X 
Panama X 
Nicaragua X 
Honduras X 
Venezuela X 
Colombia X 
Peru X 
Surinam X 
Chile X 
Argentina X 
Uruguay X 
Paraguay X 
* L a t i n American countries would l i k e to have st a t e immunity preserved 
except those few countries w i t h low subsystem autonomy l i k e Mexico, Argentina, 
e t c . , ready t o i m i t a t e leading i n d u s t r i a l i s e d countries such as the USA and 
the UK, i n respect of the momentous l e g i s l a t i v e changes t h a t were made i n the 
sa i d leading i n d u s t r i a l i s e d countries. 
L a t i n American countries have from the outset expressed opinio non 
juris against the a p p l i c a t i o n of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. And those sued i n 
f o r e i g n courts have also r e s i s t e d the j u r i s d i c t i o n of n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t i e s , 
arguing t h a t they be accorded immunity, which according t o them i s the 
accepted norm. 
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(10) Caribbean Countries or West Indies 
Country State 
Immunity 
R e s t r i c t i v e 
Immunity Position Obscure 
Cuba X 
Jamaica x But i n the past 
followed sovereign 
immunity 
Bahamas x 
H a i t i x 
Dominican 
Republic 
X 
St. K i t t s 
Nevis 
X 
Martinique X 
St. Lucia X 
St. Vincent X 
Grenada X 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
X 
Barbados X 
Dominica X 
Guadeloupe X 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
X 
V i r g i n 
Islands 
X 
Puerto Rico X 
Bermuda X 
The above l i s t of developing nations has not considered the s t a t e 
immunity controversy l o c a l l y but evidence forthcoming shows c l e a r l y t h a t a l l 
these countries e i t h e r have promobilised a u t h o r i t a r i a n or promobilised 
democratic p o l i t i c a l systems. 
V i r g i n Islands and Puerto Rico f o l l o w the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity because 
U.S.A. follows the same p r i n c i p l e . 
Bermuda also f o l l o w s r e s t r i c t i v e immunity because the U.K. has a 
l e g i s l a t i o n on r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 
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(11) The Pos i t i o n of Other States: 
Country State Immunity Restrictive 
Immunity 
Position 
Obscure 
I n d i a X 
Join the group of 77 to 
oppose r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity 
South Korea X 
North Korea X 
Turkey X 
Saudi Arabia X 
Sweden X 
Lebanon I t s courts have 
followed 
r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity 
Bangladesh X 
Kuwait X 
I s r a e l X 
Jordan X 
United Arab 
Emirates 
X 
Afghanistan X 
Vietnam X 
Malaysia I t s courts have 
followed the 
nature t e s t 
X 
I r e l a n d I t s courts have followed 
sovereign immunity 
Byelorussia X 
New Zealand X 
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Some Thoughts on the Asian-African Legal Consultative 
Committee's Report 
The Asian-African Legal C o n s u l t a t i v e Committee i n 1960 
considered the c e n t r a l issue r e l a t i n g t o the immunity of states 
i n respect of commercial t r a n s a c t i o n s . The Committee was made 
up of the representatives of such c o u n t r i e s as Burma, Ceylon, 
In d i a , Indonesia, I r a q , Japan, Pakistan, Sudan, Syria and the 
United Arab Republic. The f i n a l r e p o r t of the Committee on 
Immunity of States i n respect of commercial trans a c t i o n s and 
other matters r e l a t i n g t o t r a n s a c t i o n s of a p r i v a t e character, 
as revised i n the t h i r d session, h e l d between January and 
February 1960 i n Colombo, w i t h Indonesia as the only dissenter 
i n support of absolute immunity, f e l l short of recommending t h a t 
states should subscribe t o a m u l t i l a t e r a l t r e a t y , which they 
considered as premature at t h a t time. 
The Committee was enlarged i n 1958 t o include A f r i c a n 
states, since i t was e x c l u s i v e l y an Asian Committee i n 1956, and 
so f a r these countries have been able t o play an important r o l e 
i n promoting the development of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 2 7 
One aspect of the A s i a n - A f r i c a n Legal Consultative 
Committee report which i s of immediate importance t o t h i s study 
can be stated as f o l l o w s : 
"(8) I t was recognised by a l l delegations t h a t a decree 
obtained against a f o r e i g n s t a t e could not be executed against 
i t s public property. The p r o p e r t y of a s t a t e t r a d i n g 
organisation which has a separate j u r i s t i c e n t i t y may, however, 
be available f o r execution. 
27See T.O. E l i a s , New Horizons o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1979) 
pp. 21-30. 
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(9) The Committee having taken the view of a l l the 
delegations i n t o consideration decided to recommend as follows: 
(10) The state t r a d i n g organisations which have a 
separate j u r i s t i c e n t i t y under the municipal laws of the country 
where they are incorporated should not be e n t i t l e d to immunity 
of the s t a t e i n respect of any of i t s a c t i v i t i e s i n a f o r e i g n 
s t a t e . Such organisations and t h e i r representatives could be 
sued i n the municipal courts of a f o r e i g n state i n respect of 
t h e i r t ransactions or a c t i v i t i e s i n these states. 
(11) A state which enters i n t o transactions of a 
commercial or p r i v a t e character ought not to raise the plea of 
sovereign immunity i f sued i n the courts of a foreign state i n 
respect of such transactions. I f the plea of immunity i s raised 
i t should not be admissible t o deprive the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the 
domestic c o u r t s . " 2 8 
But the question t o ask respecting the above 
recommendations i s what y a r d s t i c k must be used i n the 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the a c t i v i t i e s of the sovereign state and how 
are the l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between the state and j u r i s t i c organs 
be determined? These are complicated issues because states 
d i f f e r i n t h e i r needs and i n t e r e s t and secondly, i t i s submitted 
t h a t the l e g a l p o s i t i o n of these j u r i s t i c organs i s derived from 
l o c a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e laws which may d i f f e r 
from country t o country, and t h e r e f o r e i t would not be h e l p f u l 
t o simply generalise on such d e l i c a t e issues as regards t h e i r 
s t a t u s and a u t h o r i t y . 
I n one of the questionnaires sent to the delegates of the 
Committee, the f o l l o w i n g questions were posited: 
Q(3) "Do you agree w i t h the view expressed by some that a state by e n t e r i n g 
i n t o trade assumes the r o l e of a p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l , and i n respect of 
such t r a n s a c t i o n s i t s waiver of immunity should be presumed?" 
I n r e p l y : 
2 8See Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee Report, 
T h i r d Session, Colombo (1960) pp. 72-73. 
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"Japan and the U.A.R. answered the question i n the a f f i r m a t i v e . I r a q 
d i d not think t h a t the sta t e assumed the r o l e of a p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l 
by entering i n t o trade or other p r i v a t e a c t i v i t i e s ; the s t a t e remained 
a p u b l i c a u t h o r i t y regardless of what a c t i v i t y i t entered i n t o . Ceylon 
and India agreed wit h I r a q . Burma d i d not t h i n k t h a t any presumption 
would ari s e . " 
Q(4) "Has your government e i t h e r i n i t s p r a c t i c e or i n any de c l a r a t i o n of 
p o l i c y made i t s p o s i t i o n known on t h i s question, i . e . , whether i t 
regards the doctrine of sovereign immunity as absolute or subject t o 
l i m i t a t i o n s ? " 
I n r e p l y : 
" I r a q , Burma, Indonesia and Japan said t h e i r governments had not 
declared t h e i r p o l i c y on t h i s matter. The U.A.R. sa i d t h a t though 
there was no o f f i c i a l d e c l a r a t i o n , the t r e n d of p r a c t i c e was t o l i m i t 
s t a t e immunity." 
Under governmental a c t i v i t i e s of a qua s i - p u b l i c character: 
"Does your government engage i n the purchase of ma t e r i a l s or equipment 
i n foreign countries which are needed f o r p u b l i c services, or p u b l i c 
u t i l i t i e s or f o r the maintenance of food supplies w i t h i n the country?" 
" A l l delegations answered the question i n the a f f i r m a t i v e . " 2 9 
The report i n i t s e n t i r e t y appeared t o have been g r e a t l y 
i n f l u e n c e d by European p r a c t i c e and the j u r i s t i c w r i t i n g s of 
English and American p u b l i c i s t s on s t a t e immunity. The rep o r t 
i n some respects d i d f o l l o w the m o d a l i t i e s of the do c t r i n e of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity, but f a i l e d t o provide a road map as t o how 
to d i s t i n g u i s h between commercial and non-commercial a c t i v i t i e s 
of s t a t e s . The report also d i d not t e l l us what r o l e the lex 
fori must play i n the c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n o f the a c t i v i t i e s of 
stat e s . I t simply suggested t h a t a s t a t e which enters i n t o a 
commercial transaction w i t h a p r i v a t e t r a d e r ought not t o plead 
f o r immunity. The said l i m i t a t i o n was presumed and wholly 
derived from European and American p r a c t i c e . The delegates, 
2 9 I b i d . at p. 73. 
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however, recommended against the use of enforcement measures. 
An o b j e c t i v e comparison of the answers given by delegates t o the 
said questionnaires appeared less r e f l e c t i v e of the f i n a l 
recommendation o f the AALCC i n many respects. The report thus 
m i r r o r s the import of the Tate l e t t e r , which according t o the 
delegates, served as an i n s p i r a t i o n t o them. 
Although the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee 
r e p o r t on s t a t e immunity of 1960 had been c i t e d i n numerous 
l e g a l p e r i o d i c a l s over the years, as evidence of practice of the 
developing w o r l d i n respect of sovereign immunity, there are 
indeed, however, some d i f f i c u l t i e s associated w i t h the report 
being designated as the current evidence of pra c t i c e of Asian 
and A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s , i n view of the f a c t t h a t i n 1960 only 
very few c o u n t r i e s i n A f r i c a were independent, and for t h a t 
matter, d i d not p a r t i c i p a t e or share the o r i g i n a l views 
expressed i n the re p o r t . Furthermore, the views expressed i n 
the r e p o r t cannot be imposed on those countries which became 
independent a f t e r the repor t was adopted. So i n essence the 
said r e p o r t or recommendations could only be r e f e r r e d to as an 
expression o f some countries t o t a l l y l i m i t e d i n value as 
evidence of p r a c t i c e of a l l the countries i n Asia and A f r i c a . 
I n f a c t , the r e p o r t i s over t h i r t y - e i g h t years o l d and the 
p o s i t i o n adopted by Burma, Ceylon, I n d i a , Indonesia, I r a q , 
Japan, Pakistan, the Sudan, Syria and the U.A.R. have arguably 
metamorphosed over the years. I t i s th e r e f o r e not that easy as 
of now t o c o r r e c t l y s t a t e the p o s i t i o n of these countries on 
s t a t e immunity by using the AALCC re p o r t as a yardstick. The 
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U.A.R., as i t may be re c a l l e d , f o r example, broke up i n the 
ear l y 1960s and Egypt went i t s way by f u l l y embracing the 
r e s t r i c t i v e p r i n c i p l e , while Pakistan t h e r e a f t e r r e s o r t e d t o the 
same p r i n c i p l e by introducing the d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity i n t o i t s statute book. The p o s i t i o n of the AALCC at 
the moment i s f a r from clear on the issues r e l a t i n g t o the 
absolute sovereign immunity controversy. However, i t would 
appear a great number of these countries would l i k e t o have 
state immunity preserved. 
Further Reflections on the State of the Law 
(1) Some Sal i e n t Issues 
The d o c t r i n e of state immunity has a long h i s t o r y , but i n 
spi t e of i t s long h i s t o r y , there i s s t i l l u n c e r t a i n t y w i t h 
respect t o i t s current place i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. Some 
countries i n the Western world have f o r reasons of j u s t i c e and 
equity i n transnational business t r a n s a c t i o n s threw t h e i r 
support behind the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity while other c o u n t r i e s , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y the developing world of Asia, A f r i c a and L a t i n 
American countries, and also Eastern European c o u n t r i e s f o r 
reasons of s e l f - i n t e r e s t p e c u l i a r t o c e n t r a l economic planning 
and trade, have t r i e d t o advance t h e i r preferences f o r s t a t e 
immunity i n order to avoid being open t o s u i t . 
I t i s therefore important t h a t a considerable c a u t i o n be 
taken i n assessing the current s t a t e of the law. This i s so 
because s t a t e practice on the subject i s not s e t t l e d and 
decisions of municipal courts on the a p p l i c a t i o n o f r e s t r i c t i v e 
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immunity are not p a r t i c u l a r l y thorough and the problem i s 
f u r t h e r exacerbated by equivocal and c o n f l i c t i n g judgments less 
r e f l e c t i v e of customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
Decisions o f municipal courts i n general, although quite 
important, do p l a y a more or less subordinate ro l e i n 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. And t h i s i s p e r f e c t l y l o g i c a l because 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s h o r i z o n t a l and thus regulated by t r e a t i e s 
and customary law p r i n c i p l e s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from municipal 
jurisprudence. I n p r a c t i c e , however, domestic law analogies 
have i n f l u e n c e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. I n any event, there i s less 
consistency i n the decisions of municipal courts because the lex 
fori d i f f e r from country t o country and thus i n the main has 
created d i f f e r e n t methods i n the c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of the 
a c t i v i t i e s of modern s t a t e s . 3 0 The end r e s u l t i s that a 
considerable amount of divergent decisions have been developed 
to such heights as t o create a penumbra of doubt i n the current 
law and f o r t h a t matter, i n the r u l e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 
A review o f the l i t e r a t u r e on s t a t e immunity shows t h a t 
some leading a u t h o r i t i e s who have w r i t t e n on the subject have 
f a i l e d t o speak w i t h c l e a r and unequivocal v o i c e . 3 1 Thus while 
some scholars have spoken w i t h one voice, t h e i r counterparts 
have on the other hand expressed scepticism and therefore have 
3 0Oppenheimer, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, 9th Ed. (1992) pp. 362-
363; Brownlie, op. c i t . , p. 333. 
3 1 S u c h a r i t k u l , State Immunities and Trading A c t i v i t i e s 
(1959); L i s s i t z y n i n Friedmann, Henkin and L i s s i t z y n (eds.), 
Essays i n Honour o f P h i l i p C. Jessup (1972); Molot and Jewett, 
20 Canadian Year Book (1982) pp. 96-104; Brownlie, op. c i t . , pp. 
322-345. 
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taken q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n . This phenomenon i s not a t 
a l l h e l p f u l and theref o r e has given room or reasons t o n a t i o n a l 
a u t h o r i t i e s t o enact laws couched on n a t i o n a l data not i n the 
least r e f l e c t i v e of customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. For obvious 
reasons, i t i s submitted that because of the force of the 
p r i n c i p l e of e q u a l i t y of states i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, customary 
law cannot be created by some few states by imposing t h e i r w i l l 
on others, but should rather be made through a c a r e f u l 
r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the elements of usus and opinio juris. 
So f a r the attempt by some municipal courts i n the Western 
world t o f o l l o w the doctrine of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity has met 
with d i f f i c u l t i e s and t h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y due t o the f a c t t h a t 
modern judges have c a v a l i e r l y r e l i e d on the preponderance, 
support and w r i t i n g s of some i n f l u e n t i a l scholars i n respect o f 
the d i s t i n c t i o n between acta jure gestionis and acta jure 
imperii, without considering the basic and s p e c i f i c u n d e r l y i n g 
p r i n c i p l e s respecting the said d i s t i n c t i o n , and whether i t i s 
l o g i c a l l y grounded and supported by sta t e p r a c t i c e and t h e r e f o r e 
r e f l e c t i v e of customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. I n I Congreso d e l 
Partido, Lord Wilberforce o f f e r e d a p l a u s i b l e and h e l p f u l 
explanation of the law thus: 
"We do not need statute to make t h i s good. On the other 
hand, the precise l i m i t s of the doctrine were, as the voluminous 
m a t e r i a l placed at our disposal w e l l shows, s t i l l i n course of 
development and i n many respects uncertain. I f one s t a t e 
chooses t o l a y down by enactment c e r t a i n l i m i t s , t h a t i s by 
i t s e l f no evidence that those l i m i t s are gene r a l l y accepted by 
stat e s . And p a r t i c u l a r l y enacted l i m i t s may be (or presumed t o 
be) not i n c o n s i s t e n t with general i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w — t h e l a t t e r 
Fitzmaurice 1933 14 BYIL; O'Connell, op. c i t . 
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being i n a s t a t e of u n c e r t a i n t y — w i t h o u t a f f o r d i n g evidence what 
that law i s . " 3 3 
The t h r u s t and f o r c e o f t h i s p a r t of the said judgment i s 
generally i n l i n e w i t h the p r i n c i p l e s of p u b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law. I t t h e r e f o r e e s s e n t i a l l y answers the t r i c k y question and 
confusion surrounding the c u r r e n t place of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity 
and n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. Which simply 
means t h a t the enactment of the basic underlying p r i n c i p l e s of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i n t o the various n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n i n 
place are not conclusive or supported by sta t e p r a c t i c e and 
therefore do not command the support of general i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law. 3 4 
I t must be s t a t e d c l e a r l y , however, t h a t i n the I Congreso 
del Partido, which a d m i t t e d l y was a complicated case, the Law 
Lords were candid t o say t h a t they had d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t a c k l i n g 
the issue r e l a t e d t o the Marble Islands, and t h i s i s arguably so 
i n view of the f a c t t h a t the Law Lords were forced t o go an 
extra mile by t h e i r own c h e e r f u l i n t e n t i o n s t o r e l y on an 
emerging r u l e , i . e . , r e s t r i c t i v e immunity which i s cumbersome of 
d e f i n i t i o n and a p p l i c a t i o n . 
In Trendtex, an e a r l i e r case, which was l i t i g a t e d before 
the Court of Appeals, Lord Denning and h i s colleagues were also 
taken to task f o r t r y i n g t o determine whether based upon the 
3 3 I Legal Reports 64 1988 p. 311. 
34See the judgment o f Lord Wilberforce: ILR, 64 (1983); 
McElhinney v. Williams and Her Majesty's Secretary of State f o r 
Northern I r e l a n d , I r e l a n d Supreme Court, 15 Dec. (1995) per 
Hamilton CJ. 
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nature t e s t of a t r a n s n a t i o n a l transaction, an agency of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, i . e , the Central Bank, could be 
accorded immunity i n respect of i t s a c t i v i t i e s i n imp o r t i n g 
cement i n t o the said country. The court r a t i o n a l i s e d d o c t r i n e , 
case law qua the changing scope of sovereign immunity and the 
nature of the commercial transaction i n question t o deny 
immunity t o Nig e r i a , but f a i l e d to give clear and convincing 
reasons why the Central Bank be characterised or designated as 
an independent j u r i s t i c organ. The judgment found favour w i t h 
some, however, others s t i l l remain d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h the primary 
issue regarding the status of the Central Bank and whether the 
i n t e r i m Mareva i n j u n c t i o n d i r e c t e d against the removal of funds 
from the forum s t a t e , i . e . , England, was consistent w i t h general 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. The answer i s simply no, f o r such a de c i s i o n 
was contrary t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, however, much depends, of 
course, upon the data before the lex fori and secondly because 
s t a t e p r a c t i c e i s s t i l l evolving and not yet w e l l s e t t l e d i n 
respect of t h i s area of the law. While Shaw LJ thought the 
enforcement measure was i n order and therefore d e r i v a t i v e of the 
s u i t , Stephenson LJ, on the other hand, voiced out the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s he had w i t h the issue concerning saisie 
conservatoire, but never dissented on the Mareva i n j u n c t i o n , 
thus leaving on record only his w e l l reasoned reservations i n 
respect of the argument posited by Lord Denning t h a t there had 
been a change i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and t h a t i t be received i n t o 
English law. 
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The d i f f i c u l t i e s regarding p o l i t i c a l subdivisions and 
state agencies s t i l l remain f o r the mere f a c t t h a t the functions 
of these st a t e i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s appear undoubtedly obscure 
coupled with the f a c t t h a t these s t a t e agencies operate under 
d i f f e r e n t economic, s o c i a l and l e g a l systems. I t i s also 
important t o note t h a t these s t a t e agencies do perform 
concurrent f u n c t i o n s covering both p o l i t i c a l and commercial 
p o l i c i e s d i r e c t l y c o n t r o l l e d from the top by p o l i c y makers and 
government technocrats. So i n most cases, the functions of 
these p o l i t i c a l subdivisions are i n t e r t w i n e d and thus could give 
mixed and c o n f l i c t i n g signals as t o the r e a l scope of commercial 
or p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s of s t a t e agencies. The current law i s 
based on unexamined assumptions and a p r i o r i g e n eralisations and 
therefore does not provide any c o n s i s t e n t approach t o r e s o l v i n g 
these i n t r a c t a b l e problems. Perhaps the problem could be 
contained i f the status of these p o l i t i c a l subdivisions or s t a t e 
agencies i s deemphasised and reference i s made respecting 
national law and comparative l a w — t o determine t h e i r l e g a l 
status. 
The judgment i n the recent case of Kuwait Airways Corp. v. 
I r a q i Airways, 3 5 f o r example, leaves much t o be desired because 
although the use of force by I r a q i n i t s e l f was a v i o l a t i o n of 
the peremptory norms of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, nonetheless i t was 
acta jure imperii and the acta jure gestionis argument advanced 
by the court i n support of the judgment although may f i n d favour 
(1995) 1 WLR 1147 House of Lords. 
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with some, l a c k s l o g i c a l foundation and thus may lea d us i n t o 
uncharted seas of l e g a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n s . I s aggression by a 
sovereign s t a t e a c t a j u r e gestionis? C e r t a i n l y no. The 
wrongful i n t e r f e r e n c e by the f i r s t defendant with the a i r c r a f t 
was an i n c i d e n t a l commercial element which must be discounted. 
Lord Slynn must the r e f o r e be commended for there i s an element 
of reasonableness i n h i s reasoning. In the French case of 
Cameroon's Development Bank v. Souete des Establissement 
Robber, 3 6 the t r a n s a c t i o n which f e l l to be considered involved a 
guarantee duly given by a s t a t e owned f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n , i n 
r e s p e c t of b i l l s of exchange drawn by the Republic of Cameroon, 
fo r the main purpose of secu r i n g or i n s u r i n g c r e d i t for the 
c o n s t r u c t i o n of a p u b l i c h o s p i t a l i n Yaounde. The bank was sued 
f o r v i o l a t i n g the agreement. The bank i n turn argued th a t being 
a governmental e n t i t y , i t could not be impleaded. The court by 
f o l l o w i n g the nature t e s t r u l e d that i t had j u r i s d i c t i o n and 
thus overlooked the f a c t t h a t the guarantee was made on behalf 
of the s a i d government for a p u b l i c works contract. This i s 
another example where the nature t e s t produced an undesirable 
r e s u l t . The court should have considered the whole context i n 
which the c l a i m a g a i n s t the bank was made v i s - a - v i s the l e g a l 
p o s i t i o n of the Republic of Cameroon i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
3 6 (1988) 77 I L Reports p. 37. 
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State Immunity and the Controversy over Embassy Bank Accounts 
and Foreign Reserves 
In respect of i s s u e s r e l a t i n g to execution of judgments 
against s t a t e property, i . e . , execution forcee, i t would appear 
the seizure of the a s s e t s of the C e n t r a l Bank i n Hispanio 
Americano Mercantil v. C e n t r a l Bank of N i g e r i a , 3 7 p a r t i c u l a r l y 
the mareva i n j u n c t i o n sanctioned by E n g l i s h courts i n 
r e s t r a i n i n g the removal of funds from the j u r i s d i c t i o n u n t i l 
f u r t h e r notice was contrary to g e n e r a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l . I t i s 
important to note that immunity from j u r i s d i c t i o n or s u i t s and 
execution against s t a t e property are two d i f f e r e n t f a c e t s of the 
l e g a l process, and the f a c t t h a t j u r i s d i c t i o n has been procured 
by a national j u d i c i a l a u t h o r i t y does not mean t h a t a d e c i s i o n 
execution forcee can be taken without the consent of the 
defendant's s t a t e . The main question to con s i d e r i n t h i s l i g h t 
i s whether enforcement measures could be d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t the 
property of a s t a t e , i n c l u d i n g i t s a s s e t s s p e c i f i c a l l y 
designated for the o f f i c i a l f u n c t i o n s of a di p l o m a t i c mission. 
The majority opinion says no, but some c o u n t r i e s on record 
have been quite adamant i n acceding to a p r a c t i c e which l a c k s 
usus, where immunity i s denied to sovereign s t a t e s i n res p e c t of 
t h e i r a s s e t s . E.g., Ni g e r i a , Guinea and Tanzania have been 
subjected to such a c t i o n s i n the U.S. 
The underlying question r e l a t i n g , however, to execution 
forcee was thoroughly considered i n the P h i l i p p i n e Embassy 
Hispano (1979) 2 Lloyds Report 277. 
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c a s e . 3 8 There the p l a i n t i f f obtained an attachment and 
assignment order from the D i s t r i c t Court of Bonn (Amtsgericht) 
a g a i n s t the bank account held i n the name of P h i l i p p i n e Embassy 
at the Deutsche Bank of Bonn for a r r e a r s of rent and r e p a i r 
c o s t s emanating from a purported tenancy contract. The account 
i n question presumably was p a r t l y used f o r the every day running 
of the P h i l i p p i n e Embassy. The Government of P h i l i p p i n e s i n 
turn f i l e d an o b j e c t i o n to the s a i d order arguing that the 
attached account was not s u b j e c t to the j u r i s d i c t i o n of German 
court s and t h a t the account was s p e c i f i c a l l y designated for the 
running of the P h i l i p p i n e Embassy. The D i s t r i c t Court of Bonn 
stayed the a c t i o n i n the l i g h t of the force of A r t i c l e 100(2), 
of the B a s i c Law and thus r e f e r r e d the matter to the Federal 
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Court. A f t e r a thorough a n a l y s i s of the i s s u e s 
i n the case, the court r u l e d that 
"There e x i s t e d a general r u l e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law 
a c c o r d i n g to which forced execution of judgment by the s t a t e of 
the forum under a w r i t of execution a g a i n s t a foreign s t a t e 
which had been i s s u e d i n r e s p e c t of non-sovereign a c t s acta i u r e 
gestionis of t h a t s t a t e , on property of t h a t s t a t e which was 
p r e s e n t or s i t u a t e d i n the t e r r i t o r y of the s t a t e of the forum 
was i n a d m i s s i b l e without the consent of the foreign s t a t e i f , a t 
the time of the i n i t i a t i o n of the measure of execution, such 
p r o p e r t y s e r v e d sovereign purposes of the f o r e i g n s t a t e . Claims 
a g a i n s t a g e n e r a l c u r r e n t bank account of the embassy of a 
f o r e i g n s t a t e which e x i s t e d i n the s t a t e of the forum and the 
purposes of which was to cover the embassy's c o s t s and expenses 
were not s u b j e c t to forced execution by the s t a t e of the 
forum." 3 9 
The c o u r t f u r t h e r argued t h a t 
3 8 I L R 65, 146. 
3 9 I b i d . , p. 150. 
520 
"The p r i n c i p l e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law ne impediatur legatio 
precludes such measures where they might impair the e x e r c i s e of 
diplomatic d u t i e s . " 4 0 
The court i n c l e a r terms l a i d down some important 
p r i n c i p l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i n r e s p e c t of enforcement 
measures. However, there s t i l l remains c e r t a i n s p e c i f i c 
d i f f i c u l t i e s that can be detected i n the judgment, and t h a t i s 
which a s s e t s of the s t a t e can c l e a r l y be designated as immune 
because of i t s diplomatic purpose and whether general 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law allows a municipal court to i n v e s t i g a t e or 
i n q u i r e into the s p e c i f i c proportion of embassy accounts used 
for commercial purposes without i n t e r f e r i n g with the sovereignty 
or the r e g a l dignity of s t a t e s . C e r t a i n l y , i t i s d i f f i c u l t to 
f i n d a workable method by which to d e l i m i t d i p l o m a t i c a s s e t s 
from other a s s e t s used f or non-diplomatic purposes. 
Furthermore, i t would be an e x e r c i s e of f u t i l i t y to group bank 
accounts into watertight compartments—one f o r immune purposes 
and the other for non-immune purposes. I n c i d e n t a l l y , general 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law does not cover these s e n s i t i v e areas of the 
problem and therefore municipal courts are l e f t to f i l l i n the 
gaps. And so f a r the attempts made by n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t i e s to 
deal with these e l u s i v e l e g a l problems have f a i l e d to a t t r a c t 
the support of sovereign s t a t e s . 
I b i d . , p. 186. A s i m i l a r approach seemed to have been 
followed i n Foxworth v. Permanent Mission of the Rep. of Uganda 
to the U.N. (ILR 99 p. 138), U.S. D i s t r i c t Court Southern 
D i s t r i c t of N.Y. (1992); and i n T h i r d Ave. A s s o c i a t e s and 
Another (1993) ILR 99, p. 195. 
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The judgment i n Alcorn and the P h i l i p p i n e Embassy case ex 
hypothesi d i s p l a c e d the a u t h o r i t y i n the non-resident P e t i t i o n 
v. C e n t r a l Bank of N i g e r i a case, where Nigeri a ' s plea for 
immunity was r e j e c t e d , even though the main objection r a i s e d was 
centred on the s e n s i t i v e i s s u e of avoiding execution against i t s 
f o r e i g n r e s e r v e s . I t would have been h e l p f u l i f the s a i d i s s u e 
was s i n g l e d out f o r an in-depth a n a l y s i s . In short, the 
d i s t r i c t c ourt c a v a l i e r l y r e j e c t e d N i g e r i a ' s plea that i t be 
accorded immunity and thus sidestepped the important i s s u e 
whether f o r e i g n r e s e r v e s are meant for immune a c t i v i t i e s . I n 
Alcorn, which r e l a t e s to the attachment of a bank account 
belonging to Colombian diplomatic mission, the House of Lords 
r u l e d t h a t a bank account of a diplomatic mission which i s used 
f o r a sovereign purpose cannot be attached even though Donoldson 
MR i n a p r i o r c o u r t of appeal judgment r e s t o r e d the garnishee 
o r d e r s . 4 1 The judgment of E n g l i s h courts and German courts shows 
c l e a r l y t h a t the problems of embassy bank accounts and foreign 
r e s e r v e s are f a r from over. Perhaps a r b i t r a t i o n could be 
designated as a way of r e s o l v i n g these e l u s i v e problems, where 
i s s u e s r e s p e c t i n g embassy accounts can be resolved without 
c r e a t i n g any p o l i t i c a l t ensions and resentments. 
I n the absence of l e g i s l a t i v e executive and j u d i c i a r y 
pronouncements on the law, s t a t e p r a c t i c e i n respect of s t a t e 
immunity can be seen i n the context of r e a c t i o n s to claims which 
have been p r e f e r r e d a g a i n s t f o r e i g n s t a t e s i n domestic courts. 
4 1 (1983) 3 WLR 906, 911. 
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The r e s i s t a n c e to these p r i v a t e claims and the quest i n pleading 
that immunity be accorded presupposes a l e g a l c l a i m or the 
balancing of c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s and needs. These claims, 
clothed i n l e g a l arguments c l e a r l y r e f l e c t i v e of customary law, 
are s t a t e p r a c t i c e and thus r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the p o s i t i o n of 
the defendant s t a t e . Thus, to the defendant s t a t e , i t s p o s i t i o n 
r e s p e c t i n g s t a t e immunity i s how i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s supposed 
to be. 
I t would take a lawsuit to draw the a t t e n t i o n of sovereign 
s t a t e s to r e a c t to p r i v a t e claims. Thus no s t a t e simply submits 
to the j u r i s d i c t i o n of another s t a t e without f i r s t p l e a d i n g t h a t 
i t be accorded immunity. 4 2 Thus, although some s t a t e s are w i l l i n g 
to accept the r a t i o n a l e behind the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity, 
however, t h i s does not n e c e s s a r i l y mean that they would submit 
to the j u r i s d i c t i o n of other s t a t e s without a f i g h t s i n c e 
government lawyers or i n t e r n a t i o n a l lawyers are always ready to 
explore the loopholes u s u a l l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h n a t i o n a l 
l e g i s l a t i o n , and for that matter, r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. Dr. 
Laurence C o l l i n s some time ago wrote an a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d "The 
E f f e c t i v e n e s s of the R e s t r i c t i v e Theory of Sovereign Immunity," 
i n which he advanced arguments i n support of the s a i d theory, 
with respect, h i s p o s i t i o n thus on the s u b j e c t i n view of the 
current s t a t e of the law was premature because the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between acta jure imperium and acta jure gestionis i s 
4 2 S i n c l a i r (1980 11) 167 Hague R e c u e i l ; Schreuer, S t a t e 
Immunity, Some Recent Developments (1988). The l i t i g a t i o n 
between American Courts, E n g l i s h courts, German c o u r t s and 
Canadian courts could be c i t e d as good examples. 
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fundamentally flawed. 4 3 And Dr. Badr's t h e s i s which concludes 
that s t a t e immunity i s a f i c t i o n and that i t would soon wither 
away i s non-sequitur f o r sovereign immunity would continue to 
appeal to s t a t e s because of the h o r i z o n t a l nature of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 4 4 Thus, although r e s t r i c t i v e immunity has 
gained some grounds, i t s t i l l l a c k s usus and th e r e f o r e would 
take some time to become w e l l grounded i n the p r a c t i c e of 
s t a t e s . I t would t h e r e f o r e be c a r e l e s s to conclude as of now 
that r e s t r i c t i v e immunity has a t t a i n e d the s t a t u s of customary 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 4 5 I t i s submitted th a t s t a t e immunity i s not 
dead accurate and t h e r e f o r e the debate between the supporters of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity and sovereign immunity w i l l c e r t a i n l y 
continue i n t o the f u t u r e . I n f a i r n e s s , the v a r i o u s n a t i o n a l 
l e g i s l a t i o n or s t a t e l e g i s l a t i o n i n place cannot simply be 
accepted as evidence of the p r i n c i p l e s of general i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law. I n r e a l terms, the s a i d i n d i v i d u a l n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n on 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity r e p r e s e n t s the opinio individualis juris 
generalis of each of these c o u n t r i e s and the r e f o r e cannot be 
forced on other c o u n t r i e s as a way of c r e a t i n g equity i n the 
market p l a c e . I n sum, the dismal swamp i s s t i l l f u l l of muddy 
water, for the USSR, now R u s s i a , and other E a s t e r n European 
co u n t r i e s as w e l l as a m a j o r i t y of developing c o u n t r i e s from 
A s i a , A f r i c a and L a t i n American countries have expressed an 
4 3See Brownlie, op. c i t . , p. 333. 
4 4See Sornarajah (1981) 31 ICLQ, 661. 
4 5See Brownlie, op. c i t . ; see a l s o the judgment per 
Wilberforce i n I Congreso d e l Partido (1983) AL 244, 260. 
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opinio non juris i n respect of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity and 
therefore would l i k e to have the r u l e of absolute immunity 
preserved r a t h e r than abrogated. C e r t a i n l y , the p o s i t i o n of 
these c o u n t r i e s cannot be relegated to the background. 
Employment Contracts and State Immunity: Can the Problem Be 
Resolved Through R e s t r i c t i v e Immunity? 
The attempt by municipal courts to apply r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity to employment contracts i n respect of the person of the 
s t a t e i s arguably incautious and therefore must be d i s c a r d e d f o r 
a more venerable approach. S t r i c t l y speaking, the law of 
diplomatic p r i v i l e g e s and immunities precedes the p r i n c i p l e s of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law as regards s t a t e immunity. 4 6 I t i s i n s t r u c t i v e 
to note t h a t the law of immunities of sovereigns and ambassadors 
has i n the main e x e r c i s e d to a large extent some i n f l u e n c e on 
the development of the law of s t a t e immunity. 4 7 T h i s might have 
inf l u e n c e d modern judges to devise a s i n g l e l e g a l approach to 
r e s o l v i n g problems r e l a t i n g to these two important a r e a s of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. State immunity and diplomatic immunity are 
two d i s t i n c t l e g a l d i s c i p l i n e s . Diplomatic immunity i s as o l d 
as i n t e r n a t i o n a l law 4 8 and may i n many re s p e c t s be construed as 
lex specialis. Thus, while the law of s t a t e immunity operates 
46Sompong S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , p. 23; C r a i g Baker, The 
Abuse of Diplomatic P r i v i l e g e s and Immunities--A Necessary E v i l 
(1997), pp. 14-31. 
" S u c h a r i t k u l , op. c i t . , pp. 23-24. 
4 8 C r a i g Baker, The Abuse of Diplomatic P r i v i l e g e s and 
Immunities—A Necessary E v i l (1997), p. 14; see, Geraldo E. do 
Nasamento e S i l v a , i n f r a . 
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on the notion of immunity ratione materia, the law of diplomatic 
p r i v i l e g e s on the other hand i s p r e d i c a t e d on immunity ratione 
personae. These p r i v i l e g e s e x i s t so as to pave way f o r s t a t e 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n the r e c e i v i n g s t a t e to perform t h e i r 
diplomatic work most e f f i c i e n t l y without any i n t e r f e r e n c e 
whatsoever. The r e l e v a n t p r i n c i p l e s r e l a t i n g to t h i s area of 
the law can be found i n the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations 1961, A r t i c l e s 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 and 37, 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . The p r i v i l e g e s and immunities therefore granted 
to diplomatic missions are (1) the person of a diplomat and h i s 
or her p r i v a t e residence s h a l l be i n v i o l a b l e ; (2) the diplomat 
s h a l l be immune from l o c a l j u r i s d i c t i o n ; (3) a diplomat s h a l l be 
protected a g a i n s t g i v i n g evidence as a witness; (4) there s h a l l 
be i n v i o l a b i l i t y of a r c h i v e s and correspondence of the sending 
s t a t e ; and (5) there s h a l l be exemption from taxes and custom 
du t i e s . Thus i n s p i t e of the f o r c e and t h r u s t of the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic R e l a t i o n s as regards p r i v i l e g e s and 
immunities duly accorded to the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of s t a t e s , there 
appear to be an avalanche of s u i t s p r e f e r r e d against f o r e i g n 
sovereign s t a t e s before the c o u r t s of the host country or the 
r e c e i v i n g s t a t e . 4 9 For example, out of the 1200 cases brought 
4 9See Lady Fox Employment Cont r a c t s as an exception to s t a t e 
immunity. I s a l l p u b l i c s e r v i c e immune? (1995) BYIL, Vol. 
LXVI. The United S t a t e s , f o r example, has been sued i n a l o t of 
c o u n t r i e s . See a l s o David E p s t e i n ' s l e c t u r e , A Paper D e l i v e r e d 
at the Lawyers i n Europe Conference on State Immunity, 30 June-2 
Jul y (1994); c a s e s : Hensala v. T u r k i s h State § 92/44 3 1993: 
120; MK v. Republic of Turkey 94 I n t Law Reports (1994) p. 350; 
Abbott v. Republic of South A f r i c a ILA Report 5(a) 135, B o l e t i n 
de J u r i s p r u d e n c i a C o n s t i t u t i o n a l (1992), p. 155, et seq.; Reid 
v. Republic of Mouiri, ILR (1994); Arab Rep. of Egypt v. Gamal-
E l d i n (Employment Appeal T r i b u n a l , 6 June (1995), I Law Reports 
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a g a i n s t the United S t a t e s i n 80 countries i n 1993, i t would 
appear that about 80-82 percent seemed to be r e l a t e d to s t a f f -
employment d i s p u t e s . 5 0 One important question worth c o n s i d e r i n g 
a t t h i s juncture, however, i s whether the e x e r c i s i n g of 
j u r i s d i c t i o n over employment disputes or s u i t s a g a i n s t a f o r e i g n 
s t a t e can adequately be supported. And i f so, what l o g i c a l 
l e g a l arguments can be advanced to counteract the p r i n c i p l e of 
ne impediatur legatio or the e f f e c t of the Vienna Convention of 
1961, a r t i c l e 31, which had been r a t i f i e d by a l a r g e number of 
c o u n t r i e s ? 
So f a r municipal courts have given c o n f l i c t i n g d e c i s i o n s 
often obscured by f a i l e d t heories and exceptions to s t a t e 
immunity. There i s therefore a general confusion and 
i n c i d e n t a l l y the v a r i o u s n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n i n p l a c e seem to 
o f f e r only very l i t t l e help. W i l l i t be apposite to r e l y on the 
r u l e s of p r i v a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and a r b i t r a t i o n , or should 
these p r i v a t e s u i t s be s e t t l e d on r e s t r i c t i v e immunity before 
the courts of the r e c e i v i n g s t a t e ? Or i s i t s t i l l rewarding f o r 
municipal courts to continue r e l y i n g on the doctrine of absolute 
immunity? These are important questions that must be c a r e f u l l y 
addressed. Perhaps our s t a r t i n g point must be the lex laboris 
generalis et arbitri or one could a l s o consider the leges 
laboris speciales, as regards p r i v a t e l i t i g a t i n g p a r t i e s with 
r e s p e c t to c e r t a i n underlying fundamental r i g h t s and d u t i e s of 
104 (1997), pp. 673-683. 
5 0Lady Fox, op. c i t . , p. 98; David Epstein, op. c i t . 
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s t a t e s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. For what i s i n a c t u a l f a c t being 
considered herein i s not j u r i s d i c t i o n a l immunity of diplomatic 
agents, but r a t h e r i n d i r e c t l y the immunity of the person of the 
s t a t e . Because i n a c t u a l f a c t , the immunity ratione personae of 
the diplomatic agent i s d e r i v e d from the " r e p r e s e n t a t i v e link." 
which the diplomat has with the sending s t a t e . The argument 
commonly advanced by municipal c o u r t s i s t h a t any d e c i s i o n taken 
by a diplomatic mission r e s p e c t i n g employment c o n t r a c t s which i s 
not governmental but commercial and r e s u l t s i n dispute must be 
denied immunity and l i a b i l i t y imputed to the s t a t e . The s a i d 
approach, however, i s not an easy undertaking s i n c e the 
a p p l i c a t i o n of r e l a t i v e immunity l a c k s usus and seems to c r e a t e 
a web of confusion i n r e s p e c t of the f a c t t h a t both diplomatic 
law and s t a t e immunity are two d i s t i n c t i v e s u b j e c t s arguably 
regulated by d i f f e r e n t l e g a l p r i n c i p l e s but somehow e x h i b i t an 
element of confluere as regards the p o s i t i o n of the s t a t e . 5 1 
Arguably, even i f a n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y be allowed to e x e r c i s e 
j u r i s d i c t i o n over a p a r t i c u l a r c l a i m , s t a t e p r a c t i c e and 
decisions by municipal courts show t h a t i t would be d i f f i c u l t to 
have the judgment enforced. 5 2 The d e c i s i o n s i n Z a i r e v. 
5 1Geraldo E. do Nasamento e S i l v a i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law 
Achievements and Prospects, op. c i t . , pp. 441-442; Foxworth 
(1992) ILR 99, p. 138; Republic of 'A' Embassy Case, ILR 77, 
489. 
5 2See g e n e r a l l y the w r i t i n g s of the v a r i o u s s c h o l a r s on the 
execution of s t a t e property, NYIL (1979) 10; see a l s o (1999) 
General Assembly, F i f t y - F i r s t S e s s i o n , A/CN.4/L.576 p. 51. 
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Duclaux, 5 3 Alcorn, and the P h i l i p p i n e Embassy case are c l e a r 
a u t h o r i t a t i v e judgments that cannot be swept under the carpet. 
Thus i n Sengupta v. Republic of I n d i a , 5 4 a l r e a d y 
considered, Professor Higgins, argued on behalf of her c l i e n t 
t h a t "the question of immunity has to be decided by reference 
s o l e l y to the terms of the co n t r a c t without regard to the breach 
of i t by the s t a t e . " 5 5 The Employment Appeal Tribunal r e j e c t e d 
her submission by r u l i n g that "The decision of the House of 
Lords i n I Congreso de Partido shows that the question does not 
f a l l to be decided s o l e l y by reference to the nature of the 
un d e r l y i n g c o n t r a c t and without reference to the nature of the 
b r e a c h . " 5 6 The court therefore d e c l i n e d to take j u r i s d i c t i o n of 
the case because of the underlying reasoning that a l l matters 
r e s p e c t i n g the running of an embassy were immune. Sengupta, 
t h e r e f o r e , e s t a b l i s h e d a precedent at E n g l i s h common law that 
employment c o n t r a c t s entered i n t o by s t a t e s i n respect of a l l 
workers employed w i t h i n the confines of diplomatic premises, be 
i t s e n i o r s t a f f or j u n i o r s t a f f , are immune. Some commentators 
are a l s o agreed that even i f the 1978 Act had been applied, the 
Republ i c of I n d i a would s t i l l have been immune.57 A s i m i l a r 
r easoning can be detected i n the judgment of the I r i s h Supreme 
5 394 ILR 368. 
5 4(1983) ICR 221, Employment Appeal Tribunal. 
5 5 I b i d . 
5 6 I b i d . 
5 7See Lady Fox, op. c i t . , BYIL (1995) for a c l e a r exposition 
on the i s s u e s regarding employment contracts and s t a t e immunity. 
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Court i n Canada v. Burke, 5 8 where a wrongful d i s m i s s a l claim 
brought against Canada was held immune. The t h r u s t of the 
d e c i s i o n of the I r i s h Supreme Court i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t i e s seemed 
to have been predicated on the s e c u r i t y aspect of the p o s i t i o n 
of the Ambassador's d r i v e r . The p r i n c i p l e of sovereign immunity 
was therefore applied by the s a i d court because of the 
underlying s e c u r i t y reason, f o r i n t h i s case the nature t e s t 
appeared not at a l l appropriate. 
Again i n Van Der Hulst v. United S t a t e s , 5 9 the p l a i n t i f f 
was employed as a s e c r e t a r y at the United S t a t e s embassy i n 
H o l l a n d — t h e Hague. While at work one day the p l a i n t i f f was 
duly informed that because of s e c u r i t y reasons her appointment 
would be subject to p e r i o d i c s a t i s f a c t o r y s e c u r i t y check. I n 
August 1984 Van Der Hulst was sacked f o r not l i v i n g up to the 
s e c u r i t y requirements of the embassy. The p l a i n t i f f then sued 
for breach of the employment c o n t r a c t i n i s s u e . A f t e r a c a r e f u l 
consideration of the evidence t h e r e i n presented, the d i s t r i c t 
court r u l e d that "Even i f there was a l r e a d y a p r i v a t e law 
employment contract and the r e s u l t of the s e c u r i t y check was 
used as a ground for termination t h e r e o f , the claim by the 
United States to immunity was w e l l founded." 6 0 On appeal the 
judgment of the d i s t r i c t court was upheld based on a s t r a i g h t -
5 8Canada v. Employment Appeals T r i b u n a l and Burke (1992) 
ILRM 325. Here, the I r i s h Court followed the E n g l i s h d e c i s i o n 
i n Sengupta. 
5 994 ILR 3374, The Netherlands Supreme Court. 
€ 0 I b i d . 
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forward reasoning t h a t a sovereign s t a t e i n the course of 
c a r r y i n g out i t s diplomatic a c t i v i t i e s has the r i g h t to claim 
immunity f o r d i s m i s s i n g an employee f o r s e c u r i t y reasons. 
I n MK v. The Republic of Turkey, 6 1 the p l a i n t i f f , a Dutch 
n a t i o n a l , was d i s m i s s e d i n 1984 from her p o s i t i o n as s e c r e t a r y 
of the T u r k i s h Embassy i n the Netherlands. The p l a i n t i f f , 
having c a r e f u l l y considered the i s s u e s regarding her d i s m i s s a l , 
appealed to the s u b - d i s t r i c t court of the Hague to declare the 
termination of her appointment void. To the s u r p r i s e of many, 
the p l a i n t i f f ' s c l a i m was granted i n the following formulated 
words: 
" ( 1 ) I t c o u l d not be argued that the p l a i n t i f f was employed on 
T u r k i s h t e r r i t o r y and t h a t t h e r e f o r e the court had no 
j u r i s d i c t i o n to hear the case. Although the embassy served as 
T u r k i s h t e r r i t o r y f o r diplomatic purposes, the land on which the 
embassy was s i t u a t e d was p a r t of Dutch t e r r i t o r y over which the 
Netherlands had f u l l j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
(2) The a b s o l u t e theory of immunity co u l d no longer be regarded 
as a r u l e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and s t a t e s were only e n t i t l e d to 
immunity f o r a c t s that had been performed jure imperii; 
a c c o r d i n g l y , the c o u r t had j u r i s d i c t i o n over a foreign s t a t e for 
a c t s t h a t were performed on the same footing as p r i v a t e 
i n d i v i d u a l under p r i v a t e law." 6 2 
I t would appear counsel for Turkey seemed to have 
overlooked the a u t h o r i t y i n Radwan v. Radwan,63 i n defending the 
r e p u b l i c of Turkey, f o r according to general i n t e r n a t i o n a l law 
the premises of an embassy and perhaps the consulate are not 
p a r t of the t e r r i t o r y of the sending s t a t e . This e x a c t l y 
6 1 (1994) I L Report, p. 350, Vol. 94. 
6 2 I b i d . , p. 351. 
6 3 (1972) 3 A l l ER 967 (Family D i v i s i o n ) . This explains the 
law to some ex t e n t . 
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represents the p o s i t i o n advanced sometime ago by Dr. Akehurst, 6 4 
and Professor Fawcett i n h i s w r i t i n g s . 6 5 The second argument 
advanced by the s u b - d i s t r i c t court of the Hague t h a t "the 
absolute theory of immunity could no longer be regarded as a 
r u l e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law" appears to be i n e r r o r or might have 
been based on conjecture. For such a p o s i t i o n simply appears to 
run counter to current s t a t e p r a c t i c e because many s t a t e s s t i l l 
r e s i s t the underlying p r i n c i p l e s of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. I t i s 
i n s t r u c t i v e to note, however, tha t i n view of the forc e of the 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission's Report and the p o s i t i o n of 
developing s t a t e s , sovereign immunity i s not dead accurate. 
Although the i s s u e s i n MK and Heusala v. Turkey appear quite 
s i m i l a r , the Supreme Court of F i n l a n d h e l d immune a c l a i m f or 
u n f a i r d i s m i s s a l . 6 6 Arguably, counsel f o r Turkey l o s t the case 
i n MK v. The Republic of Turkey by h i s r e l i a n c e on a f a i l e d 
theory, coupled with a l e s s convincing i n t e r n a t i o n a l law 
argument which d i d not f i n d favour with the j u r i s p r u d e n c e of the 
court as regards the e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l i t y of the embassy of the 
sending s t a t e on the t e r r i t o r y of the r e c e i v i n g s t a t e . 6 7 The 
p e t i t i o n e r having won the s a i d case attempted to enforce the 
judgment by seeking to attach the embassy bank account of the 
Republic of Turkey. This prompted the Dutch S e c r e t a r y of 
6 4Akehurst, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law (1991), p. 117. 
6 5See the judgment of Cumning-Bruce J i n Radwan v. Radwan 
(1972) 3 A l l ER 967. 
6 6§92/44.3, 1993: 120. 
6 7 I L R Report, op. c i t . , p. 351. 
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J u s t i c e , a c t i n g pursuant to A r t i c l e 13(4) of the B a i l i f f ' s 
Regulations, to i n t e r v e n e , thus i n s t r u c t i n g the b a i l i f f s to 
d e s i s t from e x e c u t i n g the judgment aga i n s t the Republic of 
Turkey. The p e t i t i o n e r , having been embittered by such an 
a c t i o n , appealed a g a i n s t the d e c i s i o n of the S t a t e Secretary for 
j u s t i c e . On November 1986, the Netherlands Council of State 
r e j e c t e d the appeal as f o l l o w s : 
"(1) I n the absence of any t r e a t y between Turkey and the 
Netherlands r e g a r d i n g immunity from execution of judgment, the 
case had to be decided i n accordance with the p r o v i s i o n s of 
customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
(2) When i n t e r p r e t i n g and a n a l y s i n g customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law 
the c o u r t should take account of the opinion of the Executive as 
i t r e p r e s e n t e d the s t a t e i n i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p with other s t a t e s 
and help mould customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law by i t s p r a c t i c e and 
the d i s s e m i n a t i o n of i t s views. 
(3) Customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law d i d not permit the 
attachment of a s s e t s belonging to another s t a t e i f those a s s e t s 
were intended to be used f o r a p u b l i c purpose. The Turkish 
Embassy i n a note verbale to the court, had s t a t e d that a l l 
funds i n the bank account i n question had been s e t a s i d e for the 
purpose of d e f r a y i n g the running c o s t s of the embassy. Taking 
i n t o account the g r e a t importance t h a t had t r a d i t i o n a l l y been 
att a c h e d to the e f f i c i e n t performance of embassy functions as 
evidenced by the Vienna Conventions on d i p l o m a t i c and consular 
r e l a t i o n s , Turkey's submission was s u f f i c i e n t f o r the court to 
award i t immunity from e x e c u t i o n . " 6 8 
The s a i d judgment i s a b s o l u t e l y i n l i n e with the 
f u n c t i o n a l n e c e s s i t y theory and thus a l s o seemed to support the 
concept of the s p e c i a l duty of p r o t e c t i o n required of the 
r e c e i v i n g s t a t e . Perhaps the c l e a r e s t expression of diplomatic 
law can be found i n the w r i t i n g s of V a t t e l thus: 
"The r e s p e c t which i s due to sovereigns should r e f l e c t 
upon t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and p a r t i c u l a r l y upon an ambassador, 
as r e p r e s e n t i n g the person of h i s master i n the h i g h e s t degree. 
68MK v. S t a t e S e c r e t a r y for J u s t i c e , The Netherlands, 
Council of S t a t e , 24 November (1986) . 
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. . I t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y the duty of sovereign to whom a m i n i s t e r 
i s sent to a f f o r d s e c u r i t y to the person of the m i n i s t e r . To 
r e c e i v e a m i n i s t e r i n h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e c a p a c i t y i s e q u i v a l e n t 
to promising to give him the most p a r t i c u l a r p r o t e c t i o n and to 
see that he enjoys a l l p o s s i b l e s a f e t y . " 6 9 
I f V a t t e l ' s p o s i t i o n be relevant to our needs today as regards 
diplomatic law, then one could argue t h a t a l l t h i n g s being 
equal, the i n v i o l a b i l i t y of the person of the diplomat simply 
r e i n f o r c e s the often c r i t i c i s e d r u l e of s t a t e immunity by v i r t u e 
of A r t i c l e s 22 to 38, r e s p e c t i v e l y . V a t t e l ' s p o s i t i o n i s ex 
hypothesi therefore rel e v a n t i n these modern times i n r e s p e c t of 
the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e character theory i n diplomatic law. 
Quite a d i f f e r e n t view, however, was taken i n R e i d v. the 
Republic of Nauru, 7 0 there the p l a i n t i f f was employed by the 
Republic of Nauru as a p i l o t . The a i r l i n e i n question was 
wholly owned by the Republic of Nauru. The p l a i n t i f f thus 
brought s u i t a gainst the s a i d country f o r a breach of h i s 
contract of employment. The defendant i n turn pleaded t h a t i t 
be accorded immunity. The court, having taken p a i n s to review 
the evidence t h e r e i n presented, r u l e d i n favour of Mr. Reid. 
The A u s t r a l i a n court simply r u l e d t h a t immunity from the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of the courts of another s t a t e was not absolute 
anymore. The court simply followed the d i s t i n c t i o n between a c t a 
jure imperii and acta jure gestionis and thus found f o r the 
p l a i n t i f f . The court a l s o argued f o r c e f u l l y t h a t "The 
C i t e d from J . Craig Barker, The Abuse of Diplomatic 
P r i v i l e g e s and Immunities—A Necessary E v i l ? (1997), p. 76. 
7 0 A u s t r a l i a , Supreme Court of V i c t o r i a , 17 Feb. (1992) I L 
Report, Vol. 101 (1995), p. 193. 
534 
r e s t r i c t i v e theory of immunity did not compromise the 
sovereignty of the s t a t e concerned and protected the i n t e r e s t s 
of j u s t i c e with r e s p e c t to an i n d i v i d u a l e n t e r i n g into a 
t r a n s a c t i o n with a s t a t e . " 7 1 
A c a r e f u l review of these cases shows c r y s t a l c l e a r that 
while c i v i l law c o u n t r i e s follow the p u b l i c / p r i v a t e law 
d i s t i n c t i o n i n determining whether to grant immunity or not i n 
respect of employment c o n t r a c t s , courts i n common law countries 
have simply r e s i g n e d to the well-known approach i n 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between commercial and non-commercial a c t i v i t i e s 
of s t a t e s when faced w i t h c l a i m s against sovereign s t a t e s before 
domestic or l o c a l c o u r t s . 7 2 This i n f a c t has given r i s e to 
d i v e r s i t y i n s t a t e p r a c t i c e and un c e r t a i n grasp of the subject 
i n i s s u e . The l e a r n e d Lady Fox i n o f f e r i n g her thoughts on the 
above s u b j e c t concluded t h a t 
"The f i r s t c o n c l u s i o n to be drawn from the above survey 
of the operation of the employment exception to immunity i s t h a t 
a r e s t r i c t i v e t h e o r y i n simple form does not work. Under that 
theory, i f the work i s i d e n t i c a l to t h a t performed i n the 
p r i v a t e s e c t o r , the t e s t of the nature of the work should render 
the c l a i m s u b j e c t t o the l o c a l c o u r t ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n . But as the 
House Report on the US FSIA, the US and other common law 
j u r i s d i c t i o n s i n model show, p u b l i c s e r v i c e continues immune by 
t a k i n g i n t o account the p u b l i c s t a t u s of the employer and the 
purpose of the work, the achievements of the c l a s s i c f u n c t i o n s 
of government, thus l a r g e l y p r e s e r v i n g a r u l e of absolute 
immunity f o r c i v i l s e r v a n t s abroad. W h i l s t t h i s goal may be the 
d e s i r e d r e s u l t , t he d i s t o r t i o n of the commerciality t e s t to 
7 1 I b i d . 
7 2See Lady Fox i n BYIL (1995) on t h i s point. However, there 
are other important c a s e s t h a t a t t e s t to t h i s approach: Hann 
Hensala v. Tur k i s h S t a t e , § 92/44.3 1993: 120; MK v. Republic of 
Turkey 94 I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Reports (1994), p. 350; Sengnipta v. 
Republic of I n d i a (1983) ICR 221 Employment Appeal T r i b u n a l . 
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achieve i t undermines i t s use elsewhere i n r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity." 7 3 
The current s t a t e of the law i n r e s p e c t of employment 
con t r a c t s and s t a t e immunity i s f a r from c l e a r . And the attempt 
to introduce the m a n i f e s t l y flawed concept of r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity int o the parlance of diplomatic law would undoubtedly 
exacerbate the problem to such heights as to c r e a t e harassment 
which would lead to disrepute. I t i s submitted t h a t the 
exposition of Lady Fox on employment co n t r a c t s as regards the 
p o s i t i o n of the sovereign s t a t e i s l o g i c a l l y grounded and 
therefore one may be hard put to take i s s u e with the u n d e r l y i n g 
reasoning behind her t h e s i s . 7 4 At any r a t e i t would be q u i t e 
d i f f i c u l t to c h a r a c t e r i s e the work of a c i v i l s e r v a n t i n an 
embassy s e t t i n g to be commercial by r e l y i n g on the nature t e s t . 
Thus the employment of a q u a l i f i e d l o c a l n a t i o n a l to work i n the 
embassy of the sending s t a t e i s not any d i f f e r e n t from n a t i o n a l s 
employed from the sending s t a t e , for i n the main the work done 
i n most embassies i s always p o l i t i c a l l y based and s p e c i f i c a l l y 
geared towards the f u l f i l m e n t of the sovereign f u n c t i o n of the 
sending s t a t e . Furthermore, i n order to a i d the e f f e c t i v e 
performance of the work of the diplomatic agent, the s p e c i a l 
duty of p r o t e c t i o n has i n the s t r i c t e s t sense been confirmed and 
strengthened under A r t i c l e s 22(2) and 29, r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
Embassies do not produce goods for s a l e on the market and 
t h e r e f o r e the reason for employment co n t r a c t s or the employment 
7 3Lady Fox, op. c i t . 
7 4 I b i d . 
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of the n a t i o n a l s of a given r e c e i v i n g s t a t e i s arguably to f i l l 
vacancies t h a t could help promote the e f f e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l 
representation of the sending s t a t e . Hence i t would be 
l o g i c a l l y untenable to suggest t h a t employment c o n t r a c t s be 
ch a r a c t e r i s e d i n t o commercial and non-commercial ca t e g o r i e s as a 
prelude to determining what i s immune and what i s not immune. 
Perhaps the p u b l i c and p r i v a t e law d i s t i n c t i o n may be somewhat 
he l p f u l but again i t would seem such an approach i s a l s o fraught 
with d i f f i c u l t i e s and u n c e r t a i n t i e s and th e r e f o r e most l i k e l y to 
confuse the modern judge because a s t a t e does not become a 
j u r i d i c a l person or n a t u r a l person simply by employing a 
resident of the forum s t a t e . I n the l i g h t of these bottlenecks, 
i t i s suggested th a t m u n i c i p a l c o u r t s must endeavour to abandon 
the quest of in t r o d u c i n g the r e s t r i c t i v e approach i n t o 
diplomatic law i n r e s p e c t of employment c o n t r a c t s , f o r s t a t e 
p r a c t i c e i s u n s e t t l e d , coupled with a c l e a r d i v e r s i t y i n the 
jurisprudence of s t a t e s . 7 5 Thus the continued a p p l i c a t i o n of the 
doctrine of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity to r e s o l v e these problems 
simply undermines the f o r c e of the i n v i o l a b i l i t y of the person 
of the diplomatic agent which on the whole i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n 
nature. This, however, does not mean that a se n i o r s t a f f of an 
embassy could dis m i s s an employee a t w i l l without any 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n . At l e a s t the employment p r a c t i c e s of the s t a f f 
of the sending s t a t e must be based on good f a i t h and good 
conscience i n order to d i s p e l l o c a l employee apprehensions i n 
respect of job s e c u r i t y . 
7 5 I b i d . 
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The perception held i n c e r t a i n c i r c l e s that workers w i t h i n 
the embassy of the sending s t a t e be c l a s s i f i e d according to 
grades leads us nowhere, s i n c e every member of the work force i n 
the embassy, one way or the other, aids i n the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of 
the sending s t a t e . Hence p o s i t i o n s such as a s e c r e t a r y , d r i v e r , 
messenger and other support s e r v i c e s arguably seem to be more 
p o l i t i c a l i n many re s p e c t s than many would b e l i e v e . 7 6 The h e a r t 
of the whole i s s u e , however i s whether a diplomatic mission has 
a c t e d as a p r i v a t e person because i t offered a job to a l o c a l 
n a t i o n a l . I t i s not that easy to come up with a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d 
answer, but s c h o l a r s are agreed that the s t a t e n e v e r t h e l e s s a c t s 
imperium and i t s diplomatic agents always act as c i v i l s e r v a n t s 
and t h a t i t would be d i f f i c u l t to d e l i m i t the scope of the 
a c t i v i t i e s of s t a t e agents, i . e . , c i v i l servants r e s i d e n t i n a 
r e c e i v i n g s t a t e on a h y b r i d b a s i s — o n e commercial and the other 
non-commercial. I t i s a l s o important to s t a t e more c l e a r l y 
t h a t the i s s u e of procedural immunity i s d i f f e r e n t from 
questions r e l a t i n g to enforcement measures a g a i n s t s t a t e 
property. The former always precedes the l a t t e r . But one 
important point worth p u t t i n g forth i s that although i t i s 
p o s s i b l e a domestic court could take j u r i s d i c t i o n over c e r t a i n 
c l a i m s duly p r e f e r r e d a g a i n s t foreign s t a t e s , the next stage of 
e n f o r c i n g the judgment becomes a d i f f i c u l t t a s k s i n c e such 
measures undermine the p o s i t i o n of the s t a t e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
7 6Sengupta v. Republic of India (1983) ICR 221 Employment 
Appeal; Van Der Hulst v. U.S., 94 ILR 374, The Netherlands 
Supreme Court; Canada v. Burke (1992) ILM, 325. 
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law. Thus although j u r i s d i c t i o n may be procured, the 
enforcement of the judgment (execution forcee) and pre-judgment 
attachment (saisie conservatoire) are not supported by s t a t e 
p r a c t i c e 7 7 and therefore may m i l i t a t e a g a i n s t p eaceful r e l a t i o n s 
of s t a t e s . I t i s th e r e f o r e the opinion of the present w r i t e r 
that a r b i t r a t i o n be studi e d i n depth as a prelude to r e s o l v i n g 
problems i n t h i s area of the law, or judges could simply r e s o r t 
to the a p p l i c a t i o n of the lex laboris generalis et arbitri, 
which means c e r t a i n p r i v a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l law p r i n c i p l e s must 
be explored to a i d the process. 
Any s t a t e that i s ipso iure sovereign and thus has suprema 
potestas within i t s spheres of i n f l u e n c e would not on i t s own 
accord submit to the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the courts of another s t a t e 
and i n the end being made to face the consequence of l o s i n g i t s 
property to a p r i v a t e e n t i t y . 7 8 Thus u n t i l such time tha t the 
two c o n s t i t u t i v e elements of s t a t e immunity, t h a t i s , the corpus 
and the animus are t o t a l l y overshadowed by the spectre of the 
emerging doctrine of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity, sovereign s t a t e s 
would continue to plead t h a t they be accorded immunity i n view 
of the f a c t that i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s h o r i z o n t a l i n nature and 
secondly because s t a t e p r a c t i c e i s f a r from s e t t l e d . The 
problem therefore cannot be r e s o l v e d eo instanti by simply 
7 7See the co n t r i b u t i o n made by d i f f e r e n t s c h o l a r s on the 
subject i n NYIL (1979) 10, where most of the s c h o l a r s have 
argued that the question of ex e c u t i o n i s u n s e t t l e d i n the 
p r a c t i c e of s t a t e s , e.g., Bouchez, e t a l . , 10 Neths Yrbk (1979). 
7 8See M. Sornarajah (1982) ICLQ, V o l . 31, 661 r e l a t i n g to 
the problem of applying the d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 
See a l s o the d e c i s i o n of E n g l i s h and American c o u r t s . 
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r e s i g n i n g to a d i s t i n c t i o n between commercial and non-
commercial or to the p u b l i c and p r i v a t e law d i s t i n c t i o n s as 
regards s t a t e a c t i v i t i e s . 
I t i s therefore the opinion of the present w r i t e r to 
p o s t u l a t e t h a t the p e r s i s t e n t divergence between co u n t r i e s t h a t 
adhere to s t a t e immunity and that of countries g r a v i t a t i n g 
toward the d o c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity w i l l c e r t a i n l y 
continue unabated u n t i l someone comes along perhaps with a 
b e t t e r p h i l o s o p h i c a l approach l i k e l y to appeal to a l l and 
sundry, thus bridging t h i s self-imposed deep gulf. C e r t a i n l y , 
the "dismal swamp" i s l e f t undrained for the exceptions 
advocated a t s t a t e l e v e l do not have the support of s t a t e 
p r a c t i c e u n i v e r s a l l y grounded as to allow derogation from 
customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. A f t e r a l l the provisions s e t f o r t h 
i n the v a r i o u s n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n do not a c c u r a t e l y represent 
the p r i n c i p l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law 7 9 but only show as to how 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s understood i n each of these c o u n t r i e s . The 
c u r r e n t s t a t e of the law i s s t i l l not c l e a r , hence s t a t e 
immunity i n every respect remains a r u l e rather than an 
exception, notwithstanding the p l e a by the l e g i s l a t u r e i n some 
c o u n t r i e s t h a t exceptions to s t a t e immunity be i n c r e a s e d . 
Perhaps Alexander Hamilton was r i g h t when he postulated that " I t 
i s i nherent i n the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to 
the s u i t of an i n d i v i d u a l without i t s consent. This i s the 
7 9John McElhinney v. Anthony I v a r John Williams and Her 
Majesty's S e c r e t a r y of State f o r Northern I r e l a n d (defendants), 
The Supreme Court 175/94, Del (1995). 
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general sense and the general p r a c t i c e of mankind." I t would 
undoubtedly be hard for any "candid mind" to take i s s u e with 
Hamilton's po s i t i o n i n res p e c t of present-day i n t e r n a t i o n a l law 
because the s a i d law i s h o r i z o n t a l w h i l e municipal law i s 
h i e r a r c h i c a l coupled with i t s compulsory f o r c e only over the 
r u l e d . 
The t r e a t y t e x t c u r r e n t l y r e g i s t e r e d with the UN 
unfortunately had produced mixed r e s u l t s and t h e r e f o r e h i g h l y 
u n l i k e l y to f i n d favour with many c o u n t r i e s . The r i f t between 
the West and the Third World c e r t a i n l y t h e r e f o r e would continue 
unabated and the argument by some l e a d i n g s c h o l a r s t h a t as 
r e s u l t of the demise of the USSR the currency of the r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity would supersede t h a t of absolute immunity i s simply 
premature and non sequitur. 
I t i s i n s t r u c t i v e to note tha t s t a t e p r a c t i c e i n res p e c t 
of c o n t r a c t s of employment i s scanty and q u i t e fragmented. The 
attempt by the S i x t h Committee to co n s i d e r the s u b j e c t proved 
u n f r u i t f u l . And i n c i d e n t a l l y , subsequent informal c o n s u l t a t i o n s 
h e l d i n 1994 met with d i f f i c u l t i e s because of the divergent 
8 0See The F e d e r a l i s t Papers, No. 81, p. 487 (Hamilton) : 
This does not mean that the present w r i t e r i s advocating th a t 
s t a t e immunity be maintained. Nothing on t h i s e a r t h would 
remain the same, for ever y t h i n g i s bound to undergo some 
changes. But such a change must be done with care and should 
not be predicated on f a i l e d t h e o r i e s or incomplete t h e o r i e s 
l i k e l y to increase the muddy water i n the "dismal swamp." 
C e r t a i n l y , i f progress i s to be made, r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i s 
not the answer for i t has s i t vernia verbo c r e a t e d a Pandora's 
box of d i f f i c u l t i e s and u n c e r t a i n t i e s i n t r a n s n a t i o n a l 
l i t i g a t i o n . I c e r t a i n l y , t h e r e f o r e , share the p o s i t i o n of M. 
Sornarajah on problems r e l a t i n g to the a p p l i c a t i o n of the 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity (1983) ICLQ 661, V o l . 31. 
541 
views expressed on d r a f t a r t i c l e 11, sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) 
of paragraph 2. As regards sub-paragraph ( c ) , members of the 
informal group suggested that the s a i d provision could not 
p o s s i b l y be r e c o n c i l e d with the p r i n c i p l e of non-discrimination, 
as d e r i v e d from the concept of n a t i o n a l i t y . 8 1 
A r t i c l e 11 of ILC d r a f t a r t i c l e s o f f e r s a d e l i c a t e balance 
between the labour laws of the r e c e i v i n g s t a t e and the competing 
i n t e r e s t s of the sending s t a t e , i . e . , the employer s t a t e . The 
i n d i v i d u a l l e g i s l a t i o n passed i n the seven common law countries 
f a i l e d to r e s o l v e the problem but r a t h e r exacerbated i t by the 
i n c r e a s i n g emphasis placed on the nature t e s t . Although the 
U.S. f o l l o w s r e s t r i c t i v e immunity, recent S i x t h Committee 
meeting on the s u b j e c t shows tha t i t i s not i n favour of a r t i c l e 
11 of the d r a f t a r t i c l e . Ms. Jacobson of the United S t a t e s 
o f f e r e d the p o s i t i o n of her country thus: 
"The c u r r e n t wording of d r a f t a r t i c l e 11 (contracts of 
employment) f a i l e d to address the major labour-employment i s s u e 
f a c i n g d i p l o m a t i c m i s s i o n s . Her d e l e g a t i o n had r a i s e d before 
i t s concerns over the c o n f l i c t between l o c a l labour laws and the 
a b i l i t y of d i p l o m a t i c f a c i l i t i e s to perform t h e i r mission. 
L a w s u i t s a g a i n s t foreign s t a t e s f o r a c t i o n s r e l a t i n g to 
downsizing, r e o r g a n i z a t i o n and c l o s i n g of diplomatic and 
c o n s u l a r f a c i l i t i e s , and the withdrawal of diplomatic missions 
from p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n bankrupt mandatory s o c i a l s e c u r i t y systems 
f o r t h e i r l o c a l l y h i r e d personnel had soured over the past 
y e a r s . " 8 2 
8 1See g e n e r a l l y , I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission, F i f t y - F i r s t 
S e s s i o n , Geneva, 3 May-23 J u l y , 1999. 
8 2 F i f t y - S e c o n d Session A/C 6/52 SR 26 2 Feb. 1998, S i x t h 
Committee Meeting. 
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The concern of the U.S.A. i s j u s t i f i e d , but i t s c u r r e n t p o s i t i o n 
i s ambivalent since over the years the (nature t e s t ) , 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity has been made the b a s i s of i t s p r a c t i c e . 
Immunity so far has been granted to s t a t e s i n r e s p e c t of 
employment of nationals of the forum a t di p l o m a t i c or con s u l a r 
posts, where there i s a c l e a r evidence t h a t the employment i n 
is s u e i n v o l v e s the performance of a governmental a c t i v i t y . 8 3 
Courts i n some other c o u n t r i e s , on the other hand, have 
e x e r c i s e d j u r i s d i c t i o n i f the employment c o n t r a c t i n dispute 
mirrors t h a t of the p r i v a t e s e c t o r . 8 4 However, i t i s submitted 
that general recognition i s given to c o n t r a c t s of employment, i f 
there i s a showing that the employee's p o s i t i o n i s i n e x t r i c a b l y 
r e l a t e d or involved with governmental a c t i v i t i e s . Courts i n 
general have had d i f f i c u l t i e s i n e x p l o r i n g the above s t a t e d 
i s s u e s . 
The suggestion, however, by the working group which was 
e s t a b l i s h e d by General Assembly r e s o l u t i o n 53/98, of 8 December 
1998, t h a t a d i s t i n c t i o n be made between the r i g h t and d u t i e s of 
employees and i s s u e s r e l a t i n g to general p o l i c y of employment i s 
i n order, but t h i s idea must be explored by i n c o r p o r a t i n g the 
1961 Vienna Convention on diplomatic r e l a t i o n s and the 1963 
United States of America v. The P u b l i c S e r v i c e of Canada 
and others, ILR, 94, p. 264; (1992) 65 ILR p. 338. 
8 4 (19 9 2) Reid v. Republic of Maura ILR 101 p. 193: Supreme 
Court of A u s t r a l i a ( V i c t o r i a . (1994) Governor of P i t c a i r n and 
Ass o c i a t e d I s l a n d v. Sutton, ILR 40, p. 508: New Zealand Court 
of Appeal. 
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Vienna Convention on Consular R e l a t i o n s i n t o the d r a f t a r t i c l e s 
as a way of b u i l d i n g consensus among s t a t e s . 
The Future of the Law of Sovereignty Immunity 
How does one prove that the currency of a r u l e has come to 
an end or completely abandoned and that a new r u l e has come to 
b i r t h i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law? T h i s i s not an easy question, but 
such l e g a l parameters as evidence of usus and opinio juris could 
be h e l p f u l i n exploring the s a i d question. These parameters, 
however, have not been p a r t i c u l a r l y h e l p f u l as regards the 
current s t a t u s of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity i n modern i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law, and t h i s i s so because l o c a l or forum law i s a cr e a t u r e of 
sovereignty coupled with the f a c t that the j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l 
foundations of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity are f a t a l l y flawed. I n 
other words, there i s no c l e a r c u t boundary between immune and 
non-immune t r a n s a c t i o n s which according to the proponents of 
r e s t r i c t i v e immunity must s o l e l y be based on the nature t e s t . 
Furthermore, the argument u s u a l l y made i n support of r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity, that i t would promote j u s t i c e i n the market place, 
l a c k s l o g i c and therefore not compelling enough as to prompt a 
r a d i c a l change from sovereign immunity to r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. 
Arguably, f or such a change to command the support of s t a t e s , 
the underlying p r i n c i p l e s of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity must be 
pr e d i c a t e d on a w e l l reasoned and grounded s e t of r u l e s without 
any v a r i e d connotations. Any r u l e of law which has v a r i e d 
meaning must be r e j e c t e d , otherwise i t would defeat the purpose 
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of j u s t i c e and thus may introduce r e l a t i v i t y i n t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law. 
Many have argued that the s t a t e be s u b j e c t e d to the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of j u d i c i a l a u t h o r i t i e s of the forum s t a t e , and be 
made to pay f o r any i n f r a c t i o n s caused by i t s a c t i o n s and t h a t 
the s t a t e i s not above the law. But which law are we 
s p e c i f i c a l l y r e f e r r i n g to? I f i t i s i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, then one 
i s burdened by the f a c t that a l l s t a t e s are equal before the law 
and sovereign immunity i s s t i l l supported by many s t a t e s because 
of the inescapable idea that sovereignty i s i n a l i e n a b l e and 
d e s i r a b l e i n the community of independent s t a t e s . However, i n 
case of municipal law ( i . e . , the procedural and remedial l a w ) , a 
d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t may be r e a l i s e d because the lex fori may 
i n t e r p r e t the law according to the d i c t a t e s of l o c a l law, thus 
d i s t u r b i n g the p o s i t i v e normative r u l e s of general i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law, which i n a l l f a i r n e s s are based on general agreement r a t h e r 
than s u b j e c t i o n or harassment. 
True, why should the i n d i v i d u a l bear the consequences of 
s t a t e a c t i v i t i e s which might have worked hardship on the 
i n d i v i d u a l ? Or can a s t a t e be sued f or v i o l a t i n g the terms of 
an agreement to b u i l d a nuclear f a c i l i t y ? What about a wrongful 
d i s m i s s a l of an employee i n the forum s t a t e ? Can an aggression 
which has produced an economic crime be c h a r a c t e r i s e d according 
to the nature t e s t ? And can a s t a t e be brought to j u s t i c e f o r 
i t s t o r t i o u s a c t , j u r e imperii? These are d i f f i c u l t questions 
to grapple with s i n c e i n t e r n a t i o n a l law does not have any b u i l d -
i n mechanism i n t a c k l i n g the above s t a t e d q u e s t i o n s . However, 
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i n John McElhinney v. Anthony Ivor John Williams and Her 
Majesty's S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for Northern I r e l a n d , the Supreme 
Court of I r e l a n d r u l e d t h a t s t a t u t e s belong to the domestic 
domain and t h e r e f o r e d i d not evidence the p r i n c i p l e of general 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and t h a t the s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s and the 
European Convention t h a t were c i t e d by the appellant to support 
h i s claim d e v i a t e d from general i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and therefore 
not r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of i t . The court i s t o t a l l y r i g h t simply 
because i n t e r n a t i o n a l law t r u l y represents what has been 
accepted, understood and g e n e r a l l y acknowledged among sovereign 
s t a t e s as law but not what the lex fori i n a given country deems 
f i t . Thus the f a c t t h a t a sovereign s t a t e has entered in t o a 
c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p with a t r a d e r i s not s u f f i c i e n t for 
those s t a t e s who have s t a t u t e s i n place to e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n 
or for any other s t a t e s to e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n over the 
contract i n i s s u e without procuring the consent of the defendant 
s t a t e , and t h i s a p p l i e s as w e l l to the locus t e s t or the lex 
loci delicti, r e s p e c t i n g t o r t i o u s i n f r a c t i o n s of s t a t e s , because 
such municipal a n a l o g i e s as the nature t e s t and locus t e s t have 
no place i n p u b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i n the l i g h t of the f a c t 
that these t h e o r i e s were premised upon unexamined assumptions 
r e s p e c t i n g the s t a t u s and f u n c t i o n s of s t a t e s . 
Aggression i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s regarded as delicta 
juris gentium and t h e r e f o r e must be accepted as acta jure 
imperii, even i f i t r e s u l t e d i n economic crimes. I n Kuwait 
Airways Corporation which i n v o l v e s the use of force and s e i z u r e 
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of property, the court of appeal granted immunity. 8 5 However, on 
appeal to the house of Lords, the Law Lords disagreed by denying 
immunity to I r a q i Airways. 8 6 I t i s true th a t I r a q v i o l a t e d 
a r t i c l e 2 ( 4 ) , but i s aggression acta jure gestionis? Or i s the 
economic crime of conversion i n a s t a t e of war commercial? 
C e r t a i n l y no, for I r a q i Airways (a s u b s i d i a r y organ of I r a q ) 
would not dare to f l o u t the authority of a d i c t a t o r i a l 
government of Saddam Hussein by r e f u s i n g to follow n a t i o n a l 
p o l i c y d i r e c t i v e s and t h i s should have given the Law Lords the 
b r i g h t l i g h t to approach the is s u e s of the case e c l e c t i c a l l y , 
f o r the i n v a s i o n of Kuwait and the s e i z u r e of Kuwait Airways 
a i r c r a f t cannot be c h a r a c t e r i s e d as f a l l i n g w i t h i n the co n f i n e s 
of Section 3 ( 3 ) c of the 1978 Act. The Law Lords should have 
r a t h e r r e l i e d on j u s cogens as t h e i r reason for the judgment. 
The nature t e s t and the locus t e s t are de r i v e d from human 
values without much regard to s t a t e values and t h e r e f o r e must 
only be a p p l i e d to the needs of municipal law r a t h e r than to 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, i . e . , the a c t i v i t i e s of s t a t e s . The 
judgments i n Senguta v. Republic of I n d i a , Alcorn v. Republic of 
Colombia, Canada v. Bucke, and Mcelhinney ex hypothesi would not 
offend common sense. However, decisions such as Trentext, Texas 
and M i l l i n g Corp. v. Federal Republic of N i g e r i a , Cameroon's 
Development Bank v. Societe des Establissement Robber, I 
8 5Kuwait Airways Corporation v. I r a q i Airways Company and 
Another (1993), The Times 27 October 122. 
8 6Kuwait Airways Corporation v. I r a q i Airways Company and 
Another, per Lord Goff (1995) IWLR 1147. 
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Congreso del Partido, Nonresident P e t i t i o n e r v. C e n t r a l Bank of 
Nigeria, and Kuwait Airways Corporation, leave much to be 
desired, i f c a r e f u l l y balanced a g a i n s t the needed requirement of 
usus, thus exposing the f a l l a c y i n the nature t e s t , for i t i s 
not easy sometimes to separate the nature t e s t from the purpose 
t e s t . 
I t i s submitted t h a t as a r e s u l t of the r u l e s of the 
i n t e r s t a t e system, sovereign s t a t e s are r a d i c a l l y opposed to the 
nature t e s t and thus u n w i l l i n g to submit to the j u r i s d i c t i o n of 
other s t a t e s f o r there i s no p e r s u a s i v e p r i n c i p l e or r u l e w e l l 
grounded i n s t a t e p r a c t i c e which s t i p u l a t e s t h a t s t a t e 
a c t i v i t i e s be d i s t i n g u i s h e d according to l o c a l data as a prelude 
to e x e r c i s i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n over s u b j e c t s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
The nature t e s t , t h e r e f o r e , i s open to question because i t i s 
based on unfounded mythology of j u s t i c e without any coherence. 
The law of sovereign immunity, however, has l o s t i t s great 
appeal i n the West and t h e r e f o r e may never be the same again. 
I t s weakness i n terms of e q u i t y and s t a b i l i t y i n the market 
place has w e l l been explored, debunked and exposed without 
s e r i o u s l y c o n s i d e r i n g the i n h e r e n t weakness i n the nature t e s t . 
The suggestion, however, t h a t i t be r e p l a c e d has met with 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the l i g h t of the p o s i t i o n of L a t i n American 
countries, the new commonwealth A f r i c a n s t a t e s and other s t a t e s 
from Asia, e.g., I n d i a , China, e t c . 
Sovereign immunity, given the c u r r e n t p o s i t i o n of s t a t e s , 
would continue to be the guiding l i g h t but one must a l s o concede 
that although r e s t r i c t i v e immunity was a mistake, i t would 
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p e r s i s t as a r u l e of thumb i n i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e l e g i s l a t i o n . But 
i t i s appropriate to suggest that i t should not be used as 
s h a c k l e s to bind sovereign s t a t e s because of the very f a c t t h a t 
i t i s wholly premised upon the t r a n s i t o r y conditions or 
f u n c t i o n s of s t a t e s . There i s an a i r of s o p h i s t r y a s s o c i a t e d 
with r e s t r i c t i v e immunity and i t i s i n r e a l i t y nebulous a t b e s t . 
I t i s e q u a l l y important to s t a t e that at i t s F o r t y - T h i r d 
Session i n 1991 the ILC submitted the d r a f t a r t i c l e s to the 
General Assembly with a recommendation that an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
conference of p l e n i p o t e n t i a r i e s be convened to examine the d r a f t 
a r t i c l e s so as to have a convention concluded. The Assembly i n 
i t s r e s o l u t i o n 49/61 of 9th December 1994 duly accepted the 
recommendation of the ILC. Somewhere l a s t year the Assembly 
recommended t h a t the S i x t h Committee should look i n t o the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of s e t t i n g up a working group at the F i f t y - F o u r t h 
Session to consider outstanding substantive i s s u e s i n r e s p e c t of 
the d r a f t a r t i c l e s . The S i x t h Committee commenced i t s work on 
9th November 1998 and a l l speakers at the meeting were agreed 
t h a t a working group be formed as envisaged i n General Assembly 
r e s o l u t i o n 52/151. At i t s 2569th meeting an agreement was 
reached where a working group was e s t a b l i s h e d , i . e . , on 7 May 
1999, and the s a i d group so f a r has made some i n s i g h t f u l 
suggestions as to how to deal with the unresolved i s s u e s a r i s i n g 
out of the d r a f t a r t i c l e s . 
S t a t e s are s t i l l d i v i d e d over i s s u e s r e l a t i n g to the 
concept of s t a t e f o r purpose of immunity, c r i t e r i a f o r 
determining the commercial character of a contract, concept of a 
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state enterprise i n r e l a t i o n t o commercial transactions, 
contracts of employment and measures of c o n s t r a i n t against st a t e 
property. So f a r we do not have any accepted set of rules on 
j u r i s d i c t i o n a l immunities of s t a t e s , but one i s hopeful t h a t the 
suggestions of the working group would f i n d favour w i t h many 
states. C e r t a i n l y great d i f f i c u l t i e s s t i l l e x i s t i n a quest t o 
f i n d a common understanding and s o l u t i o n t o the problems 
r e l a t i n g t o sovereign immunity. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
CONCLUSION: A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR RESOLVING THE 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY CONTROVERSY 
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The f o l l o w i n g conclusions are der i v e d from the preceding 
analysis as regards the r i g h t s of the sovereign s t a t e and t h a t 
of the p r i v a t e trader. 
(1) The doctrine of s t a t e immunity, as can be gathered 
from case law, state p r a c t i c e and the w r i t i n g s of learned 
scholars, must be designated de lege lata as customary 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, a product of e a r l y European m e t a - j u r i d i c a l 
philosophy which found a p p l i c a t i o n i n the c l a s s i c judgment of 
Chief Justice Marshall i n 1812, i n v o l v i n g p r i v a t e s u i t s against 
Napoleon of France, f o r having f o r c i b l y acquired t i t l e t o the 
Schooner Exchange, a l b e i t a p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y belonging to two 
American c i t i z e n s . That the decision i n the Schooner Exchange 
d i d f i n d favour w i t h many judges and t h e r e f o r e became w e l l 
established or grounded i n the p r a c t i c e o f st a t e s i n the 19th 
century up to the e a r l y p a r t of the 20th century cannot be 
disputed. I n other words, there was enough evidence of usus and 
opinio juris sive necessitatis f o r i t s acceptance among 
sovereign states. This, however, i s g r a d u a l l y changing i n the 
West. 
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THE INFLUENCE OF EUROPEAN META-JURIDICAL PHILOSOPHY ON AMERICAN 
COURTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW CAN BE SUPPORTED BY THE FOLLOWING 
STATISTICS 
The Writings 
of P u b l i c i s t s 
Citations i n 
Pleadings 
Court 
Citations 
Court 
Quotations 
Grotius 16 11 2 
Pufendorf 9 4 8 
Bynkershoek 25 16 2 
V a t t e l 92 38 22 
(a) Professor Edwin D. Dickinson, a leading American 
l e g a l scholar, prepared the above s t a t i s t i c s . V a t t e l ' s work, 
f o r example, became a source book and an e s s e n t i a l a u t h o r i t y i n 
American jurisprudence respecting the theory of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law. 
(b) The s t a t i s t i c s are cle a r evidence of how American 
courts r e l i e d on the w r i t i n g s of Grotius, Pufendorf, Bynkershoek 
and V a t t e l t o decide cases between 1789-1820. Bynkershoek and 
V a t t e l , f o r example, were s p e c i f i c a l l y c i t e d i n the Schooner 
Exchange i n 1812. 
(c) Thus Grotius, Pufendorf, Bynkershoek and V a t t e l , 
although d i d not study st a t e immunity s p e c i f i c a l l y , however the 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l w r i t i n g s of these scholars d i d influence the 
development o f the d o c t r i n e of st a t e immunity. A ca r e f u l review 
of h i s t o r y , however, would show t h a t G e n t i l i , Grotius, 
Bynkershoek and V a t t e l expended t h e i r energies i n studying 
personal immunities of f o r e i g n sovereigns and problems of 
dip l o m a t i c immunities. 
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(2) Whenever there i s doubt as t o the exact scope of an 
applicable r u l e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, t h a t i s , when there i s no 
t r e a t y , then the said r u l e must be i n t e r p r e t e d according t o the 
e s s e n t i a l elements of customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. This 
approach, however, becomes qui t e d i f f i c u l t because of the s t a t e 
v o l u n t a r i s t approach, i . e . , the consent of s t a t e s t o 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s determined from the conduct or behaviour of 
the subjects of the lawmakers themselves, which i n the main 
requires proper proof. The subjects of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, 
t e c h n i c a l l y , are also lawmakers, law enforcement agents and 
judges of the law at the same time i n t h e i r own r i g h t . Thus 
given the h o r i z o n t a l nature of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, t h e r e i s every 
i n d i c a t i o n t h a t developing countries would continue t o i n s i s t 
t h a t sovereign immunity be maintained because of t h e i r 
c o l l e c t i v e s e l f - i n t e r e s t and sheer lack of c a p i t a l and 
tec h n o l o g i c a l advancement. This argument i s supported by the 
work of the Sixth Committee and the proceedings of the 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission's d r a f t a r t i c l e s on j u r i s d i c t i o n a l 
immunities of foreign states and t h e i r p r o p e r t y (ILC Report 
1980-1988) . 
(3) Large markets i n i n d u s t r i a l i s e d centres regarding 
t r a d i n g a c t i v i t i e s would not decline i f c o u n t r i e s subscribe t o 
the tenets of absolute immunity, f o r so f a r no one has been able 
to prove by clear evidence of any serious harm caused t o date 
to p r i v a t e traders as a r e s u l t of according absolute immunity t o 
t h e i r f o r e i g n business partners, i . e . , f o r e i g n sovereign s t a t e s . 
Thus the a p p l i c a t i o n or the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the r e s t r i c t i v e 
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immunity i n t o t r a n s n a t i o n a l l i t i g a t i o n would not help but 
confound the s i t u a t i o n because the mechanism of adjudicative 
competence and the enforcement j u r i s d i c t i o n of domestic courts 
are rendered l e s s e f f e c t i v e by the h o r i z o n t a l nature of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
(4) Countries would continue t o pray i n t h e i r defence 
t h a t they be granted immunity i n view of the f a c t t h a t the 
do c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity lacks usus and opinio juris. 
Secondly, as a r e s u l t o f the influe n c e of the l e g a l profession 
and the loopholes i n n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n , lawyers would 
continue defending f o r e i g n states before domestic courts. 
(5) True, i t would be i n order or apposite i f the concept 
of absolute immunity i s modified to move i n abreast w i t h time, 
thus promoting good f a i t h , good conscience and sub s t a n t i a l 
j u s t i c e i n t r a n s n a t i o n a l business t r a n s a c t i o n . This 
p r o p o s i t i o n , however, i s not advocating a wholesale enactment of 
n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n couched i n r a d i c a l terms wholly lacking of 
usus and opinio juris. I n t h i s respect i t i s important t o guard 
against f a c i l e l e g i s l a t i o n or l o c a l l y enacted l e g i s l a t i o n 
somewhat couched i n support of p r i v a t e traders over the r i g h t s 
of s t a t e s , f o r the l e g a l foundation of s t a t e immunity t o some 
extent s t i l l has m e r i t . That i s why t o date i t has remained the 
s t a r t i n g p o i n t i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l l i t i g a t i o n respecting s u i t s 
against f o r e i g n s t a t e s before domestic courts. For lawyers, the 
issue can v i g o r o u s l y be argued both ways, e.g., Trendtex, I 
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Congreso del Partido, Rolimpex, Alcom, P h i l i p p i n e s Embassy Case 
and Sengupta. 1 
(6) I t i s equally important t o note t h a t l e g i s l a t i o n or 
c o d i f i c a t i o n has i t s own inherent problems: 
(1) That i t i s less f l e x i b l e . 
(2) That i t i s less adaptable t o changes i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law. 
(3) That i t i s impossible t o cover every aspect o f the 
sovereign immunity controversy through l e g i s l a t i o n , 
e.g., the State Immunity Act 1978 f a i l e d t o cover 
issues t h a t f e l l before the court t o consider i n 
Sengupta v. Republic of In d i a (1983) ICR 221. 
American scholars, f o r example, i n recent times have 
c a l l e d f o r the amendment of the 197 6 FSIA. 
(4) The meaning of the terms commercial t r a n s a c t i o n and 
sovereign a u t h o r i t y i n respect of d i r e c t or i n d i r e c t 
impleading are not w e l l explained i n the vari o u s 
n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n . There i s t h e r e f o r e the need 
f o r amendments t o be made t o the various enacted laws 
respecting state immunity. 
(5) The e l u c i d a t i o n on subsidiary organs of the s t a t e or 
"separate e n t i t y " , e.g., § 14 of the 1978 UK Act i s 
f a r from adequate. The explanation, f o r example, 
given i n Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of 
Nige r i a , without doubt was inconclusive and thus 
1(1978) 1 A l l ER 89. 
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l e a v i n g c e r t a i n questions unanswered, i . e . , mixed 
a c t i v i t y of s t a t e s . 
(7) Treaty p r o v i s i o n would be most h e l p f u l and w i l l 
c e r t a i n l y b r i n g about s t a b i l i t y i n t r a n s n a t i o n a l business 
t r a n s a c t i o n . Thus b i l a t e r a l t r e a t i e s must be p r e f e r r e d to 
m u l t i l a t e r a l t r e a t i e s . I t i s f u r t h e r suggested t h a t states 
should enter i n t o b i l a t e r a l t r e a t i e s i n order to provide f o r 
waiver of immunity i n cases of commercial contracts. But i t 
appears some countries would not be able t o waive immunity 
because of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s , e.g., Colombia. Thus 
while c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s of some countries may allow 
waiver t o j u r i s d i c t i o n , others do not allow waiver to 
j u r i s d i c t i o n or enforcement measures i n respect t o state 
property. This simply confounds the problem; t h a t i s why 
perhaps b i l a t e r a l t r e a t i e s would be most appropriate. 
(8) A Proposal f o r the Development of the Law. The 
problems of s t a t e immunity can only be resolved through a 
p r a c t i c a l approach. One such approach f o r r e s o l v i n g these 
problems i s t o allow the law t o grow through a gradual process, 
thus encouraging municipal c o u r t judges t o put t h e i r l e g a l 
reasoning t o work r a t h e r than r e s t r i c t them t o l o c a l 
l e g i s l a t i o n , which are i n most cases not r e f l e c t i v e of customary 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and sometimes enacted w i t h s i m p l i s t i c 
a s p i r a t i o n s . Secondly, such an approach would b u i l d i n t o 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law f l e x i b i l i t y , c e r t a i n t y and an abundant source 
of comparative l i t e r a t u r e f o r the judge t o draw on, thus 
removing a penumbra of doubt as t o the l e g i t i m a t e l e g a l basis of 
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n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n i n respect t o general i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
T h i r d l y , t o promote the development of sovereign immunity law, a 
n a t i o n a l j u d i c i a l a u t h o r i t y faced with the issue of g r a n t i n g 
immunity or denying immunity must choose a road of e c l e c t i c i s m 
by making reference f i r s t t o the h i s t o r y of the subj e c t , 
municipal laws and general i n t e r n a t i o n a l law f o r guidance. 
These must f u r t h e r be c a r e f u l l y supplemented by comparative 
l i t e r a t u r e and s t a t e p r a c t i c e the world over. I n t h i s 
connection, such parameters as usus, opinio juris or opinio 
juris sive necessitatis must be taken i n t o consideration, but 
where the issues appear not to be clearcut, a municipal c o u r t 
must r e l y on a "proviso" or what scholars have c a l l e d the 
"r e s i d u a l clause," i . e . , the p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e , e q u i t y and 
good conscience t o resolve the problem. 
(9) The kernel of the whole subject matter i s t h a t as of 
now there i s no agreed p r i n c i p l e on the question of r e l a t i v e 
immunity. One important p r a c t i c e t h a t must be adhered t o 
s t r i c t l y , however, i s tha t each state must respect the 
fundamental r i g h t of each other. The a p p l i c a t i o n of the concept 
of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity has given b i r t h t o the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between p u b l i c and p r i v a t e acts of the s t a t e , which has 
admittedly confused the subject t o such heights as t o make i t 
most e l u s i v e . There i s , therefore, no uniform r u l e nor a 
uniform p r a c t i c e t o f o l l o w . Given these d i f f i c u l t i e s , i t i s 
suggested t h a t when courts are faced w i t h sovereign immunity 
issues, regard must be had, or a t t e n t i o n be pai d t o the 
f o l l o w i n g f a c t o r s : 
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(1) The s t a t e and i t s economic organisation, e.g., China 
and the T h i r d World. 
(2) The c o n s t i t u t i o n of the s t a t e . 
(3) The p o l i t i c a l system of the s t a t e , which must 
encompass s t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and c u l t u r a l 
s e c u l a r i s a t i o n , e.g., w h i l e some countries such as 
B r i t a i n , France, Germany and the USA, have a high 
subsystem autonomy, others such as Russia, China, 
North Korea, have a subsystem c o n t r o l . Furthermore, 
most T h i r d World c o u n t r i e s such as Libya, Zimbabwe, 
Nigeria, Sudan, Cuba, e t c . , have promobilised 
a u t h o r i t a r i a n systems. 
(4) The d i f f e r e n c e i n the a c t i v i t y of states and s t a t e 
economic v e h i c l e s . 
(5) The value placed on s t a t e organs and e n t i t i e s , as 
regards l e g a l a u t h o r i t y , ownership, possession and 
representation. 
These suggestions are being put f o r t h i n order t o promote 
conditions i n which sovereign immunity l i t i g a t i o n would be 
centred on the s p e c i f i c issues respecting the behaviour and 
needs of states coupled w i t h the determination and the balancing 
of the j u s t i f i e d expectations of the p r i v a t e t r a d e r as against 
the r i g h t of the s t a t e , r a t h e r than simply resign t o the 
determination of whether a governmental a c t i v i t y i s commercial 
or not. This approach c e r t a i n l y would ecli p s e the entrenched 
a t t r i b u t e s of the s t a t e , e.g., the independence, e q u a l i t y and 
d i g n i t y of states. I t i s t h e r e f o r e submitted t h a t balancing the 
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r i g h t s of the l i t i g a t i n g p a r t i e s i n respect of the issue i n a 
given case would produce a b e t t e r r e s u l t than arguably resign t o 
a d i s t i n c t i o n between the p u b l i c and p r i v a t e acts of the s t a t e , 
a method a l l too o f t e n made the cornerstone of n a t i o n a l 
l e g i s l a t i o n . 
(10) I n order t o promote a balance of j u s t i c e , i t i s 
submitted de lege ferenda t h a t the doctrine of r e s t r i c t i v e 
immunity be forsaken or abandoned e n t i r e l y because i t has 
created confusion and indeed has made transnational l i t i g a t i o n 
more unce r t a i n and d i f f i c u l t than ever before. Thus the promise 
given by the protagonists of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity t h a t i t would 
c r y s t a l l i s e i n t o the promotion of equity and j u s t i c e has been 
conducted on t h e o r e t i c a l grounds due to the f a c t t h a t the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis 
quaere jure privoto i s simply impracticable f o r the whole 
concept i s q u i t e d i f f i c u l t of a p p l i c a t i o n . 
(11) The formation of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l contract between a 
s t a t e and a f o r e i g n p r i v a t e e n t i t y requires a l o t of hard work 
and good l e g a l d r a f t i n g , t a k i n g i n t o consideration complex l e g a l 
p r i n c i p l e s . Be t h i s as i t may, i t i s suggested t h a t i n order t o 
avoid " l i t i g a t i n g f u t u r e " disputes before municipal courts, a 
s p e c i a l clause be i n s e r t e d i n t o the contract c a l l i n g f o r any 
dispute t o be f i r s t resolved amicably based on the p r i n c i p l e of 
novation ad interim or through a process of c o n c i l i a t i o n . This 
approach would a f f o r d the two opposing p a r t i e s the op p o r t u n i t y 
t o get t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s resolved instead of throwing t h e i r 
e f f o r t s i n t o the uncharted seas by canvassing t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s 
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before a nati o n a l j u d i c i a l a u t h o r i t y which i n t u r n would 
rekindle the problem of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity, a l l too o f t e n 
wholly predicated on the d i s t i n c t i o n between acts jure imperii 
and acts j u r e gestionis. 
(12) A c a r e f u l review of a l l the n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n i n 
place would show t h a t mixed a c t i v i t i e s o f states and the concept 
of act of state were ignored or were not given any 
consideration. I t i s suggested t h a t these mixed a c t i v i t i e s of 
states be designated as a d i s c r e t e category f o r diplomatic 
r e s o l u t i o n as was suggested by Goff J, i n I Congreso del 
Partido. Or a " d i s c r e t i o n a r y f u n c t i o n exemption" be duly 
accorded to government executives so t h a t they would be i n a 
b e t t e r p o s i t i o n t o take s w i f t decisions f r e e from s u i t or 
possible l i t i g a t i o n , so as t o prevent a d i s a s t e r or a r r e s t a 
d i f f i c u l t p o l i t i c a l or economic problem. 2 Or a judge could 
r e s o r t t o the a p p l i c a t i o n of the maxim, salus populi suprema 
lex, i . e . , the p r i n c i p l e of s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n t o deal w i t h 
problems respecting mixed a c t i v i t i e s o f s t a t e s , because the said 
p r i n c i p l e permits the welfare and s e c u r i t y of a sovereign s t a t e 
t o override the r i g h t s of i t s c i t i z e n s and the nationals of 
for e i g n states under exceptional circumstances. This p r i n c i p l e 
i s undoubtedly recognised by many nations of the world and 
therefore would not offend common sense. Thus i f Country A 
2The Trendtex case which d e a l t w i t h the Nigerian Cement case; 
and the De Sanchez, i n v o l v i n g the use of d i s c r e t i o n a r y powers, 
are good examples where the " d i s c r e t i o n a r y f u n c t i o n exemption" 
concept can be allowed without a t t r a c t i n g an avalanche of s u i t s 
from i n d i v i d u a l s . 
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enters i n t o a c o n t r a c t w i t h a p r i v a t e e n t i t y B, can i t be immune 
by a subsequent p o l i t i c a l decision which prima facie might have 
been genuinely prompted by an unexpected event even though i t 
breaches the i n i t i a l transaction? As already stated above, such 
problems be resolved through the maxim salus populi suprema lex 
or a " d i s c r e t i o n a r y f u n c t i o n exemption" be followed by the judge 
t o promote j u s t i c e . 
(13) I t i s submitted t h a t l o c a l jurisprudence or municipal 
j u r isprudence should not be r e a d i l y t r a n s l a t e d from the i n t e r n a l 
plane i n t o p u b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i f such laws are not 
supported ex abundanti cautela by general i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, f o r 
the r e l a t i o n s o f states cannot be considered on an equal f o o t i n g 
as regards the p o s i t i o n of n a t u r a l persons w i t h i n a p o l i t y . 
Thus i n t e r n a t i o n a l law problems must not be judged s t r i c t l y 
according t o municipal law c r i t e r i a but rather by i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law standards. 
(14) The new states of Asia and A f r i c a , according t o 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, are aut o m a t i c a l l y bound by the rule s of 
customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law e x i s t i n g at the time of t h e i r 
independence. But these countries on the other hand can prevent 
any emerging customary law from becoming binding on them 
provided the s a i d countries oppose the r u l e ab initio and 
t h e r e a f t e r continue t o maintain consistent opposition t o the 
s a i d r u l e , i . e . , the p e r s i s t e n t o b j e c t o r r u l e . I n t h i s respect 
Asian and A f r i c a n states and other T h i r d World states which have 
r e c e n t l y gained independence have the r i g h t t o r e s i s t the 
currency o f the do c t r i n e of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity ex debito. 
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(15) Customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i n some unique cases may 
be created eo instanti ( i . e . , immediately or i n s t a n t l y or droit 
spontane). However, state immunity or r e s t r i c t i v e immunity 
cannot be created eo instanti without s t a t e p r a c t i c e . Thus i n 
concrete terms, claims or arguments made by states before 
municipal courts based on a w e l l founded r u l e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law or i n t e r e s t are state p r a c t i c e because such claims or 
arguments show how i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s perceived and understood 
i n a given stat e . Municipal court decisions also f a l l n e a t l y 
i n t o t h i s category. The November 1987 complaint made by the 
Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee against the United 
States 1976 Sovereign Immunity Act re s p e c t i n g "excessive 
j u r i s d i c t i o n , " f o r example, can also be designated as s t a t e 
p r a c t i c e . (See Doc No AALCC/IM/87/1 [Nov. 1987] f o r d e t a i l s . ) 
(16) The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission has incorporated 
i n t o the d r a f t a r t i c l e s the purpose t e s t , which has been 
r e j e c t e d i n most n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n . Thus i f these d r a f t 
a r t i c l e s are accepted as a t r e a t y t e x t , i t would give f o r e i g n 
states an e f f e c t i v e t o o l i n challe n g i n g the j u r i s d i c t i o n o f 
domestic courts on many grounds, although t h e r e appears t o be a 
seemingly s t r i n g e n t requirement imposed upon when the purpose 
t e s t i s to be taken i n t o consideration. 
(17) Another panacea t o r e s o l v i n g the sovereign immunity 
controversy i s to r e s o r t t o a r b i t r a t i o n , where l i t i g a t i n g 
p a r t i e s would be brought together based on the p r i n c i p l e of 
entente cordiale. This method was sometime ago suggested i n 
Part I I of the r e s o l u t i o n of the 45th Conference of the 
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I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Association at Lucerne m 1952. However, the 
suggestion was q u i c k l y c r i t i c i s e d and simply buried. Thus an 
equi t a b l e method l i k e l y t o command the acceptance of a l l and 
sundry must f o l l o w sound p r i n c i p l e s whereby the lex f o r i and the 
lex arbitri can be c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d t o avoid complications. 
Which means t h a t the attempt t o a r b i t r a t e would not open the 
door f o r the foundation of j u r i s d i c t i o n over the dispute by a 
l o c a l c o u r t w i t h o u t f i r s t g i v i n g the l i t i g a t i n g p a r t i e s the 
op p o r t u n i t y t o s e t t l e t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s per the terms of the 
co n t r a c t . I t i s suggested herein t h a t the domestic court must 
a i d the umpire r a t h e r than f r u s t r a t e him. And the umpire i s 
advised t o f o l l o w the p r i n c i p l e of equ i t y , where the three 
elements of e q u i t y can be put t o use, e.g., equity intra legem, 
i . e . , adopting the laws t o the f a c t s of a given case, equity 
praeter legem, i . e . , f i l l i n g gaps i n the law and equity infra 
legem, i . e . , ap p l y i n g only j u s t laws and r e j e c t i n g unjust laws, 3 
3Michael Akehurst (1976) 25 ICLQ 801. I t i s suggested t h a t 
a r b i t r a t i o n i s a v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e which must be taken 
s e r i o u s l y . For i t would appear most countries would p r e f e r 
s e t t l i n g t h e i r disputes or di f f e r e n c e s amicably rather than 
throw t h e i r disputes w i t h i n the realm of the domestic 
j u r i s d i c t i o n o f a forum s t a t e . 
The enactment of l e g i s l a t i o n by some leading Western 
nations as regards the l i m i t i n g of immunity would continue t o 
create controversy i n view of the f a c t t h a t r e s t r i c t i v e immunity 
i s not w e l l grounded i n the p r a c t i c e of a great m a j o r i t y of 
countries o f the world. The argument by some scholars t h a t the 
r u l e of s t a t e immunity would completely be abandoned i n the 
shortest p o s s i b l e time i s non sequitur and perhaps premature; 
see the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission's Report from 1978-1988 and 
the i n c l u s i o n of the purpose t e s t i n the d r a f t a r t i c l e s of the 
ILC Report (1991) . There i s c e r t a i n l y an expression of opinio 
non juris by a great m a j o r i t y of countries of the developing 
world i n the d i r e c t i o n of the r e s t r i c t i v e immunity. And these 
expressions show how i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s understood i n these 
c o u n t r i e s . 
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or the whole subject of a r b i t r a t i o n could be d e l o c a l i s e d , thus 
applying the concept of the lex marcatorial, i . e . , where the 
ordinary process of l o c a l a r b i t r a t i o n proves very d i f f i c u l t and 
unattainable i n a given case. 
(18) I f the t r e a t y t e x t on sovereign immunity c u r r e n t l y 
r e g i s t e r e d w i t h the UN f a i l s t o a t t r a c t the r e q u i r e d 
r a t i f i c a t i o n s , and f a i l i n g a l l the suggestions put f o r t h herein, 
then i t would be most apposite i f a plea i s made f o r the 
establishment of a special court f o r the settlement of sovereign 
immunity issues. For i n r e a l i t y l e g a l disputes between a 
n a t u r a l person and a state cannot be brought before the 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Court. Thus only states may l i t i g a t e before the 
World Court ( A r t i c l e 34). Special courts have been e s t a b l i s h e d 
i n c i v i l law countries w i t h success and the suggestion such as 
i s here put f o r t h would go a long way t o promote s t a b i l i t y i n 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l business transactions between s t a t e s and n a t u r a l 
persons. I n t h i s regard the controversy of s u b j e c t i n g a s t a t e 
t o the j u r i s d i c t i o n of another s t a t e would be resolved or put t o 
r e s t . This special court must have a compulsory j u r i s d i c t i o n 
and must f o l l o w the practice of the world c o u r t , but i t s 
functions should be narrowly s t r u c t u r e d t o c a t e r f o r l e g a l 
issues a r i s i n g from sovereign immunity controversy. Thus i f a 
special i n t e r n a t i o n a l court or t r i b u n a l i s e s t a b l i s h e d f o r the 
reasons advanced above, such problems of p o l i t i c a l 
embarrassment, an a f f r o n t to the d i g n i t y of s t a t e s , the 
v i o l a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e of state e q u a l i t y and the problems of 
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j u r i s d i c t i o n would disappear overnight, or would perhaps be 
minimised i n the eyes of sovereign s t a t e s . 
(19) F i n a l l y , I venture to propose a COMPARATIVE DOMINANT 
THEORY, i . e . , i f a court wishes to balance the nature t e s t as 
against the purpose t e s t . T h i s approach may encompass f i r s t the 
c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of the i s s u e s of a given case. A f t e r t h i s the 
problem must be broken down into p i e c e s having regard to the 
sta t u s of the s t a t e and the r i g h t s of the n a t u r a l person or 
l e g a l e n t i t y . T h i s then must be followed by a l o g i c a l t e s t 
where the r i g h t s of the s t a t e and the i n d i v i d u a l are balanced. 
Which means t h a t the primary and secondary purpose t e s t s would 
c a r e f u l l y be compared or balanced a g a i n s t the primary and 
secondary nature t e s t s to determine which one predominates or i s 
more w e l l grounded r e s p e c t i n g the a c t i v i t i e s of the s t a t e qua 
the c o n t r a c t or t r a n s a c t i o n and breach i n i s s u e . In t h i s 
respect the purpose t e s t and the nature t e s t would j u d i c i o u s l y 
be compared to determine whether to grant immunity or not. Thus 
where the purpose t e s t predominates immunity must be granted, 
but i f , on the other hand, the nature of the a c t i v i t y appears 
dominant, then immunity must be denied or the matter be re f e r r e d 
to a r b i t r a t i o n . M unicipal courts are t h e r e f o r e urged to 
incorporate the purpose t e s t i n t o t h e i r working formula i n order 
to promote j u s t i c e and t r a n q u i l l i t y i n t r a n s n a t i o n a l business 
t r a n s a c t i o n s . T h i s approach may not r e s o l v e a l l the i n t r a c t a b l e 
problems a s s o c i a t e d w i t h s t a t e immunity, but would a t l e a s t help 
the judge to ask the r i g h t questions and to explore the iss u e s 
i n a meaningful manner r a t h e r than simply r e s i g n only to the 
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d i s t i n c t i o n between commercial and non-commercial a c t i v i t i e s of 
s t a t e s . 
True, p e r f e c t i o n i s not a human v i r t u e , hence i t i s the 
fervent expectation of the present w r i t e r t h a t these modest 
proposals would f i n d favour with judges, lawyers and l e g a l 
s c h o l a r s . But before I put down my pen I s h a l l humbly beg to 
crave the indulgence of those i n t e r e s t e d i n reading t h i s study 
to take note of what S i r Frederick Pollock s a i d some time ago, 
thus: 
"Those who make no mistakes, i t has been s a i d 
w i l l never make anything; and the judge who i s 
a f r a i d of committing himself may be c a l l e d sound and 
safe i n h i s own generation, but w i l l not have no 
mark on the law." 
By S i r Frederick Pollock 
J u d i c i a l Caution and Valour 
(1929) 45 LQR 293. 
J u s t i c e Marshall and Lord Denning t h e r e f o r e must be h i g h l y 
commended for t h e i r courage and contributions to the development 
of the law of sovereign immunity and a l l other judges and 
sc h o l a r s who have a l s o contributed to the understanding of t h i s 
e l u s i v e s u b j e c t . Thus without t h e i r sagacious reasoning we 
s h a l l a l l be l e f t i n the middle of the ocean without any 
navigating force, but now, we do have a n a v i g a t i n g f o r c e and may 
therefore someday reach the shore. I s there any u n i t y between 
the s t a t e and the law? And can the s t a t e be j u s t i f i e d by law? 
These are d i f f i c u l t questions. However, once we begin to 
understand the underlying p r i n c i p l e s behind p o s i t i v e law, and 
th a t i t i s d i f f e r e n t from j u s t i c e and t h e r e f o r e g i v e s root to 
the compulsive order of the s t a t e then one would be j u s t i f i e d to 
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argue that i t i s q u i t e cumbersome to j u s t i f y the s t a t e by law. 
The era of n a t u r a l law has given way to p o s i t i v e law which says 
that law be construed as an order of human compulsion. Can i t 
be s a i d that sovereign s t a t e s be subjected to t h i s compulsion i n 
view of the f a c t t h a t i t i s l o c a l l y based and therefore v e r t i c a l 
i n every r e s p e c t ? The answer i s i n the negative, hence the long 
controversy r e s p e c t i n g s t a t e immunity and the expression of 
opinio non juris i n r e s p e c t of r e s t r i c t i v e immunity by Third 
World c o u n t r i e s . 
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APPENDIX I 
E U R O P E A N C O N V E N T I O N ON S T A T E IMMUNITY 
AND A D D I T I O N A L P R O T O C O L 1972 
PREAMBLE 
The :nember States of the Council of Europe, signatory hereto. 
Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity 
between its Members; 
Taking into account the fact that there is in international law a tendency to restrict 
he cases in which a State may claim immunity before foreign courts; 
Desiring to establish in their mutual relations common rules relating to the scope of 
the immunity of one State from the jurisdiction of the courts of another State, and 
signed to ensure compliance with judgments given against another State; 
Considering that the adoption of such rules will tend to advance the work of har-
onisation undertaken by the member States of the Council of Europe in the legal field. 
Have agreed as follows: 
CHAPTER I. IMMUNITY FROM JURISDICTION 
~ Article J 
1. A contracting State which institutes or intervenes in proceedings before a court 
another Contracting State submits, for the purpose of those proceedings, to the juris-
iction of the courts of that State. 
Such a Contracting State cannot claim immunity from the jurisdiction of the 
ourts of the other Contracting State in respect of any counterclaim: 
fa) arising out of the legal relationship or the facts on which the principal claim is 
ased; 
(b) if, according to the provisions of this Convention, it would not have been en-
tied to invoke immunity in respect of that counterclaim had separate proceedings been 
ought against it in those courts. 
3. A Contracting State which makes a counterclaim in proceedings before a court 
another Contracting State submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of that State with 
spect not only to the counterclaim but also to the principal claim. 
Article 2 
A Contracting State cannot claim immunity from the jurisdiction of a court of an-
her Contracting State if it has undertaken to submit to the jurisdiction of that court 
her: 
170 
(a) by international agreement; 
(b) by an express term contained in a contract in writing; or 
(c) by an express consent given after a dispute between the parties has 
Article 3 
1. A Contracting State cannot claim immunity from the jurisdiction 
another Contracting State if. before claiming immunity, it takes any step it 
ings relating to the merits. However, if the State satisfies the court that it c 
acquired knowledge of facts on which a claim to immunity can be based un 
taken such a step, it can claim immunity based on these facts if it does so 
possible moment. 
2. A Contracting State is not deemed to have waived immunity if i t; 
a court of another Contracting State in order to assert immunity. 
Article 4 
1. Subject to the provisions of Article 5. a Contracting State canno 
nity from the jurisdiction of the courts of another Contracting State if tl 
relate to an obligation of the State, which, by virtue of a contract, falls to 
in the territory of the State of the forum. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply: 
(a) in the case of a contract concluded between States; 
(bj if the parties to the contract have otherwise agreed in writing; 
(c) if the State is party to a contract concluded on its territory and 
of the State is governed by its administrative law. 
Article 5 
1. A Contracting State cannot claim immunity from the jurisdictio 
another Contracting State if the proceedings relate to a contract of emplo; 
the State and an individual where the work has to be performed on the ' 
State of the forum. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where: 
(a) the individual is a national of the employing State at the time wh< 
ings are brought; 
(bj at the time when the contract was entered into the individual 
national of the State of the forum nor habitually resident in that State; or 
(cj the parties to the contract have otherwise agreed in writing, u 
dance with the law of the State of the forum, the courts of that State 
jurisdiction by reason of the subject-matter. 
3. Where the work is done for an office, agency or other establishn 
in Article 7, paragraphs 2 (a) and (bj of the present Article apply only if, 
contract was entered into, the individual had his habitual residence in I 
State which employs him. 
Article 6 
1. A Contracting State cannot claim immunity from the jurisdictic 
another Contracting State if it participates with one or more private pe 
pany.association or other legal entity having its sent, registered office oi 
of business on the territory of the State of the forum, and the proceedi 
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relationship, in matters arising out of that participation, between the State on the one 
hand and the entity or any other participant on the other hand. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply if it is otherwise agreed in writing. 
Article 7 
1. A contracting State cannot claim immunity from the jurisdiction of a court of 
another Contracting State if it has on the territory of the State of the forum an office, 
agency or other establishment through which it engages, in the same manner as a private 
person, in an industrial, commercial or financial activity, and the proceedings relate :o 
that activity of the office, agency or establishment. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply if all the parties to the dispute are States, or if the 
parties have otherwise agreed in writing. 
Article 8 
A Contracting State cannot claim immunity from the jurisdiction of a court of an-
other Contracting State if the proceedings relate: 
fa) to a patent, industrial design, trade-mark, service mark or other similar right 
which, in the State of the forum, has been applied for, registered or deposited or is 
otherwise protected, and in respect of which the State is the applicant or owner. 
lb) to an alleged infringement by it, in the territory of the State of the forum, of 
such a right belonging to a third person and protected in that State; 
(cj to an alleged infringement by it, in the territory of the State of the forum, of 
copyright belonging to a third person and protected in that State; 
(d) to the right to use a trade name in the State of the forum. 
Article 9 
A Contracting State cannot claim immunity from the jurisdiction of a court of an-
other Contracting State if the proceedings relate to: 
(a) its rights or interests in. or its use or possession of, immovable property: or 
(b) its obligations arising out of its rights or interests in, or use or possession of, 
immovable property 
and the property is situated in the territory of the State of the forum. 
y Article 10 
A Contracting State cnnot claim immunity from the jurisdiction of a court of an-
other Contracting State if the proceedings relate to a right in movable or immovable 
property arising by way of succession, gift or bona vacantia. 
Article 11. 
A Contracting State cannot claim immunity from the jurisdiction of a court of an-
other Contracting State in proceedings which relate to redress for injury to the person or 
damage to tangible property, if the facts which occasioned the injury or damage oc-
curred in the territory of the State of the forum, and if the author of the injury or 
damage was present in that territory at the time when those facts occurred. 
Article 12 
1. Where a Contracting State has agreed in writing to submit to arbitration a dis-
ute which has arisen or may arise out of a civil or commercial matter, that State may 
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not claim immunity f rom the jurisdiction of a court o f another Contracting Stat' 
territory or according to the law of which the arbitration has taken or wi l l take 
respect of any proceedings relating to : 
(a) the validity or interpretation of the arbitration agreement: 
(b) the arbitration procedure; 
(cj the setting aside of the award, 
unless the arbitration agreement otherwise provides. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to an arbitration agreement between States. 
Article 13 
Paragraph 1 of Article 1 shall not apply where a Contracting State asserts, in 
ings pending before a court of another Contracting State to which it is not a pi 
i t has a right or interest in property which is the subject-matter of the proceed 
the circumstances are such that i t would have been entitled to immunity i f the 
ings had been brought against i t . 
Article 14 
Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as preventing a court of Cc 
State f rom administering or supervising or arranging for the administration of 
such a trust property or the estate o f a bankrupt, solely on account of the fac 
other Contracting State has a right or interest in the property. 
Article 15 
A Contracting State shall be entitled to immunity f rom the jurisdiction of 
of another Contracting State i f the proceedings do not fall within Articles 1 
court shall decline to entertain such proceedings even if the State does not appi 
CHAPTER I I . PROCEDURAL RULES 
Article 16 
1. In proceedings against a Contracting State in a court of another C 
State, the following rules shall apply. 
2. The competent authorities o f the State of the forum shall transmit 
the original or a copy of the document by which the proceedings are institi 
a'copy of any judgment given by default against a State which was defen 
proceedings, 
through the diplomatic channel to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
State, for onward transmission, where appropriate, to the competent autho 
documents shall be accompanied, i f necessary, by a translation into the of f ic i i 
or one of the off ic ia l languages, of the defendant State. 
3. Service of the documents referred to in paragraph 2 is deemed to 
effected by their receipt by the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs. 
4. . The time-limits within which the State must enter an appearand 
against any judgment given by default shall begin to run two months after 
which the document by which the proceedings were instituted or the copy 
ment is received by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
5. I f its rests with the court to prescribe the time-limits for entering an 
or for appealing against a judgment given by default, the court shall allow tl 
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:ss than two months after the date on which the document by which the proceedings 
re instituted or the copy of the judgment is received by the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs. 
6. A Contracting State which appears in the proceedings is deemed to have waived 
ny objection to the method of service. 
7. If the Contracting State has not appeared, judgment by default may be given 
gainst it only if it is established that the document by which the proceedings were insti-
uted has been transmitted in conformity with paragraph 2. and that the time-limits for 
ntering an appearance provided for in paragraphs 4 and 5 have been observed. 
Article 1 7 
No security , bond or deposit, however described, which could not have been required 
i the State of the forum of a national of that State or a person domiciled or resident 
here, shall be required of a Contracting State to guarantee the payment of judicial costs 
r expenses. A State which is a claimant in the courts of another Contracting State shall 
iay any judicial costs or expenses for which it may become liable. 
Article 18 
A Contracting State party to proceedings before a court of another Contracting State 
nay not be subjected to any measure of coercion, or any penalty, by reason of its failure 
ir refusal to disclose any documents or other evidence. However the court may draw any 
onclusion it thinks f i t from such failure or refusal. 
Article 19 
1. A court before which proceedings to which a Contracting State is a party are 
stituted shail. at the request of one of the parties or. if its national law so permits, of 
s own motion, decline to proceed with the case or shall stay the proceedings i f other 
roceedings between the same parties, based on the same facts and having the same pur-
ose. 
/'a) are pending before a court of that Contracting State, and were the first to be 
nstituted: or 
(b) are pending before a court of any other Contracting State, were the first to be 
nstituted and may result in a judgment to which the State party to the proceedings must 
ive effect by virtue of Article 20 or .Article 25. 
2. Any Contracting State whose law gives the courts a discretion to decline to pro-
eed with a case or to stay the proceedings in cases where proceedings between the same 
arties. based on the same facts and having the same purpose, are pending before a court 
f another Contracting State, may, by notification addressed to the Secretary General of 
he Council o f Europe, declare that its courts shall not be bound by the provisions of 
aragraph 1. 
CHAPTER I I I . EFFECT OF JUDGMENT 
Article 20 
1. A Contracting State shall give effect to a judgment given against it by a court of 
nother Contracting State: 
(a) i f , in accordance with the provisions of Article 1 to 13, the State could not 
laim immunity from jurisdiction: and 
(bj i f the judgment cannot or can no longer be set aside i f obtained by default, or i f 
t is not or is no longer subject to appeal or any other form of ordinary review or to 
nnulment. 
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2. Nevertheless, a Contracting State is not obliged to give effect to such a judgmei 
in any case: 
(a) where i t would be manifestly contrary to public policy in that State to do so, > 
where, in the circumstances, either party had no adequate opportunity fairly to prese 
his case; 
(b) where proceedings between the same parties, based on the same facts and havii 
the same purpose: 
(i) are pending before a court of that State and were the first to be instituted: 
f i i ) are pending before a court of another Contracting State, were the first to 1 
instituted and may result in a judgment to which the State party to the procee 
ings must give effect under the terms of this Convention; 
(cj where the result o f the judgment is inconsistent with the result of another jud 
ment given between the same parties: 
(i) by a court o f the Contracting State, i f the proceedings before that court we 
the first to be instituted or i f the other judgment has been given before the jud 
ment satisfied the conditions specified in paragraph 1 (b): or 
(ii) by a court of another Contracting State where the othe judgment is the first 
satisfy the requirements laid down in the present Convention; 
(dj where the provisions of Article 16 have not been observed and the State has n< 
entered an appearance or has not appealed against a judgment by default. 
3. In addition, in the case provided for in .Article 10, a Contracting State is m 
obliged to give effect to the judgment. 
(a) i f the courts of the State of the forum would not have been entitled to assun 
jurisdiction had they applied, mutatis mutandis, the ruies of jurisdiction (other th< 
those mentioned in the Annex to the present Convention) which operate in the Sta 
against which judgment is given: or 
(b) i f the court, by applying law other than that which would have been applied 
accordance with the rules o f private international law of that State, has reached a resu 
different from that which would have been reached by applying the law determined t 
those rules. 
However, a Contracting State may not rely upon the grounds of refusal specified 
sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above i f it is bound by an agreement with the State of t l 
forum on the recognition and enforcement of judgments and the judgment fulf i ls t l 
requirement of that agreement as regards jurisdiction and, where appropriate, the la 
applied. 
Article 21 
1. Where a judgment has been given against a Contracting State and that State do 
not give effect thereto, the party which seeks to invoke the judgment shall be entitled i 
have determined by the competent court of that State the question whether effe: 
should be given to the judgment in accordance with Article 20. Proceedings may also 1 
brought before this court by the State against whicti judgment has been given, i f its la 
so permits. 
2. Save in so far as may be necessary for the application o f Article 20, the cor 
petent court of the State in question may not review the merits of the judgment. 
3. Where proceedings are instituted before a court of a State in accordance wit 
paragraph 1: 
(a) the parties shall be given an opportunity to be heard in the proceedings; 
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ents produced by the party seeking to invoke the judgment shall not be 
ation or any other like formality; 
i r i ty , bond or deposit, however described, shall be required of the party 
lgment by reason of his nationality, domicile or residence; 
ty invoking the judgment shall be entitled to legal aid under conditions 
)le than those applicable to nationals of the State who are domiciled and 
lontracting State shall, when depositing its instrument o f ratification, 
ccession, designate the court of courts referred to in paragraph 1. and in-
aiy General of the Council of Europe thereof. 
Article 22 
racting State shall give effect to a settlement to which it is a party and 
made before a court of another Contracting State in the course of the 
: provisions of Article 20 do not apply to such a settlement. 
State does not give effect to the settlement, the procedure provided for in 
be used. 
Article 23 
i of execution or preventive measures against the property o f a Contract-
e taken in the territory of another Contracting State except where and to 
the State has expressly consented thereto in writing in any particular 
CHAPTER IVi. OPTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article 24 
istanding the provisions of .Article 15, any State may, when signing this 
iepositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance or accession, or at 
by notification addressed to the Secretary General o f the Council of 
that, in cases not falling within Article 1 to 13, its courts shall be en-
lin proceedings against another Contracting State to the extent that its 
ed to entertain proceedings against States not Party to the present Con-
declaration shall be without prejudice to the immunity f rom jurisdiction 
States enjoy in respect o f acts performed in the exercise o f sovereign 
ire imperii). 
irts of a State which has made the declaration provided for in paragraph 
ver be entitled to entertain such proceedings against another Contracting 
risdiction could have been based solely on one or more o f the grounds 
e Annex to the present Convention, unless that other Contracting State 
i in the proceedings relating to the merits without first challenging the 
le court. 
visions of Chapter I I apply to proceedings instituted against a Contract-
>rdance with the present Article. 
:laration made under paragraph 1 may be withdrawn by notification 
Secretary General o f the Council o f Europe. The withdrawal shall take 
iths after the date of its receipt.but this shall not affect proceedings 
the date on which the withdrawal becomes effective. 
176 
Article 25 
1. Any Contracting State which has made a declaration under Article 24 sh 
cases not falling within Article 1 to 13, give effect to a judgment given by a court 
other Contracting State which has made a like declaration: 
(a) i f the conditions prescribed in paragraphs 1 (b) o f Article 20 have been fu i 
and 
(b) i f the court is considered to have jurisdiction in accordance with the fo i l 
paragraphs. 
2. However, the Contracting State is not obliged to give effect to such a judgr 
(a) if there is a ground for refusal as provided for in paragraph 2 of Article 20; 
(b) i f the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 24 have not been observed. 
3. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 4, a court of a Contracting State si 
considered to have jurisdiction for the purpose of paragraph 1 (b): 
(a) i f its jurisdiction is recognised in accordance with the provisions o f an agre 
to which the State o f the forum and the other Contracting State are Parties; 
(b) where there is no agreement between the two States concerning the recog 
and enforcement of judgments in civil matters, i f the courts of the State o f the 
would have been entitled to assume jurisdiction had they applied, mutatis mutand 
rules o f jurisdiction (other than those mentioned in the Annex to the present Cc 
tion) which operate in the State against which the judgment was given. This pre 
does not apply to questions arising out of contracts. 
4. the Contracting States having made the declaration provided for in Ar t i 
may, by means o f a supplementary agreement to this Convention, determine the c: 
stances in which their courts shall be considered to have jurisdiction for the purpc 
paragraph 1 (b) o f this Article. 
5. I f the Contracting State does not give effect to the judgment, the proc 
provided for in Article 21 may be used. 
Article 26 
Notwithstanding the provisions o f Article 23, a judgment rendered against ; 
tracting State in proceedigs relating to an industrial or commercial activity, in whi 
State is engaged in the same manner as a private person, may be enforced in the Si 
the forum against property of the State against which judgment has been given 
exclusively in connection with such an activity, i f 
(a) both the State of the forum and the State against which the judgment ha 
given have made declarations under Article 24; 
(b) the proceedings which resulted in the judgment fell within Articles 1 to 
were instituted in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 24; and 
(cj the judgment satisfies the requirements laid down in paragraph 1 (b) o f . 
20. 
CHAPTER V. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Article 27 
1. For the purposes of the present Convention, the expression "Contracting 
shall not include any legal entity o f a Contracting State which is distinct therefrc 
is capable of suing or being sued, even i f that entity has been entrusted with 
functions. 
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ings may be instituted against any entity referred to in paragraph 1 be-
of another Contracting State in the same manner as against a private 
, the courts may not entertain proceedings in respect of acts performed 
:he exercise of sovereign authority (acta jure imperii)-
ngs may in any event be instituted against any such entity before those 
esponding circumstances, the courts would have had jurisdiction i f the 
been instituted against a Contracting State. 
Article 28 
prejudice to the provisions of Article 27. the constituent States of a 
not enjoy immunity. 
•, a Federal State Party to the present Convention, may, by notifica-
> the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, declare that its con-
jay invoke the provisions of the Convention applicable to Contracting 
the same obligations. 
Federal State has made a declaration in accordance with paragraph 2. 
ents on a constituent State of a Federation shall be made on the Min-
U'fairs of the Federal State, in conformity with .Article 16. 
eral State alone is competent to make the declarations, notifications 
ions provided for in the present Convention, and the Federal State alone 
iroceedings pursuant to .Article 34. 
Article 29 
onvention shall not apply to proceedings concerning: 
:urity; 
>r injury in nuclear matters; 
duties, taxes or penalties. 
Article 30 
onvention shall not apply to proceedings in respect of claims relating to 
seagoing vessels owned or operated by a Contracting State or to the 
:s and of passengers by such vessels or to the carriage o f cargoes owned 
State and carried on board merchant vessels. 
Article 31 
is Convention shall affect any immunities or privileges enjoyed by a 
in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by, or in relation 
es when on the territory of another Contracting State. 
Article 32 
e present Convention shall affect privileges and immunities relating to 
le functions of diplomatic missions and consular posts and of persons 
iem. 
Article 33 
: present Convention shall affect existing or future international agree-
elds which relate to matters dealt wi th in the present Convention. 
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Article 34 
1. Any dispute which might arise between two or more Contracting States con-
cerning the interpretation or application of the present Convention shall be submitted to 
the International Court of Justice on the application of one of the parties to the dispute 
or by special agreement unless the parties agree on a different method of peaceful settle-
ment of the dispute. 
9 
2. However, proceedings may not be instituted before the International Court of 
Justice which relate to: 
fa) a dispute concerning a question arising in proceedings instituted against a Con-
tracting State before a court of another Contracting State, before the court has given a 
judgment which fulfills the condition provided for in paragraph 1 (b) of Article 20; 
(b) a dispute concerning a question arising in proceedings instituted before a court 
of a Contracting State in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 21, before the court has 
rendered a final decision in such proceedings. 
Article 35 
1. The present Convention shall apply only to proceedings introduced after its 
entry into force. 
2. When a State has become Party to this Convention after it has entered into 
force, the Convention shall apply only to proceedings introduced after it has entered 
into force with respect to that State. 
3. Nothing in this Convention shall apply to proceedings arising out of, or judg-
ments based on, acts, omissions or facts prior to the date on which the present Conven-
tion is opened for signature. 
CHAPTER VI. FINAL PROVISIONS 
Article 36 
1. The present Convention shall be open to signature by the member States of the 
Council of liurope. It shall be subject to ratification or acceptance. Instruments of ratifi-
cation or acceptance shall be deposited with the Secretary General of the Council of 
Europe. 
2. The Convention shall enter into force three months after the date of the deposit 
of the third instrument of ratification or acceptance. 
3. In respect of a signatory State ratifying or accepting subsequently, the Conven-
tion shall enter into force three months after the date of the deposit of its instrument of 
ratification or acceptance. 
Article 37 
1. After the entry into force of the present Convention, the Committee of Minis-
ters of the Council of Europe may, by a decision taken by a unanimous vote of the mem-
bers casting a vote, invite any non-member State to accede thereto. 
2. Such accession shall be effected by depositing with the Secretary General of the 
Council of Europe an instrument of accession which shall take effect three months after 
the date of its deposit r 
3. However, if a State having already acceded to the Convention notifies the 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe of its objection to the accession of another 
non-member State, before the entry into force of this accession, the Convention shall 
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Article 38 
may, at the time of signature or when depositing its instruments of 
ance or accession, specify the territory or territories to which the 
shall apply. '_ 
may, when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance or 
later date, by declaration addressed to the Secretary General of the 
extend this Convention to any other territory or territories specified 
and for whose international relations it is responsible or on whose 
:d to give undertakings. 
ation made in pursuance of the preceding paragraph may, in respect 
itioned in such declaration, be withdrawn according to the procedure 
40 of this Convention. 
Article 39 
permitted to the present Convention. 
Article 40 
icting State may, in so far as it is concerned, denounce this Conven-
notification addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of 
iciation shall take effect six months after the date of receipt by the 
>f such notificationr This Convention shall, however, continue to 
s introduced before the date on which the denunciation takes effect, 
en in such proceedings. 
Article 41 
eneral of the Council of Europe shall notify the member States of 
>e and any State which has acceded to this Convention of: 
e; 
of an instrument of ratification, acceptance or accession; 
entry into force of this Convention in accordance with Articles 36 
ition received in pursuance of the provisions of paragraph 2 of 
ru cation received in pursuance of the provisions of paragraph 4 of 
tion received in pursuance of the provisions of paragraph 1 of 
val of any notification made in pursuance of the provisions of 
5 24; 
tion received in pursuance of the provisions of paragraph 2 of 
tion received in pursuance of the provisions of paragraph 3 of 
an received in pursuance of the provisions of Article 38; 
ion received in pursuance of the provisions of Article 40 and the 
iation takes effect. 
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ANNEX 
The grounds of jurisdiction referred to in paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (a), ol . 
20, paragraph 2 of Article 24 and paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (b), of Article 25 ; 
following: 
(a) the presence in the territory of the State of the forum of property beloni 
the defendant, or the seizure by the plaint i ff of property situated there, unless 
the action is brought to assert proprietary or possessory rights in that prope 
arises from another issue relating to such property; or 
the property constitutes the security for a debt which is the subject-matter 
action; 
(b) the nationality of the plaintiff ; 
(cj the domicile, habitual residence or ordinary residence of the plaint iff wi t l 
territory of the State of the forum unless the assumption of jurisdiction on 
ground is permitted by way of an exception made on account of the particular s 
matter of a class o f contracts; 
(d) the fact that the defendant carried on business within the territory o f t h 
of the forum, unless the action arises f rom that business; 
fe) a unilateral specification o f the forum by the plaintiff, particularly in an ii 
A legal person shall be considered to have its domicile or habitual residence w 
has its seat, registered office or principal place of business. 
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 
ON STATE IMMUNITY 
The member States of the Council of Europe, signatory to the present Protoco 
Having taken note o f the European Convention on State Immunity - here 
referred to as "the Convention" - and in particular Articles 21 and 34 thereof; 
Desiring to develop the work of harmonisation in the field covered by the C 
tion by the addition of provisions concerning a European procedure for the sett 
of disputes, 
Have agreed as follows: 
P A R T I 
Article I 
1. Where a judgment has been given against a State Party to the Conventi 
that States does not give effect thereto, the party which seeks to invoke the ju 
shall be entitled to have determined the question whether effect should be givei 
judgment in conformity with Article 20 or Article 25 of the Convention, by ins 
proceedings before either: 
(a) the competent court of that State in application of Article 21 of the ( 
tion; or 
(b) the European Tribunal constituted in conformity with the provisions o f 
of the present Protocol, provided that that State is a Party to the present Proto 
has to made the declaration referred to in Part IV thereof.' 
The choice between these two possibilities shall be final. 
2. I f the State intends to institute proceedings before its court in accordar 
the provisions of paragraph 1 o f Article 21 of the Convention i t must give noti 
intention to do so to the party in whose favour the judgment has been given; tl 
may thereafter institute such proceedings before the European Tribunal. Oi 
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psed. the party in whose favour the judgment has been given may no longer 
eedings before the European Tribunal. 
in so far as may be necessary for the application of Articles 20 and 25 of 
>n, the European Tribunal may not review the merits of the judgment. 
PART I I 
Article 2 
dispute which might arise between two or more States Parties to the 
col concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention shall be 
i the application of one of the parties to the dispute or by special agree-
European Tribunal constituted in conformity with the provisions of Part I I I 
t Protocol. The States Parties to the present Protocol undertake not to sub-
pute to a different mode of settlement. 
e dispute concerns a question arising in proceedings instituted before a 
State Party to the Convention against another State Party to the Conven-
stion, arising in proceedings instituted before a court of a State Party to the 
i accordance with Article 21 of the Convention, i t may not be referred to 
Tribunal until the court has given a final decision in such proceedings. 
edings may not be instituted before the European Tribunal which relate to 
:erning a judgment which it has already determined or is required to deter-
! o f Part I of this Protocol. 
Article 3 
i the present Protocol shall be interpreted as preventing the European 
determining any dispute which might arise between two or more States 
Convention concerning the interpretation or application thereof and which 
l i t ted to it by special agreement, even i f these Parties, or any of them, are 
the present Protocol. 
PART I I I 
Article 4 
shall be established a European Tribunal in matters of State Immunity to 
:s brought before it in conformity wi th the provisions of Parts I and I I of 
itocol. 
uropean Tribunal shall consist of the members of the European Court of 
and, in respect o f each non-member State of the Council o f Europe which 
> the present Protocol, a person possessing the qualifications required o f 
at Court designated, with the agreement of the Committee o f Ministers o f 
Europe, by the government of that State for a period of nine years. 
esident of the European Tribunal shall be the President o f the European 
n Rights. 
Article 5 
proceedings are instituted before the European Tribunal in accordance 
ions o f Part I o f the present Protocol, the European Tribunal shall consist 
:omposed of seven members. There shall sit as ex officio members of the 
lember of the European Tribunal who is a national of the State against 
tnent has been given and the member of the European Tribunal who is a 
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national of the State of the forum, or, should there be no such member in one 
other case, a person designated by the government of the State concerned to sit 
capacity of a member of the Chamber. The names of the other five members s 
chosen by lot by the President of the European Tribunal in the presence of the Re 
2. Where proceedings are instituted before the European Tribunal in acco 
with the provisions of Part I I of the present Protocol, the Chamber shall be cons 
in the manner provided for in the preceding paragraph. However, there shall si 
officio members of the Chamber the members of the European Tribunal who are 
als of the States parties to the dispute or, should there be no such member, a 
designated by the government of the State concerned to sit in the capacity of a n 
of the Chamber. 
3. Where a case pending before a Chamber raises a serious question affect 
interpretation of the Convention or of the present Protocol, the Chamber may, 
time, relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the european Tribunal meeting in i 
session. The relinquishment of jurisdiction shall be obligatory where the resolu 
such question might have a result inconsistent with a judgment previously deliver 
Chamber or by the European Tribunal meeting in plenary session. The relinqui 
of jurisdiction shall be final. Reasons need not be given for the decision to rel 
jurisdiction. 
Article 6 
1. The European Tribunal shall decide any disputes as to whether the Tr ib t 
jurisdiction. 
2. The hearings o f the European Tribunal shall be public unless the Trib 
exceptional circumstances decides otherwise. 
3. The judgments o f the European Tribunal, taken by a majority of the m 
present, are to be delivered in public session. Reasons shall be given for the judgr 
the European Tribunal. I f the judgment does not represent in whole or in part 
animous opinion of the European Tribunal, any member shall be entitled to d 
separate Opinion. 
4. The judgments of the European Tribunal shall be final and binding uj: 
parties. 
Article 7 
1. The European Tribunal shall draw up its own rules and fix its own proced 
2. The Registry o f the European Triubnal shall be provided by the Registrai 
European Court of Human Rights. 
Article 8 
1. The operating costs of the European Tribunal shall be borne by the Coi 
Europe. States non-members of the Council of Europe having acceded to the 
Protocol shall contribute thereto in a manner to be decided by the Committee o 
ters after agreement with these States. 
2. The members of the European Tribunal shall receive for each day of 
compensation to be determined by the Committee of Ministers. 
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PART IV 
Article 9 
ate may, by notification addressed to the Secretary General of the Coun-
the moment of its signature of the present Protocol, or o f the deposit of 
f ratification, acceptance or accession thereto, declare that it wil l only be 
I I to V of the present Protocol. 
notification may be withdrawn at any time. 
PART V 
Article 10 
sent Protocol shall be open to signature by the member States of the 
pe which have signed the Convention. It shall be subject to ratification 
Instruments of ratification or acceptance shall be deposited with the 
il o f the Council of Europe. 
sent Protocol shall enter into force three months after the date of the 
|th instrument of ratification or acceptance. 
:t of a signatory State ratifying or accepting subsequently, the Protocol 
force three months after the date of the deposit of its instrument of rati-
tance. 
ler State of the Council of Europe may not ratify or accept the present 
\ having ratified or accepted the Convention. 
Article 11 
Iwhich has acceded to the Convention may accede to the present Pro-
l i n t o force. 
ession shall be effected by depositing with the Secretary General o f the 
an instrument of accession which shall take effect three months after 
losit . 
Article 12 
| is permitted to the present Protocol. 
Article 13 
racting State may, in so far as i t is concerned, denounce the present 
i o f a notification addressed to the Secretary General o f the Council o f 
|inciation shall take effect six months after the date of receipt by the 
j f such notification. The Protocol shall, however, continue to apply to 
|uced in conformity with the provisions of the Protocol before the 
i denunciation takes effect. 
lion of the Convention shall automatically entail denunciation of the 
184 
Article 14 
The Secretary General ot" the Council of Europe shall notify the member Sta 
the Council and any State which has acceded to the Convention of: 
(a) any signature of the present Protocol. 
(b) any deposit of an instrument of ratification, acceptance or accession; 
(c) any date of entry into force of the present Protocol in accordance with A 
10 and 11 thereof; 
(d) any notification received in pursuance o f the provisions of Part IV and any 
drawal of any such notification; 
(ej any notification received in pursuance o f the provisions of Article 13 ai 
date on which such denunciation takes effect. 
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto, have signi 
present Protocol. 
Done at Basle, this 16th day o f May 1972, in English and French, both texts 
equally authoritative, in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the archives 
Council of Europe. The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall transmit 
tied copies to each of the signatory and acceding States. 
RESOLUTION (72) 2 OF THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS OF THE COUNC 
EUROPE CONCERNING THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON STATE IM-
MUNITY ADOPTED AT THE 206TH MEETING OF THE MINISTERS' DEPl 
ON 18 JANUARY 1972 
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 
Having taken note of the text of the European Convention on State Immunity; 
Considering that one of the aims of this Convention is to ensure compliance 
judgments given against a State, 
Recommends the governments o f those member States which shall become f 
to this Convention to establish, for the purpose o f Article 21 of the Convention, 
cedure which shall be as expeditious and simple as possible. 
APPENDIX I I 
T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S 
GN S O V E R E I G N IMMUNITIES A C T O F 1976 
AN ACT 
jurisdiction of United States courts in suits against foreign states, the 
which foreign states are immune from suit and in which execution may 
heir property, and for other purposes. 
by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
•ess assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Foreign Sovereign 
1976". 
That chapter 85 of title 28. United States Code, is amended by insert-
;fore section 1331 the following new section: 
\ions against foreign states 
| tnc t courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount 
any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in section 
ttle as to any claim for relief in personam wi th respect to which the 
\t entitled to immunity either under sections 1605-1607 of this title or 
jle international agreement. 
jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief 
strict courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has 
action 1608 of this t i t le. 
joses of subsection (b), an appearance by a foreign state does not 
|irisdiction with respect to any claim for relief not arising out of any 
jrrence enumerated in sections 1605-1607 of this t i t le ." . 
ig in the chapter analysis of that chapter before: 
. question; amount in controversy; costs." 
l i tem: 
|against foreign states". 
ection 1332 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by striking 
|and (3) and substituting in their place the following: 
>f a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state; 
>f different States and in which citizens or subjects o f a foreign state 
|es;and 
state, defined in section 1603(a) o f this title, as plaintiff and -itizens 
ferent States.". 
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Sec. 4. («) That title 28, United States Code, is amended by inserting afte: 
95 the following new chapter: 
"CHAPTER 97. JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES O F F O R E I G N ST 
"Sec. -• • • ••- - - • -
"1602. Findings and declaration of purpose. 
"1603. Definitions. 
"1604. Immunity of a foreign state from jurisdiction. 
"1605. General exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state. 
"1606. Extent of liability. 
"1607. Counterclaims. 
"1608. Service; time to answer default. 
"1609. Immunity from attachment and execution of property of afdreign s 
"1610. Exceptions to the immunity from attachment or execution. 
"1611. Certain types of property immune from execution. 
" § 1602. Findings and declaration of purpose 
"The Congress finds that the determination by United States courts of the. 
foreign states to immunity from the jurisdiction of such courts would serve the 
of justice and would protect the rights of. both foreign states and litigants r 
States courts; Under international law, states are not immune from the jurisd 
foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned, and their coi 
property may be levied upon for the satisfaction of judgments rendered against 
connection with their commercial activities. Claims of foreign states to immunit 
henceforth be decided by courts of the United States and of the States in co 
with the principles set forth in this chapter. 
" § 1603. Definitions 
"For purposes of this chapter: 
"(a) A 'foreign state', except as used in section 1608 of this title, include: 
cal subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign 
defined in subsection (b). 
"(f») An 'agency or instrumentality of a foreign state' means any entity: ; 
"(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and 
"(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thei 
majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign 
political subdivision thereof, and 
"(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as d 
section 1332 (<r) and (d) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third 
"(c) The 'United States' includes all territory and waters, continental o; 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 
. "(d) A'commercial activity'means either a regular course of commercial 
or a particular commercial transaction of act. The commercial character of ar 
shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or p 
transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose. 
"(e) A 'commercial activity carried on in the United States by a forei 
means commercial activity carried on by such state and having substantial con 
the United States. 
" § 1604. Immunity of a foreign state from jurisdiction 
"Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a 
the time of enactment of this act a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisd 
187 
arts o f the United States and o f the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 
f this chapter. 
1605. General exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state 
) A foreign state shall not be immune f rom the jurisdiction o f courts o f the 
States in any case: 
) in which the foreign state has waived its- immunity either explicitly or by im-
in, notwithstanding any withdrawal o f the waiver which the foreign state may 
t to effect except in accordance wi th the terms o f the waiver; 
I i n which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the 
States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in con-
wi th a commercial activity o f the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside 
i tory o f the United States in connection wi th a commercial activity of the foreign 
sewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States; 
in which rights in property taken in violation o f international law are in issue 
t property or any property exchanged for such property is present in the United 
n connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the 
state; or that property or any property exchanged fo r such property is owned or 
d by an agency or instrumentality o f the foreign-state and that agency or instru-
ty is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States; 
in which rights in property in the United States acquired by succession or gif t 
i i n immovable property situated in the United States are in issue; or 
not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above, in which money damages 
dit againstya'foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss o f 
r, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission o f 
sign state or o f any off icial or employee o f that foreign state while acting within 
e o f his office or employment; except this paragraph shall not apply to : 
"(A) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to 
rise or perform a discretionary funct ion regardless o f whether the discretion be 
td, or 
I "(B) any claim arising out o f malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libeL 
Ber, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference wi th contract rights: 
I A foreign sate shall not be immune f rom the jurisdiction o f the courts o f the 
•States in any case in which a suit in admiralty is brought to enforce a maritime 
• r o t a vessel or cargo o f the foreign state, which maritime lien is based upon a 
• r i a l activity o f the foreign state: Provided, That: 
I notice o f the suit is given by delivery o f a copy o f the summons and o f the 
l i t to the person, or his agent, having possession o f the vessel or cargo against 
l i e maritime lien is asserted; but such notice shall not be deemed to have been 
m, nor may i t thereafter be delivered, i f the vessel or cargo is arrested pursuant to 
l>btained on behalf o f the party bringing the suit - unless the party was unaware 
Ivessei or cargo o f a foreign state was involved; in which event the service o f pto-
Hrest shall be deemed to constitute valid delivery o f such notice; and ' 
I notice to the foreign state o f the commencement o f suit as provided in section 
Bth is t i t le is initiated within ten days either o f the delivery o f notice as provided 
fltion (b) (1) o f this section or, in the case o f a party who was unaware that the 
I cargo o f a foreign state was involved, o f the date such party determined the 
• o f the foreign state's interest. 
B notice is delivered under subsection (6) (1) o f this section, the maritime lien 
Heaf ter be deemed to be an in personam claim against the foreign state which at 
I owns the vessel or cargo involved: Provided, That a court mayno t award judg-
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ment against the foreign state in an amount greater than the value o f the vessel or cargo 
upon which the maritime lien arose, such value to be determined as o f the time notice is 
served under subsection (2>)(1) o f this section. 
" § 1606. Extent of liability 
" A s to any claim for relief wi th respect to which a foreign state is not entitled to 
immunity under section 1605 or 1607 o f this chapter, the foreign state, shall be liable in 
the same- manner and to the same extent as a. private individual under like circumstances; 
but a foreign state except for an agency or instrumentality thereof shall not be liable for 
punitive damages; i f , however, i n any case wherein death was caused, the law o f the place 
where the action or omission occurred provides, or has been construed to provide, for 
damages only punitive in nature, the foreign state shall be liable for actual or compen-
satory damages measured by the pecuniary injuries resulting f rom such death which were 
incurred by the persons for whose benefit the action was brought 
" § 1 6 0 7 . Counterclaims 
" I n any action brought by a foreign state, or in which a foreign state intervenes, in a 
court o f the United States or o f a State, the foreign state shall not be accorded immunity 
wi th respect to any counterclaim; -
"(o) for which a foreign state would not be entitled to immunity under section 
1605 o f this chapter had such claim been brought in a separate action against the foreign 
state; or 
"(b) arising put o f the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter o f the 
claim o f the foreign state; or 
"(c) to the extent that the counterclaim does not seek relief exceeding in amount 
o f differing in kind f rom that sought by the foreign state. 
" § 1608. Service; time to antwer; default 
"(a) Service in the courts o f the United States and o f the States shall be made upon 
a foreign state or political subdivision o f a foreign state: 
"(1) by delivery o f a copy of the summons and complaint in accordance with any 
special arrangement fo r service between the pla in t i f f and the foreign state or political 
subdivision; or 
"(2) i f no special arrangement exists, by delivery o f a copy o f the summons and 
complaint in accordance wi th an applicable international convention on service o f 
judicial documents; or 
"(3) i f service cannot be made under paragraphs (1) or (2), by sending a copy o f 
the summons and complaint and a notice o f suit, together wi th a translation o f each into 
the off ic ia l language o f the foreign state, by any fo rm of mail requiring a signed receipt, 
to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk o f the court to the head o f the ministry o f 
foreign affairs o f the foreign state concerned, or 
"(4) ~ i f service cannot be made wi th in 30 days under paragraph (3), by sending two 
copies of the summons and complaint and a notice o f suit, together w i th a translation o f 
each into the off ic ia l language o f the foreign state, by any f o r m of mail requiring a 
signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk o f the court to the Secretary 
of State in Washington, District o f Columbia, to the attention o f the Director o f Special 
Consular Services - and the Secretary shall transmit one copy o f the papers through 
diplomatic channels to the foreign state and shall send to the clerk o f the court a certi-
fied copy of the diplomatic note indicating when the papers were transmitted. 
As used in this subsection, a 'notice o f suit* shall mean a notice addressed to a foreign 
state and in a form prescribed by the Secretary of State by regulation. 
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the courts of the United States and of the States shall be made upon 
tentality o f a foreign state: 
y of a copy o f the summons and complaint in accordance with any 
for service between the pla in t i f f and the agency or instrumentality; 
ial arrangement exists, by delivery o f a copy of the summons and 
an officer, a managing or general agent, or to any other agent autho-
l t or by law to receive service o f process in the United States; or in 
applicable international convention on service o f judicial documents; 
cannot be made under paragraphs (1) or (2), and i f reasonably cal-
t l notice, by delivery o f a copy of the summons and complaint, to-
tion o f each into the off ic ia l language of the foreign state: 
xected by an authority o f the foreign state or political subdivision 
stter rogatory or request or 
ny form o f mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dis-
erk o f the court to the agency or instrumentality to be served, or 
rected by order of the court consistent wi th the law o f the place 
s be made. 
i l l be deemed to have been made: 
e of service under subsection (a)(4), as of the date of transmittal 
f led copy of the diplomatic note; and 
ier case ounder this section, as o f the date o f receipt indicated in the 
and returned postal receipt, or other proof o f service applicable to 
e employed. 
ion Brought in a court o f the United States or o f a State, a foreign 
division thereof, or an agency or instrumentality o f a foreign state 
r or other responsive pleading to the complaint wi th in sixty days 
i made under this section. 
mt by default shall be entered by a court o f the United States or o f 
sign state, a political subdivision thereof, or an agency or instrumen-
ate, unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evi-
i the court. A copy o f any such default judgment shall be sent to the 
ical subdivision in the manner prescribed f o r service in this section. 
uty from attachment and execution of property of a foreign state 
ing international agreements to which the United States is a party at 
ait of this Act the property in the United States o f a foreign state 
m attachment, arrest and execution except as provided i n sections 
is chap ter. 
ions to the immunity from attachment or execution 
rty in the United States o f a foreign state, as defined in section 
ter, used for a commercial activity in the United States, shall not be 
unent in aid o f execution, or f rom execution, upon a judgment 
f the United States or o f a State after the effective date o f this Act, 
state has waived its immunity f rom attachment in aid o f execution 
her explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal o f 
n state may purport to effect except in accordance wi th the terms 
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"(2) the property, is or was used for the commercial activity upon which the claim 
is based, or 
"(3) the execution relates to a judgment establishing rights in property which has 
been taken in violation o f international law or which has been exchanged for property 
taken in violation of international law, or 
"(4) the execution relates to a judgment establishing rights in property: 
"(A) which, is acquired by succession or g i f t , or 
" ( £ ) which is immovable and situated in the United States: Provided, That 
such property is not used for purposes o f maintaining a diplomatic or consular 
mission or the residence of the Chief o f such mission, or 
"(5) the property consists o f any contractual obligation or any proceeds from such 
a contractual obligation to indemnify or hold harmless the foreign state or its employees 
under a policy o f automobile or other liability or casualty insurance covering the claim 
which merged into the judgment 
"(b) I n addition to subsection (a), any property in the United States o f an agency 
or instrumentality o f a foreign state engaged in commercial activity in the United States 
shall not be immune f rom attachment in aid o f execution, or f rom execution, upon a 
judgment entered by a court o f the United States or o f a State after the effective date o f 
this Act, i f : 
" (1) the agency or instrumentality has waived its immunity f rom attachment in aid 
of execution or f rom execution either explicitly or implicit ly, notwithstanding any wi th-
drawal o f the waiver the agency or instrumentality may purport to effect except in 
accordance wi th the terms o f the waiver, or 
"(2) the judgment relates to a claim for which the agency or instrumentality is not 
immune by virtue o f section 160S (a) (2), (3), or (5), or 1605 (b) o f this chapter, regard-
less o f whether the property is or was used for the activity upon which the claim is 
based. 
"(c) No attachment or execution referred to in subsections (a) and (b) o f this sec-
tion shall be permitted unti l the court has ordered such attachment and execution after 
having determined that a reasonable period o f time has elapsed following the entry o f 
judgment and the giving o f any notice required under section 1608 (e) o f this chapter. 
"(d) The property o f a foreign state, as defined in section 1603 (a) o f this chapter, 
used for a commercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune f rom attach-
ment prior to the entry o f judgment in any action brought in a court o f the United 
States or o f a State, or prior to the elapse o f the period of time provided in subsection 
(c) o f this section, i f : 
"(1) the foreign state has explicitly waived its immunity f rom attachment prior to 
judgment, notwithstanding any withdrawal o f the waiver the foreign state may purport 
to effect except in accordance wi th the terms o f the waiver, and 
" (2) the purpose o f the attachment is to secure satisfaction o f a judgment that has 
been or may ultimately be entered against the foreign state, and not to obtain jurisdic-
t ion. 
" § 1 6 1 1 . Certain typei of property immune from execution 
"(a) Notwithstanding the provisions o f section 1610 o f this chapter, the property 
of those organizations designated by the President as being entitled to enjoy the privi-
leges, exemptions, and immunities provided by the International Organizations Immu-
nities Act shall not be subject to attachment or any other judicial process impeding the 
disbursement o f funds to, or on the order of , a foreign state as the result o f an action 
brought in the courts o f the-United States or o f the States. 
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ithstanding the provisions of section 1610 of this chapter, the property 
e shall be immune from attachment and f rom execution, i f : 
roperty is that of a foreign central bank or monetary authority held for 
t , unless such bank or authority, or its parent foreign government, has 
d its Immunity f rom attachment in aid o f execution, or f rom execution, 
; any withdrawal o f the waiver which the bank, authority or government 
effect except in accordance with the terms o f the waiver; or 
operty is, or is intended to be used in connection wi th a military activity 
is o f a military character, or 
is under the control o f a military authority or defense agency." 
E analysis o f "Part I V . Jurisdiction and Venue" of t i t le 28, United States 
1 by inserting after: 
s Court.", 
/ i t e m : 
ional Immunities o f Foreign States.". 
section 1391 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at 
ie following new subsection: 
I action against a foreign state as defined in section 1603 (a) o f this title 
| judicial district in which a substantial part o f the events or omissions 
occurred, or a substantial part o f property that is the subject of 
udicial district in which the vessel or cargo of a foreign state is situated, 
ted under section 1605 (6) o f this t i t le ; 
iidicial district i n which the agency or instrumentality is licensed to do 
; business, i f the action is brought against an agency or instrumentality 
i defined in section 1603 (b o f this t i t le ; or 
failed States District Court for the District o f Columbia i f the action is 
foreign state or political subdivision thereof.". 
ction 1441 o f ti t le 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at 
I following new subsection: 
action brought in a State court against a foreign state as defined in 
' this t i t le may be removed by the foreign state to the district court 
for the district and division embracing the place where such action 
Removal the action shall be tried by the court without ju ry . Where 
»on this subsection, the time.limitations o f section 1446 (b) o f this 
I at any time for cause shown.". 
brovision o f this Act or the application thereof to any foreign state is 
(validity does not affect other provisions or applications o f the Act 
effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end 
i Act are severable. 
| shall take effect ninety days after the date of its enactment. 
(1,1976. 
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4ITED KINGDOM STATE IMMUNITY ACT 1978 
make new provision wi th respect to proceedings in the United Kingdom 
ther States; to provide for the effect o f judgments given against the 
in the- courts of States parties to the European Convention on State 
ike new provision wi th respect to the immunities and privileges o f heads 
connected purposes. 
(20th July 1978) 
d by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and wi th the advice and 
ords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament 
i the authority o f the same, as follows: 
P A R T I 
1GS I N UNITED KINGDOM BY OR AGAINST OTHER STATES 
Immunity from jurisdiction 
State is immune f r o m the jurisdiction o f the courts o f the United King-
tvided in the following provisions o f this Part o f this Act. 
shall give effect to the immunity conferred by this section even 
oes not appear in the proceedings in question. 
Exceptions from immunity 
State is not immune as respects proceedings in respect o f which i t has 
liction o f the courts o f the United Kingdom. 
| may submit after the dispute giving rise to the proceedings has arisen 
ten agreement; but a provision in any agreement that i t is to be gov-
| f the.United Kingdom is not to be regarded as a submission. 
; deemed to have submitted: 
(instituted the proceedings; or 
subsections (4) and (5) below, i f i t has intervened or taken any step 
|>n (3)(i») above does not apply to intervention or any step taken for 
niunity; or 
Ian interest in property in circumstances such that the State would 
to immunity i f the proceedings had been brought against i t . 
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(5) Subsection (3 )(ft) above does not apply to any step taken by the : 
ignorance o f facts entitling i t to immunity i f those facts could not reasonably ha 
ascertained and immunity is claimed as soon as reasonably practicable. 
(6) A submission in respect o f any proceedings extends.to any appeal bu 
any counter-claim unless i t arises out o f the same legal relationship or facts as the 
(7) The head o f a State's diplomatic mission in the United Kingdom, or thi 
for the time being performing his funct ion, shall be deemed to have authority tc 
on behalf o f the State in respect o f any proceedings; and any person who has 
into a contract on behalf o f and wi th the authority o f a State shall be deemed 
authority to submit on its behalf in respect o f proceedings arising out o f the cont 
3. (1) A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to : 
(a) a commercial transaction entered into by the State; or 
(ft) an obligation o f the State which by virtue of a contract (whether a con 
transaction or not) falls to be performed wholly or partly in the United Kingdom 
(2) This section does not apply i f the parties to the dispute are States 
otherwise agreed in wri t ing; and subsection ( l ) ( f r ) above does not apply i f the i 
(not being a commercial transaction) was made in the territory o f the State co 
and the obligation in question is governed by its administrative law. 
V (3) In this section "commercial transaction" means: 
(a) any contract for the supply o f goods or services; 
(6) any loan or other transaction for the provisic n o f finance and any guar 
indemnity in respect o f any such transaction or o f any other financial obligation; 
(c) any other transaction or activity (whether o f a commercial, industria 
cial, professional or other similar character) into which a State enters or in ' 
engages otherwise than in the exercise o f sovereign authority; 
but neither paragraph o f subsection (1) above applies to a contract o f empi 
between a State and an individual. 
4 . (1) A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to a con 
employment between the State and an individual where the contract was mad 
United Kingdom or the work is to be wholly or partly performed there. 
(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4) below, this section does not apply i f 
(a) at the time when the proceedings are brought the individual is a nat 
the State concerned; or 
(ft) at the time when the contract was made the individual was neither a 
of the United Kingdom nor habitually resident there; or 
(c) the parties to the contract have otherwise agreed in writing. 
(3) Where the work is for an office, agency or establishment maintaine< 
State in the United Kingdom for commercial purposes, subsection (2)(a) and (. 
do not exclude the application o f this section unless the individual was, at t 
when the contract was made, habitually resident in that State. 
(4) Subsection (2)(c) above does not exclude the application o f this 
where the law o f the United Kingdom, requires the proceedings to be brought 
court o f the United Kingdom. 
(5) In subsection (2)(ft) above "national o f the United Kingdom" means 
o f the United Kingdom and Colonies, a person who is a British subject by virtu 
tion 2, 13 or 16 o f the British Nationality Act 1948 or by virtue o f the British I 
i t y Act 1965, a British protected person within the meaning o f the said Act o f 
a citizen o f Southern Rhodesia. 
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In this section "proceedings relating to a contract of employment" includes 
gs between the parties to such a contract in respect of any statutory rights or 
which they are entitled or subject as employer or employee. 
A State is not immune as respects proceedings in respect of: 
death or personal in jury; or 
damage to or loss o f tangible property, 
an act or omission in the United Kingdom. 
(1) A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating t o : 
any interest o f the State in , or its possession or use of , immovable property in 
1 Kingdom; o r 
any obligation o f the State arising out of its interest in , or its possession or use 
ch property. 
A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to any interest of the 
lovable or immovable property, being an interest arising by way of succession, 
la vacantia. 
The fact that a State has or claims an interest in any property shall not pre-
court f rom exercising in respect of it any jurisdiction relating to the estates o f 
>ersons or persons o f unsound mind or to insolvency, the winding up o f com-
the administration o f trusts. 
A court may entertain proceedings against a person other than a State not-
ing that the proceedings relate to property: 
which-is in the possession or control o f a State; or 
in Which a State claims an interest, 
e would not have been immune had the proceedings been brought against i t or, 
vithin paragraph (ft) above, i f the claim is neither admitted nor supported by 
s evidence^ 
A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to : 
any patent, trade-mark, design or plant breeders' rights belonging to the State 
aed or protected i n the United Kingdom or for which the State has applied in 
.'Kingdom; " 
an alleged infringement by the State in the United Kingdom of any patent, 
:, design, plant breeders' rights or copyright; or 
the right to use a trade or business name in the United Kingdom. 
(1) A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to its membership 
corporate, an unincorporated body or a partnership which: 
has members other than States; and 
is incorporated or constituted under the law of the United Kingdom or is con-
n or has its principal place o f business in the United Kingdom, 
eedings arising: between the State and the body or its other members or, as the 
e, between the. State and the other partners. 
[Tiis section does not apply i f provision to the contrary has been made by an 
in writing between the parties to the dispute or by the constitution or other 
establishing or regulating the body or partnership in question. 
1) Where a State has agreed in writing to submit a dispute which has arisen, 
e, to arbitration, the State is not immune as respects proceedings in the courts 
ed Kingdom which relate to the arbitration. 
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(2) This section has effect subject to any contrary provision teethe arbitratic 
agreement and does not apply to any arbitration agreement between States. 
10. (1) : This section applies to : 
(a) Admiralty proceedings; and 
(b) proceedings on any claim which could be made the subject o f Admiralty pr 
ceedings. 
(2) A State is not immune as respects: 
(a) an action in rem against a ship belonging to that State; or 
(6) an action in personam for enforcing a claim in connection wi th such a ship, 
i f , at the time when the cause o f action arose, the ship was in use or intended for use f 
commercial purposes. ' 
(3) Vlfoere ah~action^ta r ^ to a State for t 
forcing a claimKm connection wi th another ship belonging to that State, subsecti 
(2)(a) above does not apply as respects the first-mentioned ship unless, at the time wh 
the cause o f action relating to the other ship arose, both ships were in use or intend 
for use for commercial purposes. 
(4) A State is not immune as respects: 
(a) an action in rem against a cargo belonging t o that State i f both the cargo a 
the ship carrying i t were, at the time when the cause o f action arose, in use or intend 
for use for commercial purposes; or 
(b) an action in personam for enforcing a claim in connection wi th such a carg< 
the ship carrying i t was then in use or intended fo r use as aforesaid. 
(5) In the foregoing provisions references to a ship or cargo belonging to a St 
include references to a ship or cargo i n its possession or control o r i n which i t claims 
interest; and, subject to subsection (4) above, subsection (2) above implies to prope 
other than a ship as i t applies to a ship. 
(6) Sections 3 to 5 above do not apply to proceedings o f the k ind described 
subsection (1) above i f the State in question is a party to the Brussels Convention s 
the claim relates to the operation ofa ship owned or operated by that State, the earn 
o f cargo or passengers on any such ship or the carriage o f cargo owned by that State 
any cither ship. 
11 . A State is not immune as respects; proceedings relating to its liability for : 
(a) value added tax, any duty o f customs or excise or any agricultural levy; or 
(ft) rates in respect o f premises occupied by i t for commercial purposes. 
Procedure 
12. (1) Any wri t or other document required to be served for instituting i 
ceedings against a State shall be served by being transmitted through the Foreign . 
Commonwealth Office to the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs o f the State and service shal 
deemed to riave been effected when the w r i t or document is received at the Ministry. 
(2) Any time for entering an appearance (whether prescribed by rules o f cour 
otherwise) shall begin to run two months after the date on which the wr i t or docum 
is received as aforesaid. 
(3) A State which appears in proceedings cannot thereafter object that subsed 
(1) above has not been complied wi th i n the case o f those proceedings. 
(4) No judgment in default o f appearance shall be given against a State excep 
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t i on (1) above has been complied wi th and that the time f o i entering an 
ended by subsection (2) above has expired. 
' of any judgment given against a State in default of appearance shall be 
igh the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to the Ministry o f Foreign 
tate and any time for applying to have the judgment set aside (whether 
es o f court or otherwise) shall begirt to run two months after the date 
y o f the judgment is received at the Ministry. 
tion (1) above does not prevent the service of a wr i t or other document 
> which the State has agreed and subsections (2) and (4) above do not 
ce is effected in any such manner. 
ct ion shall not be construed as applying to proceedings against a State 
er-claim or to an action in rem; and subsection (1) above shall not be 
cting any rules o f court Whereby leave is required fo r the service o f pro-
urisdiction. ':• 
0 penalty by way o f committal or fine shall be imposed in respect o f 
iusal by or on behalf o f a State to disclose or produce any document or 
1 for the purposes o f proceedings to which i t is a party. 
t to subsections (3) and (4) above: 
ihall not be given against a State by way of injunction or order for 
nee or fo r the recovery o f land or other property; and 
>perty o f a State shall not be subject to any process for the enforcement 
r arbitration award or, in an action in rem, fo r its arrest, detention or 
tiofi (2) above does not prevent the giving of any relief or the issue o f 
l the written consent o f the State concerned; and any such consent 
:ontained in a prior agreement) may be expressed so as to apply to a 
generally; but a provision merely submitting to the jurisdiction o f the 
e regarded as a consent for the purposes o f this subsection. 
t ion (2)(fr) above does not prevent the issue o f any process in respect 
h is for the time being in use or intended fo r use fo r commercial pur-
use not falling within section 10 above, this subsection applies to prop-
r t y to the European Convention on State Immunity only i f 
jcess is for enforcing a judgment which is f inal wi th in the meaning o f 
below and the State has made a declaration under Article 24 o f the 
icess is for enforcing an arbitration award. 
ad o f a State's diplomatic mission in the United Kingdom, or the person 
g performing his functions, shall be deemed to have authority to give on 
te any such consent as is mentioned i n subsection (3) above and, for the 
action (4) above, his certificate to the effect that any property is not in 
for use by or on behalf o f the State for commercial purposes shall be 
dent evidence o f that fact unless the contrary is proved. 
application of this section toi Scotland: 
srence to " injunct ion" shall be construed as a reference to "interdict"; 
agraph (b) o f subsection (2) above there shall be substituted the follow* 
le property of a State shall not be subject to any diligence fo r enforcing 
or order o f a court or a decree arbitral or, in an action in rem, to arrest-
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(c) any reference to "process" shall be construed as a reference to " d i 
any reference to "the issue o^any process" as a reference to "the doing o f d 
and the reference in subsection (4)(A) above to "an arbitration award" as a reft 
"a decree arbitral". 
• •.. . > Supplementary provisions 
14. (1) The immunities and privileges conferred by this Part o f this Act 
any foreign or commonwealth State other than the United Kingdom; and refere 
State include references to: 
(a) the sovereign or other head o f that State in his public capacity; 
(ft) the government o f that State; and 
(c) any department of-that government, 
but n o t to any entity (hereafter referred to as a "separate ent i ty") which is dist 
the executive organs o f the government o f the State and capable o f suing or beii 
(2) A separate entity is immune f rom the jurisdiction o f the courts o f t l 
Kingdom i f , and only i f : 
(a) the proceedings relate to anything done by i t in the exercise o f 
authority; arid 
(b) the circumstances are such that a State (or, in the case o f proceedings 
section 10 above applies, a State which is not a party to the Brussels Conventic 
have been so immune. ; 
(3) I f a separate entity (not being a State's central bank o r other monetai 
i t y ) submits to the jurisdiction in respect o f proceedings in the case o f whic 
t i t led to. immunity by virtue o f subsection (2) above,, subsections (1) to (4) of ' . 
above shall apply to i t in-respect o f those procedures as i f references to a £ 
references to that entity _ . 
Property o f a State's central bank or other monetary authority sh 
regarded f o r the purposes o f subsection (4) o f section 13 above as in use or int 
use-for commercial purposes; and where-any such bank or authority is a sepai 
subsections, ( l ) . t o . (3) o f that section .shall apply to i t as i f references to a J 
references, to the- bank o r authority. 
(5) Section 12 above- applies to proceedings against the constituent terri 
federal State; and Her. Majesty may by Order i n Council provide for the other 
o f this Part o f this Act to apply to any such constituent territory specified in 
as they apply to a State. 
(6) Where the provisions o f this Part o f this Act do not apply to a c 
territory by virtue o f any such Order subsections (2) and (3) above shall applj 
i t were a separate entity. 
•L5. (1) I f i t appears to Her Majesty tha t the immunities and privileges 
by this Part o f this. Act ' in relation to any State: 
(a) exceed those accorded' by the law o f that State in relation to the Ui 
dom;or 
(b) are less than those required by any treaty, convention or other in 
agreement to which that State and the United Kingdom are parties, 
Her. Majesty may by Order in Council provide for restricting or, as the ca 
extending those immunities and privileges to such extent as appears to Her 
be appropriate. 
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(2) Any statutory instrument containing an Order under this section shall be sub-
to annulment in pursuance of a resolution o f either House o f Parliament. 
16. (1) This Part o f this Act does not affect any immunity or privilege conferred 
the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 or the Consular Relations Act 1968 ; and: 
(a) section 4 above does not apply to proceedings concerning the employment of 
members o f a mission withm the meaning o f the Convention scheduled to the said 
: o f 1964 or o f the members o f a consular post within the meaning of the Convention 
eduled to the said Act o f 1968; 
(ft) section 6(1) above does not apply to proceedings concerning a State's title to 
ts possession o f property used for the purposes o f a diplomatic mission. 
(2) This Part o f this Act does riot apply to proceedings relating to anything done 
or in relation to the armed forces o f a State while present in the United Kingdom 
I , in particular, has effect subject to the Visiting Forces Act 19S2. 
(3) This Part o f this Act does not apply to proceedings to which section 17(6) of 
Nuclear Installations Act 1965 applies. 
(4) This Part o f this Act does not apply to criminal proceedings. 
(5) This Part o f this Act does not apply to any proceedings relating to taxation 
er than those mentioned in section 11 above. 
17. (1) In this Part o f this Act: 
"the Brussels Convention" means the International Convention fo r the Uni-
fication o f Certain Rules Concerning the Immunity o f State-Owned Ships, signed in 
.'Brussels on 10th Apr i l 1926; 
"commercial purposes" means purposes of such transactions or activities as are 
mentioned in section 3(3) above; 
"ship" includes hovercraft. 
(2) In sections 2(2) and 13(3) above references to an agreement include references 
i treaty, convention or other international agreement 
(3) For the purposes of sections 3 to 8 above the terriroty o f the United Kingdom 
11 be deemed to include any dependent territory in respect o f which the United King-
n is a party to the European Convention on State Immunity. 
(4) In sections 3(1), 4(1), 5 and 16(2) above references to the United Kingdom in-
de references to its territorial waters and any area designated under section 1(7) o f 
Continental Shelf Act 1964. 
(5) In relation to Scotland in this Part o f this Act "action in rem" means such an 
ion only in relation to Admiralty proceedings. 
PART I I 
JUDGMENTS AGAINST UNITED KINGDOM I N CONVENTION STATES 
18. (1) This section applies to any judgment given against the United Kingdom 
a court in another State party to the European Convention on State Immunity, being 
idgment: 
(a) given in proceedings in which the United Kingdom was not entitled to immu-
f by virtue of provisions corresponding to those o f sections 2 to 11 above; and 
(ft) which is f inal , that is to say, which is not or is no longer subject to appeal or, 
iven in default o f appearance, liable to be set*aside. 
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(2) Subject to section 19 below; a judgment to which this section i 
recognised i n any court i n the United Kingdom as conclusive between the 
in al l proceedings founded on the same cause of action and may be reliec 
defence or counter-claim in such proceedings! 
(3) Subsection (2) above (but not section 19 below) shall have eff i 
t ion tor an j r settlement entered into by the United Kingdom before a co 
State party to the Convention which under the law of that State is treatei 
to a judgment 
(4) In this section references to a court i n a State party to the Conv 
references to a court in any territory in respect o f which i t is a party. 
19. (1) A court need not give effect to section 18 above in the < 
ment: 
(a) -,iTtoido so would be manifestly contrary to public policy or i f an 
proceeaUngs in which the judgment was given had no adequate opportunity 
case; or 
(f t ) i f the judgment was given without provisions corresponding to t l 
12 above having been complied wi th and the United Kingdom has not ente 
ance or applied to have the judgment set aside. 
(2) A court need not give effect to section 18 above in the case o f a j 
(a) i f proceedings between the same parties, based on the same fa< 
the same purpose 
(0 are pending before a court in the United Kingdom and were i 
instituted; or 
( if) are pending before a court in another State party to the Conven 
first to be instituted and may result in a judgment to which t h 
apply; or 
(ft) i f the result o f the judgment is inconsistent wi th the result o f 
ment given in proceedings between the same parties and: 
(i) the other judgment is by a court i n the United Kingdom and eit 
ceedings were the first to be insti tutedor the judgment o f t h a t « 
before the first-mentioned judgment became f ina l wi thin the. m< 
section ( l ) ( f t ) o f section 18 above; or 
( if) the other judgment is by a court i n another State party to the Cc 
that section has already become applicable to i t 
(3) Where the judgment was given against the United Kingdom i n p 
respect o f which the United Kingdom was not entitled to immunity by viri 
sion corresponding to section 6(2) above, a court need not give effect t 
above i n respect o f the judgment i f the court that gave the judgment: 
(a) would not have had jurisdiction in the matter i f i t had applied m l 
tion corresponding to those applicable to such matters in the United Kingdc 
(ft) applied a law other than that indicated by the United Kingdom n 
international law and would have reached a different conclusion i f i t had at 
so indicated. 
(4) In subseciton (2) above references to a court i n the United Kinj 
references to a court in any dependent territory in respect o f which the Uni 
is a party to the Convention, and references to a court in another State part 
vention include references to a court in any territory in respect o f which i t i 
r 
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PART m 
MISCELLANEOUS A N D SUPPLEMENTARY 
20. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section and to any necessary modifica-
tions, the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 shall apply to : 
(a) a sovereign or other head o f State; 
(6) members o f his family forming part o f his household; and 
(c) his private servants, 
as i t applies to the head of a diplomatic mission, to members o f his family forming part 
af his household and to his private servants. 
(2) The immunities and privileges confereed by virtue o f subsection ( l ) (a ) and (b) 
bove shall not be subject to the restrictions by reference to nationality or residence 
entioned in Article 37(1) or 38 in Schedule 1 to the said Act o f 1964. 
(3) Subject to any direction to the contrary by the Secretary o f State, a person on 
i O m immunities and privilees are conferred by virtue o f subsection (1) above shall be 
nti t led to the exemption conferred by section 8(3) o f the Immigration Act 1971. 
(4) Except as respects value added tax and duties of customs or excise, this sec-
n does not affect any question whether a person is exempt f rom, or immune as 
ects proceedings relating to, taxation. 
(5) This section applies to the sovereign or other head o f any State on which im-
unities and privileges are conferred by Part I o f this Act and is without prejudice to 
e application o f that Part to any such sovereign or head o f State in his public capacity. 
2 1 . A certificate by or on behalf o f the Secretary o f State shall be conclusive evi-
ce on any question: 
(a) whether any country is a State for the purposes o f Part I o f this Act, whether 
iy territory is a constituent territory o f a federal State for those purposes or as to the 
>n or persons to be regarded for those purposes as the head or government o f a 
ite; 
(b) whether a State is a party to the Brussels Convention mentioned in Part I o f 
Ac t ; 
(c) whether a State is a party to the European Convention on State Immunity, 
nether i t had made a declaration under Article 24 o f that Convention or as to the 
tones in respect o f which the United Kingdom or any other State is a party; 
(</.) whether, and i f so when, a document has been served or received as mentioned 
section 12(1) or (5) above. 
22. (1) In this Act "court" includes any tribunal or body exercising judicial func-
ms; and references to the courts or law o f the United Kingdom include referrences to 
e courts or law of any part o f the United Kingdom. 
(2) In this Act references to entry o f appearance and judgments in default o f 
earance include references to any corresponding procedures. 
(3) In this Act "the European Convention on State Immuni ty" means the Conven-
n o f that name signed in Basle on 16th May 1972. 
(4) In this Act "dependent terri tory" means: 
(a) any o f the Channel Islands; 
(b) the Isle o f Man; 
(c) any colony other than one for whose external relations a country other than 
: United Kingdom is responsible; or 
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(d) any country or territory outside Her Majesty's dominions in which Her 
t y has jurisdiction in right o f the government o f the United Kingdom. 
(5) Any power conferred by this Act to make an Order in Council includes 
to vary or revoke a previous Order. 
23. (1) This Act may be cited as the State Immunity Act 1978. 
(2) Section 13 o f the Administration o f Justice (Miscellaneous Provisioi 
1938 and section 7 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Ac 
(which become unnecessary in consequence o f Part I o f this Act) are hereby repea 
(3) Subject to subsection (4) below, Parts 1 and I I o f this Act do not apply 
ceedings in respect o f matters that occurred before the date o f the coming into f 
this Act and, in particular: 
(a) sections 2(2) and 13(3) do not apply to any prior agreement, and 
"(fr) sections 3, 4 and 9 do not apply to any transaction; contract or arbi 
agreement, 
entered into before that date. 
(4) Section 12 above applies to any proceedings instituted after the coml 
force o f this Act. 
(5) This Act shall come into force on such date as may . be specified by ai 
made by the Lord Chancellor by statutory instrument. 
(6) This Act extends to Northern Ireland. 
(7) Her Majesty may by Order in Council extend any o f the provisions o f t l 
w i th or without modification, to any dependent territory. 
f 
APPENDIX IV 
HE SINGAPORE STATE IMMUNITY ACT 1979 
o make provisions with respect to proceedings in Singapore by or against 
and for purposes connected therewith. 
[26 October 1979] 
P A R T I 
PRELIMINARY 
This Act may be cited as the State Immunity Act, 1979. 
set to subsection (3), Part I I does not apply to proceedings in respect of 
iccurrcd before the commencement o f this Act and, in particular: 
sction (2) o f section 4 and subsection (3) o f section IS do not apply to any 
:nt; and 
sns 5, 6 and 11 do not apply to any transaction, contract or arbitration 
>efore that date. 
on 14 applies to any proceedings instituted after the commencement o f 
In this Act: 
ial purposes" means purposes of such transactions or activities as are men-
ection (3) o f section 5; 
dudes any tribunal or body exercising judicial functions; 
ludes hovercraft. 
s Ac t : 
:nces to an agreement in subsection (2) o f section 4 and subsection (3) of 
lude references to a treaty, convention or other international agreement; 
mces to entry o f appearance and judgments in default o f appearance in-
es to any corresponding procedures. 
PART I I 
FEEDINGS IN SINGAPORE BY OR AGAINST OTHER STATES 
Immunity from jurisdiction 
K State is immune f rom the jurisdiction o f the courts o f Singapore except 
the following provisions o f this Part. 
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(2) A court shall give effect to the immunity conferred by this section even t l 
the State does not appear in the proceedings in question. 
Exceptions from immunity 
4. (1) A State" is no t immune as respects proceedings in respect o f which 
submitted to the jurisdiction o f the courts o f Singapore. 
(2) A State may submit after the dispute giving rise to the proceedings has aria 
by a prior written agreement; but a provision in any agreement that i t is to be govi 
by the law of Singapore is not to be regarded as a submission. 
(3) A State is deemed to have submitted: 
(a) i f i t has instituted the proceedings; or 
(b) subject to subsections (4) and (5), i f i t has intervened or taken any step i 
proceedings.- . . 
(4) Paragraph (6) o f subsection (3) does not apply to intervention or any step i 
for the purpose only of : 
(a) claiming immunity; or 
(6) asserting an interest in property in circumstances such that the State would 
been entitled to immunity i f the proceedings had been brought against i t . 
(5) Paragraph (b) o f subsection (3) does not apply to any step taken by the St 
ignorance o f facts entitling i t to immunity i f those facts could not reasonably have 
ascertained and immunity is claimed as soon as reasonably practicable. 
(6) A submission in respect o f any proceedings extends to any appeal but n 
any counter-claim unless i t arises out o f the same legal relationship or facts as the cL 
(7) The head o f a State's diplomatic mission i n Singapore, or the person fc 
time being performing his functions, shall be deemed to have authority to subm 
behalf o f the State in respect o f any proceedings; and any person who has entered i 
contract on behalf o f and wi th the authority o f a State shall be deemed to have au 
ity, to submit on its behalf i n respect o f proceedings arising out o f the contract. 
5. (1) A State is not immune as respects proceedings relation to : 
(a) a commercial transaction entered into by the State; or 
(ft) an obligation o f the State which by virtue o f a contract (whether a commi 
transaction or not) falls to be performed wholly or partly in Singapore, 
but this subsection does not apply to a contract o f employment between a State at 
individual. 
(2) This section does not apply i f the parties to the dispute are States or have o 
wise agreed in writ ing; and paragraph (6) o f subsection (1) does not apply i f the con 
(not being a commercial transaction) was made in the territory o f the State conce 
and the obligation m question is governed by i U administrative'law. 
(3) In this section "commercial transaction" means: 
(a) any contract f o r the supply o f goods or services; 
(b) any loan or other transaction for the provision o f finance and any guarant 
indemnity in respect o f any such transaction or o f any other financial obligation; am 
(c) any other transaction or activity (whether o f a commercial, industrial, final 
professional or other similar character) into which a State enters or in which i t enj 
otherwise than in the exercise o f sovereign authority. 
6. (1) A/State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to a contract oi 
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it between the State and an individual where the contract was made in Singapore 
ork is to be wholly or partly performed in Singapore. 
Subject to subsections (3) and (4), this section does not apply if: 
at the time when the proceedings are brought the individual is a national of the 
ncerned; 
at the time when the contract was made the individual was neither a citizen of 
e nor habitually resident in Singapore; or 
the parties to the contract have otherwise agreed in writing. 
Where the work is for an office, agency or establishment maintained by the 
Singapore for commercial purposes, paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (2) do 
ude the application of this section unless the individual was, at the time when 
ract was made, habitually resident in that State. 
Paragraph (c) of subsection (2) does not exclude the application of this section 
le law of Singapore requires the proceedings to be brought before a court in 
this section "proceedings relating to a contract of employment" includes pro-
I between the parties to such a contract in respect of any statutory rights or 
| which they are entitled or subject as employer or employee. 
. State is not immune as respects proceedings in respect of: 
death or personal injury; or 
lage to or loss of tangible property, 
' an act, at omission in Singapore. 
[1) A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to: 
ay interest of the State in, or its possession or use of, immovable property in 
|?;or 
ay obligation of the State arising out of its interest in, or its possession or use 
\ch property. 
State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to any interest of the 
lovable or immovable property, being an interest arising by way of succession, 
i vacantia. 
lie fact that a State has or claims an interest in any property shall not preclude 
from exercising in respect of it any jurisdiction relating to the estates of 
persons or persons of unsound mind or to insolvency the winding up of corn-
he administration of trusts. 
court may entertain proceedings against a person other than a State notwith-
at the proceedings relate to property: 
finch is in the possession or control of a State; or 
i which a State claims an interest, 
|e would not have been immune had the proceedings been brought against it or, 
paragraph (b), if the claim is neither admitted nor supported by prima 
ice. 
I State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to: 
py patent, trade-mark or design belonging to the State and registered or pro-
pore or for which the State has applied in Singapore; 
alleged infringement by the State in Singapore of any patent, trade-mark, 
opyright; or 
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(c) the right to use a trade or business name in Singapore. 
10. (1) A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to its membei 
of a body corporate, an unincorporated body or a partnership which: 
(a) has members other than States; and 
(b) is incorporated or constituted under the law of Singapore or is controlled 1 
or has its principal place of business in Singapore, 
being proceedings arising between the State and the body or its other members or, a: 
case may be, between the State and the other partners. 
(2) This Section does not apply, if provision to the contrary has been made b 
agreement in writing between the- parties to the dispute or by the constitution or o 
instrument establishing or regulating the body or partnership in question. 
11. (1) Where a State has agreed in writing to submit a dispute which has arisei 
may arise, to arbitration, the State is not immune as respects proceedings in the cour 
Singapore which relate to the arbitration. 
(2) This section has effect subject to any contrary provision in the arbitration a) 
ment and does not apply to any arbitration agreement between States. 
12. (1) This section applies to: 
(a) Admiralty proceedings; and 
(b) proceedings on any claim which could be made the subject of Admiralty 
ceedings. -> 
(2) A State is not immune as respects: 
(a) an action in rem against a ship belonging to that State; or 
(b) an action in personam for enforcing a claim in connection with such a ship, 
if, at the time when the cause of action arose, the ship was in use or intended for usi 
commercial purposes. 
• (3) Where an action in rem is brought against a ship belonging to a State foi 
forcing a claim in connection with another ship belonging to that State, paragraph (i 
subsection (2) does not apply as respects the first-mentioned ship unless, at the 1 
when the cause of action relating to the other ship arose, both ships were in us* 
intended for use for commercial purposes. 
(4) A State is not immune as respects: 
(a) an action in rem against a cargo belonging to that State if both the cargo and 
ship carrying it were, at the time when the cause of action arose, in use or intended 
use for commercial purposes; or 
(b) an action in personam for enforcing a claim in connection with such a car) 
the ship carrying it was then in use or intended for use as aforesaid. 
(5) In the foregoing provisions references to a ship or cargo belonging to a Stat 
dude references to a ship or cargo in its possession or control or in which it claim 
interest; and, subject to subsection (4), subsection (2) applies to property other th; 
ship as it applies to a ship. 
13. A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to its liability for: 
(a) any customs duty or excise duty; or 
(b) any tax in respect of premises occupied by it for commercial purposes. 
^ Procedure 
14. (1) Any writ or other document required to be served for instituting proa 
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State shall be served by being transmitted through the Ministry of Foreign 
lore, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State and service shall be 
e been effected when the writ or document is received at the Ministry. 
ime for entering an appearance (whether prescribed by rules of court or 
U begin to run two months after the date on which the writ or document 
foresaid. 
te which appears in proceedings cannot thereafter object that subsection 
m complied with in the case of those proceedings. 
dgment in default of appearance shall be given against a State except on 
jsection (1) has been complied with and that the time for entering an 
sxtended by subsection (2) has expired. 
y of any judgment given against a State in default of appearance shall be 
irough the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, to the Ministry of 
s of that State and any time for applying to have the judgment set aside 
ribed by rules of court or otherwise) shall begin to run two months after 
ich the copy of the judgment is received at the Ministry. 
:tion (1) does not prevent the service of a writ or other document in any 
ich the State has agreed and subsections (2) and (4) do not apply where 
ed in any such manner. 
sction shall not be construed as applying to proceedings against a State by 
r-claim or to an action in rem; and subsection (1) shall not be construed as 
ules of court whereby leave is required for the service of process outside 
o penalty by way of committal or fine shall be imposed in respect of any 
al by or on behalf of a State to disclose or produce any document or 
on for the purposes of proceedings to which it is a party. 
Lto subsections (3) and (4): 
hall not be given against a State by way of injunction or order for specific 
for the receovery of land or other property; and 
»perty of a State shall not be subject to any process for the enforcement 
or arbitration award or, in an action in rem, for its arrest, detention or 
tion (2) does not prevent the giving of any relief or the issue of any pro-
ritten consent of the State concerned; and any such consent (which may 
a prior agreement) may be expressed so as to apply to a limited extent or 
provision merely submitting to the jurisdiction of the courts is not to be 
nsent for the purposes of this subsection. 
ph (b) of subsection (2) does not prevent the issue of any process in 
erty which is for the time being in use or intended for use for commercial 
ad of a State's diplomatic mission in Singapore, or the person for the 
arming his functions, shall be deemed to have authority to give on behalf 
r such consent as is mentioned in subsection (3) and, for the purposes of 
lis certificate to the effect that any property is not in use or intended for 
half of the State for commercial purposes shall be accepted as sufficient 
fact unless the contrary is proved. 
208 
PART ID 
SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS 
16. (1) The immunities and privileges confened by Part II apply to any f< 
commonwealth State other than Singapore; and references to a State include re 
to: 
(a) the sovereign or other head of that State in his public capacity; 
(b) the government of that State; and 
(c) any department of that government. 
but not to any entity (hereinafter referred to as a separate entity) which is distu 
the executive organs of the governments of the State and capable of suing or beii 
(2) A separate entity is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts in Sing 
and only if: -
(a) the proceedings relate to anything done by it in the exercise of sovereigr 
ity;and 
(b) the circumstances are such that a State would have been so immune. 
(3) if a separate entity (not being a State's central bank of other monetary 
ity) submits to the jurisdiction in respect of proceedings in the case of which 
titled to immunity by virtue of subsection (2), subsections (1) to (4) of section 
apply to i t in respect of those proceedings as if references to a State were refer 
that entity. 
(4) Property of a State's central bank or other monetary authority shall 
regarded for the purposes of subsection (4) of section IS as in use or intended 
for commercial purposes; and where any such bank or authority is a separate en 
sections (1) to (3) of that section shall apply to it as if references to a State we 
ences to the bank or authority. 
(5) Section 14 applies to proceedings against the constituent territories of; 
State; and the President may by order provide for the other provisions of this 
apply to any such constituent territory specified in the order as they apply to a S 
: .(6> Where the provisions of Part I I do not apply to a constituent territory b 
of any:such order subsections (2) and (3) shall apply to it as if it were a separate < 
17. If it appears to the President that the immunities and privileges confe 
Part U. in relation to any State: 
(a) exceed those accorded by the law of that State in relation to Singapore; < 
(b) 'are less than those required by any treaty, convention or other inten 
agreement to which that State and Singapore are parties, 
the President may, by order, provide for restricting or, as the case may be, ex 
those immunities and privileges to such extent as appears to the President to to 
priate? ; 
18. A certificate by or on behalf of the Minister for Foreign Affairs shall 
elusive evidence on any question: 
(a) whether any country is a State for the purposes of Part I I , whether any t 
is a constituent territory of a federal State for those purposes or as to the persor 
sons to be regarded for those purposes as the head or government of a State; 
(b) whether, and if so when, a document has been served or received as me 
in subsection ( l lor (5) of section 14. 
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i Part II does not affect any immunity or privilege applicable in Singapore to 
and consular agents, and subsection (1) of section 8 does not apply to pro-
mcerning a State's title to or its possession of property used for the purposes 
latic mission. 
rt I I does not apply to: 
aceedings relating to anything done by or in relation to the armed forces of a 
: present in Singapore and, in particular, has effect subject to the Visiting 
> 
minal proceedings; and 
>ceedings relating to taxation other than those mentioned in section 13. 
APPENDIX V 
UCISTANI STATE IMMUNITY ORDINANCE 1981 
ORDINANCE NO. VI of 1981 
AN 
ORDINANCE 
to amend and consolidate the law relating 
immunity of States from the jurisdiction of courts 
is expedient to amend and consolidate the law relating to the immunity 
the jurisdiction of courts; 
as the President is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it 
Ice immediate action; 
fore, in pursuance of the Proclamation of the fifth day of July, 1977, read 
(Continuance in Force) Order, 1977 (C.M.L.A. Order No. 1 of 1977), and 
II powers enabling him in that behalf, the President is pleased to make and 
following Ordinance: 
titled extend and commencement. (1) This Ordinance may be called the 
' Ordinance, 1981. 
nds to the whole of Pakistan. 
come into force at once. 
etation. In this Ordinance, "court" includes any tribunal or body exer-
mctions. 
Immunity from jurisdiction 
I immunity from jurisdiction. (1) A State is immune from the jurisdic-
ts of Pakistan except as hereinafter provided. 
t shall give effect to the immunity conferred by subsection (1) even if the 
ppear in the proceedings in question. 
Exceptions from immunity 
lion to jurisdiction. (1) A State is not immune as respects proceedings 
ich it has submitted to jurisdiction. 
: may submit to jurisdiction after the dispute giving rise to the proceed-
>r by a prior agreement; but a provision in any agreement that it is to be 
law of Pakistan shall not be deemed to be a submission. 
In this subsection and in subsection (3) of section 14, "agreement" in-
invention or other international agreement. 
shall be deemed to have submitted: 
instituted the proceedings; or 
to subsection (4) it has intervened or taken any step in the proceedings. 
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(4) Clause (A) of subsection (3) does not apply : 
(a) to intervention or any step taken for the purpose only of: 
(1) claiming immunity; or 
(ii) asserting an interest in property in circumstances such that the State woul 
been entitled to immunity if the proceedings had-been brought against it; • 
(b) to any step taken by the State in ignorance of the facts entitling it to imri 
if those facts could not reasonably have been ascertained and immunity is claii 
soon as reasonably practicable. 
(5) A submission in respect of any proceedings extends to any appeal but 
any counter claim unless it arises out of the same.legal relationship or facts as the c 
(6) The head of a State's diplomatic mission in Pakistan, or the person for th 
being performing his functions, shall be deemed to have authority to submit on be 
the State in respect of any proceedings; and any person who has entered into a cc 
on behalf of and with the authority of a State shall be deemed to have authority 
mit on its behalf in respect of proceedings arising out of the contract. 
5. Commercial transactions and contracts to be performed in Pakistan. 
State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to: 
(a) a commercial transaction entered into by the State; or 
(b) an obligation of the State which by virtue of a contract, which may or m 
be a commercial transaction, falls to be performed wholly or partly in Pakistan. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a contract of employment between a St: 
an individual or if the parties to the dispute are States or have otherwise agi 
writing; and clause (b) of that subsection does not apply if the contract, not 1 
commercial transaction, was made in the territory of the State concerned and the 
tion in question is governed by its administrative law. 
(3) In this section "commercial transaction" means: 
(a) any contract for the supply of goods or services; 
(ft) any loan or other transaction for" the provision of finance and any guara 
indemnity in respect of any such transaction or of any other financial obligation; < 
(c) any other transaction or activityy whether of a commercial, industrial, fir 
professional or other similar character; into which a State eneters or in which it < 
otherwise than in the exercise of its.sovereign authority. 
6. Contracts of employment. (I) A State is not immune as respects proa 
relating to a contract of employment between a State- and an individual where ti 
tract was made, or the work is to be wholly or partly performed, in Pakistan. 
Explanation. In this subsection, "proceedings relating to a contract of e 
ment" includes proceedings between the parties to such a contract in respect 
statutory rights or duties to whrJi they are entitled or subject as employer or emp 
(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4), subsection (1) does not apply if: 
(a) at the time when the proceedings-are brought the individual is a nationa 
State concerned; or 
(b) at the time when the contract was made the individual was neither a cil 
Pakistan nor habitually resident in Pakistan;or 
(c) the parties to the contract have otherwise agreed in writing. 
(3) Wher^  the work is for an office, agency or establishment maintained 
State in Pakistan for commercial purposes, clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (2) 
exclude the application of subsection (1) unless the individual was, at the time wl 
contract was made, habitually resident in that State. 
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ause (c) of subsection (2) does not exclude the application of subsection (1) 
law of Pakistan requires the proceedings to be brought before a court in 
wnership, possession and use of property. (1)A State is not immune as 
oceedings relating to: 
ly interest of the State in, or its possession or use of, immovable property in 
»r 
ly obligation of the State arising out of its interest in, or its possession or use 
:h property. 
State is not immune as respects proceedings, relating to any interest of the 
lovable or immovable property, being an interest arising by way of succession, 
la vacantia. 
he fact that a State has or claims an interest in any property shall not preclude 
from exercising in respect of such property any jurisdiction relating to the 
deceased persons or persons of unsound mind or to insolvency, the winding up 
lies or the administration of trusts. 
court may entertain proceedings against a person other than a State notwith-
hat the proceedings relate to property: 
hich is in the possession of a State; or 
i which a State claims an interest, 
:e would not have been immune had the proceedings been brought against it or, 
eferred to-in clause (b), if the claim is neither admitted nor supported by prima 
nee. '' 
tents, trade marks, etc. A State is not immune as respects proceedings re-
y patent, trade mark, design or plant breeders' rights belonging to the State 
registered or protected in Pakistan or for which the State has applied in 
alleged infringement by the State in Pakistan of any patent, trade mark, 
t breeders' rights or copyright; or 
e right to use a trade or business name in Pakistan. 
"embership of bodies corporate, etc. (1) A State is not immune as respects 
s relating to its membership of a body corporate, an unincorporated body or 
ip which: 
s members other than States; and 
incorporated or constituted under the law of Pakistan or is controlled from, 
principal place of business in, Pakistan, 
eedings arising between the State and the body or its other members or, as the 
be, between the State and the othr partners. 
ubsection (1) does not apply if provision to the contrary has been made by an 
t in writing between the parties to the dispute or by the constitution or other 
t establishing or regulating the body or partnership in question. 
rbitrations. (1) Where a State has agreed in writing to submit a dispute which 
, or may arise, to arbitration, the State is not immune as respects proceedings 
rts of Pakistan which relate to the arbitration. 
ubsection (1) has effect subject to the provisions of the arbitration agreement 
not apply to an arbitration agreement between States. 
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11. Ships used for commercial purposes. (1) The succeeding provisions of tl 
tiorrapply to: 
(a) Admiralty proceedings; and 
(b) proceedings on any claim which could be made the subject of Admiralt 
ceedingi. 
(2) A State is nof immune as respects: 
(a) an action in rem against a ship belonging to it; or 
(b) an action in personam for enforcing a claim in connection with such a ship 
if, at the time when the cause of action arose, the ship was in use or intended for t 
commercial purposes. 
(3) Where an action in rem is brought against a ship belonging to a State 1 
forcing a claim in connection with another ship belonging to that State clause (a) < 
section (2) does not apply as respects the first-mentioned ship unless, at the time 
the cause of action relating to the other ship arose, both ships were in use or ini 
for use for commercial purposes. 
(4) A State is not immune as respects: 
(a) an action in rem against a cargo belonging to that State if both the cargo a 
ship carrying it were, at the time when the cause of action arose, in use or intent 
use for commercial purposes; or 
(b) an action in personam for enforcing a claim in connection with such a c 
the ship carrying, it was then in use or intended for use as aforesaid. 
(5) In the foregoing provisions references to a ship or cargo belonging to a Si 
elude references to a ship or cargo in its possession or control or in which it cla 
interest; and, subject to subsection (4), subsection (2) applies to property other 
ship as it applies to a ship. 
(6) Section 5 and 6 do not apply to proceedings of the nature mentioned : 
section (1) if the State in question is a party to the Brussels Convention and the 
relates to the operation of a ship owned or operated by that State, the carriage o: 
or passengers on any such ship or the carriage of cargo owned by that State on an) 
ship. 
Explanation. In this section, "Brussels Convention" means the Internationi 
vention for the Unification of Certain Rules Concerning the Immunity of State-
Ships signed in Brussels on the tenth day of April, 1926, and "ship" includes hovei 
12. Value added tax, customs-duties, etc A State is not immune as respec 
ceedings relating to its liability for: 
(a) value added tax, any duty of customs or excise or any agricultural levy; oi 
(ft) rates in respect of premises occupied by it for commercial purposes. 
Procedure 
13. Services of process and judgment in default of appearance. (1) Any nc 
other document required to be served for instituting proceedings against a State s 
served by being transmitted through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State and service shall be deemed to have b 
fected when the notice or document is received at the latter Ministry. 
(2) Any proceedings in court shall not commence earlier than two months ai 
date on which the notice or document is received as aforesaid. 
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ice which appears in proceedings cannot thereafter object that subsection 
en complied with as respects those proceedings. 
idgment in default of appearance shall be given against a State except on 
jsection (1) has been complied with and that the time for the commence-
edings specified in subsection (2) has elapsed. 
>y of any judgment given against a State in default of appearance shall be 
irough the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan to the Ministry of 
rs of the State and the time for applying to have the judgment set aside 
run two months after the date on which the copy of the judgment is re-
atter Ministry. 
ction (1) does not prevent the service of a notice or other document in 
o which the State has agreed and subsections (2) and (4) do not apply 
is effected in any manner. 
•receding provisions of this section shall not be construed as applying to 
lainst a State by way of a counter-claim or to an action in rem. 
procedural privileges. (1) No penalty by way of committal to prison or 
nposed in respect of any failure or refusal by or on behalf of a State to dis-
ice any document or information for the purposes of proceedings to which 
ct to subsections (3) and (4). 
shall not be given against a State by way of injunction or order for specific 
r for the recovery of land or other property; and 
roperty of'a State, not being property which is for the time being in use or 
ise for'commercial purposes, shall not be subject to any process for the 
)f a judgment or arbitration award or, in an action in rem, for its arrest, 
lie. 
ction (2) does not prevent the giving of any relief or the issue of any pro-
written consent of the State concerned; and any such consent, which may 
n a prior agreement, may be expressed so as to apply to a limited extent 
lat a provision merely submitting to the jurisdiction of the courts shall not 
be a consent for the purposes of this subsection. 
ead of a State's diplomatic mission in Pakistan, or the person for the time 
ing his functions, shall be deemed to have authority to give on behalf of 
such consent as is mentioned in subsection (3) and, for the purposes of 
ibsection (2), his certificate that any property is not in use or intended for 
lehalf of the State for commercial purposes shall be accepted as sufficient 
it fact unless the contrary is proved. 
Supplementary provisions 
entitled to immunities and privileges. (1) The immunities and privileges 
Act apply to any foreign State; and references to State include refeT-
vereign or other head of that State in his public capacity; 
eminent of that State; and 
partment of that government, 
entity, hereinafter referred to as a "separate entity", which is distinct 
litive organs of the government of the State and capable of suing or being 
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(2) A separate entity is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of Pakii 
and only if: 
•(«). the proceedings relate to anything done by it in the exercise of sovereign i 
ityjand 
(b) the circumstances are such that a State would have been so immune. 
(3) If a separate entity, not being a State's central bank or other monetary; 
ity, submits-to. the jurisdiction in respect of proceedings in the case of which it is e 
to immunity by virtue of subsection (2) of this section, the provisions of subsecti 
to (3) of section 14 shall apply to it in respect of those proceedings as if referent 
State were references to that entity. 
(4) Property of a State's central bank or other monetary authority shall 
regarded for the purposes of subsection (3) of section 14 as in use or intended for 
commercial purposes; and where any such bank or authority is a separate entity 
tions (1) and (2) of that section shall apply to it as if references to a State wer 
ences to the bank or authority. 
(5) Section 13 applies to proceedings against the constituent territories of a 
State; and the Federal Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, 
for the other provisions of this Ordinance to apply to any such constituent t< 
specified in the notification as they apply to a State. 
(6) Where the provisions of this Ordinance do not apply to a constituent t< 
by virtue of a notification under subsection (5), the provisions of subsections (2) 
shall apply to it as if it were a separate entity. 
16. Restriction and extension of immunities and privileges. (1) If it appear 
Federal Government that the immunities and privileges conferred by this Ordin 
relation to any State: 
(a) exceed those accorded by the law of that State in relation to Pakistan; or 
(b) are less than those required by an treaty, convention or other inten 
agreement to which that State and Pakistan are parties, 
the Federal Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, provide for 
ing or, as the case may be, extending those immunities and privileges to such ext< 
may deem fit. 
17. Savings, etc. (l)This Ordinance does not affect any immunity or i 
conferred by the Diplomatic and Consular Privileges Act, 1972 (IX of 1972); and 
(a) section 6 does not apply to proceedings concerning the employment 
members of a mission within the meaning of the Convention set out in the First 
ule to the said Act of 1972 or of the members of a consular post within the me; 
the Convention set out in the Second Schedule to that Act; 
(b) subsection (1) of section 7 does not apply to proceedings concerning a 
title to, or its possession of, property used for the purposes of a diplomatic missic 
(2) This Ordinance does hot apply to: 
(a) proceedings relating to anything done by or in relation to the armed foi 
State while present in Pakistan; 
(b) criminal proceedings; or 
(c) proceedings relating to taxation other than those mentioned in section I 
1£. Proof as to certain matters. A certificate under the hand of a Secretar 
Government of Pakistan shall be conclusive evidence on any question. 
(a) whether any country is a State for the purposes of this Ordinance, whet 
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itory is a constituent territory of a federal State for those purposes or as to the per-
or persons to be regarded for those purposes as the head or government of a State; or 
(b) whether, and if so when, a document has been served or received as mentioned 
ubsection (1) or subsection (5) of section 13. 
19. Repeal Sections 86 and 87 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 
8), are hereby repealed. 
APPENDIX VI 
T H E SOUTH AFRICAN 
FOREIGN STATES IMMUNITIES ACT 1981 
ACT 
To determine the extent of the immunity of foreign states 
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the Republic; 
and to provide for matters connected herewith. 
e it enacted by the State President and the House of Assembly of the Republic of 
i Africa, as follows: 
(I) In this Act, unless the context otherwise indicates: 
(i) "commercial purposes" means purposes of any commercial transaction as 
defined in section 4 (3); 
(ii) "consular post" means a consulate-general, consulate, consular agency, 
trade office or labour office; 
(iii) "Republic" includes the territorial waters of the Republic, as defined in 
^section 2 of the Territorial Waters Act, 1963 (Act No. 87 of 1963); 
(iv) "separate entity" means an entity referred to in subsection (2) (i). 
) Any reference in this Act to a foreign state shall in relation to any particular 
pi state be construed as including a reference to: 
) the head of state of that foreign state, in his capacity as such head of state; 
) the government of that foreign state; and 
) any department of that government, 
ot including a reference to: 
I any entity which is distinct from the executive organs of the government of that 
foreign state and capable of suing.or being sued; or 
) any territory forming a constituent part of a federal foreign state. 
(1) A foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
blic except as provided in this Act or in any proclamation issued thereunder. 
) A court shall give effect to the immunity conferred by this section even though 
ireign state does not appear in the proceedings in question. 
) The provisions of this Act shall not be construed as subjecting any foreign state 
i criminal jurisdiction of the courts of the Republic. 
(1) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of 
epublic in proceedings in respect of which the foreign state has expressly waived its 
nity or is in terms of subsection (3) deemed to have waived its immunity. 
) Waiver of immunity may be effected after the dispute which gave rise to the 
edings has arisen or by prior written agreement, but a provision in an agreement 
t is to be governed by the law of the Republic shall not be regarded as a waiver. 
) A foreign state shall be deemed to have waived its immunity: 
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(a) if it has instituted the proceedings; or 
(b) subject to the provisions of subsection (4), if it has intervened or taken any : 
in the proceedings. 
(4) Subsection (3) (6) shall not apply to intervention or any step taken for the | 
pose only of: • _ 
(j) claiming immunity, or 
(fc) asserting an interest in property in circumstances such that the foreign s 
would have been entitled to immunity if the proceedings had been brought against it. 
(5) A waiver in respect of any proceedings shall apply to any appeal and to 
counter-claim arising out of the same legal relationship or facts as the claim. 
(6) The head of a foreign state's diplomatic mission in the Republic, or the per 
for the time being performing his functions, shall be deemed to have authority to w: 
on behalf of the foreign state its immunity in respect of any proceedings, and any per 
who has entered into a contract on behalf of and with the authority of a foreign si 
shall be deemed to have authority to waive on behalf of the foreign state its immunit 
respect of proceedings arising out of the contract. 
4. (1) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the court 
the Republic in proceedings relating to: 
(a) a commercial transaction entered into by the foreign state; or 
(b) an obligation of the foreign state which by virtue of a contract (whether a c( 
mercial transaction or not) falls to be performed wholly or partly in the Republic. 
(2) Subsection (1) shall not apply if the parties to the dispute are foreign state: 
have agreed in writing that the dispute shall be justiciable by the courts of a fore 
state. 
(3) In subsection (1) "commercial transaction" means: 
(a) . any contract for the supply of services or goods; 
(b) any loan or other transaction for the provision of finance and any guarantee 
indemnity in respect of any such loan or other transaction or of any other finam 
obligation; and 
(c) any other transaction or activity of a commercial, industrial, financial, p 
fessional or other similar character into which a foreign state enters or in which it 
gages otherwise than in the exercise of sovereign authority, 
but does not include a contract of employment between a foreign state and an indh 
uaL 
5. (1) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts 
the Republic in proceedings relating to a contract of employment between the fore 
state and an individual if: 
(a) the contract was entered into in the Republic or the work is to be perfom 
wholly or partly in the Republic; and 
(b) at time when the contract was entered into the individual was a South Afrit 
citizen or was ordinarily resident in the Republic; and 
(c) at the time when the proceedings are brought the individual is not a citizen 
the foreign state. 
(2) Subsection (1) shall not apply if: 
(a) the parties to the contract have agreed in writing that the dispute or any dispi 
relating to the contract shall be justiciable by the courts of a foreign state; or 
(b) the proceedings relate to the employment of the head of a diplomatic mission 
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:r of the diplomatic, administrative, technical or service staff of the mission or 
ployment of the head of a consular post or any member of the consular, 
le, administrative, technical or service staff of the post. 
foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
proceedings relating to: 
death or injury of any person; or 
nage to or loss of tangible property, 
n act or omission in the Republic. 
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of 
c in proceedings relating to: 
interest of the foreign state in, or its possession or use of, immovable prop-
epublic; 
obligation of the foreign state arising out of its interest in, or its possession 
[ch property; or 
interest of the foreign state in movable or immovable property, being an 
ig by way of succession, gift or bona vacantia. 
iction (1) shall not apply to proceedings relating to a foreign state's title 
or possession of, property used for a diplomatic mission or a consular post. 
ireign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
roceedings relating to: 
patent, trademark, design or plant breeder's right belonging to the foreign 
red or protected in the Republic or for which the foreign state has 
|e Republic; or 
leged infringement by the foreign state in the Republic of any patent, 
tesign, plant breeder's right or copyright; or 
it to use a trade or business name in the Republic. 
A foreign state which is a member of an association or other body (wheth-
srson or not), or a partnership, which: 
lembers that are not foreign states; and 
irporated or constituted under the law of the Republic or is controlled 
lublic or has its principal place of business in the Republic, 
imune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the Republic in proceedings 
to the foreign state's membership of the association, other body or 
hership;and 
| between the foreign state and the association or other body or its other 
ers or, as the case may be, between the foreign state and the other part-
ion (1) shall not apply if: 
its of an agreement in writing between the parties to the dispute; or 
is of the constitution or other instrument establishing or governing the 
tier body or partnership in question, 
Justiciable by the courts of a foreign state. 
foreign state which has agreed in writing to submit a dispute which has 
rise, to arbitration, shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the 
Republic in any proceedings which relate to the arbitration. 
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(2) Subsection (1) shall not apply if: 
(a) the arbitration agreement provides that the proceedings shall be broug 
courts of a foreign state; or 
(b) the parties to the arbitration agreement are foreign states. _ 
11. (1) A foreign state shall not be immune from the admiralty jurisdictic 
court of the Republic in: ~ 
(a) an action in rem against a ship belonging to the foreign state; or 
(*) an action in personam for enforcing a claim in connection with such a sJ 
if, at the time when the cause of action arose, the ship was in use or intended ft 
commercial purposes. 
(2) A foreign state shall not be immune from the admiralty jurisdiction of s 
of the Republic in: 
(a) an action in rem against any cargo belonging to the foreign state i f 
cargo and the ship carrying it were, at the time when the cause of action arose, 
intended for use for commercial purposes; or 
(b) an action in personam for enforcing a claim in connection with any sue 
the ship carrying it was, at the time when the cause of action arose, in use or 
for use for commercial purposes. 
(3) Any reference in this section to a ship or cargo belonging to a foreign : 
be construed as including a reference to a ship or cargo in the possession or co 
foreign state or in which a foreign state claims an interest, and, subject to the ] 
of subsection (2), subsection (1) shall apply to property other than a ship as it 
a ship. 
12. A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the cou 
Republic in proceedings relating to the foreign state's liability for: 
(a) sales tax or any customs or excise duty; or 
(b) rates in respect of premises used by it for commercial purposes. 
13. (1) Any process or other document required to be served for instit 
ceedings against a foreign state shall be served by being transmitted through tl 
ment of Foreign Affairs and Information of the Republic to the ministry < 
affairs of the foreign state, and service shall be deemed to have been effected 
process or other document is received at that ministry. 
(2) Any time prescribed by rules of court or otherwise for notice of in 
defend or oppose or entering an appearance shall begin to run two months aft< 
on which the process or document is received as aforesaid. 
(3) A foreign state which appears in proceedings cannot thereafter objec 
section (1) has not been complied with in the case of those proceedings. 
(4) No judgment in default of appearance shall be given against a foi 
except on proof that subsection (1) has been complied with and that the time 
of intention to defend or oppose or entering an appearance as extended by 
(2) has expired. 
(5) A copy of any default judgment against a foriegn state shall be t 
through the Department of Foreign Affairs and information of the Repul 
ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign state, and any time prescribed by ml 
or otherwise for applying to have the judgment set aside shall begin to run t\ 
after the date on which the copy of the judgment is received at that ministry. 
(6) Subsection (1) shall not prevent the service of any process or other d< 
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any manner to which the foreign state has agreed, and subsection (2) and (4) shall not 
apply where service is effected in any such manner. 
(7) The preceding provisions of this section shall not be construed as applying to 
proceedings against a foreign state by way of counter-claim or to an action in rem, and 
subsection (1) shall not be construed as affecting any rules of court whereby leave is 
required for the service of process outside the jurisdiction of the court. 
14. (1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3): 
(a) relief shall not be given against a foreign state by way of interdict or order for 
specific performance or for the recovery of any movable or immovable property; and 
(ft) the property of a foreign state shall not be subject to any process for the en-
forcement of a judgment or an arbitration award or, in an action in rem, for its attach-
ment or sale. 
(2) Subsection (1) shall not prevent the giving of any relief or the issue of any pro-
cess with the written consent of the foreign state concerned, and any such consent, 
which may be contained in a prior agreement, may be expressed so as to apply to a 
limited extent or generally, but a mrere waiver of a foreign state's immunity from the 
jurisdiction of the courts of the Republic shall not be regarded as a consent for the pur-
poses of this subsection. 
(3) Subsection (1) ( i ) shall not prevent the issue of any process in respect of prop-
erty which is for the time being in use or intended for use for commercial purposes. 
15. (1) A separate entity shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of 
the Republic only if : 
'{a)' the proceedings relate to anything done by the separate entity in the exercise 
of sovereign authority; and 
(b) the circumstances are such that a foreign state would have been so immune. 
(2) I f a separate entity, not being the central bank or other monetary authority of 
a foreign state, waives the immunity to which it is entitled by virtue of subsection (1) in 
respect of any proceedings, the provisions of section 14 shall apply to those proceedings 
as i f references in those provisions to a foreign state were references to that separate 
entity. 
(3) Property of the central gank or other monetary authority of a foreign state shall 
not be regarded for the purposes of subsection (3) of section 14 as in use or intended for 
use for commercial purposes, and where any such bank or authority is a separate entity 
the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) of that section shall apply to it as i f references 
in those provisions to a foreign state were references to that bank or authority. 
16. I f it appears to the State President that the immunities and privileges conferred 
by this Act in relation to a particular foreign state: 
(a) exceed or are less than those accorded by the law of that foreign state in rela-
tion to the Republic; or 
(b) are less than those required by any treaty, convention or other international 
agreement to which that foreign state and the Republic are parties, 
he may by proclamation in the Gazette restrict or, as the case may be, extend those im-
munities and privileges to such extent as appears to him to be appropriate. 
17. A certificate by or on behalf of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information 
shall be conclusive evidence on any question: 
(a) whether any foreign country is a state for the purposes of this Act; 
(6) whether any territory is a constituent part of a federal foreign state for the said 
purposes; 
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(c) as to the person ot persons to be regarded for the said purposes as the head of 
state or government of a foreign state; 
(d) whether, and i f so when, any document has been served or received as con-
templated in section 13 (1) or (5). 
18. This Act shall be called the Foreign States Immunities Act, 1981, and shall 
come into operation on a date to be fixed by the State President by proclamation in the 
Gazette. 
f 
APPENDIX VII 
TANADIAN STATE IMMUNITY ACT 1982 
ACT 
ovide for state immunity in Canadian courts 
[Assented to 3rd June, 1982; 
came into effect July 15, 1982] 
Her Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and 
ouse of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows: 
SHORT TITLE 
1. This Act may be cited as the State Immunity Act. 
INTERPRETATION 
2. In this Act, 
igency'of a foreign state" means any legal entity that is an organ of 
e foreign state but that is separate from the foreign state; 
lommercial activity" means any particular transaction, act or conduct 
any regular course of conduct that by reason of its nature is of a 
mmercial character; 
oreign state" includes 
(a) any sovereign or other head of the foreign state or of any 
political subdivision of the foreign state while acting as such in a 
public capacity, 
(b) any government of the foreign state or of any political sub-
division of the foreign state, including any of its departments, and 
any agencies of the foreign state, and 
(c) any political subdivision of the foreign state: 
lolitical subdivision" means a province, state or other like political 
bdivision of a foreign state that is a federal state. 
^ STATE IMMUNITY 
3. (1) Except as provided by this Act, a foreign state is immune 
>m the jurisdiction of any court in Canada. 
(2) In any proceedings before a court, the court shall give effect to 
e immunity conferred on a foreign state by subsection (1) notwith-
tnding that the state has failed to take any step in the proceedings. 
4. (1) A foreign state is not immune from the jurisdiction of a 
urt if the state waives the immunity conferred by subsection 3(1) by 
omitting to the jurisdiction of .the court in accordance with subsec-
» n ( 2 ) o r ( 4 ) . 
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(2) In any proceedings before a court, a foreign state submits 
the jurisdiction of the court where it 
(a) explicitly submits to the jurisdiction of the court by writt 
agreement or otherwise either before or after the proceedings co 
mence; 
(ft) initiates the proceedings in the court; or 
(c) intervenes or takes any step in the proceedings before t 
court. 
(3) Paragraph (2)(c) does not apply to 
(a) any intervention or step taken by a foreign state in proceed! 
before a court for the purpose of claiming immunity from the ju 
diction of the court; or 
(6) any step taken by a foreign" state in ignorance of facts entitl 
it to immunity i f those facts should not reasonably have been aa 
tained before the step was taken and immunity is claimed as sooi 
reasonably practicable after they are ascertained. 
(4) A foreign state that initiates proceedings in a court or t 
intervenes or takes any step in proceedings before a court, other tl 
an intervention or step to which paragraph (2)(c) does not apply, s 
mits to the jurisdiction of the court in respect of any third party i 
ceedings that arise, or counter-claim that arises, out of the sub} 
matter of the proceedings initiated by the state or in which the si 
has so intervened or taken a step. 
(5) Where, in any proceedings before a court, a foreign state i 
mits to the jurisdiction of the court in accordance with subsection 
or (4), such submission is deemed to be a submission by the state to 
jurisdiction of such one or more courts by which those proceed 
may, in whole or in part, subsequently be considered on appeal o 
the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction. 
5. A foreign state is not immune from the jurisdiction of a ct 
in any proceedings that relate to any commercial activity of the fori 
state. 
6. A foreign state is not immune from the jurisdiction of a ci 
in any proceedings that relate to 
(a) any death or personal injury, or 
(6) any damage to or loss of property 
that occurs in Canada. 
7. (1) A foreign state is not immune from the jurisdiction 
court in any proceedings that relate to 
(a) an action in rem against a ship owned or operated by the s 
or 
(6) an action in personam for enforcing a claim in connection' 
such a ship, 
i f , at the time the claim arose or the proceedings were commenced 
ship was being used or was intended for use in a commercial activitj 
(2) A foreign state is not immune from the jurisdiction of a c 
in any proceedings that relate to 
(s) an action in rem against any cargo owned by the state if, a 
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Idem 
Property in 
Canada 
time the claim arose or the proceedings were commenced, the cargo 
and the ship carrying the cargo were being used or were intended for 
use in a commercial activity; or 
(b) an action in personam for enforcing a claim in connection with 
such cargo if, at the time the claim arose or the proceedings were 
commenced, the ship carrying the cargo was being used or was in-
tended for use in a commercial activity. 
(3) For the purposes of subsections (1) and (2), a ship or cargo 
owned by a foreign state includes any ship or cargo in the possession 
or control of the state and any ship or cargo in which the state claims 
an interest. 
8. A foreign state is not immune from the jurisdiction of a court 
in any proceedings that relate to an interest of the state in property 
that arises by way of succession, gift or bona vacantia. 
Service on a 
foreign state 
Service on an 
agency of a 
foreign state 
Idem 
Date of service 
Default 
judgment 
PROCEDURE AND RELIEF 
9. (1) Service of an originating document on a foreign state, 
other than on an agency of the foreign state, may be made 
(a) in any manner agreed on by the state; 
(b) in accordance with any international Convention to which the 
state is a party; or 
(c) in the manner provided in subsection (2). 
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (l)(c), anyone wishing to serve 
an originating document on a foreign state may deliver a copy of the 
document, in person or by registered maiL to the Under-Secretary of 
State for External Affairs or a person designated by him for the pur-
pose, who shall transmit it to the foreign state. 
(3) Service of an originating document on an agency of a foreign 
state may be made 
(a) in any manner agreed on by the agency; 
(b) in accordance with any international Convention applicable to 
the agency; or 
(c) in accordance with any applicable rules of court. 
(4) Where service on an agency of a foreign state cannot be made 
under subsection (3), a court may, by order, direct how service is to be 
made. 
(5) Where service of an originating document is made in the man-
ner provided in subsection (2), service of the document shall be deemed 
to have been made on the day that the Under-Secretary of State for 
External Affairs or a person designated by him pursuant to subsection 
(2) certifies to the relevant court that the copy of the document has 
been transmitted to the foreign state. 
(6) Where, in any proceedings in a court, service of an originating 
document has been made on a foreign state in accordance with subsec-
tion (1), (3) or (4) and the state has failed to take, within the time 
limited therefor by the rules of the court or otherwise by law, the 
initial step required of a defendant or respondent in such proceedings in 
that court, no further step toward judgment may be taken in the pro-
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property 
ceedings except after the.expiration of at least sixty days following the 
date of service of the originating document. 
(7) Where judgment is signed against a foreign state in any pro-
ceedings in which the state has failed to take the initial step referred to 
in subsection (6), a certified copy of the judgment shall be served on 
the foreign state 
(o) where service of the document that originated the proceedings 
was made on an agency of the foreign state, in such manner as is 
ordered by the court; or 
(b) in any other case, in the manner specified in paragraph (1 )(c) 
as though the judgment were an originating document. 
(8) Where, by reason of subsection (7), a certified copy of ajudg-! 
ment is required to be served in the manner specified in paragraph (1) 
(c), subsections (2) and (5) apply with such modifications as the cir-
cumstances require. 
(9) A foreign state may, within sixty days after service on it of a 
certified copy of a judgment pursuant to subsection (7), apply to have 
the judgment set aside. 
10. (1) Subject to subsection (3), no relief by way of an injunc-
tion, specific performance or the recovery of land or other property 
may be granted against a foreign state unless, the state consents in 
writing to such relief and, where the state so consents, the relief granted 
shall not be greater than that consented to by the state. 
(2) Submission by. a foreign state to the jurisdiction of a court is 
not consent for the purposes of subsection (1). 
(3) This section does not apply to an agency of a foreign state. 
11. - (1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), property of a foreign 
"state that is located in Canada is- immune from attachment and exe-
cution and\ in the case of an action in rt?m, from arrest, detention, 
seizure and forfeiture-except where 
(a) the state has, either explicitly or by implication, waived its im-
munity from attachment, execution, arrest, detention, seizure or 
forfeiture, unless-the foreign , state has withdrawn the waiver of im-
munity in accordance with any term thereof that permits such with-
drawal; 
(b) the property is used or is intended for a commercial activity; or 
(c) the execution relates to a judgment establishing rights in prop-
erty that has been acquired by succession or gift or in immovable 
property located in Canada. 
(2) Subject to subsection (3), property of ah agency of a foreign 
state is not immune from attachment and execution and, in the case of 
an action in rem, from arrest, detention, seizure and forfeiture, for the 
purpose of satisfying a judgment of a court in any "proceedings in 
respect of which the agency is not immune from the jurisdiction of the 
court by reason of any provision of this Act. 
I~ (3) Property of a foreign state... 
(a) that is used or is intended to be used in connection with a 
military activity, and 
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(b) that is military in nature or is under the control of a military 
authority or defence agency 
is immune from attachment and execution and, in the case of an action 
in rem, from arrest, detention, seizure and forfeiture. 
(4) Subject to subsection (5), property of a foreign central bank or 
monetary authority that is held for its own account and is not used or 
intended for a commercial activity is immune from attachment and 
execution. 
(5) The immunity conferred on property of a foreign central bank 
or monetary authority by subsection (4) does not apply where the 
bank, authority or its parent foreign government has explicitly waived 
the immunity, unless the bank, authority or government has withdrawn 
the waiver of immunity in accordance with any term thereof that per-
mits such withdrawal. 
12. (1) No peanlty or fine may be imposed by a court against a 
foreign state for any failure or refusal by the state to produce any 
document or other information in the course of proceedings before the 
court. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to an agency of a foreign state. 
GENERAL 
13. (1) A certificate issued by the Secretary of State for External 
.Affairs, or on his behalf by a person authorized by him, with respect to 
any of the following questions, namely, 
(a) whether a country is a foreign state for the purposes of this 
Act, 
(b) whether a particular area or territory of a foreign state is a 
political subdivision of that state, or 
(c) whether a person or persons are to be regarded as the head of 
government of a foreign state or of a political subdivision of the 
foreign state, 
is admissible in evidence as conclusive proof of any matter stated in the 
certificate with respect to that question, without proof of the signature 
of the Secretary of State for External Affairs or other person or of that 
other person's authorization by the Secretary of State for External 
Affairs. 
(2) A certificate issued by the Under-Secretary of State for Ex-
ternal Affairs, or on his behalf by a person designated by him pursuant 
to subsection 9(2), with respect to service of an originating or other 
document on a foreign state in accordance with that subsection is ad-
missible in evidence as conclusive proof of any matter stated in the 
certificate with respect to such service, without proof of the signature 
of the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs or other person or 
of that other person's authorization by the Under-Secretary of State for 
External Affairs. 
14. The Governor in Council may, on the recommendation of the 
Secretary of State for External Affairs, by order restrict any immunity 
or privileges under this Act in relation to a foreign state where, in the 
opinion of the Governor in Council, the immunity or privileges exceed 
those accorded by the law of that state. 
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not aiTected 
Application 
15. Where, in any proceeding or other matter to which a provision 
of this Act and a provision of the Visiting Forces Act or the Diplomatic 
and Consular Privileges and Immunities Act apply, there is a conflict 
between such provisions, the provision of this Act ceases to apply in 
such proceeding or other matter to the extent of the conflict. 
16.. Except to the extent required to give effect to this Act, 
nothing in this Act shall be construed or applied so as to negative or 
affect any rules of a court, including rules of a court relating to service 
of a document out of the jurisdiction of the court 
17. This Act does not apply to criminal proceedings or proceedings 
in the-nature of criminal proceedings. 
Coning into 
force 
COMMENCEMENT 
18. This Act or any provision thereof shall come into force on a 
day or days to be fixed by proclamation. 
r i 
APPENDIX VI I I 
H E ILA MONTREAL DRAFT CONVENTION ON 
STATE IMMUNITY 
(1982) 
es Party to this Convention. 
to achieve a further harmonization of the law of State Immunity, 
on the following Articles: 
i "tribunal includes any court and any administrative body acting in an 
ive capacity. 
itate "~ 
"foreign State" includes: 
government of the State; 
other State organs; -
icies and instrumentalities of the State not possessing legal personality 
net from the State; 
constituent units of a federal State. 
y or instrumentality of a foreign State which possess legal personality 
om the State shall be treated as a foreign State only for acts or omissions 
1 in the exercise of sovereign authority, Le. jure imperii 
ial Activity 
"commercial activity" refers either to a regular course of commercial 
>r a particular commercial transaction or act It shall include any activity 
tion into which a foreign State enters or in which it engages otherwise than 
rcise of sovereign authority and in particular: 
urangemen for the supply of goods or services; 
financial transaction involving lending or borrowing or guarantee ring finan-
bligations. 
g this definition, the commercial character of a particular act shall be deter-
eference to the nature of the act rather than by reference to its purpose. 
\ Foreign State from adjudication 
a foreign State shall be immune from the adjudicatory jurisdiction of a 
pr acts performed by it in the exercise of its sovereign authority, Le. jure 
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imperii. It shall not be immune in the circumstances provided in Article I I I . 
ARTICLE in 
Exceptions to Immunity from Adjudication 
A foreign State shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the forum State to 
adjudicate in the following instances inter alia: 
A. Where the foreign State has waived its immunity from the jurisdiction of the forum 
State either expressly or by implication. A waiver may not be withdrawn except in 
accordance with its terms. 
1. An express waiver may be made inter alia: 
(a) by unilateral declaration; or 
(b) by international agreement; or 
(c) "~by a provision in a contract; or~ 
(d) by an explicit agreement. 
2. An implied waiver may be made inter alia: 
(a) by participating in proceedings before a tribunal of the forum State. 
(i) Subsection 2(a) above shall not apply i f a foreign State intervenes or 
takes steps in the proceedings for the purpose of: 
(A) claiming immunity; or 
(B) asserting' an interest in the proceedings in circumstances such 
that it would have been entitled to immunity i f the proceedings 
had been brought against i t ; 
(ii) In any action in which a foreign State participates in a proceeding 
before a tribunal in the forum State, the foreign State shall not be 
immune with respect to any counterclaim or setoff (irrespective of 
the amount thereof): 
(A) for which a foreign State would not be entitled to immunity 
under other provisions of this Convention had such a claim been 
brought in a separate action against the foreign State; or 
(B) arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject 
matter of the claim of the foreign State; 
(hi) In any action not within the scope of subsection 2(A)(ii) above in 
which a foreign State participates in a proceeding before a tribunal in 
the forum State,'the foreign State shall not be immune with respect 
to claims arising between the parties from unrelated transactions up 
• to the amount of its adverse claim. 
(b) by agreeing in writing to submit a dispute which has arisen, or may arise, to 
arbitration in the forum State or in a number of States which may include 
the forum State. In such an instance a foreign State shall not be immum 
with respect to proceedings in a tribunal of the forum State which relate 
to: .'. -o;,. , v • 
(i) the constitution or appointment of the arbitral tribunal; or 
(ii) the validity or interpretation of the arbitration agreement or th< 
award, or 
(iii) the arbitration procedure; or 
(iv) the setting aside of the award. 
B. Where the cause of action arises out of: 
1. A commercial activity carried on by the foreign State; or 
2. An obligation of the foreign State arising out of a contract (whether or not; 
commercial transaction but excluding, a contract of employment) unless thi 
parties have otherwise agreed in writing. 
C. Where the foreign State enters into a contract for employment in the forum State, o 
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work under such a contract is to be eprformed wholly or partly in the forum 
md the proceedings relate to the contract. This provision shall not apply if: 
it the time proceedings are brought the employee is a national of the foreign 
tate; or 
it the time the contract for employment was made the employee was neither a 
ational nor a permanent resident of the forum State; or "" — 
lie employer and employee have otherwise agreed in writing. 
rovision shall not confer on tribunals in the forum State competence in respect 
>loyees appointed under the public (administrative) law of the foreign State. 
the cause of action realtes to: 
he foreign State's rights or interests in, or its possession or use of, immovable 
roperty in the forum State; or 
Obligations of the foreign State arising out of its rights , or interests in, or its 
ossession or use of, immovable property in the forum State; or 
Jghts or interests of the foreign State in movable or immovable property in the 
arum State arising by way of succession, gift or bona vacantia. 
the cause of action relates to: 
itellectual or industrial property rights (pantet, industrial design, trademark, 
opyright, or other similar rights) belonging to the foreign State in the forum 
tate or for which the foreign State has applied in the forum State; or 
L claim for infringement by the foreign State of any patent, industrial design, 
rademark, copyright or other similar right; or 
he right to use a trade or business name in the forum State. 
the cause of action relates to: 
ieath or^personal injury; or 
lamage to or loss of property. 
:tions 1 and 2 shall not apply unless the act or omission which caused the 
injury or damage occurred wholly or partly in the forum State, 
the cause of action relates to rights in property taken in violation of inter-
al law and that property or property exchanged for that property is: 
i the forum State in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the 
>rum State by the foreign State; or 
iwned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign State and 
lat agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the forum 
tate. 
rv 
Process 
ceedings against a foreign State under these articles the following rules shall 
i shall be made upon a foreign State: 
y transmittal of a copy of the summons, notice of suit, and complaint in 
rcordance with any special arrangement in writing for service between the 
lain t i f f and the foreign State; or 
y transmittal of a copy of the summons, notice of suit, and complaint in 
scordance with any applicable international agreement on service of judicial 
>cuments;or 
Y transmittal of a copy of the summons, notice of suit, and complaint through 
plomatic channels to the ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign State; or 
y transmittal of a copy of the summons, notice of suit, and complaint in any 
her manner agreed between the foreign State and the forum State. 
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B. Service of documents shall be deemed to have been effected upon their recei 
the ministry of foreign affairs unless some other time of service has been pre* 
in an applicable international convention or arrangement. 
C. The time limit within which a State must enter an appearance or appeal again! 
judgment or order shall begin to run sixty days after the date on which the sum 
or notice of suit or complaint is deemed to have been'effectively received in t 
dance with this article. 
ARTICLE V 
Default Judgments 
No default judgment may be entered by a tribunal in a forum State against a ft 
State, unless service has been effected in accordance with Article IV and a claim 01 
to relief is established to the satisfaction of the tribunaL 
ARTICLE V I 
Extent of Liability 
A. As to any claim with respect to which a foreign State is not entitled to imm 
under this Convention, the foreign State shall be liable as to amount to the 
extent as a private individual under like circumstances; but a foreign State sha 
be liable for punitive damages. If , however, in any case wherein death or othc 
has occurred, the law of the place where the action or omission occurred provid 
has been construed to provide, for damages only punitive in nature, the foreign 
shall be liable for actual or compensatory damages measured by the primary 1< 
curred by the persons for whose benefit the suit was brought. 
B. Judgments enforcing maritime liens against a foreign State may not exceed the 
of the vessel or cargo, with value assessed as of the date notice of suit was served 
ARTICLE VTI 
Immunity from A ttachment and Execution 
A foreign State's property in the forum State shall be immune from attache 
arrest, and execution, except as provided in Article V I I I . 
ARTICLE V I I I 
Exceptions to Immunity from Attachment and Execution 
A. A foreign State's property in the forum State, shall not be immune from any 
sure for the enforcement of a judgment or an arbitration award i f : 
1. The foreign State has waived its immunity either expressly or by implii 
from such measures. A waiver may not be withdrawn except in accordanci 
its terms; or 
2. The property is in use for the purposes of commercial activity or was in u 
the commercial activity upon which the claim is based; or 
3. Execution is against property which has been taken in violation of interna 
law, or which has been exchanged for property taken in violation of intern 
al law and is pursuant to a judgment or an arbitral award establishing rig 
such property. 
B. In the case of mixed financial accounts that proportion duly identified of t 
count used for non-commercial activity shall be entitled to immunity. 
C. Attachment or execution shall not be permitted, i f : 
1. /The property against which execution is sought to be had is used for dipk 
or consular purposes; or 
235 
2. The property is of a military character or is used or intended for use for military 
purposes; or 
3. The property is that of a State central bank held by it for central banking pur-
poses; or 
4. The property is that of a State monetary authority held by it for monetary pur-
poses; 
unless the foreign State has made an explicit waiver with respect to such property. 
D. In exceptional circumstances, a tribunal of the forum State may order interim mea-
sures against the property of a foreign State available under this convention for 
attachment, arrest, or execution, including prejudgment attachment of assets and in-
junctive relief, if a party present a prima facie case that such assets within the terri-
torial limits of the forum State may be removed, dissipated or otherwise dealt with 
by the foreign State before the tribunal renders judgment and there is a reasonable 
probability that such action will frustrate execution of any such judgment. 
ARTICLE IX 
Miscellaneout Provisions 
A. This Convention is without prejudice to: 
1. Other applicable international agreements; 
2. The rules of international law relating to diplomatic and consular privileges and 
immunities, to the immunities of foreign public ships and to the immunities of 
international organizations. 
B. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as conferring on tribunals in the 
forum State any additional competence with respect to subject matter. 
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I I . DRAFT ARTICLES ON JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES 
OF STATES AND THEIR PROPERTY 
PART I 
INTRODUCTION 
A r t i c l e 1 
Scope of the p r e s e n t a r t i c l e s 
p r e s e n t a r t i c l e s a p p l y to the immunity of a S t a t e and i t s p r o p e r t y 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of the c o u r t s of another S t a t e . 
A r t i c l e 2 
Use of terms 
the purposes of the p r e s e n t a r t i c l e s : 
" c o u r t " means any organ of a S t a t e , however named, e n t i t l e d to 
j u d i c i a l f u n c t i o n s ; 
" S t a t e " means: 
the S t a t e and i t s v a r i o u s organs of government; 
c o n s t i t u e n t u n i t s of a f e d e r a l S t a t e ; 
p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n s of the S t a t e v h i c h are e n t i t l e d to perform 
a c t s i n the e x e r c i s e of the s o v e r e i g n a u t h o r i t y of the S t a t e ; 
a g e n c i e s or i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s of the S t a t e and other e n t i t i e s , to 
the e x t e n t t h a t they are e n t i t l e d to perform a c t s i n the e x e r c i s e o 
the s o v e r e i g n a u t h o r i t y of the S t a t e ; 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the S t a t e a c t i n g i a t h a t c a p a c i t y ; 
"commercial t r a n s a c t i o n " means: 
any commercial c o n t r a c t or t r a n s a c t i o n f o r the s a l e of goods or 
s upply of s e r v i c e s ; 
any c o n t r a c t f o r a l o a n or other t r a n s a c t i o n of a f i n a n c i a l n a t u r e , 
i n c l u d i n g any o b l i g a t i o n of guarantee or of indemnity i n r e s p e c t of 
any such l o a n or t r a n s a c t i o n ; 
any o t h e r c o n t r a c t or t r a n s a c t i o n of a commercial, i n d u s t r i a l , 
t r a d i n g or p r o f e s s i o n a l n a t u r e , but not i n c l u d i n g a c o n t r a c t of 
employment of p e r s o n s . 
t e r m i n i n g whether a c o n t r a c t or t r a n s a c t i o n i s a "commercial 
n" under paragraph 1 ( c ) , r e f e r e n c e s h o u l d be made p r i m a r i l y to the 
the c o n t r a c t or t r a n s a c t i o n , but i t s purpose s h o u l d a l s o be t a k e n 
n t i f , i n the p r a c t i c e of the S t a t e which i s a p a r t y to i t , t h a t 
purpose i s r e l e v a n t to determining the non-commercial c h a r a c t e r of the 
c o n t r a c t or t r a n s a c t i o n . — 
3. The p r o v i s i o n s of paragraphs 1 and 2 re g a r d i n g the use of terms i n the 
p r e s e n t a r t i c l e s a r e without p r e j u d i c e to the use of those terms or to the 
meanings which may be g i v e n to them i n other i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t r u m e n t s or i : 
the i n t e r n a l law of any S t a t e . 
A r t i c l e 3 
P r i v i l e g e s and immunities not a f f e c t e d by the p r e s e n t a r t i c l s s 
1. The p r e s e n t a r t i c l e s are without p r e j u d i c e to the p r i v i l e g e s and 
immunities e n j o y e d by a S t a t e under i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i n r e l a t i o n to the 
e x e r c i s e of the f u n c t i o n s of: 
( a ) i t s d i p l o m a t i c m i s s i o n s , c o n s u l a r p o s t s , s p e c i a l m i s s i o n s , m i s s i o n s 
to i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s , or d e l e g a t i o n s to organs of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s or to i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f e r e n c e s ; and 
(b) persons connected w i t h them. 
2. The p r e s e n t a r t i c l e s are l i k e w i s e without p r e j u d i c e to p r i v i l e g e s and 
immunities accorded under i n t e r n a t i o n a l law to Heads of S t a t e r a t i o n e 
personae. 
A r t i c l e 4 
N o n - r e t r o a c t i v i t y of the p r e s e n t a r t i c l e s 
Without p r e j u d i c e to the a p p l i c a t i o n of any r u l e s s e t f o r t h i n the 
present a r t i c l e s to which j u r i s d i c t i o n a l immunities of S t a t e s and t h e i r 
property are s u b j e c t under i n t e r n a t i o n a l law independently of the p r e s e n t 
a r t i c l e s , the a r t i c l e s s h a l l not appiy to any q u e s t i o n of j u r i s d i c t i o n a l 
[immunities of S t a t e s or t h e i r property a r i s i n g i n a p r o c e e d i n g i n s t i t u t e d 
p.gainst a S t a t e b e f o r e a c o u r t of another S t a t e p r i o r to the e n t r y i n t o force 
pf the p r e s e n t . a r t i c l e s f o r the S t a t e s concerned." 
• PART I I 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
A r t i c l e 5 
S t a t e immunity 
A S t a t e e n j o y s immunity, i n r e s p e c t of i t s e l f and i t s p r o p e r t y , from the 
i r i s d i c t i o n of the c o u r t s of another S t a t e s u b j e c t to the p r o v i s i o n s of the 
esen t a r t i c l e s . 
A r t i c l e 6 
M o d a l i t i e s f o r g i v i n g e f f e c t to S t a t e immunity 
A S t a t e s h a l l g i v e e f f e c t to S t a t e immunity under a r t i c l e 5 by r e f r a i n i n g 
:om e x e r c i s i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n i n a proceeding before i t s c o u r t s a g a i n s t another 
;ate and to t h a t end s h a l l ensure t h a t i t s c o u r t s determine on t h e i r own 
l i t i a t i v e t h a t the immunity of t h a t o t h e r S t a t e under a r t i c l e 5 i s r e s p e c t e d . 
A p r o c e e d i n g before a court of a S t a t e s h a l l be c o n s i d e r e d to have been 
i s t i t u t e d a g a i n s t another S t a t e i f t h a t other S t a t e : 
( a ) i s named as a p a r t y to t h a t proceeding; or 
(b) i s not named as a pa r t y to the proceeding but the p r o c e e d i n g i n 
f e e t seeks to a f f e c t the property, r i g h t s , i n t e r e s t s or a c t i v i t i e s of t h a t 
her S t a t e . 
A r t i c l e 7 
Ex p r e s s consent to e x e r c i s e of j u r i s d i c t i o n 
A S t a t e cannot invoke immunity from j u r i s d i c t i o n i n a p r o c e e d i n g b e f o r e a 
u t of another S t a t e w i t h regard to a matter or c a s e i f i t has e x p r e s s l y 
lsented to the e x e r c i s e of j u r i s d i c t i o n by the c o u r t w i t h r e g a r d to the 
iter or c a s e : 
( a ) by i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreement; 
(b) i n a w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t ; or 
( c ) by a d e c l a r a t i o n before the c o u r t or by a w r i t t e n communication i n a 
c i f i c p r o ceeding. 
Agreement by a S t a t e f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n of the law of another S t a t e 
i l l not be i n t e r p r e t e d as consent to the e x e r c i s e of j u r i s d i c t i o n by the 
r t s of t h a t o t h e r S t a t e . 
A r t i c l e 8 
E f f e c t of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a proceeding b e f o r e a c o u r t 
A S t a t e cannot invoke immunity from j u r i s d i c t i o n i n a p r o c e e d i n g b e f o r e a 
r t of another S t a t e i f i t has: 
(a) i t s e l f i n s t i t u t e d the proceeding; or 
(b) i n t e r v e n e d i n the proceeding or taken any o t h e r s t e p r e l a t i n g to the 
i-ts. However, i f the S t a t e s a t i s f i e s the c o u r t t h a t i t c o u l d not have 
l i r e d knowledge of f a c t s on which a c l a i m to immunity can be based u n t i l 
>r i t took s u c h a s t e p , i t can c l a i m immunity based on those f a c t s , 
rided i t does so a t the e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e moment. 
A S t a t e s h a l l not be c o n s i d e r e d to have consented to the e x e r c i s e of 
s d i c t i o n by a c o u r t of another S t a t e i f i t i n t e r v e n e s i n a p r o c e e d i n g o r 
s any othe r s t e p f o r the s o l e purpose o f : 
( a ) i n v o k i n g immunity; or 
(b) a s s e r t i n g a r i g h t or i n t e r e s t i n p r o p e r t y a t i s s u e i n the 
p r o c e e d i n g . 
3. The appearance of a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of a S t a t e b e f o r e a c o u r t of_anoth« 
S t a t e as a w i t n e s s s h a l l not be i n t e r p r e t e d as consent by the former S t a t e 
the e x e r c i s e of j u r i s d i c t i o n by the c o u r t . 
4 . F a i l u r e on the p a r t of a S t a t e to e n t e r an appearance i n a p r o c e e d i n g 
b e f o r e a c o u r t of another S t a t e s h a l l not be i n t e r p r e t e d as c o n s e n t by the 
former S t a t e to the e x e r c i s e of j u r i s d i c t i o n by the c o u r t . 
A r t i c l e 9 
C o u n t e r - c l a i m s 
1. A S t a t e i n s t i t u t i n g a proceeding b e f o r e a c o u r t of another S t a t e canno 
invoke immunity from the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the c o u r t i n r e s p e c t of any counte: 
c l a i m a r i s i n g out of the same l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p or f a c t s as the p r i n c i p a l 
c l a i m . 
2. A S t a t e i n t e r v e n i n g to p r e s e n t a c l a i m i n a p r o c e e d i n g b e f o r e a c o u r t c 
another S t a t e cannot invoke immunity from the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the c o u r t i n 
r e s p e c t of any c o u n t e r - c l a i m a r i s i n g out of the same l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p or 
f a c t s as the c l a i m p r e s e n t e d by the S t a t e . 
3. A S t a t e making a c o u n t e r - c l a i m i n a proceeding i n s t i t u t e d a g a i n s t i t 
before a c o u r t of another S t a t e cannot invoke immunity from the j u r i s d i c t i o n 
of the c o u r t i n r e s p e c t of the p r i n c i p a l c l a i m . 
PART I I I 
PROCEEDINGS IN WHICH STATE IMMUNITY CANNOT BE INVOKED 
- A r t i c l e 10 
Commercial t r a n s a c t i o n s 
1. I f a S t a t e engages i n a commercial t r a n s a c t i o n w i t h a f o r e i g n n a t u r a l oi 
j u r i d i c a l person and, by v i r t u e of the a p p l i c a b l e r u l e s of p r i v a t e 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, d i f f e r e n c e s r e l a t i n g to the commercial t r a n s a c t i o n f a l l 
w i t h i n the j u r i s d i c t i o n of a c o u r t of another S t a t e , the S t a t e cannot invoke 
immunity from t h a t j u r i s d i c t i o n i n a p r oceeding a r i s i n g out of t h a t commercia 
t r a n s a c t i o n . 
2. Paragraph 1 does not apply: 
( a ) i n the c a s e of a commercial t r a n s a c t i o n between S t a t e s ; or 
(b) i f t h e p a r t i e s to the commercial t r a n s a c t i o n have e x p r e s s l y agreed 
o t h e r w i s e . 
3 . The immunity from j u r i s d i c t i o n enjoyed by a S t a t e s h a l l n ot be a f f e c t e d 
w i t h r e g a r d to a p r o c e e d i n g which r e l a t e s to a commercial t r a n s a c t i o n engaged 
1! 
in by a S t a t e e n t e r p r i s e or o t h e r e n t i t y e s t a b l i s h e d by the S t a c e which has an 
independent l e g a l p e r s o n a l i t y and i s capable o f : 
( a ) s u i n g or being sued; and 
(b) a c g u i r i n g , owning or p o s s e s s i n g and d i s p o s i n g of p r o p e r t y , i n c l u d i n g 
property which che S t a t e has a u t h o r i z e d i t to operate or manage. 
A r t i c l e 11 
C o n t r a c t s of employment 
1. U n l e s s o t h e r w i s e agreed between the S t a t e s concerned, a S t a t e cannot 
invoke immunity from j u r i s d i c t i o n b e f o r e a c o u r t of another S t a t e which i s 
otherwise competent i n a proceeding which r e l a t e s to a c o n t r a c t of employment 
between the S t a t e and an i n d i v i d u a l f o r work performed or to be performed, i n 
whole or i n p a r t , i n the t e r r i t o r y of t h a t o t h e r S t a t e . 
2. Paragraph 1 does not apply i f : 
( a ) the employee has been r e c r u i t e d to perform f u n c t i o n s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d 
to the e x e r c i s e of governmental a u t h o r i t y ; 
(b) the s u b j e c t of the proceeding i s the r e c r u i t m e n t , renewal of 
employment or r e i n s t a t e m e n t of an i n d i v i d u a l ; 
( c ; the employee was n e i t h e r a n a t i o n a l nor a h a b i t u a l r e s i d e n t of the 
State of the forum a t the time when the c o n t r a c t of employment was concluded; 
(d) the employee i s a n a t i o n a l of the employer S t a t e a t the time when 
the p r oceeding i s i n s t i t u t e d ; or 
(e ) the employer S t a t e and the employee have o t h e r w i s e agreed i n 
w r i t i n g , s u b j e c t to any c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of p u b l i c p o l i c y c o n f e r r i n g on the 
courts of the S t a t e of the forum e x c l u s i v e j u r i s d i c t i o n by r e a s o n of the 
su b j e c t - m a t t e r of the p r o c e e d i n g . 
A r t i c l e 12 
P e r s o n a l i n j u r i e s and damage to p r o p e r t y 
U n l e s s o t h e r w i s e agreed between the S t a t e s concerned, a S t a t e cannot 
invoke immunity from j u r i s d i c t i o n b e f o r e a c o u r t of another S t a t e which i s 
otherwise competent i n a proceeding which r e l a t e s to p e c u n i a r y compensation 
for death or i n j u r y to the person, or damage to or l o s s o f t a n g i b l e p r o p e r t y , 
caused by an a c t or o m i s s i o n which i s a l l e g e d to be a t t r i b u t a b l e to the S t a t e , 
i f the a c t or o m i s s i o n o c c u r r e d i n whole or i n p a r t i n the t e r r i t o r y of t h a t 
other S t a t e and i f the author of the a c t or o m i s s i o n was p r e s e n t i n t h a t 
t e r r i t o r y a t the time o f the a c t or o m i s s i o n . 
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A r t i c l e 13 
Ownership, p o s s e s s i o n and use of p r o p e r t y 
U n l e s s o t h e r w i s e agreed between th» S t a t e s concerned, a S t a t e cannot 
invoke immunity from j u r i s d i c t i o n before a c o u r t of another S t a t e which i s 
o t h e r w i s e competent i n a proceeding which r e l a t e s to the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of: 
( a ) any r i g h t or i n t e r e s t of the S t a t e i n , or i t s p o s s e s s i o n or use o 
or any o b l i g a t i o n of the S t a t e a r i s i n g out of i t s i n t e r e s t i n , or i t s 
p o s s e s s i o n or use o f , immovable property s i t u a t e d i n the S t a t e of the forum 
(b) any r i g h t or i n t e r e s t of the S t a t e i n movable or immovable proper 
a r i s i n g by way of s u c c e s s i o n , g i f t or bona v a c a n t i a : or 
( c ) any r i g h t or i n t e r e s t of the S t a t e i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of 
p r o p e r t y , such as t r u s t property, the e s t a t e of a bankrupt or the p r o p e r t y 
a company i n the event of i t s winding-up. 
A r t i c l e 14 
I n t e l l e c t u a l and i n d u s t r i a l p r o p e r t y 
U n l e s s o t h e r w i s e agreed between the S t a t e s concerned, a S t a t e cannot 
invoke immunity from j u r i s d i c t i o n before a c o u r t of another S t a t e which i s 
o t h e r w i s e competent i n a proceeding which r e l a t e s to: 
( a ) the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of any r i g h t of the S t a t e i n a p a t e n t , i n d u s t r i i 
d e s i g n , t r a d e name or b u s i n e s s name, trade mark, c o p y r i g h t or any other f o r i 
of i n t e l l e c t u a l or i n d u s t r i a l property, which e n j o y s a measure of l e g a l 
p r o t e c t i o n , even i f p r o v i s i o n a l , i n the S t a t e of the forum; or 
( b ) an a l l e g e d i n f r i n g e m e n t by the S t a t e , i n the t e r r i t o r y of the Stai 
of the forum, of a r i g h t of the nature mentioned i n subparagraph (a) which 
belongs to a t h i r d person and i s p r o t e c t e d i n the S t a t e of the forum. 
A r t i c l e 15 
P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n companies or other c o l l e c t i v e bodies 
1. A S t a t e cannot invoke immunity from j u r i s d i c t i o n b e f o r e a c o u r t of 
another S t a t e which i s o t h e r w i s e competent i n a proceeding which r e l a t e s to 
i t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a company or other c o l l e c t i v e body, whether incorporat« 
or u n i n c o r p o r a t e d , being a proceeding c o n c e r n i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p between t l 
S t a t e and the body or the o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s t h e r e i n , p r o v i d e d t h a t the bod] 
( a ) has p a r t i c i p a n t s other than S t a t e s or i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s ; 
and 
(b) i s i n c o r p o r a t e d or c o n s t i t u t e d under the law of the S t a t e of the 
forum or has i t s s e a t or p r i n c i p a l p l a c e of b u s i n e s s i n t h a t S t a t e . 
2. A S t a t e can, however, invoke immunity from j u r i s d i c t i o n i n such a 
p r o c e e d i n g i f the S t a t e s concerned have so agreed or i f the p a r t i e s to the 
d i s p u t e have p r o v i d e a by an agreement i n w r i t i n g or i f the instrument 
e s t a b l i s h i n g or r e g u l a t i n g the body i n q u e s t i o n c o n t a i n s p r o v i s i o n s to t h a t 
e f f e c t . 
A r t i c l e 16 
Ships owned or operated by a S t a t e 
1. U n l e s s o t h e r w i s e agreed between the S t a t e s concerned, a S t a t e which owns 
or o p e r a t e s a s h i p cannot invoke immunity from j u r i s d i c t i o n b e f o r e a c o u r t of 
another S t a t e which i s o t h e r w i s e competent i n a proceeding which r e l a t e s to 
the o p e r a t i o n of -that s h i p , i f a t the time the cause of a c t i o n a r o s e , the s h i 
was used f o r other than government non-commercial purposes. 
2. Paragraph 1 does not apply to warships and naval a u x i l i a r i e s nor does i t 
apply to other s h i p s owned or operated by a S t a t e and used e x c l u s i v e l y on 
government non-commercial s e r v i c e . 
3. For the purposes of t h i s a r t i c l e , "proceeding which r e l a t e s to the 
op e r a t i o n of t h a t S h i p " means, i n t e r a l i a , any proceeding i n v o l v i n g the 
determination of a c l a i m i n r e s p e c t of: 
( a ) c o l l i s i o n or other a c c i d e n t s of n a v i g a t i o n ; 
(b) a s s i s t a n c e , s a l v a g e and g e n e r a l average; 
( c ) r e p a i r s , s u p p l i e s or other c o n t r a c t s r e l a t i n g to the s h i p ; 
(d) consequences of p o l l u t i o n of the marine environment. 
4. U n l e s s o t h e r w i s e agreed between the S t a t e s concerned, a S t a t e cannot 
invoke immunity from j u r i s d i c t i o n before a c o u r t of another S t a t e which i s 
otherwise competent i n a proceeding which r e l a t e s to the c a r r i a g e of cargo on 
board a s h i p owned or operated by t h a t S t a t e i f , at the time the cause of 
ac t i o n a r o s e , the s h i p was used f o r other than government non-commercial 
purposes. 
5. Paragraph 4 does not apply to any cargo c a r r i e d on board the s h i p s 
r e f e r r e d to i n paragraph 2 nor does i t apply to any cargo owned by a S t a t e and 
used or intended f o r use e x c l u s i v e l y for government non-commercial purposes. 
6. S t a t e s may p l e a d a l l measures of defence, p r e s c r i p t i o n and l i m i t a t i o n of 
l i a b i l i t y which a r e a v a i l a b l e to p r i v a t e s h i p s and cargoes and t h e i r owners. 
7. I f i n a pr o c e e d i n g t h e r e a r i s e s a q u e s t i o n r e l a t i n g to the government and 
non-commercial c h a r a c t e r of a s h i p owned or operated by a S t a t e or cargo owned 
by a S t a t e , a c e r t i f i c a t e s i g n e d by a d i p l o m a t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i v e or oth e r 
competent a u t h o r i t y of t h a t S t a t e and communicated to the c o u r t s h a l l s e r v e as 
evidence of the c h a r a c t e r of t h a t s h i p or cargo. 
A r t i c l e 17 
E f f e c t of an a r b i t r a t i o n agreement 
I f a S t a t e e n t e r s i n t o an agreement i n w r i t i n g w i t h a f o r e i g n n a t u r a l 0 1 
j u r i d i c a l person to submit to a r b i t r a t i o n d i f f e r e n c e s r e l a t i n g to a commerci; 
t r a n s a c t i o n , t h a t S t a t e cannot invoke immunity from j u r i s d i c t i o n b e f o r e a 
c o u r t of another S t a t e which i s otherwise competent i n a p r o c e e d i n g which 
r e l a t e s t o : 
( a ) the v a l i d i t y or i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o.f the a r b i t r a t i o n agreement; 
(b) the a r b i t r a t i o n procedure; or 
( c ) the s e t t i n g a s i d e of the award; 
u n l e s s the a r b i t r a t i o n agreement ot h e r w i s e p r o v i d e s . 
PAST IV 
X STATE IMMUNITY FROM MEASURES OF CONSTRAINT IN 
CONNECTION WITH PROCEEDINGS. BEFORE A COURT 
A r t i c l e 18 
S t a t e immunity from measures of c o n s t r a i n t 
1. No measures of c o n s t r a i n t , such as attachment, a r r e s t and e x e c u t i o n , 
a g a i n s t p r o p e r t y of a S t a t e may be taken i n con n e c t i o n w i t h a p r o c e e d i n g 
before a c o u r t of another S t a t e u n l e s s and except to the e x t e n t t h a t : 
( a ) the S t a t e has e x p r e s s l y consented to the t a k i n g of such measures a 
i n d i c a t e d : 
( i ) by i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreement; 
( i i ) by an a r b i t r a t i o n agreement or i n a w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t ; or 
( i i i ) by a d e c l a r a t i o n before the c o u r t or by a w r i t t e n communication 
a f t e r a d i s p u t e between the p a r t i e s has a r i s e n ; 
(b) the S t a t e has a l l o c a t e d or earmarked p r o p e r t y f o r the s a t i s f a c t i o n 
of the c l a i m which i s the o b j e c t of t h a t proceeding; or 
( c ) the p r o p e r t y i s s p e c i f i c a l l y i n use or int e n d e d f o r use by the Sta 
f o r o t h e r than government non-commercial purposes and i s i n the t e r r i t o r y of 
the S t a t e of the forum and has a connection w i t h the c l a i m which i s the obje 
of the pro c e e d i n g or w i t h the agency or i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y a g a i n s t which t h e 
proceeding was d i r e c t e d . 
2. Consent to the e x e r c i s e of j u r i s d i c t i o n under a r t i c l e 7 s h a l l not i m p l j 
consent to the t a k i n g of measures of c o n s t r a i n t under paragraph 1, f o r which 
s e p a r a t e consent s h a l l be n e c e s s a r y . 
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A r t i c l e 19 
S p e c i f i c c a t e g o r i e s of p r o p e r t y 
1. The f o l l o w i n g c a t e g o r i e s , i n p a r t i c u l a r , of p r o p e r t y of a S t a t e s h a l l not 
;e c o n s i d e r e d as p r o p e r t y s p e c i f i c a l l y i n use or intended f o r use by the S t a t e 
:or o t h e r t-han government non-commercial purposes under paragraph 1 ( c ) of 
i r t i c l e 18: 
( a ) p roperty, i n c l u d i n g any bank account, which i s used or intended f o r 
ise f o r the purposes of the d i p l o m a t i c m i s s i o n of the S t a t e or i t s c o n s u l a r 
i o s t s , s p e c i a l m i s s i o n s , m i s s i o n s to i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s , or 
e l e g a t i o n s to organs of i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s or to i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
o n f e r e n c e s ; 
(b) p r o p e r t y of a m i l i t a r y c h a r a c t e r or used or intended f o r use f o r 
i l i t a r y purposes; 
( c ) p r o p e r t y of the c e n t r a l bank or other monetary a u t h o r i t y of the 
ta t e ; 
(d) p r o p e r t y forming p a r t of the c u l t u r a l h e r i t a g e of the..State or p a r t 
E i t s a r c h i v e s and not p l a c e d or intended to be p l a c e d on s a l e ; 
(e) p r o p e r t y forming p a r t of an e x h i b i t i o n of o b j e c t s of s c i e n t i f i c , 
i l t u r a l or h i s t o r i c a l i n t e r e s t and not p l a c e d or intended to be p l a c e d on 
i l e . 
Paragraph 1 i s w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e to paragraph 1 ( a ) and (b) of 
t i d e I S . 
PART V 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
A r t i c l e 20 
S e r v i c e of p r o c e s s 
S e r v i c e of p r o c e s s by w r i t or other document i n s t i t u t i n g a proceeding 
l i n s t a s t a t e s h a l l be e f f e c t e d : 
( a ) i n accordance w i t h any a p p l i c a b l e i n t e r n a t i o n a l convention b i n d i n g 
the S t a t e of the forum and the S t a t e concerned; or 
(b) i n the absence of such a c o n v e n t i o n : 
( i ) by t r a n s m i s s i o n through d i p l o m a t i c c h a n n e l s to the M i n i s t r y of 
F o r e i g n A f f a i r s of the S t a t e concerned; or 
( i i ) by any other means a c c e p t e d by the S t a t e concerned, i f not p r e c l u d e d 
by the law of the S t a t e of the forum. 
S e r v i c e of p r o c e s s r e f e r r e d to i n paragraph 1 (b) ( i ) i s deemed to have 
n e f f e c t e d by r e c e i p t o f the documents by the M i n i s t r y of F o r e i g n A f f a i r s . 
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3. These documents s h a l l be accompanied, i f n e c e s s a r y , by a t r a n s l a t i o n 
the o f f i c i a l language, or one of the o f f i c i a l languages, of the S t a t e 
concerned. 
4 . Any S t a t e t h a t e n t e r s an appearance on the m e r i t s i n a p r o c e e d i n g 
i n s t i t u t e d a g a i n s t i t may not t h e r e a f t e r a s s e r t t h a t s e r v i c e of p r o c e s s d. 
not comply w i t h the p r o v i s i o n s of paragraphs 1 and 3. 
A r t i c l e 21 
D e f a u l t judgement 
1. A d e f a u l t judgement s h a l l not be rendered a g a i n s t a S t a t e u n l e s s the 
c o u r t has found t h a t : 
( a ) the requirements l a i d down i n paragraphs 1 and 3 of a r t i c l e 20 h 
been complied w i t h ; 
(b) a p e r i o d of not l e s s than four months has e x p i r e d from the d a t e 
which the s e r v i c e of the w r i t or other document i n s t i t u t i n g a p r o c e e d i n g h 
been e f f e c t e d or deemed to have been e f f e c t e d i n accordance w i t h p a r a g r a p h 
and 2 of a r t i c l e 20; and 
( c ) the p r e s e n t a r t i c l e s do not p r e c l u d e i t from e x e r c i s i n g 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
2. A copy of any d e f a u l t judgement rendered a g a i n s t a S t a t e , accompanied 
n e c e s s a r y by a t r a n s l a t i o n i n t o the o f f i c i a l language or one of the o f f i c i i 
languages of the S t a t e concerned, s h a l l be t r a n s m i t t e d to i t through one o; 
the means s p e c i f i e d i n paragraph 1 of a r t i c l e 20 and i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h th« 
p r o v i s i o n s of t h a t paragraph. 
3. The t i m e - l i m i t f o r a p p l y i n g to have a d e f a u l t judgement s e t a s i d e sha] 
not be l e s s than f o u r months and s h a l l begin to run from the d a t e on which 
copy of the judgement i s r e c e i v e d or i s deemed to have been r e c e i v e d by the 
S t a t e concerned. 
A r t i c l e 22 
P r i v i l e g e s and immunities d u r i n g c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g s -• 
1. Any f a i l u r e or r e f u s a l by a S t a t e to comply w i t h an o r d e r of a c o u r t c 
another S t a t e e n j o i n i n g i t to perform or r e f r a i n from p e r f o r m i n g a s p e c i f i c 
a c t or to produce any document or d i s c l o s e any other i n f o r m a t i o n f o r the 
purposes of a p r o c e e d i n g s h a l l e n t a i l no consequences o t h e r than t h e s e whic 
may r e s u l t from such conduct i n r e l a t i o n to the m e r i t s of the c a s e . I n 
p a r t i c u l a r , no f i n e or p e n a l t y s h a l l be imposed on the S t a t e by r e a s o n of s 
f a i l u r e or r e f u s a l . 
2. A S t a t e s h a l l not be r e q u i r e d to p r o v i d e any s e c u r i t y , bond or d e p o s i t 
however d e s c r i b e d , to g u a r a n t e e the payment of j u d i c i a l c o s t s or expenses i 
any proceeding to w hich i t i s a p a r t y b e f o r e a c o u r t of a n o t h e r S t a t e . 
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duced from the text provided by the I.L.M. Corresponding 
r A u s t r a l i a . The Act was assented to on December 16, 
came into force on A p r i l 1, 1986, except for Section 18 
tion 18(2) concerns a foreign s t a t e ' s immunity from " s i s t e r -
e s t i n admiralty. Under present A u s t r a l i a n law, s i s t e r - s h i p 
not a v a i l a b l e , but i t i s l i k e l y to be introduced i f the 
ations of the Aus t r a l i a n Law Reform Commission (ALRC) i n i t s 
• 3 2 » C i v i l Admiralty J u r i s d i c t i o n (1986), are adopted. Un-
time, Section 18(2) i s inoperative and was, accordingly, not 
to" enter into force. 
85 .Act follows the recommendations of the ALRC i n i t s Report 
reign State Immunity (1984)„ A summary of those recommenda-
the text of the Commission's proposed l e g i s l a t i o n appear a t 
1398 (1984). The 1985 Act d i f f e r s from the ALRC's proposals 
a t the various provisions i n Par t I I c r e a t i n g exceptions to 
rom: j u r i s d i c t i o n use the formula "not immune i n a proceeding 
as the proceeding concerns..." {see Sections 11(1), 12(1), 
15(1), 16(1), 17(1), 19, 20 and 21] which was thought to be 
se than the ALRC's language " i n a proceeding concerning".] 
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